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Abstract  
The match between education and job is an important indicator of the functioning of the 
labour market. Overeducation can be described as when an individual’s educational 
level is higher than the schooling required for his job. Since the college expansion in 
1999 in China, more graduates are reported to be found in jobs for which they are 
overeducated. This thesis focuses on the exploration of the phenomenon of 
overeducation and its impact on the Chinese labour market.  
 
Using longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1989 
to 2009, the extent and determinants of overeducation are investigated in Chapter 2. A 
variety of techniques are employed to study the wage effect of overeducation in the 
Chinese labour market. Based on the empirical results of this chapter, the extent of 
overeducation and undereducation in China, using two indexes to define required 
education, are found to be different. In addition, it is found that males and workers who 
have urban registration are more likely to be overeducated in both indexes. Furthermore, 
workers who have less experience tend to be overeducated, which is only found in the 
mean index. In terms of wage returns to overeducation, time effects indeed play an 
important role in China. The wage penalty to overeducation becomes smaller and even 
disappears between overeducated people and correctly educated people after taking 
unobserved heterogeneity into consideration. Additionally, this chapter attempts to 
ascertain if there are distinct wage effects of overeducation for different age groups and 
explores the patterns of wage effects of overeducation over time. The results indicate 
that different patterns of wage effects of overeducation by age groups and over time can 
be explained by the education and labour market reform in China since 1978. 
 
Chapter 3 explores detailed links between educational mismatch, skill mismatch and job 
satisfaction in China. Results in this chapter suggest that overeducated people are more 
satisfied with their workload, working conditions and facilities, their relationship with 
colleagues and their housing benefits than correctly educated individuals in similar jobs. 
When educational mismatch and skill mismatch are included simultaneously into the 
analysis of job satisfaction, skill mismatch demonstrates stronger negative effects on 
overall job satisfaction and many facets of job satisfaction except for job satisfaction 
with welfare, workload and commuting distance to job location than educational 
xiii 
 
mismatch, which suggests that firms and policy makers should put more emphasis on 
improving the match between the labour market’s needs and individuals’ skill levels.  
 
Given the important role played by rural-to-urban migrant workers in contemporary 
China, Chapter 4 provides a picture of education and educational mismatch issues 
associated with rural-to-urban migrant workers. This chapter contributes to the existing 
literature on the education of migrant workers by taking the generation of migrant 
workers into consideration, i.e. we distinguish between an old generation of migrant 
workers and a new generation of migrant workers. Based on OLS regression, the new 
generation of migrant workers has higher wage returns to schooling than the old 
generation of migrant workers. Quantile regression results indicate that the new 
generation of migrant workers have higher wage returns to schooling in the lower half 
of the wage distribution (i.e. 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles). Wage effects of 
undereducation between old and new generation migrant workers exist at the 25th 
percentile and 75th percentile of the wage distribution. However, distinct wage effects of 
overeducation between old and new generation migrant workers can only be found in 
the high end of the wage distribution (90th percentile). In addition, a comparative study 
of the issue of educational mismatch between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban 
residents is made in this chapter. Negative effects of overeducation appear across the 
wage distribution of urban residents except for the 90th percentile. Positive impact of 
undereducation on wages can be seen from 25th percentile to 90th percentile. However, 
for migrant workers, overeducation doesn’t exhibit negative effects on migrant workers 
on the conditional wage distribution. Wage premiums enjoyed by undereducated 
migrant workers are only present in the lower and middle part of the wage distribution 
except for the 90th percentile.   
 
This thesis concludes that empirical patterns of overeducation in the literature in terms 
of the incidence, determinants and wage effects are present in the Chinese labour 
market. Empirical results in this thesis indicate that overeducation may not result in 
negative effects on job satisfaction as a priori expectations and skill mismatch is a better 
indicator to explain job dissatisfaction than educational mismatch. Although there are no 
significant wage effects of overeducation for migrant workers, the new generation of 
migrant workers enjoys higher wage returns to education than their older counterparts. 
This thesis provides strong evidence that enhancing skills to commensurate with the 
xiv 
 
market needs should be the main concern of policy makers if China desires to sustain its 
economic growth in the future.  
 
JEL code: I20; I21; I24; I26; I28; J28; O15.  
Keywords: Overeducation; Undereducation; Wage Returns; Unobserved Heterogeneity; 
Job Satisfaction; Skill Mismatch; Rural-to-Urban Migration.  
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background  
1.1.1 Problem statement  
In 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MoE) issued the Action Plan of Education 
Promotion for the 21st Century to begin the journey of a nation-wide higher education 
expansion aiming to transform from an “elite higher education system” to “mass higher 
education”. Trow (1973) argues that an enrollment rate of higher education that is above 
15% can be called “Mass higher education”, which is also the goal set by Chinese 
government to achieve by 2010. However, China has expanded its higher education 
more rapidly than expected since 1999 and it just achieved this goal in 2002, which is 
eight years earlier than planned (Bai, 2006)1. Many scholars and the media describe this 
radical higher education expansion in China as the “Great Leap Forward of Higher 
Education” (Shi and Xing, 2010). According to the China statistical database, the 
number of college enrollments increased gradually from 0.66 to 1.08 million from 1989 
to 1998. However, the number of college enrollments in 1999 increased dramatically to 
1.55 million and the number of new students enrolling in higher education in China was 
4.47 million in 2004, 5.04 million in 2005 and 6.08 million in 2008. Up to 2011, the 
number had already climbed to 6.82 million, four times greater than that in 1999. The 
latest figure of college enrollment is 7.21 million in 2014. Figure 1 describes explicitly 
the process of the higher education expansion in China.  
 
Although the average growth rate of real GDP in China has been over 10 per cent 
annually since 1999, it still cannot keep pace with the fast growth rate of the education 
expansion
2
. Therefore, massive college unemployment and underemployment has 
followed thereafter. Although there is no official figure to confirm the exact graduate 
unemployment rate, researchers state that the college graduate unemployment rate was 
over 30 per cent in China (Li and Zhang, 2010). College unemployment is an important 
challenge for policy makers who advocate for college expansion (Wan, 2006).  
 
                                                 
1
 From year 1998 to 2002, the net college enrolment rate in China increased from 9.8 per cent to 15 per 
cent (Bai, 2006).   
2
See section 2.1.  
2 
 
 
         Figure 1: The number of college enrollments (million) (Year 1989-2014) 
              Source: Chinese statistical database 
 
In addition to the issue of college unemployment, there are another three features in the 
labour market that needs to be paid attention:  
 
Feature 1: Many new college entrants in the labour market find it difficult to secure 
their expected level job compared to graduates who entered the labour market in the 
1990s who held the same qualification and additionally, the starting salary of new 
graduates fails to meet their expectations (Bai, 2006); (Zhang et al., 2012).   
 
Feature 2: Many college graduates accept jobs that require less schooling than their 
actual educational levels or accept non-graduate jobs that are not matched with their 
education and expectations in order to make a living or to avoid being unemployed. For 
example, for those graduates who are employed in unskilled jobs with low pay are 
labeled as “Ant tribe”3. He and Mai (2015) argue that this “Ant tribe” group has two 
characteristics: (1) most of them work in low-skilled jobs and their average monthly 
wages are less than 2000 Yuan (£200 equivalent)4; (2) Their housing conditions are 
miserable and mainly accumulated in the fringes of the big cities. The total number of 
this group of college graduates was estimated to be more than 1 million in 2010 (He and 
Mai, 2015).  
                                                 
3
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28062071  
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Feature 3: Although the supply of graduates has increased, skills owned by college 
graduates do not meet the requirement of the labour market. Many employers find it 
hard to hire qualified workers (Molnar et al., 2015). This feature can also be reflected by 
the fact that some graduates work in a job that is not matched with their subject of study. 
According to Molnar et al. (2015), about 31 per cent of university graduates and 38 per 
cent of vocational college graduates work in jobs that are not relevant to their majors. 
 
The above three features can be described as the phenomenon of overeducation. Higher 
education expansion increases the average level of human capital of the labour force, 
which is beneficial for China’s economic development and can raise its 
competitiveness. However, the negative effects of overeducation on the labour market 
cause deep concern from policy-makers about the ability of the labour market to absorb 
such a highly educated labour force. Although extraordinary economic development 
since the economic reform and after entering the WTO has been made in China, the 
growth rate of GDP has begun to decrease gradually from 2010 (See Figure 2). 
Therefore, exploring the phenomenon of overeducation has important implications for 
the Chinese labour market. Overeducation is not a new topic in western countries, 
however, relevant studies in China are limited.   
  
 
Figure 2: Growth rate of real GDP in China (1979-2014) 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
                                                                                                                                               
4
 In 2010, the average monthly wage in China is 3045 Yuan (£300 equivalent). 2000 Yuan in China can 
only cover basic needs for living. Source: National Bureau of Statistics in China.  
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1.1.2 Overeducation and its impact on the labour market  
Overeducation is an economic concept, which was first put forward by Freeman (1976) 
in his book The overeducated American to explain decreased wage returns to university 
graduates in the 1960s and 1970s. Overeducation can also be called overqualification or 
overschooling. As the name suggests, when an individual’s educational attainment 
exceeds the normal requirement of his job, he or she is classified as overeducated 
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1981). Conversely, undereducation can be defined when an 
individual’s educational attainment is less than the average requirement of his job. 
Overeducation can also be described as follows: firstly, that there is a decline in one’s 
economic status to certain education level relative to people who have same education 
qualification in the past (Tsang and Levin, 1985). Second, that one’s actual job 
condition is not consistent with his expectations (Tsang and Levin, 1985). Thirdly, that 
educational skills owned by workers are greater than the requirement of their jobs 
(Rumberger, 1981). By taking heterogeneity into consideration, some scholars explicitly 
define overeducation into “apparent overeducation” and “genuine overeducation” 
according to the degree of job satisfaction of the overeducated individuals (Chevalier, 
2003). It also can be defined as “real overeducation” and “formal overeducation” 
depending on skills-utilisation (Green and Zhu, 2010).  
 
In recent years in the overeducation literature, some scholars have differentiated 
between educational mismatch (overeducation and undereducation) and skill mismatch 
(over-skilled, under-skilled and domain mismatch). Most of the literature uses years of 
schooling or qualifications to describe mismatches between individuals and jobs 
because of the convenience of information in their data. Workers would report their 
educational levels as indicators of their skill levels. However, Green and McIntosh 
(2007) suggest that these two concepts are weakly correlated. Even if two workers have 
the same educational qualifications, their skills and abilities are heterogeneous. 
Sánchez-Sánchez and McGuinness (2013) argue that when the job entry requirement is 
not equal to the actual skills needed in the job, educational attainment is not a good 
proxy of human capital and therefore educational overeducation is not appropriate to 
represent skill mismatch status. According to Allen and Van der Velden (2001), skill 
mismatch has a negative impact on job satisfaction, while there is no evidence showing 
that educational overeducation can affect job satisfaction. However, the measurement of 
skill mismatch is more complicated than educational mismatch. In empirical analysis, 
5 
 
the decision of whether to distinguish skill mismatch and educational mismatch depends 
largely on data availability.  
 
Overeducation is found to be related to many labour market outcomes, such as wages 
and job satisfaction. Empirical evidence has indicated that overeducated individuals 
have lower wages than people who have similar educational levels but who are correctly 
educated for their jobs. However, overeducated people have higher wages compared to 
those who work in the same job but are estimated as adequately matched. In the 
Overeducation-Required education-Undereducation (ORU) methodology (Duncan and 
Hoffman, 1981), both wage returns to required education and wage returns to surplus 
education are positive, but wage returns to required education are higher than returns to 
surplus education (Hartog, 1985); (Rumberger, 1987); (Alba-Ramirez, 1993). Low wage 
returns to one additional year of surplus schooling to some extent means an inefficient 
investment in education, which is potentially harmful to the economy (Iriondo and 
Pérez-Amaral, 2013). The inefficient allocation of educational resources will constrain 
the development of the economy in the future and thus the economic value of education 
will be questioned. In addition, some tax-revenue is wasted as it is used for investing in 
non-productive education (McGuinness, 2006).  
 
In terms of individuals who are overeducated, this suggests that their private investment 
on education is less productive than that of people who are correctly educated and they 
will incur an opportunity cost for non-productive investment in education. 
Overeducation can also bring negative impacts on individuals’ health status and work 
expectations (Tsang and Levin, 1985); (Johnson and Johnson, 2000).  
 
In addition, overeducation is a serious concern for organisations, because overeducation 
is found to be linked with low job satisfaction (Tsang and Levin, 1985), a high rate of 
absenteeism and high turnover rates (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972). As a result, 
production costs of companies may increase due to the reduced work effort of 
overeducated employees, which implies that there should be a negative relationship 
between overeducation and productivity. That is to say, overeducated people may 
behave in counterproductive ways. Considering the potential costs of overeducation, 
firms may avoid employing overeducated candidates (Tsang and Levin, 1985).     
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Within the literature, it is found that immigrants are more likely to be overeducated than 
their native counterparts, which has been confirmed in the United States (Chiswick and 
Miller, 2009a), UK (Lindley, 2009), Denmark (Nielsen, 2007), New Zealand (Poot and 
Stillman, 2010) and some European countries (Tijdens and van Klaveren, 2011). Less-
than-perfect international transferable human capital and labour market discrimination 
are two important reasons to explain the phenomenon of overeducation between 
immigrants and natives (Chiswick and Miller, 2009a). The exploration of over-
education of international immigrants is an important branch in the overeducation 
literature, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.   
 
1.2 Aims and structure of the Thesis 
Overeducation is an important topic in the education and labour economics area. 
According to the literature, the appearance of overeducation is related to higher 
education expansion, especially in the USA, UK and some European countries (see 
Chapter 2). China has also experienced a large scaled higher education expansion and 
similar graduate employment situations. However, due to different education systems, 
labour market structure and distinct levels of economic development, overeducation in 
China may exhibit different patterns from those foreign countries in the west and have 
implications for China, which we wish to explore in detail. This thesis aims to explore 
whether empirical patterns of overeducation can be demonstrated in the Chinese labour 
market and to investigate what lessons can be learnt from the empirical analysis to shed 
some light on the further development of the labour market and education system in 
China. The following three chapters focus on three unique perspectives to explore 
overeducation in the Chinese labour market.    
 
Chapter 2 examines the extent, determinants and wage effects of overeducation in the 
Chinese labour market based on a longitudinal analysis, which enables us to have a 
general understanding of the phenomenon of overeducation in China. Dramatic changes 
occurred in the labour market and education system in the past thirty years in China, 
thus an investigation of wage returns to overeducation by age groups and over time is 
also conducted. Due to the longitudinal feature of the dataset used, unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into consideration to explore the wage effects of overeducation.   
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Considering possible negative impacts of overeducation on productivity, Chapter 3 
investigates relationships between educational mismatch and overall job satisfaction and 
aspects of job satisfaction as well. This chapter enables us to explore whether 
overeducated individuals show discontent towards their “whole job” or only some 
aspects of their jobs. In addition, we introduce a skill mismatch variable into the 
analysis to differentiate between corresponding impacts of educational mismatch and 
skill mismatch on job satisfaction and aspects of job satisfaction.      
 
Motivated by “Hukou” system and the increasingly important role of rural-to-urban 
migrant workers in the urban labour market
5
, Chapter 4 investigates wage effects of 
overeducation for rural-to-urban migrant workers. Considering the generational 
heterogeneity between the rural-to-urban migrant groups, wage returns to education and 
wage effects of educational mismatch of the old and new generation of migrant workers 
are first examined. A comparative study of wage effects of educational mismatch 
between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban residents in China is conducted 
thereafter.   
  
At the end of this thesis, Chapter 5 presents a summary of findings obtained from this 
thesis, followed by concluding policy implications and research limitations.   
 
1.3 Research questions   
Building on the existing literature and relevant background of China, this thesis will 
examine three questions with sub-questions in each question as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 (Research question 1): What are the empirical patterns of overeducation in 
the Chinese labour market based on a longitudinal analysis?  
(1) What extent of overeducation exists in China?  
(2) What are the determinants of overeducation in the Chinese labour market?  
(3) What wage effects of overeducation can be observed in the Chinese labour market 
under the following circumstances?   
a. By age groups (Post-Mao and Mao)        
b. Time effects (over time)        
                                                 
5
 A detailed description of Hukou system in China is provided in section 4.2.  
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c. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity  
  
Chapter 3 (Research question 2): What are the relationships between educational 
mismatch (overeducation and undereducation), skill mismatch and job satisfaction?  
(1) Does educational mismatch reduce overall job satisfaction and if so, does the same 
relationship apply to different aspects of job satisfaction? 
(2) Does skill mismatch or educational mismatch play an important role in explaining 
individuals' job satisfaction? 
 
Chapter 4 (Research question 3): What are the wage returns to education and the 
wage effects of educational mismatch between the new and old generation of migrant 
workers, and between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban residents?  
(1) Are there any differences in wage returns to education between the new and old 
generations of migrant workers?  
(2) What is the incidence of educational mismatch among rural-to-urban migrant 
workers? 
(3) What are the wage effects of educational mismatch between the new and old 
generation of migrant workers?  
(4) Are there any differences between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban 
residents in terms of the incidence of overeducation and wage returns to overeducation?  
 
1.4 Summary of datasets and methodology 
In order to answer the questions above, three large scaled datasets in China are 
employed in this thesis, which are the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
1989-2009, the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008 and the Rural-Urban 
Migration in China (RUMiC) 2009. The China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
1989-2009, which is a panel data, enables us to conduct a longitudinal analysis of 
overeducation in the Chinese labour market to answer research question 1 in Chapter 2. 
The Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008 is a cross section dataset that can be 
used to explore question 2 in Chapter 3. The Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) 
2009 is employed to answer question 3 in Chapter 4. In addition, a variety of 
methodologies are applied to facilitate the empirical analysis in this thesis, which are 
the Ordered Probit Model, Pooled OLS Regression, Fixed Effects Model, Random 
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effects Model, OLS Regression and Quantile Regression (QR). Table 1-1 presents a 
summary of all the research questions, datasets and methodology used in this thesis. 
 
 
Table 1-1 Summary of research questions, datasets and methodology 
Research questions Chapter Data Methodology 
1. What are the empirical patterns of 
overeducation in the Chinese labour 
market based on a longitudinal analysis? 
 
Chapter 2 
China Health and 
Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) 1989-2009 
(Panel dataset) 
(1) Ordered Probit 
Model 
(2) Pooled OLS 
Regression 
(3) Fixed Effects 
Model (FE) 
(4) Random Effects 
Model (RE) 
2. What are the relationships between 
educational mismatch (overeducation 
and undereducation), skill mismatch and 
job satisfaction? 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Chinese General 
Social Survey 
(CGSS) 2008 
(Cross section) 
(1) Ordered Probit 
Model 
3. What are the wage returns to 
education and the wage effects of 
educational mismatch between the new 
and old generation of migrant workers, 
and between rural-to-urban migrant 
workers and urban residents?  
Chapter 4 
Rural-Urban 
Migration in China 
(RUMiC) 2009 
(Cross section) 
(1) OLS Regression 
(2) Quantile 
Regression (QR) 
  
 
1.5 Contribution of the Thesis  
There are three significant contributions of this thesis to the overeducation literature in 
China. Using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 1989-2009, a longitudinal 
analysis of the overeducation in the Chinese labour market is conducted in Chapter 2. 
Previous studies of overeducation in China all use cross-sectional data, which do not 
take time effects and unobserved heterogeneity into consideration. This longitudinal 
analysis can be used to test whether empirical results obtained from the cross sectional 
data are robust when taking time effects and unobserved heterogeneity into 
consideration.  
 
Second, in comparison to other fields of overeducation research, there is currently no 
study that explores the relationship between educational mismatch and job satisfaction 
in China. Due to the rich data information in the Chinese General Social Survey (2008), 
not only the relationship between overall job satisfaction and overeducation can be 
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explored, the impact of overeducation on satisfaction with salary, welfare, workload, 
working conditions and facilities, the relationship with colleagues, the relationship with 
the boss, commuting distance to job location and housing benefits also can be examined 
in Chapter 3. In addition, we first treat educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
separately to analyse their corresponding effects on overall job satisfaction as well as 
various specific aspects of job satisfaction, which adds considerably to the 
overeducation literature in China.  
 
Finally, Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature on the education of migrant 
workers by taking the generation of migrant workers into consideration. Moreover, this 
chapter is the first to extend the overeducation literature to the analysis of educational 
mismatch between the old and new generation of migrant workers and between rural-to-
urban migrant workers and urban residents in China, which is also a contribution to the 
overeducation literature in China.   
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Chapter 2    A longitudinal analysis of overeducation in China 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Overeducation is an important topic in the education and labour economics area, which 
has received attentions in many countries. Freeman (1976) first proposed the word 
"over-education" in his book The Overeducated American. Due to the increasing college 
enrollment rates of the new generation “baby-boomers” in the USA, the wage returns to 
schooling decreased sharply in the late 1960’s and continued to fall through the 1970’s, 
which raised the notion of overeducation. This phenomenon had attracted many U.S. 
economists to investigate it (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981); (Rumberger, 1981); (Tsang 
and Levin, 1985); (Tsang, 1987); (Sicherman, 1991); (Cohn and Khan, 1995); (Daly et 
al., 2000). In the UK, the government suggested that they would promote a college 
expansion policy for all under 30s in order to benefit from a more educated labour force, 
which gave rise to the emergence of overeducation (McGuinness, 2006). According to 
Dolton and Vignoles (2000), the number of college enrollments in the UK increased by 
42% from 1981 to 1991.       
 
Since the 1980s, the European countries (EU) have made heavy investments on 
education resulting in a significant higher education expansion (Iriondo and Pérez-
Amaral, 2013). According to Eurydice (2012), about one third of the population holds a 
higher education degree in the EU. The number of students enrolled in higher 
educational institutions has almost tripled between 1975 and 2009 and it climbed up to 
19.5 million in 2009 (Eurydice, 2012). Although the demand for highly educated people 
increased, there were still about 20% of the population working in low level jobs which 
didn’t need a higher education degree in 2010 (Iriondo and Pérez-Amaral, 2013).   
 
At the same time, many developing countries, like Pakistan, India and Mexico, have 
also witnessed the phenomenon of overeducation due to an increase in the average 
educational attainment (Abbas, 2008); (Quinn and Rubb, 2006). However, 
overeducation has different implications in developing countries where incomes are low, 
education expansion is at a rapid speed from a lower base and higher education 
institutions vary considerably in quality (Mehta et al., 2011).   
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In 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MoE) issued the Action Plan of Education 
Promotion for the 21st Century to begin the journey of a nation-wide higher education 
expansion aiming to transform from an “elite higher education system” to “mass higher 
education” in China. Trow (1973) argues that the enrollment rate of higher education 
that is above 15% can be called “Mass higher education”, which is also the goal set by 
the Chinese government to achieve by 2010. However, China expanded its higher 
education more rapidly than expected since 1999 and it had achieved this goal in 2002, 
which is eight years earlier than planned (Bai, 2006). According to the Chinese 
statistical database, college enrollment in 1999 was 1.55 million, and the number of new 
students enrolling in higher education was 4.47 million in 2004, 5.04 million in 2005 
and 6.08 million in 2008. Up to 2011, the number had already climbed to 6.82 million, 
which is four times greater than that in 1999. As a result, a large number of graduates 
flowed into the labour market. However, was China ready to accept this condition of 
mass higher education? 
 
Judging from the current economic and social environment, the answer may be “no”. 
Although the average growth rate of GDP in China has been over 10 per cent annually 
since 1999, it still cannot keep pace with the fast growth rate of the education 
expansion, which has averaged around 16 per cent6. In addition, the labour market is not 
fully adjusted with the transition of economic structure (Li and Zhang, 2010). Thus, the 
labour market couldn’t offer enough places to absorb and allocate the ever increasing 
supply of graduates. Considering the severe employment situation in the Chinese labour 
market and in order to escape from unemployment or hoping to find a better job in the 
future, more graduates would choose to acquire a higher education degree by continuing 
their studies, which increases the average level of education. The trend of acquiring a 
master’s and or a doctoral degree has become more popular in recent years (Bai, 2006). 
In addition, some graduates would accept non-graduate jobs that are not matched with 
their education and expectations to make a living (He and Mai, 2015). Both these two 
situations give rise to the appearance of “overeducation” in the Chinese labour market.  
 
In addition, many new college entrants in the labour market find it difficult to secure 
their expected level job compared to graduates who entered the labour market in the 
                                                 
6
 See Table A1 in the appendix.  
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1990s holding the same qualification (Bai, 2006). Put differently, the higher education 
degree may no longer be an important signal of high ability as before. Although more 
graduates have acquired higher education qualifications, the quality of the higher 
qualification has been criticized by many researchers (Bai, 2006); (Wan, 2006); (Tan, 
2013). On the other hand, due to the college expansion, many universities and colleges 
have more students than before so that the distribution of ability of students has been 
expanded. Some unqualified students can have the chance to gain access to higher 
education, especially in those newly opened three-year colleges (He and Mai, 2015). 
Low ability is one of the reasons causing people to be overeducated (Hartog, 2000).   
 
Under the above conditions and also undergoing similar large scaled higher education 
expansion as the UK and European countries, what extent of overeducation exists in 
China? What are the determinants of overeducation in the Chinese labour market? Will 
the empirical patterns of wage effects of overeducation in the literature be presented in 
the Chinese labour market when taking time effects and unobserved heterogeneity into 
consideration?       
 
In order to answer these questions, the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) 
1989-2009 is used to make a longitudinal analysis of overeducation in the Chinese 
labour market, which is a contribution to the overeducation literature in China. Previous 
studies of overeducation in China all use cross-sectional data, which do not take time 
effects and unobserved heterogeneity into consideration. In this chapter, I employ a 
variety of techniques to analyse the extent of overeducation, the determinants of 
overeducation and the wage effects of educational mismatch in various aspects in 
China.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is arranged as follows. A comprehensive description of 
labour market reform and the educational system reform in China are presented in 
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides a detailed summary of the literature related to this 
topic. In Section 2.4, I will explicitly introduce the data and econometric methods. 
Section 2.5 explores the determinants of overeducation and wage effects of 
overeducation in the Chinese labour market. The conclusion and implications are 
presented in Section 2.6.    
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2.2 Background 
2.2.1 The country  
China, located in East Asia, is the most populous country in the world. According to the 
Chinese statistical database, the total population was over 1.37 billion at the end of 2014. 
China is also the second largest country in the world in terms of land area, covering 9.6 
million square kilometres. It has international borders with 15 countries. In addition, the 
Communist Party is the founding and the only ruling party in China. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the growth rate of real GDP increased on average 
10% from 1979 to 2014 (See Figure 2 in section 1.1.1). The World Bank reports that 
China is now the second largest economy in the world, based on the total amount of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and has helped more than 500 million people in its own 
country out of poverty. At the same time, China is also the world’s largest manufacturer 
and exporter, and holds the maximum amount of foreign exchange reserves in the world 
(Morrison, 2013).  
 
2.2.2 Labour market reform in China  
Before 1978 
Before the war fighting against Japan in 1937, China had a domestic-ownership 
predominated economy with the modest development of communications, 
transportation, banking and finance sectors, commercialized agriculture and well-
functioned labour market with free mobility across regions (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). 
However, the eight-year full-scale war against Japan and the following civil war 
between the Communist party and Kuomintang resulted in an economy with inflation 
and recession. Since 1949 with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, a 
Soviet economic development model was adopted by the government directly in order 
to help China recover smoothly from the ravage of continuous war. Under the Soviet 
model, a planning system controlled by the government was applied. That is to say, the 
state makes all the economic decisions and production decisions rather than through 
market forces. For example, the government set the prices of all the input and output 
and the assignment of labour force and industries distribution are controlled by the state.  
 
Under the centrally-planned economy, assignment of workers to enterprises was in the 
hand of government, who controlled all the matches between jobs and employees. The 
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allocation of labour force was referred to employment quota assigned by the State 
Ministry of Labour and Personnel rather than education and other kinds of human 
capital. The quota was firstly allocated to each province and city. Then jobs were 
allocated to individuals who needed a job through a particular school and local 
communal offices. In this case, individuals were not allowed to find jobs by themselves 
and enterprises were not permitted to recruit freely. To some extent, there was no real 
‘education and job match’. Moreover, employment was for lifetime and both 
geographical and occupational mobility were restricted. In addition, the government 
determined and controlled the wages of all workers through a grade system, which was 
designed on seniority rather than promoting productivity and innovation (Zhang et al., 
2005). In this case, wage differentials between different occupations were compressed 
to a small extent. Even sometimes, unskilled workers may have equal or higher wages 
than skilled workers or professionals, which is called wage compression. This wage 
setting system has been criticised as reducing workers’ incentives and leading to low 
productivity and a large number of redundant labour (Knight and Song, 1995).   
 
After 1978 
With the end of the Cultural Revolution (CR) in 1978, in order to alter the low 
productivity and misallocated resource in the society under the centrally-planned 
system, the new leadership of Deng Xiaoping began to reform the economy from a 
centrally-planned system to a market-oriented economy. In terms of the labour market, 
“Resolution on Economic Institutional Reform” was passed by the Communist Party in 
1984 to use a floating wage system to replace the previous wage quota system, which 
allows firms to pay flexible wages and bonus based on worker’s real productivity. In 
1986, “Temporary Regulations on the Use of Labour Contract in State-Run Enterprises” 
was issued by the State Council firstly to introduce the labour contract system to the 
Chinese labour market. Since then, the percentage of employees holding a labour 
contract increased from 13 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent in 1995. Under the labour 
contract system, firms have the freedom to choose the most suitable workers by 
themselves, which increases the mobility of labour and competition for productive 
workers. In turn, employees can also compete for jobs according to their education and 
work experience. At the same time, lifetime employment was ended by the application 
of labour contract in the Chinese labour market (Zhang et al., 2005).  
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In the early 1990s, losses from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had become severe 
because of the less-incentive wage setting system in the SOEs and the full-employment 
goals set by the government. Over 40 per cent of SOEs were reported to have a profit 
loss (Meng, 2012). In 1994, the government issued a policy to allow the privatisation of 
small and medium SOEs, which is known as the “seizing the large and letting go of the 
small”. This policy aimed to protect 1000 large-scale state-owned enterprises and permit 
those loss-making small and medium SOEs to go bankrupt and dissolve. In response to 
this privatisation policy, some SOEs began to dismiss workers. However, this process 
was tightly controlled and limited by the government. In 1997, due to the fact that 
massive and ever increasing financial losses couldn’t be controlled in the SOEs, the 
state finally decided to break the “iron rice bowl”, a lifetime and guaranteed 
employment of Chinese urban workers, to begin the reconstruction of the SOEs within 
four years from 1997 to 2000 (Yueh, 2004). As a result, approximately 12 million 
workers from SOEs had been laid off between 1997 and 1998. Although an increased 
unemployment rate and decreased labour force participation in the Chinese labour 
market were observed, this reconstruction led to a significant rise of employment in the 
private enterprises (Zhao, 2002). In order to relieve the unemployment problem of those 
laid-off workers from the SOEs (Xiagang), the government created reemployment 
centres to provide job training and job searching assistance to laid-off workers. In 
addition, reemployment centres also provided laid-off workers up to three years 
minimum living subsidies, which included pension and health care benefits (Cai et al., 
2008). The reconstruction of the SOEs was completed in the March 2005 and all the 
reemployment centres had been closed. Since then, laid-off workers from SOEs were 
registered as unemployed workers.    
 
2.2.3 Education reform in China    
In order to keep up with the changes in economic development, the education system in 
China also had experienced a series of changes and reforms. The historical course of 
educational reform is now outlined.  
 
Mao’s education 1949 -1978 
After abandoning the civil service examination system at the beginning of the 20th 
century, China decided to adopt the American model to build its modern school system 
in 1922 and this model had been used until 1949. The American model refers to a 6-3-3-
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4/5 structure, which contains six years of primary school, three years of junior middle 
school, three years of senior middle school and four or five years of university 
education (Deng and Treiman, 1997). Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came 
to power in 1949, the Soviet Union’s educational model was adopted by the 
government, in which the state was in charge of all the issues regarding education. This 
included constructing all educational institutions, the school system, changing all the 
private schools to public schools and designing a unified teaching syllabus and 
textbooks. The education system in the Soviet Union’s model has a 5-5-4 structure, 
which consists of five years of primary school, five years of secondary school, and four 
years of university (Deng and Treiman, 1997). In 1951, the Ministry of Education 
decided to accept the Soviet Union’s model as the basic Chinese education system. 
However, it was not widely accepted by the public. Most schools still applied the old 6-
3-3-4/5 school system (Deng and Treiman, 1997). From 1958 to 1965, the Chinese 
leader Mao Zedong decided to discard the Soviet Union’s model and build an 
educational system with Chinese characteristics. This new system in China consisted of 
five to six years primary school, two or three years of lower middle school, two or three 
years of upper middle school and four years of university. In addition, all the tuition and 
fees of boarding and lodging of higher education were entirely covered by the 
government. The government also provided living stipends to students who came from 
rural areas and poor families (Zhang et al., 2005); (Sun, 2010).    
 
Another important phase of educational reform before 1978 is the “Cultural 
Revolution”, which lasted from 1966 to 1976. The “Cultural Revolution” was directed 
by Mao Zedong and his agents to eliminate differences between urban and rural, worker 
and peasant and mental and manual labour (Sun and Johnson, 1990). During the 
Cultural Revolution, production became stagnated. All kinds of secondary schools were 
shut down in 1966-1968 and universities were closed down entirely from 1966 to 1972. 
Thousands of young urban workers and students were allocated to the countryside to 
work as peasants. It seems that the “Cultural Revolution” had a huge impact on the 
Chinese education history (Cai et al., 2008).  
 
After 1978  
In order to adapt to a market-oriented socialist economy, China began to restore its 
education system. The new leader Deng Xiaoping emphasised the importance of 
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education to the nation’s development and put forwarded a “three orientations” 
guidance for education in China that education in China should satisfy the needs of 
modernisation, the world and the future (Wang, 2002). In 1979, the national university 
entrance examination was restarted, which was open to all persons less than 30 years 
old. The authorised education system was regulated into 6-3-3-4 structure, that is, six 
years of primary school, three years of junior high school, three senior high school and 
four years of university. In addition, senior high school was divided into an academic 
part and an vocational part (Hannum and Xie, 1994). In 1985, the government 
announced the Decision on Education Reform that they would give more autonomy to 
the local government and higher education institutions to build a multi-functional 
university system, like teaching, research, business and social services (Bai, 2006). In 
1986, the government announced the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, which officially sets the nine-year compulsory education. In 1993, 
according to the Guidelines for China’s education reform and development, the “user-
pays” system of student tuitions in higher education began to apply in China. That is to 
say, university or college students now have to pay fees for the higher education and the 
government would not provide the free higher education to the public. Moreover, the 
centrally-planned job assignment system was abolished. College graduates had to find 
jobs after their graduation by themselves. The government would not assign jobs to 
graduates any more (Li et al., 2014).     
 
In order to relieve the unemployment problem brought by the Asian financial crisis and 
the reconstruction of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Chinese government put 
forwarded a proposal “A consideration of Effective Approaches to stimulate China’s 
Economy” to put college educational expansion on the calendar initially in 1998. There 
are mainly three reasons behind the policy of higher education expansion listed on the 
proposal: (1) Household consumption could be increased by 100 billion, which is 
approximately equivalent to 0.5 per cent of China’s GDP growth rate per year; (2) It can 
improve the nation’s human capital level and its competitiveness to the future 
development. (3) The unemployment problem can be eased by putting more college 
graduates into schools rather than the labour market (He and Mai, 2015).  
 
In late 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Education (MoE) issued the Action Plan of 
Education Promotion for the 21st Century to begin the journey of nation-wide higher 
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education expansion. Three priorities are addressed in this official document, which 
includes increasing the college enrollment rate by 25 to 30 per cent per year, improving 
the student-teacher ratio, and adding investment on higher education. Therefore, in 
response to the government policy, the number of college enrollment increased 
massively from 1.55 million to 5.05 million between 1999 and 2005 and the growth rate 
of college enrolment before 2006 are all above 10 per cent (See Table A1 in the 
appendix). After 2006, although the growth rate of college enrollment was lower than 
10 per cent, the total number was still climbing. In 2014, the number of college 
enrollments was 7.21 million, which is almost five times higher than that in 1999 (See 
Table A1). According to the National Outline for Medium- and Long-Term Reform and 
Development (2010-2020), the total number of college enrollment is aimed to expand to 
33 million (He and Mai, 2015). Based on this official document, it seems that the 
journey of higher education expansion will last in the future and there is still a long way 
to go to achieve the mass higher education in China compared to developed countries, 
like the UK (the enrolment rate of higher education is around 70%)7.   
 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
2.3.1Definition of overeducation 
Overeducation can be defined in various ways. A commonly used definition of 
overeducation is that if an individual’s educational attainment exceeds the normal 
requirement of his job, he or she is estimated as overeducated (Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981). In turn, undereducation can be constructed when an individual’s educational 
attainment is less than the normal requirement of his job. It also can be described into 
three ways: the first one is that there is a decline in one’s economic status to certain 
education level relative to people who have same education qualification in the past 
(Tsang and Levin, 1985). The second is that one’s actual job condition is not consistent 
with his expectations (Tsang and Levin, 1985). The third one is that educational skills 
owned by workers are greater than the requirement of their jobs (Rumberger, 1981). 
Chevalier (2003) argues that above definitions of overeducation are all based on the 
assumption that graduates are homogeneous in their skills. He put forwards a unique 
explanation about overeducation that graduates in non-graduate jobs but are satisfied 
                                                 
7
 Figure is from Blanden and Machin (2004).  
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with their jobs are treated as apparently overeducated, while those who are not satisfied 
their jobs are called genuinely overeducated. This definition makes an explicit 
classification of overeducated people and we can explore the impact of overeducation 
among overeducated groups taking unobserved heterogeneity into consideration.      
 
2.3.2 Measurement methods of required education 
Within the literature on overeducation, one of the core issues is how to measure the 
amount of required education. There are three different ways to determine the required 
education. The first method is known as job analysis (JA): acquiring systematic 
evaluation about schooling required for a particular job from professional job analysts. 
The most commonly adopted job evaluation is the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
(DOT) issued by the US Employment Service (Battu et al., 2000). The DOT contains 
detailed information about the required educational qualifications and types of 
education for particular occupations. Many scholars apply this method for empirical 
investigation (Rumberger, 1987); (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988); (Van der Meer, 2006). 
The second measure is from a worker’s self-assessment (WA): workers make subjective 
evaluations by themselves to determine the required schooling for their jobs. That is to 
say, employees can directly point out the required level of education for their 
occupations. For example, The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in USA 
contains a question “How much formal education is required to get a job like yours?” 
(Sicherman, 1991). The National Graduates Survey (NGS) in Canada uses the question 
“What was the level of education needed to get the job you had last week?” (Frenette, 
2004). After answering these kinds of questions, workers can compare their actual 
educational attainment with the required educational level of their occupation to 
determine whether they are overeducated, exactly educated or undereducated. Alba-
Ramirez (1993), Battu et al. (2000), Duncan and Hoffman (1981), Dolton and Vignoles 
(2000), Dolton and Silles (2008), Green et al. (2002) and Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) all 
adopt WA method to make empirical analysis. The third method is called Realised 
Matches (RM), which was proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) and Kiker et al. 
(1997). Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) define required education as the mean level of 
schooling within an occupation. Workers are considered to be adequately educated if 
their actual education falls within one standard deviation range around the mean level of 
schooling and overeducated if their actual education is greater than one standard 
deviation above the mean level of education for a specific occupation or undereducated 
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if their actual education is more than one standard deviation below the mean level of 
education, which is also called the VV method. Kiker et al. (1997) deem that the modal 
level of education should be a better measurement instead of the mean level of 
education to measure required education. They define that workers are considered to be 
adequately educated if their actual education level is equal to the mode level of 
education within their specific occupations. Overeducated (undereducated) workers can 
be expressed as their actual education attainments are higher (lower) than the mode 
level of education within their occupations. This method was adopted by Bauer (2002), 
Groot (1996), Hung (2008), Kiker et al. (2000), Rubb (2003) and Voon and Miller 
(2005). It should be noted that JA analysis and RM method are in objective perspectives 
while WA is based on a subjective view.  
 
The above three methods all have their advantages and drawbacks. None of these three 
methods is exempt from criticism. In terms of the JA method, the information about 
required educational level for specific occupation from the job analysts might not be 
updated with the society and technological change (Chevalier, 2003). If classifications 
in JA cannot be adjusted timely, estimated results may be biased (Verhaest and Omey, 
2006). Halaby (1994) argues that if the classification of job is defined on a more 
aggregate level, some jobs in one occupation that might have different required 
educational levels but are estimated to have the same required years of schooling. 
However, Hartog (2000) argues that a systematic and comprehensive JA should not 
make any bias to define required educational levels for specific occupations with 
regularly updated job classifications. He suggests that JA would be the best option to 
measure required education.  
 
Compared to the JA method, the worker’s self-assessment (WA) method is more cost 
efficient to conduct in practice and the classification of job in WA is more particularized 
and in line with the actual conditions of the labour market. However, in the WA method, 
researchers might not know the process of judgment made by workers. Workers might 
exaggerate the education requirement of his/her job due to vanity. Moreover, WA may 
have cohort effects. That is to say, workers may decide the required educational level of 
their occupations depending on their colleagues’ ‘educational attainment’. It is sensitive 
to the observed distribution of education for a given occupation (Chevalier, 2003). In 
addition, Hartog (2000) argues that the WA method may be influenced by the hiring 
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requirement of newly hired workers, which is prone to make upward biased estimation 
of required educational levels. Additionally, Dolton and Silles (2008) highlight that we 
should tell the difference between the requirement of “to get” and “to do” the job in WA 
methods, as it is an important and serious problem when using education as a screening 
criterion to identify workers’ ability.  
 
The RM method is determined by the actual distribution of educational attainment of 
employees within specific occupations. The mode index can avoid interference effects, 
exclude the outliers, and is also less sensitive to the technological change (Kiker et al., 
1997). However, RM might make unreliable estimates in some cell size occupations and 
choosing one standard deviation in VV method has no regulations to follow (Bauer, 
2002). In practice, the principal of choosing measurement methods is based on the 
relevant data availability (Hartog, 2000).   
 
2.3.3 Incidence of overeducation 
2.3.3.1 Incidence of overeducation by methods  
The incidence of overeducation is influenced by the measurement method we use to 
define required educational level. Therefore, different methods to measure 
overeducation may yield different results of incidence of overeducation. Groot et al. 
(2000) employ the meta-analysis methodology based on 25 studies on overeducation to 
identify patterns of incidence of overeducation using different measurement methods to 
define required education. According to Groot et al. (2000), the incidence of 
overeducation across different studies is in the range between 10% and 40%. The 
average incidence of overeducation based on the Realised Matches method is 13.1% 
and the average incidence of overeducation using worker’s self-assessment method is 
about 28.6%. In addition, Groot et al. (2000) suggest that the using realised matches 
method yields the lowest estimation of the incidence of overeducation, while the highest 
estimation of the extent of overeducation can be obtained from the worker’s self-
assessment method. Based on the summary of the existing studies on overeducation, 
McGuinness (2006), Tsai (2010) and Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) all find that the 
realised matches method (the mean index) finds lower incidence of overeducation than 
the method of self-report or analysis from professional job analysts. Since the range of 
correct education become larger with extended two standard deviations in the mean 
index, thus researchers who follow Realised Matches method may get lower estimate of 
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overeducation. Higher incidence of overeducation obtaining from the JA method may 
due to the obsolete information of required education in each job category.  
  
2.3.3.2 Incidence of overeducation across countries  
The exploration of overeducation has been conducted in many countries due to the 
worldwide higher education expansion. Because of different structures of the labour 
market and education systems, the incidence of overeducation varies across countries 
(Allen and De Weert, 2007). Hartog (2000) conducts a summary from existing studies 
on overeducation in five countries: Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, UK and USA. 
According to Hartog (2000), the incidence of overeducation is approximately around 
25% among the five countries and a proper match is about 60%. USA has the highest 
incidence of overeducation and Netherlands has the lowest incidence of overeducation. 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) estimate that the incidence of overeducation in the USA in 
1976 is 42% using the self-assessment method. Cohn and Khan (1995) and Rumberger 
(1987) report the incidence of overeducation in the USA are 33% and 40% respectively. 
In the UK, the level of overeducation varies from 11% (Groot, 1996) to 38% (Dolton 
and Vignoles, 2000). Bauer (2002) suggests that the incidence of overeducation in 
Germany is 12% and 31% based on the mean and mode index respectively. Kiker et al. 
(1997) employ three methods to calculate incidence of overeducation in Portugal (VV-
9.4%; RM-25.5% and JA-33.1%). Up to date, the latest estimated incidence of 
overeducation in the OECD area is about 25% and the proportion of undereducated 
workers is 33% (Quintini, 2011).  
 
Compared with developed countries, the exploration of overeducation is relatively 
scarce in developing economies8. In Mexico, Quinn and Rubb (2006) find that the 
incidence of overeducation is 17.2% in the mean index, while based on the mode index, 
the incidence of overeducation increases to 40%. According to Zakariya and Battu 
(2013), the incidence of overeducation is 32% using the work’s self-assessment method 
in Malaysia. In Hong Kong, about 37% of males are estimated as overeducated and the 
incidence of overeducation for females is 31% in 1991 in the mode index (Cohn and 
Ng, 2000).   
  
                                                 
8
 Lack of data is the main reason (Mehza et al., 2011).  
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2.3.3.3 Incidence of overeducation in China  
With the rapid higher education expansion in China after 1999, the phenonmenon of 
overeducation has attracted attention from scholars. Yang and Yue (2005) estimate the 
incidence of overeducation (21%) based on the self-report method using survey data 
funded by the Ministry of Education of China collecting from 45 universities in China 
in 2003. Mayston and Yang (2008) examine overeducation for graduates. They use the 
self-assessment method to define required education using the data from the Research 
Center for the Economics of Education at Peking University in June 2003. According to 
their results, 20.5% of graduates across China consider themselves as overeducated. 
This figure is close to the result of Yang and Yue (2005), which uses data in the same 
year. Ren and Miller (2012) suggest that the percentage of correctly matched worker is 
45.7% and the incidence of overeducation is 27.3% in rural China. In addition, the 
percentage of overeducated males is 37.5% and the incidence of overeducated females 
is 24.9%.  
 
Wu (2008) argues that in governments, monopolised industries and developed areas, the 
incidence of overeducation is higher than others (enterprises, competitive industries and 
less developed areas). Mayston and Yang (2008) also investigate the incidence of 
overeducation across academic programs and subjects. According to their results, PhD 
graduates are reported to have the highest rate of overeducation (42%), and are followed 
by the master level (35.8%). College Diploma graduates are estimated to have the 
lowest incidence of overeducation (12.9%). In terms of subjects, Mayston and Yang 
(2008) point out that Agriculture graduates have the highest incidence of overeducation 
(28.1%) and Art graduates have the lowest overeducation rate in China (17.1%).   
 
2.3.4 Wage effects of overeducation 
In the empirical analysis of the relationship between education and wages, Mincer 
(1974) firstly proposes the Mincer wage equation, which is widely used as a tool to 
estimate the wage return to education and is described as follows: 
 
   ln𝑊𝑖𝑡= 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝛼2𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝐸𝑖𝑡
2 +𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                              (1)                    
 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is years of working experience at time t and 𝐸𝑖𝑡
2  is experience squared. 𝛼2 and 
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𝛼3 should be positive and negative respectively. 𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the actual years of schooling at 
time t. 𝛼1 is the estimation of the return rate to schooling and is assumed to be constant 
in different educational levels. 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is a residual with zero mean and a normal 
distribution. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains a vector of individual and socio-economic characteristics.  
 
However, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) argue that economic effects of surplus education 
and deficit years of schooling are different. They decompose an individual’s educational 
attainment into the number of years of required education, years of surplus education 
and years of deficit education to form a new model, which is called ORU specification 
(Overeducation-Required Education-Undereducation). This model is defined as follows:  
     
  ln𝑊𝑖𝑡= 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝜃1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟
 +𝜃2𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑜 +𝜃3𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑢+𝜇𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                             (2)                                   
 
Where ln𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of average monthly wages at time t and the actual 
completed education 𝑆𝑖𝑡 in equation (1) is classified into 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟  (required years of schooling 
in the job), 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑜 (years of surplus education) and 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑢  (years of deficit education), where:      
                                
𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑜 -𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑢  
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑜  = 𝑆𝑖𝑡-
 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟  if 𝑆𝑖𝑡>
 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟  
   =0, otherwise 
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑢= 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟 - 𝑆𝑖𝑡 if 𝑆𝑖𝑡<𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑟  
  =0, otherwise 
 
and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is an error term and has a normal distribution. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of individual and 
socio-economic characteristics. In this model, the bench mark group consists of 
individuals who are in the same occupation with overeducated people and 
undereducated people but are correctly educated.  
 
According to a strand of findings using equation (2), an additional year of schooling 
beyond the required education has positive economic value, i.e θ2>0. In addition, the 
return to one year of required education is higher than the wage return to one year of 
surplus schooling (θ1>θ2>0). However, the wage return to one year of deficit schooling 
is negative (θ3<0). Although the wage return to undereducation is negative, its absolute 
value is smaller than wage returns to required education and wage returns to 
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overeducation. This model is used to compare wage effects of overeducated / 
undereducated workers with individuals who have the required education working in the 
same job. Rumberger (1987), Sicherman (1991) and Daly et al. (2000) deploy this 
model to explore wage effects of overeducation in the United States. Results are also 
available in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000); 
(Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink, 2000); (Lenton, 2012), Portugal (Kiker and Santos, 
1991), Spain (Alba-Ramirez, 1993), Sweden (Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009), Netherlands 
(Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988), China (Ren and Miller, 2012). Hartog (2000) argues 
that the wage return to overeducation is about half and two-thirds of the return to 
required education. The estimated return to overeducation is always apparently 
significant while the returns to undereducation are not always statistically significant.  
 
Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) propose a different model (VV model) from the ORU 
specification to explore the wage effects of overeducation and undereducation. They 
replace the required education by the actual education attainment in the ORU 
specification. In addition, they introduce two dummy variables instead of the exact 
years of surplus and deficit education into the equation to represent for overeducation 
and undereducation, which can be described as follows:  
    
ln𝑊𝑖𝑡= 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝛾1𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+𝛾2𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  +𝛾3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                          (3)              
 
Where 𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  is the actual years of education and 𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  are two dummy 
variables to represent overeducation and undereducation. 𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡=1 if people have surplus 
schooling than job requirements and 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡=1 if they are estimated as undereducated. 
Overeducated and undereducated workers are compared with individuals who have the 
same years of schooling but are correctly educated. Based on empirical analysis, 
overeducated people have significant wage penalties for not fully utilising their 
education (𝛾2<0) and undereducated workers have wage premiums, i.e (𝛾3>0). Note that 
the values of 𝛾2 and 𝛾3 in this model are contrary to the coefficients of overeducation 
and undereducation in the ORU specification. Moreover, they have different 
implications to explain the wage effects of overeducation and undereductaion compared 
to the ORU specification (Cohn and Khan, 1995). Hartog (2000) argues that the 
coefficients of two dummy variables in the VV model cannot be compared to the wage 
return to actual education and the coefficient on the overeducation dummy variable 
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simply indicates that overeducated people work in a lower level of job. Therefore, 
Hartog (2000) deemed that VV model would be less used in the empirical analysis in 
the future.   
 
Among the existing literature on the wage effects of overeducation, two issues have 
been of frequent concern. One is unobserved heterogeneity and the other is 
measurement error. If some omitted variables are related to overeducation 
(undereducation) variables, such as ability, motivation and family background, which 
means that people are not assigned to educational mismatch randomly, OLS will have 
biased and inconsistent estimates. The other one is that due to the difference between 
two measurements of required education, there maybe someone who is estimated to be 
overeducated using the mean level method but not in the mode index method, which 
indicates possible measurement error.  
 
2.3.5 Theoretical background of overeducation  
In terms of theoretical explanations of overeducation, two aspects have been 
investigated by researchers, which are: 1. why overeducated people would accept jobs 
that require lower than their educational attainments? 2. Why employers would employ 
overeducated individuals? According to the existing literature, seven theories can be 
used to answer these two questions: (1) Human capital theory; (2) Search and match 
theory; (3) Career mobility theory; (4) Signaling; (5) Job competition theory; (6) 
Technological change theory; (7) Assignment theory. Among them, Human capital 
theory, Search and match theory and Career mobility theory can provide explanations to 
answer the first question. Signaling theory, Job competition theory and Technological 
change theory can be used to explain the second question. Assignment theory answers 
those two questions in an integrated perspective.     
 
2.3.5.1 Human Capital Theory  
According to the human capital theory, human capital, as a form of investment, consists 
of many components, such as formal schooling, on-the-job training and working 
experience (Becker, 1962). Sicherman (1991) suggests that there is a potential trade-off 
between education and other elements of human capital. These components can be 
substituted or compensated mutually in a given level of human capital. In this case, 
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overeducated people may have less work experience or on-the-job training but they can 
use surplus formal education to substitute in order to gain a similar level of total human 
capital as workers who are matched in this job. While insufficiently educated people 
may take working experience or on-the-job training to compensate inadequate 
educational level. Alba-Ramirez (1993) and Kiker et al. (1997) all confirm this theory in 
empirical analysis.  
 
2.3.5.2 Search and Match Theory 
According to search and match theory, overeducation is attributed to imperfect 
information in the labour market. Workers who are new to the labour market may 
choose a job for which they are overeducated at the beginning of their career due to the 
lack of information about the labour market. With accumulated information and work 
experience in the labour market, they may shift to jobs that are matched with their 
educational levels. In this case, overeducation is a just temporary phenomenon. In terms 
of undereductaion, according to Hartog (2000), people will change jobs only when new 
jobs have higher ranked level (higher required educational levels). Therefore, the 
incidence of undereducation will increase with labour market experience.  
  
2.3.5.3 Career Mobility Theory 
Career mobility theory states that an individual may choose a job with a lower wage 
return to education but with a higher probability of promotion in the future than other 
available jobs with high wage effects of schooling (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). 
Sicherman (1991) further applied this theory to explain overeducation. Overeducated 
people are willing to choose a job for which their educational levels are higher than the 
educational level needed in the job in order to acquire skills or better opportunities to 
make a career upgrade in the future. However, this theory only takes effect if 
overeducated individuals indeed move to a higher level of job to fully utilise their 
educational qualifications (Nielsen, 2007). Based on the literature, this theory is 
unrealistic due to two reasons. One is the lack of empirical evidence. Sicherman (1991) 
finds that both overeducated people and undereducated people have a positive 
probability of promotion. Büchel and Mertens (2004) argue that overeducated people 
remain mismatched status within five years. The other reason is that this theory fails to 
provide a rational explanation in terms of undereducation.  
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2.3.5.4 Signaling  
Spence (1973) argues that the labour market has asymmetric information. Employers 
are not completely sure about true productivity of employees when they make the 
employment decisions and even after hiring. There is a signal transfer mechanism 
passing the information about employees to employers in order to identify the most 
productive and motivated workers for firms. Education acts as one of important signals 
in this mechanism. Education is a screening device representing some unobserved 
personal characteristics, such as problem solving skills, communication skills and 
motivation. High educational levels signal high productivities. Therefore, in order to 
distinguish themselves from others, individuals will keep on investing in education. 
This theory can not only help firms reduce the cost of hiring, but also is beneficial for 
the final occupational distribution and placement in the labour market. If high returns of 
investment in education remain, incentives for investment in education will last long 
(Tsang and Levin, 1985). Based on this theory, overeducation may be a persistent 
phenomenon.  
 
2.3.5.5 Job Competition Theory 
Thurow (1975) postulates that the allocation of job is not determined by the educational 
level but is decided by job characteristics. For employers, they mainly focus on the 
minimum training cost of hiring a staff. The person who has the lowest training cost has 
the most possibility to stand at the head of the job queue. Training cost is judged by a 
set of individual characteristics, like educational attainment, working experience, work-
related training and so on. Firms can take the level of education and other features as 
signals to rank people’s position in the queue. Among these characteristics, education is 
a better evaluation criterion and brings more accurate expectations than others. The 
higher the educational attainment is, the lower the training cost. Thus, people will 
increase investment on education in order to get a higher rank in the job queue and 
increase the possibility to acquire the job comparing with other competitors. Therefore, 
the overall level of education in the job seeker queue will continuously climb. However, 
it is difficult for job structures to make quick reactions and adaptions to the ever 
changing supply of different skill groups. Thus in this model, overeducation is persistent 
as long as skill requirements of every job remain unchanged. Hartog and Oosterbeek 
(1988) and Sloane et al. (1999) employ econometric methods to verify this hypothesis.  
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2.3.5.6 Technological Change Theory 
Kiker et al. (2000) argue that skills gained from school should be improved paralleling 
with the technological change. Labour market new entrants should have higher skills 
than those who engaged in the labour market earlier. Due to the positive adjustment 
costs, the replacement of recent better-educated labour couldn’t be made in the short 
run. In the long run, firms may change their hiring standards and hire those better-
educated individuals. Compared with their colleagues, those new entrants are more 
likely to be overeducated. In consideration of the rapid technological change and 
possible adjustment costs, it is better to retain overeducated people.  
 
2.3.5.7 Assignment theory 
Assignment theory states that the assignment of jobs considers both the demand side 
and supply side in the labour market. That is to say, job placement is allocated 
depending on the match between different characteristics of employees and 
heterogeneous requirement of jobs (Sattinger, 1993). Based on assignment theory, 
maximum productivity can be achieved when the most skilled workers are allocated to 
the most complex jobs and the least skilled workers work in the simplest jobs (Quintini, 
2011). Overeducation can be explained by the imbalance between the supply of highly 
educated workers and the availability of current jobs in the labour market.    
 
Several scholars have made efforts to confirm which theory can be better used to 
explain the existence of overeducation (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981); (Rumberger, 
1987); (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000); (McGuinness, 2006); (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 
2011). Based on the findings from above studies, the Assignment theory is a better 
candidate to explain the existing phenomenon of overeducation and its wage effects 
than other theories (McGuinness, 2006).         
 
2.3.6 Determinants of overeducation 
Most of studies focus on gender, experience and schooling to investigate the 
determinants of overeducation. Some studies implies that females are more prone to be 
overeducated than males (Frank, 1978); (Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink, 2000). The 
main explanation of this finding is that females are always restricted in the location of 
their spouses when searching for a job, which may make them more prone to be 
overeducated. However, according to Alba-Ramirez (1993), there is no significant result 
31 
 
that indicates that overeducated workers are more likely to be females. Additionally, 
several findings confirm that males are more likely to be overeducated than females 
(Kiker et al., 1997); (Sloane et al., 1999); (Hung, 2008). Sloane et al. (1999) argues that 
men bear more financial burden than females to support family life and thus they have 
more need to accept a job that is lower than their educational level. In terms of 
experience, consistent findings imply that overeducated workers tend to be less 
experienced (Alba-Ramirez, 1993); (Kiker et al., 1997); (Sloane et al., 1999); (Hung, 
2008), which confirms the human capital theory that overeducation is a compensation 
for other insufficient human capital to perform a job.  
 
In terms of other determinants of overeducation, Sloane et al. (1999) find that 
individuals working in part-time jobs are more likely to be estimated as overeducated 
than workers in full-time jobs. Battu et al. (1999) argue that large employers are more 
likely to hire the most highly educated graduates, which may increase the possibility of 
making a good job-education match. In addition, Hung (2008) argues that workers in 
public sector are more prone to be overeducated than those in the private sector.     
  
2.3.7 Longitudinal analysis of overeducation  
According to the existing literature, most of the empirical analysis about wage effects of 
over-and undereducation are based on cross-sectional data and all individuals with a 
given educational qualification are treated as homogeneous. A potential problem using 
cross sectional data is the unobserved heterogeneity. An overqualified individual 
working in a job that requires less than his educational level might have lower ability. In 
this case, less able workers may find it hard to work in jobs that are commensurate with 
their educational qualifications. Therefore, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is 
very important if the existence of innate ability causes educational mismatch (Bauer, 
2002). Longitudinal data can avoid this problem to some extent. However, there are 
only a few studies conducting longitudinal analysis of the wage effects of 
overeducation.  
 
Bauer (2002) employs a panel dataset, the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) to 
explore the incidence and wage effects of educational mismatch in Germany. Using a 
fixed effects model and random effects model, he finds that the wage gap between 
overeducated workers and workers who work in a job matching their actual schooling 
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becomes smaller or in some cases disappears. Using the National Graduates Survey 
(NGS) in Canada, Frenette (2004) finds that wage penalties of overeducation for college 
and bachelor’s level decline after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The wage 
penalty of overeducation for bachelor’s degree decreases from 19% to 11% and the 
penalty for college graduates declines from 11% to 6%. Tsai (2010) uses data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1979-2005 to conduct a longitudinal analysis 
of the wage effects in the USA. He argues that unobserved heterogeneity is a main 
reason to explain the phenomenon of overeducation. Employing a fixed-effects model, 
the magnitude of the wage penalty to one year of surplus schooling decreases and the 
significance also becomes smaller. Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2013) also obtain similar 
results in the longitudinal analysis of overeducation for European countries employing 
the dataset European Union Statistic on Income and Living Conditions (EUSI-LC). 
Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) suggest that the educational mismatch might be a real 
economic phenomenon, not just caused by the omission of variables, such as 
unobserved productivity. Their empirical analysis is based on the data from the Swedish 
Level of living surveys (LNU) 1974-2000 in Sweden. After explicitly using health and 
ability variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity, wage effects of educational 
mismatch don’t change too much compared to the results without controlling for above 
human capital variables. In the ORU equation using fixed effects model, although 
coefficients of educational mismatch variables decrease noticeably, patterns of wage 
returns to overeducation and undereducation are consistent with the literature. Above 
studies all emphasise the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
exploration of educational mismatch.  
 
 
2.4 Data and Methodology 
2.4.1 Data description  
The empirical analysis employs data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS), which is the largest and latest longitudinal data in China. This dataset is 
reliable, as it is an ongoing open cohort, administrated by an international collaborative 
project between the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. It offers us detailed information on health, 
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nutrition, habit and family planning policies and programs. Also it contains a wide-
ranging set of socioeconomic factors like education, income, occupation and ownership. 
 
The survey is conducted in nine provinces: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong in China. They vary substantially in 
geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators. These nine 
provinces represent four featured parts of China. Guangxi and Guizhou have many 
Minorities (Zhuang, Yi and Miao) and are relatively undeveloped provinces in 
southwestern China. Heilongjiang and Liaoning are located in the northeastern China 
with many large-scale industries. Henan, Hubei and Hunan are predominantly 
agricultural provinces in central China. Shandong and Jiangsu are the second and third 
of GDP ranking in China respectively, which are the representatives of developed 
provinces in eastern China.  
 
The data was collected from 1989 with every two to four years and followed by 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. I use all 8 waves of the longitudinal dataset in 
this chapter, which may indicate different stages of the economic reform in China since 
1978. Among them, the impact of early stage of labour market reform that started in 
1982 can be captured by year 1989 and 1991; the year 1993 represents the middle stage 
of urban economic transitions after the reform re-started in 1992, and 1997 and 2000 
represents the impact of 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. In addition, year 2004, 2006 and 
2009 represent the mature stage of the economic transition (Kang and Peng, 2010).  
 
In 1997 survey, Liaoning province was not included and Heilongjiang province was 
added. The dropped province Liaoning returned to the survey in 2000. Table 2-1 
describes all the surveyed provinces and waves. 
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Table 2-1 Surveyed provinces and waves in CHNS 
Region Province CHNS dataset 
 
Northeast 
Liaoning 1989, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
Heilongjiang 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
 
Central 
Henan 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
Hubei 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
Hunan 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
East 
Shandong 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
Jiangsu 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
West 
Guangxi 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
Guizhou 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
 
Only positive average monthly wages are included in the analysis and any subsidies and 
bonuses are not included; those who are retired, students, and homemakers are removed; 
owners of small household business and self-employed individuals are excluded 
because of the difficulty in obtaining reliable income figures from their business. In 
addition, CHNS collects information on both primary occupations and secondary 
occupations. In this chapter, only primary occupations are accepted9. Observations with 
any missing value on education, wages and occupations have been dropped. 
Observations used in this chapter are restricted to the age between 16 and 60. The legal 
minimum working age in China is 16 and the mandatory retirement age is 60 (Zhang et 
al., 2005).  
 
Variables needed in this chapter are in separate datasets of CHNS, which are Individual 
Education File, Individual Jobs Files and Individual Earnings/Wages Files. These three 
are merged together using uniquely identified variables in each dataset. After merging 
and deleting observations with missing data, 17766 observations of 7724 individuals 
remain. Among them, 56 individuals attended all eight waves; 124 individuals attended 
seven waves; 175 individuals were surveyed in six waves and 442 individuals were 
surveyed in five waves. The detailed results are listed in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2 The number of waves individuals appearing  
Number of waves Number of individuals 
1 3201 
2 1817 
3 1281 
4 628 
5 442 
6 175 
7 124 
8 56 
Total 7724 
 
 
Table 2-3 Sample size and observation distributions 
Survey 
year 
Number Percent 
Deflated 
average 
monthly 
wage in 
raw wage 
data set 
(Yuan) 
Average 
monthly 
wage 
(deflated in 
1989 price) 
Average 
monthly 
wage from 
NBS 
(deflated 
in 1989 
price) 
Government 
Sector (%) 
Private 
Sector 
(%) 
Average 
age of 
working 
people 
1989 2797 15.74 100 100  100 92.2 2.8 35.0 
1991 2769 15.59 99.1 101.8 113.4 94.5 2.1 34.5 
1993 2363 13.30 124.4 125.9 133.9 93.4 1.3 35.3 
1997 2194 12.35 193.5 198.2 158.9 83.9 3.7 36.0 
2000 2014 11.34 279.4 301.2 233.2 73.1 5.8 36.5 
2004 1757 9.89 369.9 390.2 378.8 53.8 29.9 39.3 
2006 1843 10.37 461.2 483.8 480.3 48.2 35.8 40.3 
2009 2029 11.42 639.0 682.0 673.8 45.6 41.8 40.8 
Total 17766 100.00       
Note: all the results in this table are from writer’s own calculations using CHNS dataset and National Bureau of 
Statistics of China.  
 
As Table 2-3 shows, after deflating to Year 1989 price10 , average monthly wages 
increased more than six times in twenty years 11 . This trend is in line with the 
tremendous economic progress China has made since 1978. Zhang et al. (2005) pointed 
                                                                                                                                               
9
 The reason behind is that secondary occupations are almost part-time or self-employed, which are not 
centered in this chapter.   
10
 See Table A2. 
11
 For a simple comparison, I also calculated deflated average monthly wages of the raw wage dataset in 
CHNS and the average monthly wages announced by National Bureau of Statistics of China, which are 
also listed in the Table 2-3.  
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out that the increasing wage returns to education after the transition seems to be an 
important reason for a large growth of wages. In addition, according to Cai and Du 
(2011), the changing relationship between demand and supply of labour from a centrally 
planned economy to the market-oriented one also contributed to the increasing trend of 
wages after the economic reform. Moreover, the wage system was designed to promote 
productivity and motivation rather than providing egalitarian incomes for workers also 
can explain the wage growth in China. Regarding the working age, the mean age 
increases from 35.0 years old in 1989 to 40.8 years old in 2009.  
 
More than 90% of workers are employed in the government sector from 1989 to 1993, 
which is shown in Table 2-3. In 1991, this sector achieved the highest point at 94.5%. 
After 1993, it decreased dramatically from 83.9% to 45.6% in 2009. During this period, 
reconstruction of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and millions of state-owned laid-
off workers (Xiagang) resulted in the decline of the percentage. On the contrary, the 
share of workers in the private sector, which includes family contract farming, private, 
individual enterprise or three-capital enterprise, enjoys an upward trend after 1993. The 
economic liberalisation and reconstruction of SOEs accelerated the ever-increasing 
expansion of the private sector and thus the ratio of individuals working in the private 
sector increased rapidly from 3.7% in 1997 to 41.8% in 2009. The above figures echo 
the economic transition that happened in China. 
  
The dependent variable in this chapter is the natural logarithm of monthly wages last 
year, excluding any bonuses, all kinds of subsidies and in-kind benefits from the work 
unit. In terms of education attainment, education questions asked in this survey have 
two categories. One is the completed years of formal education in regular school and the 
other one is the highest level of education attained. Highest level of educational levels 
can be classified into the following groups: 1-- Primary school or less, 2--Lower middle 
school, 3--Upper middle school, 4--Technical or vocational, 5--University or college 
degree, 6--Master’s degree or higher.  
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Table 2-4 Distribution of highest educational level 
 
Highest level of education attained Number Percentage 
Level=1, Primary school or less 3279 18.46 
Level=2, Lower middle school 6545 36.84 
Level=3, Upper middle school 4090 23.02 
Level=4, Technical or vocational  2106 11.85 
Level=5, University or college degree 1720 9.68 
Level=6, Master’s degree or higher 26 0.15 
Total  17766 100.00 
 
As we can see in Table 2-4, only 9.83% of observations own university/college or 
higher degree. However, compared to developed countries, like UK and USA, in which 
the proportion of workers with tertiary education degree are 42% and 38%, respectively 
in 2010 (OECD, 2012), the proportion of individuals with a higher education degree in 
China is still very low. If China wants to accelerate its economic development and 
improves its competitiveness in the world markets in the future, higher education 
expansion should be continued. In addition, the percentage of individuals acquiring a 
lower middle school qualification is the highest at 36.84%.  
 
Table 2-5 Distribution of highest level of education by wave (1989-2009) 
 
 
Year 
Master’s 
degree or 
higher 
University 
or college 
degree 
Technical 
or 
vocational   
Upper 
middle 
school  
Lower 
middle 
school  
Primary school 
or less 
1989 5 
(0.18%) 
112 
(4.00%) 
183 
(6.54%) 
526 
(18.81%) 
1109 
(39.65%) 
862 
(30.82%) 
1991 3 
(0.11%) 
155 
(5.60%) 
195 
(7.04%) 
613 
(22.14%) 
1160 
(41.89%) 
643 
(23.22%) 
1993 5 
(0.21%) 
134 
(5.67%) 
193 
(8.17%) 
545 
(23.06%) 
973 
(41.18%) 
513 
(21.71%) 
1997 2 
(0.09%) 
124 
(5.65%) 
247 
(11.26%) 
557 
(25.39%) 
852 
(38.83%) 
412 
(18.78%) 
2000 3 
(0.15%) 
189 
(9.38%) 
263 
(13.06%) 
524 
(26.02%) 
746 
(37.04%) 
289 
(14.35%) 
2004 1 
(0.06%) 
276 
(15.71%) 
326 
(18.55%) 
440 
(25.04%) 
523 
(29.77%) 
191 
(10.87%) 
2006 2 
(0.11%) 
342 
(18.56%) 
354 
(19.21%) 
411 
(22.30%) 
549 
(29.79%) 
185 
(10.04%) 
2009 5 
(0.25%) 
388 
(19.12%) 
345 
(17.00%) 
474 
(23.36%) 
633 
(31.20%) 
184 
(9.07%) 
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There are two noticeable changes reported in Table 2-5. The first one is that the 
percentage of people who have a university or college degree increases nearly six times 
from 4.00% to 19.12% in twenty years. At the same time, the share of people who have 
a primary school qualification or less plummets from 30.82% in 1989 to 9.07% in 2009. 
Two reasons can be used to explain above figures. One is the expansion of higher 
education in China since the end of 1990s. The second one is the implementation of 
nine-year compulsory education in China since 1986. Additionally, the number of 
people owning a technical or vocational qualification doesn’t increase as rapidly as 
people who have university or college degree. The percentage rises from 6.54% to 
17.00% in twenty years. The share of upper middle school qualification increased from 
18.81% to 26.02% from year 1989 to 2000 and decreased thereafter. Additionally, the 
percent of master’s degree and doctoral degree doesn’t change too much, keeping in a 
level around 0.20% from 1989 to 2009.    
 
The variable experience is measured through age and educational attainment. Because 
there is no information about work experience in the dataset, the non-educational 
number of years is used as a proxy of maximum potential years of work experience, 
which can be defined as: Experience equals= age minus- education-6. Since this 
measurement method of working experience doesn’t count the time period of looking 
for a job or unemployment or other unexpected situations, years of work experience 
may be overestimated in this way (Li, 2003). Experience squared is also used in the 
regression to represent diminishing returns to experience.  
 
Two dummy variables (Female and Urban registration) are set to control for gender and 
identity (urban registration or rural registration). Another four dummy variables are 
added to represent type of work unit, which are government sector, collective sector, 
private sector and unknown work unit. To account for different economic regions 
involved in this survey, four dummy variables are created, which are Northeast 
(Liaoning and Heilongjiang), Central (Henan, Hubei and Hunan) and East (Shandong 
and Jiangsu), West (Guangxi and Guizhou). In addition, there are thirteen occupations 
classified in this survey, which is shown in Table A3 in the appendix. The aggregate 
occupation classification made by Ren and Miller (2012) is applied here to control for 
occupations in the empirical analysis, which are Clerk (office staff, ordinary soldier, and 
policeman), Junior (junior professional/technical worker, skilled worker and driver), 
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Senior (senior professional/ technical worker), Leader (administrator/executive/manager 
or an army officer, police officer), Other (athlete, actor, musician or other) and 
Unskilled (service worker, farmer, fisher man, hunter or non-skilled worker) 12 . 
Additionally, four dummy variables are created to control for firm size. Eight dummy 
variables representing eight waves are adopted to control for time effects. The summary 
statistics are shown in Table 2-6 and the definition of all variables used in this chapter is 
presented in Table A6 in the appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Details are provided in Table A4 in the appendix.  
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Table 2-6 Summary statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variable     
Log average monthly wages 5.206 0.861 0.354 9.529 
Independent variables     
Years of schooling 9.980 2.747 6 18 
Highest educational level: reference group (primary school or less) 
Primary school or less  0.185 0.388 0 1 
Lower middle school  0.368 0.482 0 1 
Upper middle school  0.230 0.421 0 1 
Technical or vocational  0.119 0.323 0 1 
University or college degree 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Master’s degree or higher 0.001 0.038 0 1 
Required years of schooling 9.980 1.586 7.2 14 
Years of overeducation 0.606 1.351 0 8.121 
Years of undereducation 0.622 1.290 0 7.732 
Female 0.409 0.492 0 1 
Urban Registration 0.491 0.500 0 1 
Age 36.891 10.656 16.02 60 
Experience 20.912 11.134 0 47.99 
Experience squared 561.25 507.213 0 2303.04 
Ownership: reference group (Government sector)     
Government sector  0.759 0.428 0 1 
Private sector 0.135 0.342 0 1 
Collective sector 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Unknown ownership 0.018 0.134 0 1 
Job type: reference group (Permanent)     
Permanent 0.791 0.407 0 1 
Contractor 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Temporary 0.091 0.287 0 1 
Other  0.023 0.149 0 1 
Economic Regions: reference group (West)     
Northeast 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Central 0.311 0.463 0 1 
East 0.314 0.464 0 1 
West 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Firm size: reference group (Firm size 1)     
Firm size 1 (more than 100 employees) 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 100 employees) 0.177 0.381 0 1 
Firm size 3 (Less than 20 employees) 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Unknown firm size  0.478 0.500 0 1 
Aggregate Occupation: reference group (Unskilled)      
Clerk 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Junior 0.290 0.454 0 1 
Senior 0.075 0.264 0 1 
Leader 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Other 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Unskilled  0.384 0.486 0 1 
Wave: reference group (Wave 1989)     
1989 0.157 0.364 0 1 
1991 0.156 0.363 0 1 
1993 0.133 0.340 0 1 
1997 0.123 0.329 0 1 
2000 0.113 0.317 0 1 
2004 0.099 0.299 0 1 
2006 0.104 0.305 0 1 
2009 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Total  17766 
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2.4.2 Incidence of overeducation 
Due to data availability in CHNS, the realised matches (RM) method is adopted to 
define required education in this chapter, which was proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo 
(1989) and Kiker et al. (1997). There are two expressions in realised matches: the mean 
index and the mode index. Both indexes are adopted to explore the extent of 
overeducation and undereducation in this chapter. In the mean index, required education 
is defined as the mean of completed years of education within each occupation and each 
wave. Workers are considered to be overeducated if their actual education is greater 
than one standard deviation above the mean level of education for the specific 
occupation in a given wave or undereducated if their actual education is more than one 
standard deviation below the mean level of education for the specific occupation in a 
given wave. Required education in the mode index is described as the most frequent 
level of education within each occupation and each wave. If one’s educational level is 
higher than this modal level, one is treated as overeducated and undereducated if one’s 
educational level is below this modal level.  
 
Table 2-7 presents detailed information about the incidence of overeducation and 
undereducation for the full sample and by gender. Based on the mean index, about 
18.19% of workers are estimated to be overeducated and 20.33% of the labour force is 
treated as undereducated. The remaining 61.48% have the correct education required for 
their jobs. In terms of gender, the disparity of overeducation seems very little. 18.35% 
of male workers are estimated as overeducated and 17.97% of female employees are 
overeducated. At the same time, 61.75% of female workers and 61.29% of male 
workers are correctly educated. Based on the summaries in different studies using the 
mean index technique, the incidence of overeducation is between 10% and 15% 
(McGuinness, 2006). The incidence of overeducation in the Chinese labour market is 
slightly higher in comparison.  
 
However, in terms of the mode index, the extent of overeducation seems more serious. 
Both the incidence of overeducation and undereducation are higher than those using the 
mean index. 26.10% of workers have surplus education above the required education 
level of their occupations. 30.16% are undereducated and less than half of workers are 
correctly educated. In addition, the proportion of overeducation for males is nearly 2 
percentage points higher than that for females. The percentage of females who are 
42 
 
undereducated is 30.76%, which is 1 percentage point higher than males (29.74%). 
Because different methods of measuring required education may lead to different results 
of the incidence of overeducation, it is not surprising that we get different results of the 
incidence of overeducation in this chapter.  
 
As we can see in Table 2-8, almost 76.15% of observations are classified into the same 
category in different definitions of required education. The correlation between the 
mean index and mode index is 0.7580. Additionally, 23.85% of observations have 
changed mismatch status using different index to define required education. Iriondo and 
Pérez-Amaral (2013) report that 79.79% of observations are classified into the same 
category using both mean index and mode index methods, which are very similar with 
the result in this chapter.  
 
Table 2-7 Incidence of overeducation/undereducation full sample and by gender 
Description Full sample Female Male 
 Mean Mode Mean Mode Mean Mode 
Correctly 
educated 
61.48 43.74 61.75 44.34 61.29 43.33 
Overeducated  18.19 26.10 17.97 24.90 18.35 26.93 
Undereducated  20.33 30.16 20.28 30.76 20.36 29.74 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
Table 2-8 Overeducation /Undereducation in the mean index and the mode index 
The mean index The mode index 
 Undereducated Correctly educated Overeducated Total 
Undereducated 3567 (20.08%) 45 (0.25%) 0 3612 
Correctly educated 1772 (9.97%) 7237 (40.74%) 1913 (10.77%) 10922 
Overeducated 19 (0.11%) 489 (2.75%) 2724 (15.33%) 3232 
Total 5358 7771 4637 17766 
   Note: the percentage of people who are classified into same category in both mean index and mode index is 76.15%       
(20.08%+40.74%+15.33%=76.15%).  
 
 
43 
 
2.4.3 Estimation methodology 
2.4.3.1 Ordered Probit Model  
I first explore the determinants of overeducation in this chapter. Because individuals 
who are estimated to be undereducated, correctly educated and overeducated are defined 
as 0, 1 and 2 in the data. Thus, ordered probit model technique will be employed here. 
We can get threshold coefficients and parameter 𝛽 through ordered probit model. For 
each observation, the ordered probit model can be obtained by a latent variable 
approach13, which is specified as: 
 
     𝑌𝑖
∗= 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′+ 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                          (4)                      
 
     𝑌𝑖 = m if 𝛼𝑚−1< 𝑌𝑖
∗ <𝛼𝑚                                                                                                                                                      (5)                               
 
𝑌𝑖  is an ordered response representing values {0,1,2, … … . 𝑀}. 𝛼𝑚−1 , 𝛼𝑚 are a set of 
unknown threshold coefficients or cutpoints to be estimated. 𝛽 is a vector of estimated 
parameters and 𝜇𝑖 is an error term which is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance one14. 𝑌𝑖
∗ is a latent and unobserved variable which can be treated as utility 
value.    
 
Under the latent variable model, the probability that observation i will be treated as m is 
as follows:   
    
     𝑃𝑟 (𝑌𝑖=m |𝑋𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟 (αm-1 < 𝑌𝑖
∗
 < αm)                                                                                     (6)                
 
𝑌𝑖
∗ can be written as a cumulative probability model. The whole form of the cumulative 
probabilities under the latent variable model can be written as follows:  
 
Pr (𝑌𝑖=m |𝑋𝑖) = {
𝛷(𝛼1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)                                                     𝑚 = 1            
𝛷(𝛼𝑚 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′) − 𝛷(𝛼𝑚−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)              1 < 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀 − 1
1 − 𝛷(𝛼𝑀−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)                                      𝑚 = 𝑀
                       (7) 
 
where 𝛷(∗) is the cumulative distribution function. That is to say, the possibility of 
individual i making a choice of m depends on the product  𝑌𝑖
∗ falling between cutpoints 
                                                 
13
 A latent variable is assumed to represent the ordered response.   
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(m-1) and m (Baum, 2006). A straightforward way to get the parameters of ordered 
probit model is Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), which aims to find 𝛽 and 𝛼𝑗 
that make the joint probability of obtaining 𝑚 maximum (Powers and Xie, 2008).  
 
2.4.3.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is a general method for non-linear estimation in 
statistics and econometrics. Suppose there is an independent and identically distributed 
distribution {𝑌1 , 𝑌2, 𝑌3, … … … … … 𝑌𝑛|𝑋𝑛} and its density function is defined as f(𝑌𝑖 |𝑋𝑖; 
𝜃). 𝜃 is a vector of unknown parameters. The joint density function of this sample can 
be written as follows: 
 
       𝑓(𝑌1,𝑌2, ……, 𝑌𝑛|𝑋𝑖; 𝜃) = ∏ 𝑓(𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 |𝑋𝑖; 𝜃)                                                                        (8) 
 
and the likelihood function is defined as: 
 
       𝐿(𝜃|𝑌𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) = ∏ 𝐿𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 (𝜃|𝑌𝑖,𝑋𝑖)=∏ 𝑓(𝑌𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 |𝑋𝑖;𝜃)                                                               (9) 
 
In order to calculate conveniently, a natural logarithm of likelihood function is applied 
in practice:  
        
    𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝜃|𝑌𝑖,𝑋𝑖)= ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑓(
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖;  𝜃)                                                                                      (10) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝜃) is the log-likelihood function. Maximum likelihood estimation is to find a 
𝜃 that can get the highest probability of choosing the observed sample. Therefore, the 
solution is given by: 
 
      𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝜃; 𝑌)𝜃
𝑀𝐴𝑋 = ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1𝜃
𝑀𝐴𝑋
(𝜃; 𝑌)                                                                                   (11)        
 
       
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
|=∑
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
𝑁
𝑛=1 |=0                                                                                                    (12)       
 
Based on the above, we can see that the likelihood function is equal to the joint density 
function. If the joint density function is known, we can get maximum likelihood 
                                                                                                                                               
14
 𝛽 represents for the similar effect of 𝑋𝑖 on 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖 on 𝑌𝑖
∗.  
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estimator.  
 
In the ordered probit model, for each observed 𝑚, we write the log-likelihood function 
as:  
 
        𝐿 = ∏ ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑚|𝑋𝑖)
𝑍𝑖𝑚𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                    (13) 
   
 ln 𝐿=∑ ∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑚ln[𝛷(𝛼𝑚 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′) − 𝛷(𝛼𝑚−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)𝑀𝑚=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ]                                                    (14) 
 
where 𝑍𝑖𝑚=1 if 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑚.  
                       
2.4.3.1.2 Marginal effects  
In the latent variable approach, the effect of one independent variable on the dependent 
variable is expressed as changes in 𝑌𝑖
∗ when there is one unit change in 𝑋𝑖. However, 
𝑌𝑖
∗ is a latent and unobserved variable, so the alternative choice is to calculate the 
marginal effects of the independent variables in the conditional distributions (Baum, 
2006). Thus, the marginal effects of 𝑋𝑖 can be calculated in the following way (Powers 
and Xie, 2008):   
 
     𝜕𝑃𝑟 (𝑌𝑖=m |𝑋)
𝜕𝑋𝑖
={
−𝛷((𝛼1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)𝛽𝑖                                    𝑚 = 1 
[𝛷(𝛼𝑚−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′) − 𝛷(𝛼𝑚 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)]𝛽𝑖                   1 < 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀 − 1                                    
𝛷(𝛼𝑀−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖
′)𝛽𝑖                                  𝑚 = 𝑀       
(15) 
 
 
2.4.3.2 Panel data 
The expression form of a panel data is different from a regular cross-sectional data and 
time-series data, which has a double subscript on its variables. Considering there is one 
explanatory variable X for each i, the following equation shows features of panel data in 
detail: 
 
     𝑌𝑖𝑡=𝛼𝑖𝑡 +𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡  ,     t=1, 2 ,........T                                                                                                                  (16)                             
 
The subscript i indicates cross-section scale and t shows time dimension. 𝛼𝑖𝑡  is an 
intercept and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains information on both time-varying variables and time-invariant 
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variables. 𝛽 is the coefficient of 𝑋𝑖𝑡 . 𝜇𝑖  only has one subscript, which denotes the 
unobserved individual-specific effect. It is assumed to be time-invariant random 
variable and distributed independently across individuals. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  can be called idiosyncratic 
errors as it varies with individuals and time 𝑡 as well.  
 
If we suppose that every observation in the panel data has the same regression equation 
as equation (16), we can put observations together to make OLS regression, which can 
be called “Pooled OLS Regression”. Error terms in different times within individuals 
may be correlated with each other, so cluster-robust standard errors should be used in 
the Pooled OLS Regression. In equation (16), 𝜇𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 can be treated as the composite 
error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡, e.g. 𝑣𝑖𝑡=  𝜇𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡. However, there is potential problem in the pooled OLS 
regression that unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into consideration, i.e. no 𝜇𝑖 in 
equation (16). In order to control for unobserved individual-specific effects, two models 
are widely used in the panel data. The first one is the fixed effects model by estimating 
the deviation from the mean of each observation. The second model is the random 
effects model. In the fixed effects model, 𝜇𝑖  is permitted to be correlated with the 
independent variables, while in the random effects model, 𝜇𝑖 is assumed to be unrelated 
with the regression variables.   
 
2.4.3.3 Fixed Effects model (FE)  
If there are potential correlations between µi and 𝑋𝑖 variables in panel data, Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) is not efficient anymore and can yield biased estimation of the 
parameters. In order to overcome this problem, fixed effects model is widely used to 
eliminate the individual specific effects, which is described as follows: 
 
If we average equation (16) over time for each individual i, then we can get    
  
  𝑌?̅? = 𝛼?̅? +𝛽𝑋?̅?   +𝜇𝑖   +𝜀?̅?                                                                                                                 (17)          
 
where  𝑌?̅?=𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
   and similar for 𝑋?̅? and 𝜀?̅?.  
 
Then we subtract equation (17) from equation (16) 
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 𝑌𝑖𝑡 -  𝑌?̅?  =𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 -𝑋?̅? ) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?)                                                                                            (18)                                 
 
or  
 
  𝑌𝑖𝑡̈  =𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡̈   +𝑒𝑖𝑡̈                                                                                                                               (19)            
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ̈ is equal to 𝑌𝑖𝑡 - 𝑌?̅? and similarly for 𝑋𝑖𝑡̈  and 𝑒𝑖𝑡̈ . This process is also called fixed 
effects transformation. 𝛽 is called fixed effects estimator or within-group estimator. µi is 
deleted in the transformation process, which is the advantage of this model. However, 
any time-invariant variables will also be deleted, such as gender, country and so on.   
 
2.4.3.4 Random Effects model (RE)  
Suppose we think 𝜇𝑖  is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable in all times, that is 
to say,    
      
    Cov (𝑋𝑖𝑡, µi) =0,        t =1, 2, ......., T                                                                                    (20)                                                         
 
Then, equation (16) can be used to make random effects model transformation. If we 
define 𝜇𝑖 as one part of the composite error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡, e.g. 𝑣𝑖𝑡=𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡  , which means 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
are serially correlated across time. That is to say,  
 
    𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑠) ={
𝜎𝜇
2,  𝑡 ≠ 𝑠
𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2, 𝑡 = 𝑠
                                                                               (21)        
 
𝜎𝜇
2 is the variance of µi and 𝜎𝜀
2
 is the variance of εi. The coefficient of autocorrelation is 
𝜌:  
 
      𝜌 ≡ 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜇𝑖+𝜀𝑖𝑠) =𝜎𝜇
2 𝜎𝜇
2⁄ +𝜎𝜀
2                                                                               (22)      
 
One solution to solve the autocorrelation problem is FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least-
Squares) method. Detailed FGLS transformation procedures can be seen from 
Wooldridge (2013). If we define:   
 
       θ≡1-𝜎𝜀/(𝜎𝜀
2+𝑇𝜎𝜇
2)1/2                                                                                                                            ( 23)     
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Then take θ into equation (17), which turns out to be  
 
     𝑌𝑖𝑡  - 𝜃𝑌?̅? = 𝛼 (1-𝜃) +𝛽 (𝑋𝑖𝑡  - 𝜃𝑋?̅?)+ (1-𝜃 ) µi + (εit –𝜃𝜀𝑖  )                                                                                        (24)         
 
where the overbar is the time average. 𝜃  is the estimator of 𝜃 . The above is called 
Random effects model (RE). As is shown in equation (24), error term is not autorrelated. 
Compared with fixed effects model, random effects model can explore all the variables 
effects in the equation, which is an advantage over the fixed effects model.  
 
   
2.4.3.5 Empirical Models  
Since the dataset used in this chapter is longitudinal, first, pooled OLS method is 
employed to explore the ORU equation in both indexes. The model is described as 
follows: 
 
ln𝑤𝑖𝑡= 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼1 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼2𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼3𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                   (25)                                       
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  is the years of required education. 𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 are the years of 
overeducation and years of deficit education respectively.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 are clustered error terms. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, which contains potential working experience, 
experience squared, gender, registration status, ownership, job type, firm size, aggregate 
occupation and economic regions.   
 
The data in CHNS covers 20 years, from 1989 to 2009. As we all know, the society and 
economy has changed dramatically in China in these twenty years, which may influence 
wage effects of education to a large extent. Thus any time effects should be taken into 
account. The great majority of previous studies employ cross-sectional data to explore 
the wage return to overeducation, thus they don’t consider time effect. If we take time 
effects into consideration, wage effects of overeducation may be different compared 
with existing findings. Therefore, time dummies are added into equation (25), which is 
described as follows: 
 
49 
 
ln𝑤𝑖𝑡= 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆1𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  + 𝜆2𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜆3𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝑇+𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                               (26)                                 
 
where T represents for time effects. Time effects are seven dummy variables 
representing wave 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009. Wave 1989 is the 
benchmark year.     
 
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, I employ fixed effects model and 
random effects model to revisit the ORU model (Equation (2) in section 2.3.4). 
However, the equation is slightly different from equation (26), which is described as 
follows:  
 
     ln𝑤𝑖𝑡=  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝜎1 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜎2𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜎3𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+𝜇𝑖+𝑇+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                (27)                                     
 
Where 𝜇𝑖 is unobserved individual effects.  
 
In addition, the VV model (Equation (3) in section 2.3.4) is also applied in this chapter 
using the same econometric techniques as ORU equation: pooled OLS, pooled OLS 
with time effects, fixed effects and random effects model, which are shown in below: 
 
  ln𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝛾1𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝛾2𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝛾3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                  (28)            
 
 ln𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃2𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡+ 𝜃3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑇+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                             (29)         
 
 ln𝑤𝑖𝑡
 = 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝜑1𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡+ 𝜑2𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝜑3𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖+ 𝑇+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                    (30)            
 
Where 𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  is the years of actual completed years of education, 𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  are 
two dummy variables representing for people who are overeducated and undereducated 
respectively. 𝑇 represents for time effects and 𝜇𝑖 is unobserved individual effects. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is 
the set of control variables used in the ORU equation.   
 
If we assume that 𝜇𝑖  is individuals’ unobserved productivity or ability, ability has a 
negative relationship with 𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡  (years of overeducation) and positive relationship 
with 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 (required education) and 𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 (deficit years of schooling) (Korpi and 
Tåhlin, 2009). Omission of ability in the ORU equation would have overestimated the 
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wage return to required education and underestimated the absolute value of coefficients 
of 𝑂𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 and 𝑈𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡. In the VV equation, under the same assumption with the ORU 
equation, without controlling for unobserved ability would yield upward bias of 
coefficients of years of schooling (𝐶𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡), dummy variables 𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 (overeducation) and 
𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 (undereducation).         
 
 
2.5 Empirical analysis   
2.5.1 Determinants of overeducation 
Table 2-9 reports the marginal effects of the probability of being overeducated among 
the selected variables using the ordered probit model. Since this dataset is longitudinal 
and observations maybe observed in consecutive years, the standard errors are clustered 
by individuals, allowing errors to be correlated across different years within the same 
individual. Here, I choose both the mean index and the mode index method to define 
required education in the ordered probit estimation.   
 
Gender 
In terms of gender, both indexes show that males are more prone to be overeducated 
than females, which is also reported in Kiker et al. (1997), Sloane et al. (1999) and 
Hung (2008). Reasons behind this are maybe that males have more responsibility to 
support family life than females, thus they are more likely to accept jobs that require 
lower educational level than their own. In addition, males are the main labour force in 
the Chinese labour market regardless of the job and are more likely to be estimated as 
overeducated, which is also similar with Taiwan’s labour market (Hung, 2008).  
 
Registration area  
As can be seen from Table 2-9, the marginal effects of urban registration in both indexes 
reveal that workers who have urban registration run a higher risk of being overeducated 
than rural people. On one hand, urban workers have a higher average educational level 
and better quality of education than rural workers (Rong and Shi, 2001). On the other 
hand, although job vacancies in urban labour market are more abundant than in rural 
areas, competition is sharper in urban areas than in rural areas. Under the fierce 
competition in the urban labour market, urban workers may work in a job that is lower 
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than their educational level in order to make a living and thus they have higher 
probability of being overeducated than rural workers.   
 
Educational level  
Based on the results from Table 2-9 (column 3 and column 6), individuals who have 
master’s degree or higher and university or college degree are more prone to be 
estimated as overeducated than people with primary school degree or less, which is 
confirmed in both two index where both estimations are highly significant. In addition, 
people who have lower middle school, higher middle school and vocational degree all 
have higher probabilities of being overeducated in comparison with people who have 
primary school degree or less. Frenette (2004) and Mayston and Yang (2008) all find 
similar results.  
 
Work experience 
As can be seen in Table 2-9 (column 3), experience has a negative relationship with the 
probability of being overeducated using the mean index. Workers with more working 
experience are less likely to be estimated as overeducated. In this case, overeducation is 
a compensation of insufficient working experience to perform a job. This result supports 
human capital theory that only the total human capital can determine whether a worker 
is able to do a specific job (Sicherman, 1991). Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Kiker at 
el. (1997) and Hung (2008) all support this point of view through empirical analysis. 
However, in the mode index (column 6), those people with more experience have higher 
possibility of being overeducated, which is in contrast to the existing literature.  
 
Ownership  
According to Table 2-9, consistent results have been found using both indexes that 
people working in the private sector and collective sector are more likely to be 
overeducated than individuals in the government sector. Two reasons may be used to 
explain. On one hand, the government sector has high wages, stable working 
environment and attractive welfare, which make it more easily to hire matched workers. 
On the other hand, individuals may find jobs in the private sector temporarily to gain 
experiences in order to find matched and stable jobs in government sector in the future. 
Patrinos (1997) argues that the public sector is a good place to solve the problem of 
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overeducation in Greece.  
 
Firm size  
As can be seen from Table 2-9, people who work in firms with between 20 and 100 
employees and in firms with less than 20 employees are less likely of being 
overeducated than workers in firms with more than 100 employees in both indexes, 
which is contrast to Battu et al. (1999). The reason behind it may be that employees in 
large firm have more opportunities to be promoted, have better career prospects and 
receive more fringe benefits compared to people who work in a small company 
(Kalleberg and Van Buren, 1996). Therefore, overqualified workers may voluntarily 
choose to stay in large firms due to the consideration of the above reasons.   
 
Year  
The marginal effects of seven waves are negative in both indexes, which may indicate 
that years after 1989 are less likely to be estimated as overeducated than year 1989. This 
result is not consistent with our expectations. It may due to the following reasons. First, 
with the accelerated pace of education expansion, the average educational level of 
labour force is increasing15 . The incidence of overeducation may decline with the 
increased average level of years of schooling. Second, since the economic reform in 
1978, the Chinese economy has been growing at a rapid pace, especially after China’s 
accession into WTO. The ever increasing degree of economic openness and the 
accelerated growth of the private sector may provide more opportunities for workers to 
choose. Thus, people can have more chance to find a matched job, which will reduce the 
possibility of being overeducated to some degree. Third, millions of state-owned 
workers had been laid-off (Xiagang) due to the reform of state-owned enterprises in the 
1990s. However, majority of the “laid-off” workers are people who are older than 40 
with low level of education, which may make the mean education level increase among 
current workers. Last but not least, the financial crisis in 2008 forced many firms to 
employ and retain the most qualified and skilled workers to improve work efficiency 
and keep profit, which may be expected that the average level of education will rise 
(Lenton, 2012).   
                                                 
15
 The average years of education in each wave is as follows: 8.91 years in 1989; 9.38 years in 1991; 9.50 
years in 1993; 9.71 years in 1997; 10.19 years in 2000; 10.84 years in 2004; 11.08 years in 2006; 11.18 
years in 2009.  
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Apart from above analysis, Table 2-9 also implies that temporary workers are more 
likely to be overeducated than permanent workers in both indexes. Contractor workers 
are more likely of being overeducated than permanent workers that can only be found in 
the mode index. The temporary or short-term feature of these two job types may make 
workers choose to stay in an overeducated status and then change to a matched job later 
on. In terms of regional distribution, we can see from Table 2-9 that only east region in 
the mean index is more likely to be estimated as overeducated than the west region.  
 
In ordered probit model, only results of gender, household registration, highest 
educational level, ownership, firm size, aggregate occupation and year are consistent in 
both two indexes. According to Verhaest and Omey (2010), different overeducation 
measurements may influence the outcome. Neither of measurements can capture the 
whole overeducation. Therefore, it is not surprising that results are different. In addition, 
we only focus on the exploration of the determinants of overeducation here. The 
analysis of the determinants of undereducation and corrected education is beyond our 
scope.  
 
 
2.5.2 Wage effects of over-and undereducation in the ORU specification   
2.5.2.1 Wage effects of overeducation and undereducation by full sample 
Table 2-10 reports estimated results of the ORU specification in full sample using both 
the mean index and the mode index. Columns (1) to (4) are results based on the mean 
index and columns (5) to (8) are estimated using the mode index. Among them, columns 
(1) and (5) report results of the pooled OLS regression method without controlling for 
time effects, columns (2) and (6) present results of the pooled OLS analysis taking time 
effects into consideration, columns (3) and (7) display coefficients from the Fixed 
effects model and results from the Random effects model are shown in columns (4) and 
(8). Note that, standard errors in the pooled OLS are clustered by individuals.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2-10 column (1) in the mean index, the wage return to an 
additional year of required education is around 23%. The wage return to one year of 
surplus education is around 3% and the coefficient of deficit education suggests that 
54 
 
undereducated workers suffer from wage penalties of around 4%. The above results are 
in line with previous findings using the ORU equation that educational mismatch of 
workers causes wage differentials (Tsai, 2010). However, the wage return to required 
education is much higher than wage returns to surplus education. This is expected as not 
having time effects included in the regression. In terms of the mode measure, as 
indicated in column (5) in Table 2-10, the wage return to required education level is 
26.20%. The wage return to overeducation is 9.68% and the negative wage return to 
each additional level of deficit education is about 13.19%. However, the mode index 
measures the wage return to educational level, which should be higher than the wage 
return to years of schooling.  
 
Seven dummy variables to control for time effects are added into both columns (2) and 
(6). After adding time dummies, the wage return to required education decreases a lot to 
2.80% in the mean index, which is shown in column (2) in Table 2-1016. It seems that 
controlling for time effects has a big impact on the wage effects of required education 
and it also provides answers why the wage return to required education in column (1) is 
so high. In addition, the wage return to an extra year of surplus education is about 2.6%, 
as indicated in column (2). We can also see that wage penalty of deficit education 
decreases from 4% in column (1) to 2% in column (2). Apart from the above analysis, 
the R squared in column (2) (0.6510) is higher than in column (1) (0.5588), which 
means that column (2) explains wage effects of overeducation better than column (1). In 
terms of the mode measure, as can be seen from Table 2-10 column (6), the wage return 
to required educational level is 7.73%. The wage return to overeducated workers 
declines substantially from 9.68% in column (5) to 3.94% in column (6). In addition, 
the magnitude of the wage effects of undereducation also decreases from 13.19% in 
column (5) to 8.08% in column (6).  
 
Note that coefficients of the seven year dummies in columns (2) and (6) can be treated 
as indicators of the deepening of economic reform and market improvement since 1978. 
The wage variable has been deflated to 1989 prices, therefore the ever increasing 
coefficients from Year 1989 to 2009 indicate that wage returns increased year-on-year 
along with the strong economic growth in China from 1989 to 2009.  
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Based on the above pooled OLS analysis, similar patterns of wage effects of 
overeducation from the mean index and mode index in Table 2-10 echo Hartog (2000)’s 
point of view that different definition of required education conduct similar results of 
wage effects of overeducation. In addition, time effects indeed have a big impact on the 
wage return to overeducation and undereducation in this chapter. Although time effects 
change the magnitude of wage effects, the patterns of estimation results are still 
consistent with previous findings that overeducated workers have higher wages and 
undereducated workers suffer from wage penalties compared to correctly educated 
workers who are in the same occupation.  
 
However, pooled OLS estimation has been criticised for not taking unobserved 
heterogeneity into consideration. In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) in Table 2-10, a Fixed 
effects model and a Random effects model are used to deal with the unobserved 
heterogeneity problem. However, based on a Hausman test, the random effects model is 
rejected in favour of the Fixed effects in both indexes. Next, I will explicitly explain 
results from fixed effects model. Regarding the mean index, results in column (3) 
suggest that after using fixed effects model, the wage return to required education 
decreases and is only significant at 10% level. The wage return to undereducation 
becomes small and insignificant. At the same time, the magnitude of wage effects of 
overeducation drops from 2.57% to 1.83%. In terms of the mode index in column (7), 
the magnitude of wage effects of required education becomes smaller than column (6). 
The wage return to overeducation increases slightly from 3.94% to 4.52% and the wage 
penalty to overeducation becomes smaller17, which are consistent with our expectations 
if we assume the unobserved heterogeneity as unobserved ability. However, wage 
returns to deficit education become small and insignificant. Noticeable changes of 
coefficients of educational variables indicate that unobserved heterogeneity indeed 
plays an important role in the analysis of wage effects of overeducation. However, if we 
assume unobserved heterogeneity as ability, the mode index yields feasible results in the 
fixed effects model except for the wage return to undereducation.   
                                                                                                                                               
16
 Comparing with results of the wage return to overeducation in each wave in Table 2-13, this figure is 
rational.   
17
 The wage penalty to overeducation is the gap between the wage return to required education and the 
wage return to overeducation, i.e. wage penalty of overeducation, compared to correctly educated workers 
with similar educational attainment.   
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Comparing with the results in the mean index, using the mode index to explore wage 
effects of overeducation in both pooled OLS estimation and panel estimation methods 
are found to be more consistent with the major findings of the existing literature (Groot 
and Maassen van den Brink, 2000); (Hartog, 2000); (Bauer, 2002); (Frenette, 2004); 
(Tsai, 2010).  
 
2.5.2.2 Wage effects of overeducation by age groups  
One point couldn’t be neglected is that due to significant changes within the education 
system overtime in China, people who have schooling in 1960s and 1970s (Mao 
education system) experienced different education systems compared to people who 
have schooling in 1980s and after (Post-Mao education system). People who 
experienced Post-Mao education system are more likely to be estimated as 
overeducated. In order to alleviate and differentiate the impact of different education 
systems on the wage effects of overeducation, we try to explore by age groups. People 
are classed according to their received education systems. The new Chinese education 
system began to build since 1978. Thus, the first group is people who were born in 1972 
(and afterward), went to school around 1978 (and afterward) receiving Post-Mao 
education (the starting age of schooling is six). The other group is the people who were 
born before 1972 having Mao education18. The distribution of highest educational level 
of these two groups is in Table A5 in the appendix. After splitting groups, 3368 
observations are in the first group and the remaining 14398 observations are in the 
second group.      
 
The results of wage effects of educational mismatch by age groups are reported in Table 
2-11 using the mean index and Table 2-12 in the mode measure. Firstly, patterns of 
coefficients of the pooled OLS estimation without considering time effects of two 
groups using both indexes are consistent with the full sample (column (1) and (5) in 
both Table 2-11 and Table 2-12). Then, comparing column (2) with column (6) in both 
Table 2-11 and Table 2-12, wage returns to required education for people who have 
received Post-Mao education are higher than those who have received Mao education 
                                                 
18
 The mean birth year of the second group is in 1957 and the average schooling of this group is 9.82 
years. Thus we can assume that this group represents people who received Mao education. The mean 
birth year of the first group is in 1977 and the average schooling of the first group is 10.67 years.  
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using both indexes. People in the first group (i.e. individuals with Post-Mao education) 
generally start to work in the labour market around 1990 and afterward. Therefore, they 
earn wages from a labour market with more flexibility and market-oriented decision-
making mechanism than the second group. This excess of wage returns to required 
education between two groups indicates that the labour market reform indeed takes 
effect. Apart from this, new educational agenda in Post Mao education system paid 
more attention to the importance of education to facilitate economic construction, which 
led to improved school quality (Qian and Smyth, 2008). Thus, the higher school quality 
in post Mao education system may play a role to explain higher wage returns to required 
education of the first group. In addition, the increasing education cost in the Post Mao 
education system can also result in such an excess wage return to required education 
between these two groups (Li, 2003).  
 
Comparing column (2) with column (6) in Table 2-11, the wage return to overeducation 
in the mean index of the first group is higher than the second group. While in Table 2-12 
column (2) and column (6), we can see that the wage return to overeducation in the 
mode index is lower in the first group than the second group. Generally speaking, the 
gap between wage returns to required education and wage returns to overeducation is 
the wage penalty to overeducation. Overeducated people may incur wage penalty and 
thus this gap should be positive. However, in the mean index, the gap in the second 
group is negative (Table 2-11 column (6)), which is very unusual. While in the mode 
index, gaps in both groups are positive (Table 2-12 column (2) and column (6)), which 
is consistent with existing literature (Rumberger, 1987); (Sicherman, 1991); (Hung, 
2008). Therefore, the wage return to overeducation using mean index for Mao education 
group should be interpreted with caution. According to Table 2-12 column (2) and 
column (6), we can see that wage penalty to overeducation (6.72%) is much larger in 
the first group than that in the second group (2.07%). Education expansion since 1978 
may make people who received education from the new education system more likely to 
be overeducated (Li et al., 2008)19. Moreover, with more attention from the whole 
country on the importance of education in the new education system, investment in 
education and education cost have been growing (Qian and Smyth, 2008), which may 
                                                 
19
 In this chapter, the incidence of overeducation of the first group is 30.91% and the incidence of 
overeducation of the second group is 24.98%. Both calculations are based on the mode index.   
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result in large wage penalty of people who have surplus education than job required20. 
In addition, high wage penalty to overeducation of the first group also indicates that 
education-matching problem is an important feature among people who experience Post 
Mao education system. Lower wage penalty to overeducation of the second group 
indicates that the education-job matching is not valued that much among people who 
have education from Mao education system, which can be explained by the wage 
compression and centrally planned job assignment system before 1978 to some extent.  
 
In terms of wage returns to undereducation using pooled OLS with time effects model, 
the wage penalty of undereducated workers are higher in the first group (Post-Mao 
education) than the second group (Mao education), which are reported in both indexes. 
This result indicates that undereducated people in the second group may possess some 
other skills or human capital to compensate insufficient formal education compared to 
undereducated people in the first group. We can see that people in the second group 
(Mao education system) are relatively older workers, less-well educated and entered 
labour market earlier. They are more familiar with the labour market and may have 
more skills related to work or working experiences to compensate deficit education than 
undereducated people in the first group. The smaller wage penalty associated with 
undereducation among people who acquire Mao education is consistent with the 
motivation/ability hypothesis proposed by Chiswick (1978). In all, results of wage 
effects of overeducation from pooled OLS estimation using the mode index not only 
confirm the main conclusions of the existing literature, but also show different pictures 
of wage effects of overeducation between Post Mao and Mao education systems.     
 
Then, we take unobserved heterogeneity into account21. In terms of individuals who 
have experienced Mao education system, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity into 
consideration using the mode index (Table 2-12 Column (7))22, there is a slight increase 
in the wage return to overeducation compared to Table 2-12 Column (6). The wage 
return to required education is close to the wage return to overeducation in Column (7). 
In addition, the wage return to undereducation decreases. It seems that the unobserved 
                                                 
20
 Large wage penalty to overeducation in the first group may indicates that investment in education is 
insufficient and a waste of resources. 
21
 Based on Hausman test, random effects model are rejected in Table 2-11and Table 2-12.   
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heterogeneity (ability) can be responsible to explain the wage effects of educational 
mismatch of people in the second group to some extent. All the coefficients of 
educational mismatch variables become smaller and insignificant using the mode index 
in the first group, which are not reasonable results. This may be explained by low 
within-group standard deviation of required educational level, level of overeducation 
and deficit schooling in the first group using the mode index23. That is to say, there are 
relative few individuals experiencing the changes of jobs or years of schooling as birth 
years of people in the first group are close to the current time (younger group), which 
may not able to identify the wage effects of overeducation in the fixed effects model. 
Bauer (2002) and Tsai (2010) all mention this issue in their studies.  
 
2.5.2.3 Wage returns to schooling and wage effects of overeducation over time  
In order to support the idea in this chapter that time effects have a big impact on the 
wage return to required education, overeducation and undereducation, which is shown 
in Table 2-10 Columns (2) and (6), I also explore the wage return to schooling in each 
wave and the wage effects of educational mismatch by wave. Table 2-13 reports 
detailed estimation results. The upper half of Table 2-13 is in the mean index and the 
lower half is in the mode index. As can be seen from Table 2-13 in the mean index, the 
wage return to education is very low in the 1990s, almost between 1% and 2% (2% to 
5% in the mode index), and even sometimes insignificant. However, from 2000, the 
wage return to years of schooling began to increase to about 6%. Wage returns to 
schooling in the 1990s are lower than in the 2000s in both indexes, which is in line with 
Kang and Peng (2010). Most existing studies find the return to years of schooling before 
2000s in China is less than 4% (Li, 2003). Since we only count the single monthly 
wages excluding any bonus and benefit, the wage return to education is lower in this 
chapter than others. In addition, the wage return to qualification is higher than the wage 
return to years of schooling. In terms of wage effects of educational mismatch, there is 
also a significant difference between the 1990s and the 2000s in both indexes24. In the 
                                                                                                                                               
22
 In the mean index, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, wage returns to required education and 
wage returns to undereducation become insignificant and wage returns to overeducation become smaller 
for people who experienced Mao education system.  
23
 The within-standard deviations of required educational level, overeducated level and undereducated 
level are 0.43, 0.34 and 0.24 respectively in the first group, while within-standard deviations of required 
educational level, overeducated level and undereducated level are 0.52, 0.37 and 0.37 in the second group.     
24
Since there is a significant difference of wage effects between 1990s and 2000s and results in each wave 
are only an approximation, so I mainly focus on my analysis by decade.  
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1990s, most of the three kinds of education variables in the ORU equation are 
insignificant. However, in the 2000s, coefficients of three education variables become 
significant and are in line with the existing literature except for higher wage returns to 
overeducation than wage returns to required education in 2006 in the mean index. Using 
the mode index still provides more precise results than the mean index in this case.  
 
The most feasible explanation for the significant difference in the wage return to 
education and wage effects of education mismatch between the 1990s and 2000s is the 
deepening of economic reform and market improvement. Economic reform is a 
continuous process and it always needs time to take effects. Zhang et al. (2005) argue 
that the economic reform in China permeate very slowly and began to take effects until 
the middle and late 1990s. Thus, before 2000, the influence of old labour market system 
still existed and education attainment is still not an important role in the wage 
determination regime, which may result in low wage returns to education in 1990s. In 
addition, most insignificant education variables in the ORU equation using both indexes 
in 1990s in Table 2-13 indicate that educational mismatch was not valued importantly in 
the society in the 1990s because of the still existing centrally-allocated employment 
system. Secondly, with the increasing education costs and full application of the user-
pay system of higher education in the late 1990s (Qian and Smyth, 2008), increased 
individuals’ investment on education may result in larger wage returns to educational 
mismatch in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Additionally, higher education expansion since 
1999, which makes the phenomenon of overeducation become more serious, is another 
important reason to explain significant and increased wage returns to overeducation in 
the 2000s than the 1990s. Based on above analysis, the economic transition and its 
following changes in the labour market and education system that can be reflected 
through time effects indeed has a big impact on wage returns to education and wage 
returns to educational mismatch.                  
 
Another point that needs to be highlighted in Table 2-13 is that wage returns to required 
education are higher than wage returns to actual education using both indexes in the 
2000s. The excess of the wage return to required education over the wage return to 
actual schooling by itself suggests that there is a big advantage to correct education and 
the years of surplus education are not fully rewarded.  
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2.5.2.4 Wage effects of overeducation in hourly wage  
According to the literature, using hourly wages rather than monthly or annual wages 
may provide more precise estimation of the wage return to education (Li, 2003). Li and 
Zax (2003) argue that people who own lower level of education tend to work more 
hours than the people who have higher educational level. That is to say, working hours 
have a negative relationship with educational level, which will underestimate the wage 
return to education without controlling for working hours. In the CHNS, information is 
contained about working hours in a day and working days per week. Therefore, hourly 
wages can be created to re-run the Mincer equation and ORU equation in this chapter to 
see if there is any improvement of wage returns to education and wage effects of 
overeducation. Table 2-14 reports the wage return to years of schooling using both 
monthly wages and hourly wages. Consistent with our expectation, the wage return to 
years of schooling using hourly wages in each wave all become significant and are 
slightly larger than those using monthly wages. In terms of educational mismatch in 
Table 2-15, patterns of three education variables are consistent with those using monthly 
wages, but wage returns are larger than results in Table 2-10, which is consistent with Li 
(2003). If the data of individual working hours is available, using hourly wage rate may 
be a better choice to explore the wage effects of educational mismatch in the empirical 
analysis.            
 
 
2.5.3 Wage effects of overeducation and undereducation in the VV model  
Table 2-16 shows the wage effects of overedeucation in the VV equation using the mean 
index and the mode index. We can see that results from pooled OLS estimation using 
the mode index (Table 2-16 columns (5) and (6)) are consistent with the existing 
literature (Sicherman, 1991); (Alba-Ramirez, 1993); (Kiker et al, 1997). Moreover, after 
controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity shown in Table 2-16 column (7), the return 
to required education decreases and the wage penalty of overeducated workers 
disappears, which are very similar to the results in Tsai (2010). However, wage 
premiums to undereducation increases. In terms of results from the mean index in the 
VV equation as indicated in Table 2-16 column (2), the wage penalties of overeducation 
disappears after taking time effects into consideration. After using fixed effects model to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, which is shown in Table 2-16 column (3), the 
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wage return to actual years of schooling increases a lot and wage penalties of 
overeducation even becomes positive compared to the results in column (2). In addition, 
the wage premium of undereducation disappears. According to the existing literature, 
results using the mean index in the VV model are not very justifiable.  
 
As indicated in the signaling theory, education is a screening device to help employers 
assess potential candidates’ productivity, which can be measured either by years of 
schooling or qualifications. Kominski and Siegel (1993) argue that degrees can reflect 
the reality of the criterion of employment. In addition, professional job analysts usually 
define required education in educational levels not in years. For example, the Dictionary 
of Occupational Title (DOT) in the USA regulates required education within each 
occupation using qualifications (Rumberger, 1987). Based on the results using the mode 
index in this chapter, we can infer that employers in the Chinese labour market value 
much more the credential or qualification to judge employees’ productivity than years of 
schooling. Therefore, exploring wage effects of educational mismatch using 
qualifications can provide more relevant and useful results for the current and future 
analysis.  
 
Some odd results from the mean index in this chapter may be explained by the fact that 
in real life, not everyone finishes a given educational level in the same years25. For 
example in the survey, ‘the third year upper middle school’, people may take thirteen or 
fourteen years to achieve, not the standard 12 years. Measurement error from years of 
schooling may bias the results in the mean index to some extent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 The survey asks respondents to answer completed years of formal education in regular school, which is 
categorised by educational grade.    
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Table 2-9 Marginal effects of the possibility of being overeducated in both indexes 
 In the mean index In the mode index 
Variables Undereducation Correct education Overeducation Undereducation Correct education Overeducation 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.0192*** 0.0073*** -0.0265*** 0.0451*** 0.0122*** -0.0572*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0049) 
Urban Registration -0.0096*** -0.0036*** 0.0132*** -0.0146*** -0.0039*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0010) (0.0048) 
Lower middle school -0.2733*** -0.1038*** 0.3771*** -0.4354*** -0.1175*** 0.5530*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0083) (0.0066) (0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0089) 
Upper middle school -0.5181*** -0.1968*** 0.7150*** -0.7107*** -0.1918*** 0.9025*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0145) (0.0085) (0.0063) (0.0103) (0.0099) 
Technical or Vocational  -0.4418*** -0.1678*** 0.6096*** -0.7546*** -0.2037*** 0.9583*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0130) (0.0105) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0118) 
University or college degree -0.6915*** -0.2627*** 0.9541*** -0.9478*** -0.2559*** 1.2036*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0086) (0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0116) 
Master’s degree or higher -1.0393*** -0.3948*** 1.4341*** -1.7666*** -0.4769*** 2.2435*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0283) (0.0200) (0.0272) (0.0234) (0.0276) 
Experience 0.0009** 0.0003** -0.0012** -0.0018*** -0.0005*** 0.0022*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008) 
Experience squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Private sector -0.0299*** -0.0113*** 0.0412*** -0.1106*** -0.0299*** 0.1405*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0053) (0.0068) (0.0022) (0.0084) 
Collective sector -0.0241*** -0.0091*** 0.0332*** -0.0601*** -0.0162*** 0.0763*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0017) (0.0073) 
Unknown ownership -0.0143* -0.0054* 0.0197* -0.0160 -0.0043 0.0204 
 (0.0077) (0.0029) (0.0107) (0.0129) (0.0035) (0.0163) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 100 employees) 0.0219*** 0.0083*** -0.0302*** 0.0518*** 0.0140*** -0.0658*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0016) (0.0070) 
Firm size 3 (Less than 20 employees) 0.0348*** 0.0132*** -0.0480*** 0.0706*** 0.0191*** -0.0897*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0017) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0019) (0.0083) 
Unknown firm size 0.0124** 0.0047** -0.0172** 0.0384*** 0.0104*** -0.0488*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0022) (0.0078) (0.0092) (0.0025) (0.0117) 
Contractor -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0018 -0.0348*** -0.0094*** 0.0442*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0016) (0.0075) 
Temporary -0.0074* -0.0028* 0.0102* -0.0572*** -0.0154*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0017) (0.0072) 
Other job type -0.0029 -0.0011 0.0039 -0.0050 -0.0013 0.0063 
 (0.0074) (0.0028) (0.0102) (0.0114) (0.0031) (0.0145) 
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Clerk 0.1411*** 0.0536*** -0.1947*** 0.2385*** 0.0644*** -0.3028*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0064) 
Junior 0.0999*** 0.0379*** -0.1378*** 0.1344*** 0.0363*** -0.1707*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0017) (0.0052) 
Senior 0.2226*** 0.0846*** -0.3072*** 0.4182*** 0.1129*** -0.5311*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0099) (0.0053) (0.0101) 
Leader 0.1418*** 0.0539*** -0.1957*** 0.2395*** 0.0646*** -0.3041*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0034) (0.0072) 
Other 0.0188** 0.0071** -0.0259** -0.0173 -0.0047 0.0219 
 (0.0087) (0.0034) (0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0035) (0.0163) 
Northeast -0.0052 -0.0020 0.0072 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0006 
 (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0016) (0.0075) 
Central 0.0016 0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0005 0.0022 
 (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0014) (0.0065) 
East -0.0064** -0.0024** 0.0089** -0.0071 -0.0019 0.0090 
 (0.0032) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0013) (0.0063) 
1991 0.0156*** 0.0059*** -0.0216*** 0.0080** 0.0022** -0.0102** 
 (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0010) (0.0046) 
1993 0.0364*** 0.0138*** -0.0502*** 0.0871*** 0.0235*** -0.1107*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0017) (0.0058) 
1997 0.0353*** 0.0134*** -0.0487*** 0.1032*** 0.0279*** -0.1310*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0025) (0.0083) (0.0098) (0.0029) (0.0123) 
2000 0.0522*** 0.0198*** -0.0721*** 0.1000*** 0.0270*** -0.1270*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0086) (0.0101) (0.0030) (0.0127) 
2004 0.1162*** 0.0441*** -0.1603*** 0.1268*** 0.0342*** -0.1610*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0040) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0033) (0.0138) 
2006 0.1273*** 0.0483*** -0.1756*** 0.2531*** 0.0683*** -0.3214*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0043) (0.0145) 
2009 0.1184*** 0.0450*** -0.1634*** 0.2661*** 0.0718*** -0.3379*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0041) (0.0092) (0.0112) (0.0044) (0.0137) 
Observations 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 
LR chi2 5483.05 11256.21 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.7079 0.4901 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Notes:  1. The government sector is the benchmark ownership. 2. Primary school or less is the bench mark education level. 3. West (province Guangxi, Guizhou) is the bench mark region. 4. Firms with more 
than 100 employees is the bench mark firm size. 5. Permanent is the comparison job type. 6. Unskilled worker is the bench mark occupation. 7. 1989 is the base wave.  
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Table 2-10 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) ----- mean index VS mode index 
 The mean index The mode index 
Description 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random 
effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.2324*** 0.0280*** 0.0175* 0.0271*** 0.2620*** 0.0773*** 0.0555*** 0.0787*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0097) (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0183) (0.0071) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0298*** 0.0257*** 0.0183*** 0.0260*** 0.0968*** 0.0394*** 0.0452** 0.0457*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0083) (0.0073) (0.0179) (0.0072) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.0382*** -0.0209*** -0.0076 -0.0223*** -0.1319*** -0.0808*** -0.0268 -0.0741*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0188) (0.0079) 
Year 1991  0.1063*** 0.1524*** 0.1119***  0.1107*** 0.1509*** 0.1154*** 
  (0.0114) (0.0178) (0.0118)  (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0116) 
Year 1993  0.2461*** 0.3140*** 0.2500***  0.2446*** 0.3018*** 0.2472*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0293) (0.0128)  (0.0137) (0.0319) (0.0125) 
Year 1997  0.7291*** 0.8948*** 0.7376***  0.7290*** 0.8772*** 0.7368*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0647) (0.0257)  (0.0303) (0.0693) (0.0255) 
Year 2000  1.0704*** 1.2792*** 1.0798***  1.0725*** 1.2571*** 1.0813*** 
  (0.0311) (0.0828) (0.0265)  (0.0306) (0.0895) (0.0257) 
Year 2004  1.3285*** 1.6654*** 1.3564***  1.3215*** 1.6292*** 1.3477*** 
  (0.0332) (0.1074) (0.0292)  (0.0321) (0.1185) (0.0277) 
Year 2006  1.4958*** 1.8652*** 1.5219***  1.4821*** 1.8135*** 1.5053*** 
  (0.0343) (0.1197) (0.0301)  (0.0330) (0.1322) (0.0285) 
Year 2009  1.8133*** 2.2521*** 1.8443***  1.8024*** 2.1918*** 1.8291*** 
  (0.0347) (0.1389) (0.0303)  (0.0331) (0.1539) (0.0283) 
R2 0.5588 0.6510 0.5964  0.5440 0.6525 0.5966  
Observations 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Notes:  1. The government sector is the benchmark ownership. 2. West (province Guangxi, Guizhou) is the bench mark region. 3. Firms with more than 100 employees is the bench mark firm size. 4. 
Permanent is the comparison job type. 5. Unskilled worker is the bench mark occupation. 6. 1989 is the base wave. 
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Table 2-11 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) by age groups -----The mean index 
 Post-Mao education Mao education  
Description 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects (2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects (6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.2550*** 0.0509*** 0.0472 0.0455*** 0.2038*** 0.0211*** 0.0138 0.0214*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0296) (0.0141) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0067) 
Wage return to 
overeducation 
0.0683*** 0.0328*** 0.0251 0.0364*** 0.0319*** 0.0287*** 0.0185** 0.0283*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0182) (0.0071) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0072) (0.0038) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.0802*** -0.0413*** -0.0110 -0.0448*** -0.0396*** -0.0192*** -0.0074 -0.0203*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0112) (0.0299) (0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0042) 
Year 1991  -0.0089 0.1377 0.0284  0.1109*** 0.1475*** 0.1127*** 
  (0.1034) (0.0937) (0.0703)  (0.0113) (0.0186) (0.0121) 
Year 1993  0.1791* 0.3374*** 0.2013***  0.2371*** 0.3008*** 0.2371*** 
  (0.1006) (0.1166) (0.0690)  (0.0141) (0.0311) (0.0134) 
Year 1997  0.7011*** 0.9536*** 0.7216***  0.6413*** 0.8600*** 0.6572*** 
  (0.1055) (0.1916) (0.0771)  (0.0404) (0.0713) (0.0322) 
Year 2000  1.0068*** 1.3603*** 1.0271***  0.9748*** 1.2377*** 0.9910*** 
  (0.1064) (0.2413) (0.0789)  (0.0411) (0.0904) (0.0333) 
Year 2004  1.1946*** 1.7088*** 1.2268***  1.2594*** 1.6299*** 1.2903*** 
  (0.1102) (0.3070) (0.0849)  (0.0435) (0.1167) (0.0362) 
Year 2006  1.3525*** 1.9401*** 1.3892***  1.4318*** 1.8206*** 1.4544*** 
  (0.1116) (0.3407) (0.0877)  (0.0445) (0.1297) (0.0370) 
Year 2009  1.6933*** 2.3243*** 1.7166***  1.7460*** 2.2199*** 1.7796*** 
  (0.1132) (0.3923) (0.0888)  (0.0450) (0.1503) (0.0376) 
R2 0.5084 0.6019 0.5496  0.5695 0.6500 0.6032  
Observations 3368 3368 3368 3368 14398 14398 14398 14398 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 2-12 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) by age groups -----The mode index 
 Post-Mao education Mao education 
Description 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects (2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects (6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.3117*** 0.1030*** 0.0208 0.0977*** 0.2405*** 0.0694*** 0.0632*** 0.0739*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0443) (0.0159) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0082) 
Wage return to 
overeducation 
0.1709*** 0.0358** 0.0092 0.0431*** 0.0975*** 0.0487*** 0.0550*** 0.0549*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0153) (0.0404) (0.0145) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0200) (0.0084) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.2124*** -0.1108*** 0.0203 -0.1052*** -0.1304*** -0.0761*** -0.0371* -0.0704*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0217) (0.0483) (0.0196) (0.0109) (0.0095) (0.0205) (0.0088) 
Year 1991  0.0102 0.1842** 0.0441  0.1124*** 0.1374*** 0.1137*** 
  (0.1033) (0.0916) (0.0702)  (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0118) 
Year 1993  0.2026** 0.4201*** 0.2220***  0.2344*** 0.2725*** 0.2327*** 
  (0.1005) (0.1120) (0.0687)  (0.0139) (0.0347) (0.0131) 
Year 1997  0.7290*** 1.1228*** 0.7480***  0.6425*** 0.8109*** 0.6569*** 
  (0.1054) (0.1809) (0.0764)  (0.0400) (0.0775) (0.0320) 
Year 2000  1.0463*** 1.5959*** 1.0637***  0.9757*** 1.1716*** 0.9907*** 
  (0.1060) (0.2272) (0.0774)  (0.0406) (0.0995) (0.0325) 
Year 2004  1.2381*** 2.0226*** 1.2645***  1.2473*** 1.5337*** 1.2768*** 
  (0.1089) (0.2922) (0.0822)  (0.0426) (0.1312) (0.0348) 
Year 2006  1.3881*** 2.2862*** 1.4220***  1.4154*** 1.7009*** 1.4342*** 
  (0.1100) (0.3229) (0.0841)  (0.0433) (0.1464) (0.0355) 
Year 2009  1.7351*** 2.7281*** 1.7555***  1.7306*** 2.0789*** 1.7587*** 
  (0.1110) (0.3730) (0.0845)  (0.0437) (0.1702) (0.0358) 
R2 0.4897 0.6026 0.5489  0.5596 0.6512 0.6035  
Observations 3368 3368 3368 3368 14398 14398 14398 14398 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 2-13 Wage returns to education and wage returns to overeducation (ORU) by wave 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
In the mean index 
Wage return to actual years of schooling 0.0097* 0.0119*** 0.0074 0.0169*** 0.0342*** 0.0455*** 0.0570*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Wage return to required education -0.0211 0.0022 -0.0914*** 0.0034 0.1140*** 0.0723*** 0.0591*** 0.0776*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0116) (0.0189) (0.0230) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0164) (0.0154) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0061 0.0133** 0.0198** 0.0235*** 0.0200** 0.0508*** 0.0741*** 0.0475*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.0188* -0.0113* -0.0171* -0.0057 -0.0223** -0.0433*** -0.0439*** -0.0365*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0067) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
In the mode index 
Wage return to actual educational level 0.0257** 0.0273*** 0.0132 0.0451*** 0.0781*** 0.0984*** 0.1159*** 0.1098*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0085) (0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0123) (0.0130) (0.0129) 
Wage return to required education -0.0284 -0.0048 -0.0794*** 0.0278 0.1604*** 0.1381*** 0.1263*** 0.1483*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0257) (0.0219) (0.0225) (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0286 0.0268** 0.0343* 0.0442** 0.0550*** 0.0871*** 0.1018*** 0.0416** 
 (0.0188) (0.0121) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0175) (0.0207) (0.0196) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.0354 -0.0386** -0.0319* -0.0543** -0.0710*** -0.1004*** -0.1210*** -0.1448*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0259) (0.0244) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
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Table 2-14 Wage returns to years of schooling using average monthly wages and hourly wages 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Log monthly wages 
Wage return to years of schooling  0.0097* 0.0119*** 0.0074 0.0169*** 0.0342*** 0.0455*** 0.0570*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
R2 0.0877 0.2218 0.1615 0.1504 0.1083 0.2666 0.2642 0.2698 
Observations 2797 2769 2363 2194 2014 1757 1843 2029 
Log hourly wages 
Wage return to years of schooling 0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0126** 0.0243*** 0.0410*** 0.0542*** 0.0612*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064) 
R2 0.1251 0.2054 0.1504 0.1309 0.1152 0.2940 0.3175 0.3172 
Observations 2770 2750 2304 2146 1955 1737 1827 2012 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 2-15 Wage returns to overeducation using hourly wages --- ORU equation 
 
Description Pooled OLS Pooled OLS with time effects Fixed effects Random effects 
The mean index 
Wage return to required education 0.2525*** 0.0539*** 0.0248** 0.0505*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0106) (0.0064) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0341*** 0.0300*** 0.0222*** 0.0324*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0073) (0.0036) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.0433*** -0.0265*** -0.0130 -0.0293*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0042) 
R2 0.5732 0.6536 0.5913  
Observations 17501 17501 17501 17501 
The mode index 
Wage return to required education 0.2908*** 0.1099*** 0.0628*** 0.1104*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0199) (0.0076) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.1083*** 0.0510*** 0.0441** 0.0607*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0076) (0.0195) (0.0077) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.1402*** -0.0901*** -0.0287 -0.0875*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0089) (0.0204) (0.0085) 
R2 0.5590 0.6552 0.5915  
Observations 17501 17501 17501 17501 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 2-16 Wage effects of overeducation (VV) -----The mean index and the mode index 
 The mean index The mode index  
Description 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with time effects 
(2) 
Fixed effects 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with  
time effects 
(6) 
 
(6) 
Fixed effects 
 (7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to education 0.1141*** 0.0300*** 0.2767*** 0.0286*** 0.2393*** 0.0831*** 0.0509*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0590) (0.0035) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0176) (0.0066) 
Overeducated  -0.2400*** 0.0004 0.0399** 0.0126 -0.2033*** -0.0513*** -0.0064 -0.0445*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0147) (0.0140) (0.0122) (0.0158) (0.0118) 
Undereducated  0.2257*** 0.0483*** 0.0199 0.0388** 0.1486*** 0.0285** 0.0427*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0166) (0.0235) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0158) (0.0114) 
Year 1991  0.1089*** -0.3552*** 0.1138***  0.1112*** 0.1526*** 0.1160*** 
  (0.0113) (0.1131) (0.0116)  (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0116) 
Year 1993  0.2469*** -0.7273*** 0.2503***  0.2429*** 0.3069*** 0.2466*** 
  (0.0136) (0.2305) (0.0125)  (0.0136) (0.0318) (0.0124) 
Year 1997  0.7328*** -1.2205*** 0.7405***  0.7271*** 0.8844*** 0.7362*** 
  (0.0304) (0.4681) (0.0254)  (0.0302) (0.0692) (0.0254) 
Year 2000  1.0754*** -1.6294** 1.0839***  1.0707*** 1.2668*** 1.0809*** 
  (0.0307) (0.6431) (0.0257)  (0.0306) (0.0894) (0.0257) 
Year 2004  1.3255*** -2.3024*** 1.3532***  1.3177*** 1.6427*** 1.3464*** 
  (0.0324) (0.8765) (0.0279)  (0.0321) (0.1184) (0.0277) 
Year 2006  1.4927*** -2.6264*** 1.5186***  1.4735*** 1.8329*** 1.5009*** 
  (0.0329) (0.9922) (0.0283)  (0.0328) (0.1318) (0.0282) 
Year 2009  1.8121*** -3.0427*** 1.8420***  1.7932*** 2.2136*** 1.8241*** 
  (0.0330) (1.1691) (0.0282)  (0.0330) (0.1535) (0.0281) 
R2 0.5390 0.6518 0.5972  0.5417 0.6526 0.5966  
Observations 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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2.6 Conclusion and implications  
This chapter explores the phenomenon of overeducation in the Chinese labour market 
using CHNS data from 1989 to 2009. Specifically, the three research questions 
presented in the first chapter (page 7) are answered.  Firstly, the extent of overeducation 
and undereducation in China in two indexes of defining required education is different. 
In the mean index, about 18.19% of workers in our sample are treated as overeducated 
and 20.33% employees have deficit education. While in the mode index, the incidence 
of overeducation is 26.10% and 30.16% of workers are estimated as undereducated. 
Males have higher incidence of overeducation than females in both indexes. However, 
in the mean index, males have higher incidence of undereducation than females.  
 
Second, the results from the ordered probit model in both indexes reveal the 
determinants of overeducation in China. The results indicate that males and workers 
who have urban Hukou are more likely to be estimated as overeducated in the Chinese 
labour market. People who work in firms with between 20 and 100 employees and in 
firms with less than 20 employees are less likely to be estimated as overeducated than 
those individuals who work in firms with more than 100 employees, which is confirmed 
in both indexes. Consistent results that people who work in the private sector are more 
likely to be overeducated than individuals in the government sector can be found in both 
indexes. In addition, only results in the mean index confirm that workers who have less 
experience tend to be overeducated. Individuals in the East region are more likely to be 
estimated as overeducated than the west region only in the mean index.    
 
Previous studies employ cross-sectional data to explore wage effects of overeducation 
in China, which has been criticised for ignoring time effects and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The answer to the third question of the wage effects of overeducation in 
China is addressed in this chapter by making a longitudinal analysis of the wage effects 
of overeducation, taking time effects and unobserved heterogeneity into consideration. 
In this chapter, four models (pooled OLS regression, pooled OLS regression with time 
effects, fixed effects model and random effects model), two measurement methods of 
required education (the mean index and mode index) and two equations (VV equation 
and ORU equation) are employed to explore wage effects of overeducation in China. 
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Based on pooled OLS analysis, similar patterns of wage effects of overeducation from 
the mean index and mode index in two equations echo the point of view that different 
definitions of required education conduct similar results of wage effects of 
overeducation. In addition, time effects indeed have a big impact on the wage return to 
overeducation and undereducation. Although time effects change the magnitude of 
wage effects, the patterns of estimation results are still consistent with previous findings 
that educational mismatch causes wage differentials. The exploration of wage effects of 
overeducation by wave is also conducted in this chapter and empirical results suggest 
that economic transition and its following changes in the labour market and education 
system in China can be reflected through time effects. In addition, this chapter also 
investigates wage effects of overeducation by age groups. Results of wage effects of 
overeducation from pooled OLS estimation using the mode index not only confirm the 
main conclusions of the existing literature, but also show different pictures of wage 
effects of overeducation between Post Mao and Mao education systems.      
 
As expected, taking unobserved heterogeneity into account, empirical results in this 
chapter indicate that wage penalty of overeducation becomes smaller or even 
disappears, which can be confirmed by the mode index in the VV equation. It seems that 
individual heterogeneity plays a very important role in the analysis of wage effects of 
overeducation in the Chinese labour market. We can say that wage penalty of 
overeducated population may attribute to low ability to some extent. The following 
recommendations regarding improving ability should be taken into consideration:  
 
First, higher education institutions should provide students more opportunities to gain 
relevant work experience or work placements during their studies. Through those 
occupational experiences, students can know the actual working process and 
accordingly, they will supplement and adjust their personal skills related to the market 
needs, which can improve their employability and reduce the possibility of finding a 
mismatched job. Good examples are from “Apprenticeship” in England and the “Dual-
system” in Germany. Although there are some apprenticeship programmes in China, 
they are all applied in vocational education. We can also import workplace training into 
university or higher level. In addition, higher education institutions should strengthen 
the relationship and cooperation with enterprises to create more off-campus 
employment practice bases to supply work placements and internships to students. We 
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can also set educational institutions-owned enterprises by way of joint-stock to fully use 
the advantages of human capital and technical support in education system. This method 
can not only provide more funding to higher education institutions, but also offer job 
positions and working experience to students.  
 
Second, improving the quality of teaching is essential. More funding should be provided 
to support the on-the-job training of teachers. On-the-job training can equip teachers 
with the most updated knowledge and techniques in a concordance with the needs of the 
market to improve their ability to cultivate students. On the other hand, we can recruit 
experts with working experience outside academia who can bring practical knowledge 
into teaching as teachers.  
 
Results in section 2.5.1 imply that individuals who have urban registration are more 
likely to be estimated as overeducated compared to their rural registration counterparts. 
This motivates us to make a comparison study of overeducation between urban 
residents and rural migrant workers in the urban labour market, which will be presented 
in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 Educational mismatch, skill mismatch and job 
satisfaction  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The match between skills offered by the workforce and skills needed by the labour 
market has been a particular concern of policy-makers and society in recent years. In the 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2014 in Davos, the World Economic Forum's 
Global Agenda Council on Employment presented a report to address the importance of 
skill mismatch issues across the world after the global economic crisis26. The skill 
mismatch problem also affects China. In the current Chinese labour market, three salient 
features regarding employment need to be examined: (1) the supply of graduates 
exceeds the labour market’s needs. Since the higher education expansion in China in 
1999, the number of graduates has increased from 1.55 million in 1999 to 6.82 million 
in 201127. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2014, there are 7.27 million 
graduates surging into the labour market, which is the highest number in history. This 
feature is often recognised as one of the causes of overeducation, which is also 
mentioned in Chapter 2. (2) Some firms and factories have reported that it is hard for 
them to hire suitable workers, especially in expanding service industries, like banking 
and telecommunication (OECD, 2015). (3) Skills processed by employees fail to satisfy 
the employers’ needs (Molnar et al., 2015). 
 
Skill mismatch occurs when an individual’s skills are not consistent with the skills 
required by the job. Skill mismatch can bring significant a cost to employers (firms), 
employees and the whole country. For employers, skill mismatch can reduce 
productivity and lead to high turnover rate of employees. For employees, skill mismatch 
may entail low wages, low job satisfaction and unfulfilled career expectations. For a 
given country, skill mismatch may result in reduced productivity efficiency and a 
decreased growth rate of GDP (Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011). 
                                                 
26
 Matching Skills and Labour Market Needs: Building Social Partnerships for Better Skills and Better 
Jobs.  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_Employment_MatchingSkillsLabourMarket_Rep
ort_2014.pdf.  
27
 Detailed figures of college enrollment rate in China from 1999 to 2011 can be seen in Chapter 2 Table 
A1.      
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Most literature on mismatch uses educational mismatch (overeducation and 
undereducation) to represent skill mismatch because it is convenient to collect data of 
years of schooling and qualifications (Hartog, 2000); (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000); 
(Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink, 2000). If the acquired years of schooling are higher 
than the required educational level of his job, a person is estimated as “overeducated”. 
In contrast, workers are considered to be undereducated if their actual educational years 
are lower than the required education for their jobs. The possible reasons for the 
existence of overeducation in the literature are the increased supply of graduates 
(Freeman, 1976), imperfect information and career mobility (Hartog, 2000), and 
compensation for other skills and abilities (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). 
 
The relationship between overeducation and wages is widely investigated in the existing 
literature. Empirical evidence has indicated that overeducated individuals incur wage 
penalties when compared to people who have a similar educational level but are 
correctly matched. However, employees who have a higher educational level than the 
required educational level for their jobs have higher wage compared to those who work 
in the same job but are estimated as matched. Both returns to required education and 
surplus education are positive, but returns to required education are higher than returns 
to surplus education (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981); (Hartog, 1985); (Rumberger, 1987); 
(Alba-Ramirez, 1993). In addition, overeducation is a serious concern for organisations. 
Many researchers have found that overeducated people show more job dissatisfaction 
(Tsang and Levin, 1985), experience higher rates of absenteeism and are more likely to 
switch jobs (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972). As a result, production costs of companies 
may increase due to the reduced work effort of overeducated employees, which implies 
that there should be a negative relationship between overeducation and productivity. 
That is to say, overeducated people may behave in counterproductive ways. Considering 
the potential costs of overeducation, firms may avoid employing overeducated 
candidates (Tsang and Levin, 1985).    
 
Although education or qualification data is easy to acquire and can measure generic 
skills to some extent, it doesn’t measure detailed skill categories needed for jobs, like 
literacy skills, numeric skills and management skills, and it doesn’t take the 
development of skills over the life cycle into consideration (Desjardins and Rubenson, 
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2011). Recent studies suggest that educational mismatch and skill mismatch are two 
distinct concepts (Green and McIntosh, 2007). Some researchers have begun to shift 
their research interests towards employing skill mismatch (skill surplus and skill deficit) 
to investigate mismatch issues in the labour market (Allen and De Weert, 2007); 
(Mavromaras et al., 2013). If taking skill mismatch into consideration, many existing 
links between educational mismatch and labour market outcomes, such as wages and 
job satisfaction, need to be revisited (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001); (Badillo-
Amador and Vila, 2013).    
  
Throughout the literature, the overall analysis of job satisfaction in China is very limited 
due to the absence of data on job satisfaction. Moreover, in comparison to other fields of 
overeducation research, there is no study that explores the relationship between 
educational mismatch and job satisfaction in China currently. However, a new dataset, 
the Chinese General Social Survey (2008), provides a range of job satisfaction 
measures, which enables us to explore the determinants of overall and specific aspects 
of job satisfaction and investigate detailed links between overeducation and 
undereducation and job satisfaction. For example, not only do we focus upon overall job 
satisfaction, we also investigate satisfaction with: salary, welfare, workload, working 
conditions and facilities, the relationship with colleagues, the relationship with the boss, 
commuting distance to job location and housing benefits 28 . This analysis is a 
contribution to the overeducation literature in China. In addition, the existing literature 
regarding overeducation states that overeducated individuals have wage penalties 
compared to matched workers but they fail to control for skill mismatch. To our 
knowledge, only Molnar et al. (2015) present detailed analysis of skill mismatch in 
China29. In this chapter, the availability of data on skill mismatch allows us to take both 
educational mismatch and skill mismatch into consideration simultaneously to explore 
the corresponding effects on job satisfaction.  
 
This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: first, what are the determinants of 
overall job satisfaction? Second, whether or not overeducation reduces overall job 
satisfaction and if so whether a negative relationship can be applied to different aspects 
                                                 
28
 Housing benefits include monetarisation of housing subsidies and rent subsidies. The subsidy level is 
varied among provinces and cities in China (Lee, 2000).  
29
 Five broad skill categories are analysed in Molnar et al. (2015), which includes practical skills, 
analytical skills, managing skills, critical thinking and communication skills.  
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of job satisfaction. Third, does skill mismatch or educational mismatch play an 
important role in explaining individuals’ job satisfaction?   
  
Empirical results in this chapter indicate that educational overeducation may not result 
in negative effects on job satisfaction as a priori expectations and skill mismatch is a 
better indicator to explain job dissatisfaction in the Chinese labour market. This chapter 
provides strong evidence that improving skill match efficiency should be the main 
concern of policy makers if China desires sustainable economic growth in the future. It 
is good to see that the Chinese government has realised the negative effects of skill 
mismatch to some extent. A series of policies have been issued to tackle skill mismatch 
problems in recent years, for example, The Outline of China’s National Plan for 
Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development 2010-2020 and the 
Opinion on Piloting a Modern Apprenticeship System in August 2014 (Molnar et al., 
2015). This chapter also echoes the ambition of the Chinese government to strengthen 
the development of vocational education and training in China in the future.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is constructed as follows. Section 3.2 provides a detailed 
summary of the literature related to this topic. In section 3.3 and section 3.4, I will 
explicitly introduce the data and econometric methods used in the analysis. Section 3.5 
explores the determinants of overall job satisfaction in the Chinese labour market and 
also investigates the relationship among overall job satisfaction and eight aspects of job 
satisfaction, educational mismatch and skill mismatch. Finally, the section 3.6 presents a 
discussion and conclusion.     
 
3.2 Literature review   
3.2.1 The concept of job satisfaction  
One of the most interesting notions in social science is job satisfaction. Locke (1976) 
offers a comprehensive and systematic review of the literature on job satisfaction 
regarding the concept, causes and effects of job satisfaction from the aspect of 
psychology. Argyle (1987) treats job satisfaction as one of the three most important 
predictors of overall well-being, the remaining two being marriage and family 
satisfaction. Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) argue that job satisfaction shows 
people’s attitudes toward their job experience and also can be treated as an indicator to 
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examine whether employees would choose the same job again if opportunity available. 
Hamermesh (1999) argues that job satisfaction reflects employees judgment about job 
characteristics and can be used as an index to make comparisons with other potential job 
market opportunities. Job satisfaction also reflects the extent people favour their work 
(Millan et al., 2013). Moreover, job satisfaction allows economists to have a better 
understanding of the fundamental concept of aggregate well-being than job earnings, 
which is a one-sided criterion to judge well-being (Heywood et al., 2009). However, job 
satisfaction is a concept that has been rarely considered in economics. Although job 
satisfaction data is easy to collect in surveys, the process of classifying job satisfaction 
varies with individuals. That is to say, people may have different interpretations of 
scales of job satisfaction answers. Many economists argue that job satisfaction reflects 
people’s subjective judgment, which may generate a meaningless figure in economic 
analysis. Nevertheless, psychologists and sociologists have used job satisfaction data for 
many years and the validity of survey questions has been tested thoroughly, which 
indicates that useful information is indeed contained in the questions on job satisfaction 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999). Freeman (1978) argues that subjective variables like 
job satisfaction indeed convey useful and important information for us to understand 
and predict people’s occupational choice and behaviours.  
 
Recently, economists have treated self-reported job satisfaction as a useful tool to 
explore labour market behaviours, such as productivity, quits and absenteeism (Hulin et 
al., 1985); (Johns and Xie, 1998); (Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006). Clark et al. (1998) find 
that people who are not satisfied with their work are more likely to have higher 
absenteeism and a higher possibility of quitting than individuals who have high level of 
job satisfaction. It is easy to understand that dissatisfied workers try to change jobs or 
workplaces in order to get job satisfaction (Kickul et al., 2004). High job satisfaction is 
related to positive performance within a firm (Ostroff, 1992); (Freeman et al., 2008). 
Seo et al. (2004) find that job satisfaction has a positive link with employees’ perception 
of their quality of life. The above evidence provides feasible reasons why job 
satisfaction should not be ignored by economists. 
    
3.2.2 The measurement of job satisfaction 
There are two ways to explore job satisfaction data. The first is the One-dimension 
method, which can also be called the global measure of job satisfaction, which is 
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commonly used in studies by economists. It requires respondents to take a whole 
assessment of their job (Nielsen and Smyth, 2008). Most researchers adopt direct self-
reporting methods to measure overall job satisfaction. There are generally two kinds of 
questions asked in the surveys to respondents. The format of answers is measured in 
ordered scales rather than cardinal scales in the first category. For example, in the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), individuals are asked “All things considered, 
how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job satisfaction using the same 1-
7 scale? The answers are given a number from 1 to 7, where a value 1 representing “not 
satisfied at all” and a value 7 corresponding to “completely satisfied”30. In addition, the 
data on job satisfaction in the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) are scaled 
broader than those in BHPS, where respondents are given answers ranging from 0 (very 
dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)31. Another kind of question asks respondents to reply 
to the job satisfaction question with yes, no or unknown. For example, Johnson and 
Johnson (2000) employ job satisfaction questions from a two-wave panel study of 
members of a Midwestern American Postal Workers Union local, where individuals 
were asked to reply with yes, no or cannot decide.  
 
A job consists of complex tasks, roles, responsibilities and rewards (Locke, 1976). If we 
want to get a thorough understanding of the job itself, we need to analyse its constituent 
elements. The other method is called the multidimensional method, which asks 
respondents to report job satisfaction for some particular aspect of their job. For 
example, Clark (1996) employs the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to explore 
job satisfaction data from seven aspects: promotion prospects, total pay, relations with 
supervisors, job security, ability to work on their own initiative, the actual work itself, 
and hours of work. In addition, the Triple Audit Opinion Survey (TAOS) in United 
States asks respondents to rate their degree of satisfaction from 25 aspects of the job 
(Lee and Wilbur, 1985).  
 
Both methods have advantages and drawbacks. The global measure enables respondents 
to judge job satisfaction on all kinds of job characteristics. Clark (1998) argues that 
overall job satisfaction data indeed make a good summary of the information 
respondents want to convey from their jobs. However, the one-dimension job 
                                                 
30
 The detailed job satisfaction question of BHPS comes from Clark (1996).  
31
 The detailed job satisfaction question of GSOEP comes from Hamermesh (1999).  
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satisfaction approach is often criticised in that it does not provide detailed information 
regarding satisfaction from different job dimensions. Moreover, empirical analysis 
indicates that the whole job satisfaction approach is not equivalent to the 
multidimensional job satisfaction measurement (Scarpello and Campbell, 1983). It is 
widely recognised that employees may have different attitudes towards different aspects 
of the job, for example, employees may be satisfied with the salary of their jobs, but 
dissatisfied with the relationship with colleagues. Therefore, the multidimensional 
method can give us a clear picture of job satisfaction and provides useful information to 
managers to identify advantages and weakness to improve performance. However, the 
job owns a number of aspects and due to the design limitation, some useful information 
will be missed when transforming facet-specific job satisfaction to overall job 
satisfaction (Kalleberg and Vaisey, 2005).   
 
Generally, the principal to choose the measurement approach is based upon the 
application and also data availability. In terms of application, policy makers may be 
interested in overall job satisfaction data because they may be interested in observing 
changes of job satisfaction over time (Scarpello and Campbell, 1983). However, for 
enterprises, they place more attention on multidimensional job satisfaction data, which 
can be used to explore why employees quit their jobs or to improve job satisfaction of 
employees. Some researchers employ factor analysis to reduce the number of job 
satisfaction variables (Schwochau, 1987); (Brown and McIntosh, 1998). 
 
3.2.3 Determinants of job satisfaction 
Employers always expect their employees to have high satisfaction with their job, 
because job satisfaction is a very important index to indicate employees’ labour market 
behaviour, such as productivity, quits and absenteeism. Thus, it is very important to 
explore the determinants of job satisfaction. According to Clark and Oswald (1996), an 
individual’s life utility function is defined as follows: 
 
      V=v (μ, ü)                                                                                                                           (1)                             
where v represents a function of an individual’s life utility and consists of μ, utility from 
work and ü, utility from other aspects of life. The utility from working is measured in 
the following form: 
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      μ=μ(y, i, j,)                                                                                                                          (2)   
                  
where y is an individual’s wage, i and j are individual and job characteristics. Equation 
(2) is a standard economic model to explore determinants of job satisfaction. According 
to the economic literature, the determinants of job satisfaction have revealed many 
consistent and robust findings. However, the above empirical analysis of job satisfaction 
is based on the hypothesis that wages are exogenous in the regression. 
 
Pay (Salary) 
Most individuals spend a quarter of their life time in paid work. When you ask people 
reasons why they choose to work, the majority of them would prefer money as their 
answers (Jurgensen, 1978). Therefore, pay is a very important factor for people to 
measure their current job itself and related characteristics, such as quit, absenteeism and 
job satisfaction. It is easy to understand that those who are paid more should report 
higher job satisfaction. However, theoretically, pay can have either a positive or 
negative relationship with job satisfaction. On one hand, high pay has a positive impact 
on satisfaction with pay32. According to a meta-analysis of the relationship between pay 
and job satisfaction conducted by Judge et al. (2010), higher pay leads to higher job 
satisfaction. However, self-determination theory states that extrinsic rewards, such as 
pay, will sometimes undermine employees’ autonomy when employees have different 
viewpoints with employers and thus reduce people’s motivation and degree of 
satisfaction (Deci and Ryan, 2000).   
 
In addition, there is an argument whether absolute or relative earnings are relevant in 
the relationship between pay and job satisfaction. According to Rees (1993), a worker’s 
utility is decided by his or her own wage and working hours without comparing with 
others based on neo-classical wage theory. Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) find that the 
relationship between absolute pay and job satisfaction is significantly positive. 
However, many scholars suggest that relative earnings play an important role to 
determine job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1996); (Meng, 1990); (Sloane and 
Williams, 2000). Ngoc et al. (2003) conclude four ways to measure relative earnings or 
income: (1) the earnings gap between individuals and those people who made the same 
                                                 
32
 Satisfaction with pay is one of the most important determinants of overall job satisfaction. 
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investment at the same time as them; (2) employees may compare themselves with an 
internal reference group to create expectations33; (3) individuals in a given job at time T 
may make a comparison with people who have same job at time T-1; (4) the difference 
between expected income made by the individual and the actual outcome earnings.   
        
Gender 
According to the literature, the most persistent finding is the relationship between 
gender and job satisfaction (Brown and McIntosh, 1998). After controlling for a large 
set of individual and job characteristics, women are found to be happier with their jobs 
overall than men (Clark, 1996); (Clark, 1997); (Sloane and Williams, 2000). This 
finding is not only examined in Europe and the USA, but also explored in other 
countries, for example, Canada (Murray and Atkinson, 1981), China (Loscocco and 
Bose, 1998), Singapore (Goh et al., 1991). There are mainly three plausible 
explanations. The first one is that men and women do different types of work according 
to their personal characteristics and qualifications (Clark, 1996). The second reason is 
that men and women value different aspects of their job when they evaluate job 
satisfaction. For example, men treat earnings and responsibility as the most important 
factors while women consider their relationship with co-workers and supervisors more 
important than men do (Konrad et al., 2000). However, Clark (1997) argues that those 
individuals who treat earnings as the most important determinant of job satisfaction 
report lower job satisfaction. The third reason is called the participation effect (Clark, 
1996). Dissatisfied women workers may find it easier to leave the labour market than 
men and more satisfied women stay in the labour market, which may create a selection 
problem (Clark, 1996). Despite the above reasons, Clark (1997) uses wave 1 of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to explore the relationship between gender and 
job satisfaction, and finds that women report higher job satisfaction than men after 
controlling for a large number of individual and job characteristics. Through empirical 
analysis, he claims that the main reason to explain higher job satisfaction amongst 
women is that they have lower expectations. Not because men and women do different 
jobs or by sample selection, but rather that, women’s jobs were worse in the past and 
thus they expect less from their current job (Clark, 1997). In addition, Bender et al. 
(2005) argue that some unmeasured characteristics that women value may exist in the 
                                                 
33
 McBride (2001) suggests that parents and other relatives can be employed as internal reference groups.  
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given job if women report higher job satisfaction.  
   
Age 
According to life cycle and career stage models, employees in different stages of their 
career may have different attitudes towards their jobs and thus have different levels of 
job satisfaction (Lee and Wilbur, 1985). Therefore, age is a very important determinant 
of job satisfaction. There are basically three kinds of views in the literature regarding 
the relationship between age and job satisfaction. The first one is that the relationship 
between age and job satisfaction is U-shaped (Clark et al., 1996); (Clark, 1996); (Clark 
and Oswald, 1996). Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) find that job satisfaction is higher for 
the youngest and oldest workers than those middle aged groups. The second finding is 
that job satisfaction increases with age, namely a positive relationship (Hulin and Smith, 
1965); (Lee and Wilbur, 1985); (Martin and Shehan, 1989). The third one is that there is 
a negative relationship between age and job satisfaction (Mora et al., 2007).  
 
Education  
Education plays a very important role in the study of labour market behaviour. 
Sufficient evidence indicates that individuals with higher levels of education earn more, 
are less likely to experience unemployment and can find better jobs than less-educated 
people (Card, 1999). The most important motivation for acquiring high educational 
attainment is to a do satisfying job (Glenn and Weaver, 1982). Better educated people 
may have an advantage to find jobs with more intrinsic and extrinsic rewards and at the 
same time, both rewards may result in higher job satisfaction. Based on above, the 
predicted relationship between education and job satisfaction should be positive. Martin 
and Shehan (1989) and Cheng et al. (2014b) all find a positive relationship between 
education and job satisfaction. Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) also find that education 
has a positive impact on reporting high job satisfaction. However, when controlling for 
income, the coefficient on years of education changes from being significantly positive 
to insignificantly negative, which is similar to the findings from Clark and Oswald 
(1996). Other studies suggest that the correlation between education and job satisfaction 
is negative. For example, Clark (1996) argues that the higher the level of education, the 
lower the reported satisfaction level. The reason behind it is that higher educated people 
have higher expectations for their jobs than less educated people. Unsatisfied 
expectations may lead to negative relationship between education and job satisfaction. 
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Bender et al. (2005), Clark (1997), Brown and McIntosh (1998) and Gazioglu and 
Tansel (2006) all find a negative relationship exists between education and job 
satisfaction. Nonetheless, Glenn and Weaver (1982) argue that education can have either 
a positive or a negative effect on job satisfaction. That is to say, some specific 
individuals may have a strong positive effect offsetting those who have a negative effect 
and thus leading to a positive effect in the aggregate data and vice versa. Therefore, 
Glenn and Weaver (1982) suggest that separate analysis for different groups of people is 
necessary. For instance, those people with college degree who value extrinsic rewards 
most may report low job satisfaction if their expectations about extrinsic rewards are not 
fulfilled in the jobs. However, other individuals with college degree prefer to do 
interesting jobs rather than pursuing high earnings. It is possible that the impact of 
education on job satisfaction may be positive. In light of above findings, the relationship 
between education and job satisfaction is a matter of empirical investigation.               
 
Health 
It is not surprising that individuals with poor physical health could report low job 
satisfaction. Clark (1996) argues that workers in poor health status are more likely to 
find jobs with low job satisfaction level and they also tend to be unsatisfied with every 
aspect of life. Clark (1997), Bender et al. (2005), Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) and 
Cheng et al. (2014b) all report that a health problem may be detrimental to levels of job 
satisfaction.  
 
Marital status 
Clark (1996) suggests that married employees report the highest job satisfaction than 
those single individuals (non-married). The reason behind this is that married people are 
generally happier than single individuals. Clark (1997) reported that marriage is a 
significant determinant of overall job satisfaction for women but not for men. However, 
results from Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) indicate that married people are less satisfied 
than single individuals. Single people can be considered as independent individuals and 
are easier to make a balance between work and home commitment than married workers 
(Brown and McIntosh, 1998).      
 
Establishment size  
Employees in larger firms are generally found to be less satisfied than those in smaller 
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establishments (Idson, 1990). Clark (1996) and Gazioglu and Tansel (2006) also find 
similar results. Martin and Shehan (1989) only find a significantly negative relationship 
between establishment size and job satisfaction for men. Clark (1996) argues that small 
establishments attract employees by providing attractive intrinsic rewards, which 
increases job satisfaction for those who value such job attributes.   
 
Job type  
According to the existing literature, the relationship between job type and overall job 
satisfaction is mixed. Shockey and Mueller (1994) argue that full-time workers are more 
likely to report higher job satisfaction than part-time workers. The reason behind it is 
that the working conditions of full-time workers allow for more autonomy and task 
varieties than part-time workers. Thus, they have higher satisfaction and commitment to 
their employers (Shockey and Mueller, 1994). Eberhardt and Shani (1984) argue that 
higher job satisfaction in part-time employees is due to the comparison group choosen. 
Part-time workers with sick pay and job benefits usually compare themselves with other 
part-time workers without job benefits. Logan et al. (1973) suggest that the overall job 
satisfaction of full-time workers and part-time employees are alike. However, these two 
groups have different attitudes towards facets of job satisfaction. For example, part-time 
workers report higher job satisfaction with their pay and their relationship with co-
workers. Full-time workers are more responsive to satisfaction with promotion 
opportunities (Logan et al., 1973).         
 
Work unit type  
Bogg and Cooper (1995) find that senior civil servants in the public sector in the UK  
experience higher level of job dissatisfaction and higher mental stress than people in the 
same job level in the private sector, which may be explained by longer working hours, 
poorer pay and less job autonomy in the public sector. Steel and Warner (1990) suggest 
that after controlling for a variety of characteristics, employees in the public sector 
indicate higher job satisfaction than their counterparts in the private sector. However, 
their study only focuses on young labour participants, who are not representative of all 
employees. DeSantis and Durst (1996) argue that the determinants of job satisfaction 
and the reward system are different in the public and private sector. It is better to 
explore these two groups separately in terms of job satisfaction. Markovits et al. (2007) 
state that public sector employees report higher extrinsic job satisfaction (pay and fringe 
87 
 
benefits) than their counterparts in the private sector in Greece.  
 
Other significant determinants of job satisfaction have been observed including union 
membership (Borjas, 1979), working hours (Bartel, 1981); (Clark and Oswald, 1996) 
and training opportunities (Gazioglu and Tansel, 2006).       
 
3.2.4 Job satisfaction in China  
Spector (1997) argues that different countries and cultures may exhibit different extent 
and patterns of job satisfaction. Most existing studies of job satisfaction in China focus 
on some particular groups and firms of a particular ownership type (Nielsen and Smyth, 
2008), unlike the analysis of job satisfaction in the whole countries (Green and 
Tsitsianis, 2005), which has tended to focus on representative sample of the underlying 
population.  
 
In terms of specific groups, for example, Sargent and Hannum (2005) explore the 
factors influencing teacher satisfaction at the community, school and individual levels. 
Lu et al.(2007) report that more than half of surveyed nurses were satisfied with their 
current jobs, which is in contrast to popular beliefs. Wang et al. (2013) mainly focus 
their attention on migrant workers in China employing a migrant survey from Guiyang 
city. They find that the new generation of migrants has higher job satisfaction than the 
old generation, which is in contrast to the expected result. Working conditions play an 
important role in determining job satisfaction among new generations of migrants rather 
than personal characteristics, such as income, age and gender. Apart from this, 
differences in family characteristics also contribute to the job satisfaction differential 
between the two generations of migrant workers. In addition, Cheng et al. (2014b) 
explore the determinants of job satisfaction of urban locals, first and new generation 
migrants in urban China using the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008, which 
includes data across 29 provinces and municipalities in China. Results in this study 
indicate that the new generation migrant workers show lower job satisfaction than that 
of the old generation migrant workers and urban locals.   
 
Studies of job satisfaction confined to specific ownership types including Leung et al. 
(1996) and Scott et al. (2003). Leung et al. (1996) focus on joint venture hotels in China 
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to explore the relationship between justice and job satisfaction34. It is interesting to see 
that Chinese employees working with management groups composed by overseas 
Chinese and Japanese report lower job satisfaction than their counterparts working with 
managers from western countries, which can be explained by distributive justice 
differences. Scott et al. (2003) explore job satisfaction in U.S. invested enterprise in 
China. The empirical evidence indicates that Chinese employees have higher job 
satisfaction, a lower possibility to change jobs and are more willing to cooperate with 
colleagues than their U.S. counterparts.  
 
 
3.2.5 Educational mismatch, skill mismatch and job satisfaction  
It is well recognised that a worker’s productivity and skill level is determined by one’s 
abilities, attitudes and knowledge (Badillo-Amador and Vila, 2013). When a worker 
enters into the labour market, there is a possibility that he may find a job that is not 
equivalent with the skill requirement of the job, being either lower or higher, which can 
be called job-worker skill mismatch (Sutherland, 2012). Job-worker skill mismatch has 
very important implications for both employees and employers as the quality of the job-
worker match can determine productivity and wages to some extent. There are three 
kinds of skill mismatch, namely overskill, underskill and domain mismatch (Badillo-
Amador and Vila, 2013)35. When the skill level the individual holds is higher than the 
job requires, this condition is defined as “overskill” and when the skill level is lower 
than the job requires, this can be described as “underskill”. Battu et al. (2000) argue that 
the measurement and extent of mismatch are decided by the way mismatch is defined.    
 
Most of the literature employs years of schooling or qualifications to identify job-
worker mismatch because of the convenience and feasibility to collect data (Chevalier, 
2003) and thus educational mismatch is deemed as a good proxy of skill mismatch. 
Assignment theory implies that educational mismatch and skill mismatch are closely 
related (Sattinger, 1993). In assignment theory, candidates are allocated from the top to 
the bottom of job complexity based on their skills. That is to say, the most skilled 
individuals are assigned to the most difficult and advanced jobs and meanwhile, the 
                                                 
34
 There are three kinds of justice, namely procedural justice, performance-based distributive justice and 
interactional justice.  
35
 Because of the lack of domain information in our dataset, we only focus on the discussion of overskill 
and underskill here.   
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least skilled person is allocated to the simplest one. Workers report their educational 
level as indicators of their skill level (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001). However, in the 
heterogeneous theory, Green and McIntosh (2007) suggest that these two concepts are 
weakly correlated. Even if two workers have the same educational qualifications, their 
skills and abilities are heterogeneous. Those who are overeducated earn less than people 
who have the same level of qualifications but are correctly educated is because they 
have a low level of skill (Green and McIntosh, 2007). Sánchez-Sánchez and 
McGuinness (2013) argue that when the job entry requirement is not equal to the actual 
skills needed in the job, educational attainment is a poor signal of human capital and 
therefore overeducation is not appropriate to represent skill mismatch status. In the 
literature, several researchers have confirmed that educational mismatch does not imply 
skill mismatch (Halaby, 1994); (Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006); (Allen and De Weert, 
2007).   
 
Compared with other aspects of overeducation, the issue of job satisfaction still remains 
largely unexplored due to the absence of data of job satisfaction (Fleming and Kler, 
2008). To date, the overeducation-job satisfaction relationship attracts the interest of 
economists mainly from three points of view: (1) the impact of job satisfaction on 
productivity (Tsang and Levin, 1985); (Tsang, 1987); (Büchel, 2002); (Verhaest and 
Omey, 2006), (2) expectations (Glenn and Weaver, 1982); (Tsang et al., 1991), and (3) 
relative deprivation (Johnson and Johnson, 2000). Tsang and Levin (1985) construct a 
two-stage production model for a firm to demonstrate how overeducation can have 
adverse effects on individual productivity. Tsang (1987) adopts quantitative analysis to 
explore the impact of overeducation on job satisfaction in 22 U.S. Bell companies in the 
telephone and telegraph industry from 1981 to 1982, which is based on Tsang and Levin 
(1985) model. In this study, job satisfaction is considered as an indicator of employee 
work effort. The application of the Cobb-Douglas production function and job 
satisfaction index function indicates that overeducated employees show lower job 
satisfaction.  
 
Based on the literature, education is a very important variable to form people’s 
expectations from the workplace, because it can increase individuals’ job expectations 
and aspirations (Glenn and Weaver, 1982). After a number of years of study, an 
individual expects to acquire a satisfying job, high earnings and significant social status. 
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Moreover, more educated people may set higher requirements for their jobs than their 
less educated counterparts (Tsang and Levin, 1985). However, if this expectation is not 
fulfilled, individuals will report low job satisfaction in their jobs. When individuals 
acquire a job below their educational level, they may confront reduced salary, less 
challenging tasks and restricted autonomy (Peiró et al., 2010). That is to say, their 
expectations about their jobs are unfulfilled if they are overeducated, which may lead to 
lower job satisfaction. A bulk of literature has focus on this point of view to explain the 
negative relationship between job satisfaction and overeducation (Hersch, 1991); (Battu 
et al., 2000); (Peiró et al., 2010); (Zakariya and Battu, 2013).   
 
Overeducation may give rise to relative deprivation, which could have negative effects 
on job satisfaction (Johnson and Johnson, 2000). Johnson and Johnson (2000) is the first 
study to use relative deprivation theory to explain the relationship between 
overeducation and job satisfaction. There are two sources of relative deprivation that 
overeducated workers may have. When well-educated individuals acquire a job that is 
lower than their educational level, they may incur skill mismatch, decreased salary 
(Alba-Ramirez, 1993); (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989) and thus relative deprivation may 
happen. In addition, overeducated individuals may feel deprivation in comparison with 
those counterparts who are in correctly educated status. Overeducated people have two 
comparison groups to choose. One is those individuals who have the same educational 
level as them but in jobs for which are correctly educated. While the other group of 
people are those who work in the same job with overeducated people but are correctly 
educated, namely their peers (Peiró et al., 2010).  
 
In the empirical analysis, if controlling for actual years of education, the negative 
relationship between overall job satisfaction and overeducation is confirmed by many 
studies (Tsang, 1987); (Battu et al., 2000); (Allen and van der Velden, 2001); (Verhaest 
and Omey, 2006). However, Green and Zhu (2010) suggest that overeducation itself 
without considering skill utilization cannot reduce overall job satisfaction. In terms of 
undereducation, the results are vague. Allen and Van der Velden (2001) find an 
insignificantly positive relationship between undereducation and overall job 
satisfaction. Verhofstadt and Omey (2003) find a negative impact of undereducation on 
job satisfaction for women and a positive effect for men. If taking required education 
level into consideration, Hersch (1991) and Verhaest and Omey (2006) all suggest that 
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overeducated employees are less satisfied than those who are correctly educated but 
work at the same job level. However, Büchel (2002) reports that the effect of 
overeducation on job satisfaction is positive but insignificant. In terms of 
undereducation, Verhaest and Omey (2006) find significantly negative effects using Job 
Analysis (JA) method to define educational mismatch. This negative effect is also found 
in Hersch (1991), but it is only valid for women.   
 
In order to better explore the relationship between overeducation and job satisfaction, 
some papers exploring the relationship between educational mismatch and job 
satisfaction in longitudinal analysis36. Vieira (2005) uses six waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for Portugal to explore the effects of 
overeducation on job satisfaction. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
results indicate that overall job satisfaction indeed has a negative relationship with 
overeducation. Moreover, connections between job satisfaction with pay, job 
satisfaction with the type of work and overeducation are also negative. Similarly, 
Johnson and Johnson (2000) suggest that overeducation can adversely affect job 
satisfaction in a longitudinal analysis.   
  
While many existing papers have already presented a convincing link between 
overeducation and job satisfaction, the relationship between these two becomes 
complex when skill mismatch is taken into consideration. Badillo-Amador and Vila 
(2013) find that skill mismatch and educational mismatch have different influences on 
different aspects of job satisfaction. Overeducation has negative effects on overall job 
satisfaction and job satisfaction with the type of job; while skill mismatch can detriment 
overall job satisfaction, job satisfaction with pay and job satisfaction with the type of 
job. Skill mismatch plays a more important role to explain the differences of job 
satisfaction between individuals than educational mismatch. In addition, Allen and De 
Weert (2007) suggest that both educational mismatch and skill mismatch can influence 
job satisfaction by an equal weight. Allen and Van der Velden (2001), Green and Zhu 
(2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2013) and all suggest that the relationship between skill 
mismatch and job satisfaction is significantly negative while the result of overeducation 
is insignificant.  
                                                 
36
 Kalleberg (1977) argues that the determinant of job satisfaction may change over time and thus 
longitudinal data is an ideal choice to explore the determinant of job satisfaction.     
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Another important issue has been concerned with is whether overeducated people are 
dissatisfied with every aspect of job. Zakariya and Battu (2013) suggest that 
overeducation reduces employees’ job satisfaction across four dimensions of job (high 
self-satisfaction, valuable experience, type of work and learning opportunities) using the 
2007 Graduate Tracer Study (GTS-07) in Malaysia. Johnson and Johnson (2000) 
indicate that overeducated people are dissatisfied with pay and promotion. However, in 
terms of the work and the relationship with supervisor, there is no evidence implying 
that overeducated people report low job satisfaction.  
 
 
3.3 Data 
This chapter employs the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2008 to undertake the 
empirical analysis. The CGSS is the first continuous national social survey project in 
China, starting from 2003, which is conducted jointly by Renmin University and Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology. It adopts the style of face to face 
interviews and the respondents in households and communities are randomly selected. 
To maintain the representativeness of registered households, the CGSS uses the fifth 
population census in sampling (Cheng et al., 2014b).   
 
The data of CGSS 2008 covers 29 provinces and municipalities with 6000 observations 
altogether in mainland China. In this survey, the response rate, the missing value rate 
and logic error rate are 54.32%, 3.11% and 5.18% respectively. Based on above figures, 
the CGSS 2008 is a very high-quality and valuable dataset in China now (Cheng et al., 
2014b).    
 
The CGSS 2008 provides a range of questions about job satisfaction, which are of 
interest in this chapter. Firstly, respondents are asked to rate satisfaction levels with their 
salary, welfare, workload, working conditions and facilities, the relationship with their 
colleagues, the relationship with their boss, commuting distances to job location and 
housing benefits, which are eight specific aspects of the job. The last question is to ask 
individuals to rate their overall job satisfaction when all things are considered. 
Satisfaction is an ordinal variable measuring the respondent’s perception of job 
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satisfaction in six scales: 1=very satisfied, 2=quite satisfied, 3=indifferent, 4=quite 
dissatisfied, 5=very dissatisfied, 6=hard to say37. Additionally, the CGSS 2008 includes 
a wide-ranging set of socioeconomic factors. Observations used in this chapter are 
restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 60. This is because the mandatory 
retirement age in China is 60. Those who are students and have zero or unknown 
income are omitted from the analysis. After deleting missing values of all the 
dimensions of job satisfaction and control variables and dropping observations 
answering “hard to say” about job satisfaction, 2260 valid observations remain. Table 3-
1 presents the summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables in this 
chapter. Control variables are spilt into three categories: personal characteristics, 
employment characteristics and regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 In empirical analysis in this chapter, job satisfaction scales have been recoded to 1=very dissatisfied, 
2=quite dissatisfied, 3=indifferent, 4=quite satisfied, 5=very satisfied and 6=hard to say.  
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Table 3-1 Summary statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables           Job satisfaction with 
Salary 2260 3.231 0.944 1 5 
Welfare 2260 3.118 0.997 1 5 
Workload 2260 3.177 0.918 1 5 
Working conditions and facilities 2260 3.313 0.853 1 5 
The relationship with colleagues 2260 3.908 0.696 1 5 
The relationship with boss 2260 3.619 0.768 1 5 
Commuting distance to job 
location 
2260 3.568 0.906 1 5 
Housing benefits 2260 2.790 1.048 1 5 
Overall job satisfaction 2260 3.386 0.766 1 5 
Personal characteristics  
Educational levels 2260 2.771 1.120 1 6 
Required educational level 2260 2.985 0.958 2 5 
Years of schooling 2260 10.767 3.219 6 24 
Overeducated 2260 0.231 0.422 0 1 
Undereducated 2260 0.394 0.489 0 1 
Skill mismatch 2260 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Age 2260 39.227 10.988 18 60 
Age2/100 2260 16.594 8.865 3.24 36 
Male 2260 0.557 0.497 0 1 
Ethnicity----Han 2260 0.927 0.259 0 1 
Political affiliation---Communist 
party member 
2260 0.158 0.365 0 1 
In a healthy health status 2260 0.934 0.248 0 1 
Married 2260 0.806 0.395 0 1 
Urban  2260 0.734 0.442 0 1 
Lower class 2260 0.462 0.499 0 1 
Middle class 2260 0.508 0.500 0 1 
Upper class 2260 0.030 0.171 0 1 
Employment characteristics 
Hourly wage (Yuan) 2260 9.570 16.569 0.052 520.833 
Work unit type: reference group (non-public) 
Public 2260 0.521 0.500 0 1 
Job type: reference group (Part-time) 
Full-time 2260 0.860 0.347  0 1 
Firm size: reference group (small )  
Small 2260 0.297 0.457 0 1 
Medium 2260 0.346 0.476 0 1 
Large 2260 0.357 0.479 0 1 
Regions: reference group (West)      
East 2260 0.460 0.498 0 1 
Central 2260 0.280 0.449 0 1 
West 2260 0.260 0.439 0 1 
Total  2260     
 
3.3.1 Personal characteristics 
In CGSS 2008, participants are asked to report both their highest educational 
qualifications and years of schooling. Based on the Chinese education system, 
educational levels are combined into six levels: 1. Primary school or less, 2. Junior high 
school, 3. Senior high school, 4. College level, 5. University, 6. Master’s or higher38. In 
addition, age is measured in years. According to Clark et al. (1996), it is possible to 
have a U-shaped relationship between age and job satisfaction, therefore, age squared is 
                                                 
38
 See Table B1.  
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also included in the analysis. The mean age of respondents in the sample is 39 years old. 
Male is used as a dummy variable to represent gender, in which female is the base 
group. From Table 3-1, we can see that 55.7% are male and 44.3% are female. The 
ethnicity variable is a dummy variable where ethnicity is equal to 1 if individual’s 
ethnicity is Han 39 . The Political variable is also a dummy variable where the 
respondent’s political affiliation is communists party member, Political is equal to 140. 
In addition, individuals are asked “what do you think about your health status?” 
Answers are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very unhealthy) to 5 (very 
healthy). In this chapter, health variable (in a healthy health status) is measured as a 
dummy variable where if respondents report their health status as very healthy, quite 
healthy and average, health variable is equal to 1. Marital status is spilt into two 
categories: married and single individuals (i.e. not yet married, cohabit, divorced and 
widowed). As can be seen from Table 3-1, 80.6% are married. In addition, Urban is a 
dummy variable indicating people’s household registration status and 73.4% of 
respondents own urban registration (Urban=1). Social status is measured through the 
question: which social status do you think you are?” Responses are coded into three 
levels: 1. Lower; 2. Middle and 3. Upper. Individuals who consider themselves as upper 
class are the base group. In addition, we can see from Table 3-1 that 23.1% of workers 
in the Chinese labour market are estimated to be overeducated and 39.4% of the labour 
force is treated as undereducated. The remaining 37.5% of workers have the correct 
education required for their jobs. According to the literature of overeducation in China, 
the incidence of overeducation is between 20% and 30%41.  
 
3.3.2 Employment characteristics 
Four employment variables available in the survey are included in the analysis since 
they are related to the analysis of job satisfaction. The hourly income is used to indicate 
pay in the analysis. In terms of firm size, there are three categories in this chapter: Small 
(if participant’s firm employees are no more than 25 workers), Medium (if participant’s 
                                                 
39
 There are 56 nationalities in China and Han is the largest group accounting for 91.96% of China’s 
population according to 1990 census (Gladney, 1994).    
40
 Categories of political affiliation in the survey are as follows: 1. Communist party member; 2. 
Democratic parties; 3. League member; 4. General public.                                                      
41
 Ren and Miller (2012) find that the incidence of overeducation in the rural area is 27.3% and 27% of 
workers are undereducated. In addition, Mayston and Yang (2008) report that about 20.5% of graduates 
have surplus education.  
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firm employees are between 26 and 250 employees) and Large (if respondent’s firm 
employs are more than 250 workers). The ‘small group’ is the benchmark group. Work 
unit type is measured as a dichotomous variable whereby “Public” is 1 and “Non-
public” is 042. In addition, the CGSS 2008 has two classifications for job type: 1. Full-
time, 2. Part-time. One dummy variable is included to indicate if an individual has a full 
time job or not.  
Considering the obvious regional disparity in China that may affect job satisfaction, 29 
provinces and municipalities in the data have been classified into East, Central and West 
regions according to the distinct level of economic development in this chapter. West 
region is the base group.   
 
3.3.3 The measurement of educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
One important issue in this chapter is the measurement of educational mismatch and 
skill mismatch. Due to data constraints, the mode method proposed by Kiker et al. 
(1997) is the only available method to choose to measure educational mismatch43. The 
mode method defines that workers are considered to be adequately educated if their 
actual education level is equal to the mode level of education within their occupations. 
Overeducated (undereducated) workers can be defined if their actual education 
attainment is higher (less) than the mode level of education in their occupations44. 
According to the Chinese Dictionary of Occupation Classification, occupations are 
classified into eight categories, which are shown in Table 3-2.  
 
Unlike educational mismatch, skill mismatch can be measured in a more direct way by 
asking workers whether they have the required skills to perform job tasks. Based on the 
literature, there are three measures of skill mismatch, namely skill deficit, skill surplus 
and required skill (Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011). In this chapter, the skill mismatch 
variable is constructed from the question in the survey, “did you meet the standard of 
employer regarding skills and experiences when you acquired this job?” Answers to this 
                                                 
42
 Work unit type in this chapter is classified into two categories: public enterprises (state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises) and non-public (private owned enterprises, foreign owned 
enterprises, joint-venture and other enterprises), which refers to Démurger et al. (2012).  
43
 Job analysis (JA) and worker’s self-assessment (WA) are another two methods to measure educational 
mismatch. Details can be found in Rumberger (1987) and Sicherman (1991).     
44
 Details about the highest educational level are in Table B1 in the appendix.  
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question are as follows: 1. Matched; 2. Over; 3. Under. However, due to few 
observations in “under” group45, it is not possible to construct indicators of overskilling 
and skill deficit as Allen and Van der Velden (2001) and Green and McIntosh (2007). 
Instead, a 0/1 dummy variable (mismatch=1) is created to indicate skill mismatch (Over 
and Under), which provides a direct measure of skill mismatch. The cross-tabulated 
distribution of educational mismatch and skill mismatch are shown in Table 3-3.  
 
Table 3-2 Occupation classifications 
Occupation 
Required 
educational level 
Freq. Percent 
Principals in governments, Parties, enterprises and institutions 3 181 8.01 
Professional and technicians 5 340 15.04 
Clerk and administration personnel 3 256 11.33 
Commercial personnel 3 78 3.45 
Service personnel 3 400 17.70 
Production, transport equipment operators and related personnel 2 355 15.71 
Police and soldier 3 292 12.92 
Other practitioner (difficult to classify) 2 358 15.84 
Total  2260 100.00 
 
 
Table 3-3 The relationship between educational mismatch and a measure of skill 
mismatch 
Educational 
mismatch 
Skill matched Skill mismatched Total 
Undereducated 819 (92.02%) 71 (7.98%) 890 (39.38%) 
Adequately 
educated 
768 (90.57%) 80 (9.43%) 848 (37.52%) 
Overeducated 454 (86.97%) 68 (13.03%) 522 (23.10%) 
Total 2041 (90.31%) 219 (9.69%) 2260 (100%) 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 3-3, about 9.69% of employees have the problem of skill 
mismatch. It seems that skill mismatch is not a very significant problem compared to 
                                                 
45
 There are only 73 observations in the answer “under” in the sample.  
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educational mismatch in this chapter. When taking educational mismatch into 
consideration, about 86.97% of respondents who have surplus education have matched 
skills and experiences. This percentage is quite high compared with results from Di 
Pietro and Urwin (2006) which focuses on the Italian labour market46. Two reasons may 
explain this. When specifically explore this group of workers (i.e. overeducated workers 
with matched skills), we find that about 52.86% of those workers are clerk and 
administration personnel (17.18%), service personnel (12.33%) and production and 
transportation personnel (23.35%). It seems that skill is more related to perform the job 
than qualification for these types of job. The second reason may be the “heterogeneous 
skill within qualification levels” (Green and McIntosh, 2007). That is to say, those 
overeducated people who have matched skills are at the bottom of skill distribution of 
people who have similar educational level with overeducated people. If considering 
skills and abilities, those overeducated individuals are suitable for lower level jobs that 
have a lower educational requirement, but their skills are matched in this case. A 
possible explanation for this in China is the higher education expansion which occurred 
after 1999. The expansion of the enrollment rate, has meant that the distribution of 
ability of the student body has been expanded, leading to larger tails of the distribution.  
Low ability is potentially one of reasons causing people to be overeducated (Hartog, 
2000).    
 
In addition, we find that 9.43% of employees who have accurate educational level for 
the job still report that their skills and experiences are not matched with the employment 
requirement. Furthermore, after using a correlation test, the correlation coefficient 
between educational mismatch and skill mismatch is 0.0067 (p=0.7497), which 
confirms that even two workers have the same educational qualifications, their skills 
and abilities are heterogeneous47. Based on above results, adequate evidence for the 
heterogeneous skill theory is found and the assignment theory seems not appropriate in 
Chinese labour market. 
 
3.3.4 Satisfaction with various aspects of the job  
Table 3-4 presents patterns of eight aspects of job satisfaction and overall job 
                                                 
46
 Di Pietro and Urwin (2006) find that about 22.14% of graduates who are estimated as overeducated 
reporting that they use “quite a lot” or “a lot” of knowledge and skills in the current jobs.  
47
 A dummy variable is generated to indicate educational mismatch.  
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satisfaction in the full sample. As can be seen, the most frequent response for 
satisfaction with salary; the relationship with colleagues; the relationship with boss and 
commuting distances to job location, is all “quite satisfied”. In terms of satisfaction with 
welfare, workload, working conditions and facilities and housing benefits, the mode 
responses are all “indifferent”. Chinese workers seem more satisfied with the 
relationship with colleagues and boss than other aspects of job. Conversely, nearly 40% 
of respondents report that they are “very dissatisfied” or “quite dissatisfied” with 
housing benefits, which is the highest figure reporting dissatisfaction among all the 
aspects of job and overall job satisfaction, which may be related to the ever increasing 
housing prices in China. Although the percentage of reporting “quite satisfied” or “very 
satisfied” are more than 40%, more than one fifth of respondents still “very dissatisfied” 
or “quite dissatisfied” with their salary, welfare and workload. In terms of overall job 
satisfaction, nearly half of our sample is “quite satisfied” or “very satisfied” with their 
job. In all, Chinese workers seem quite satisfied with their jobs except for the 
satisfaction with housing benefits.  
 
Table 3-4 Satisfaction with various aspects of the job 
Satisfaction with 
Very 
dissatisfied 
Quite 
dissatisfied 
Indifferent 
Quite 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
Total 
 1 2 3 4 5  
Salary 
4.69% 
(106) 
16.86% 
(381) 
33.81% 
(764) 
39.96% 
(903) 
4.69% 
(106) 
100% 
(2260) 
Welfare 
7.08% 
(160) 
18.01% 
(407) 
36.19% 
(818) 
33.45% 
(756) 
5.27% 
(119) 
100% 
(2260) 
Workload 
4.38% 
(99) 
17.08% 
(386) 
39.69% 
(897) 
34.20% 
(773) 
4.65% 
(105) 
100% 
(2260) 
Working conditions 
and facilities 
2.83% 
(64) 
12.08% 
(273) 
41.06% 
(928) 
39.03% 
(882) 
5.00% 
(113) 
100% 
(2260) 
The relationship with 
colleagues 
0.49% 
(11) 
2.08% 
(47) 
20.13% 
(455) 
60.80% 
(1374) 
16.50% 
(373) 
100% 
(2260) 
The relationship with 
boss 
0.97% 
(22) 
4.47% 
(101) 
36.50% 
(825) 
47.79% 
(1080) 
10.27% 
(232) 
100% 
(2260) 
Commuting distances 
to job location 
2.35% 
(53) 
9.96% 
(225) 
28.01% 
(633) 
47.96% 
(1084) 
11.73% 
(265) 
100% 
(2260) 
Housing benefits 
12.96% 
(293) 
25.66% 
(580) 
33.81% 
(764) 
24.51% 
(554) 
3.05% 
(69) 
100% 
(2260) 
Overall job 
satisfaction 
1.59% 
(36) 
9.16% 
(207) 
41.77% 
(944) 
43.98% 
(994) 
3.50% 
(79) 
100% 
(2260) 
100 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
3.3.5 Satisfaction in groups  
Table 3-5 describes the mean satisfaction level in three different groups: overeducated 
people, undereducated people and correctly educated people. One point needs to be 
mentioned here. Contrary to the literature, the mean satisfaction level of all job 
satisfaction dimensions and overall job satisfaction of overeducated workers are higher 
than those correctly educated individuals. That is to say, overeducated workers do not 
appear to treat their “overeducation” as a negative influence on their satisfaction level. 
In addition, based on the one way ANOVA in this chapter, the three groups show no 
difference for the mean satisfaction level only in job satisfaction with salary and job 
satisfaction with commuting distances to job locations. According to the existing 
literature, overeducated people should report lower satisfaction level than correctly 
educated workers. Zakariya and Battu (2013) note that well-matched workers have 
higher mean job satisfaction levels than overeducated workers in Malaysia. However, 
based on Table 3-5, at least in the Chinese labour market, this is contrary to our 
expectations.  
 
 
Table 3-5 Mean satisfaction level among over/under/correctly educated groups 
Mean satisfaction 
with 
Overeducated Undereducated Correctly educated One way ANOVA 
Salary 3.259 3.197 3.250 0.99 
Welfare 3.261 2.985 3.170 14.51*** 
Workload 3.291 3.093 3.193 7.92*** 
Working conditions 
and facilities 
3.441 3.234 3.317 9.78*** 
The relationship with 
colleagues 
3.969 3.894 3.883 2.73* 
The relationship with 
boss 
3.684 3.601 3.598 2.43* 
Commuting distances 
to job location 
3.632 3.527 3.571 2.23 
Housing benefits 2.956 2.737 2.744 8.54*** 
Overall job 
satisfaction 
3.460 3.338 3.392 4.19** 
101 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Estimation methodology 
In CGSS 2008, job satisfaction variables are measured on a scale from 1 (very 
dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). Therefore, an Ordered Probit Model technique will be 
employed here. Because of the small number of observations in some answer categories, 
it is necessary to combine them from 5 categories to 3 categories, namely 1. Dissatisfied; 
2. Indifferent and 3. Satisfied. The answer categories “very dissatisfied” and “quite 
dissatisfied” are combined as “dissatisfied”. The answer categories “Quite satisfied” and 
“Very satisfied” are combined as “Satisfied”.       
 
For each observation, the ordered probit model can be obtained by a latent variable 
approach48, which is specified as: 
 
     𝑌𝑖
∗= 𝛽𝑋𝑖+ 𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                      (3)                    
 
    𝑌𝑖 = m if 𝛼𝑚−1< 𝑌𝑖
∗ <𝛼𝑚                                                                                                                                                         (4)                                
 
Pr (𝑌𝑖 = 𝑚|𝑋𝑖) = Pr ( 𝛼𝑚−1< 𝑌𝑖
∗ <𝛼𝑚)       
                           = 𝑃𝑟( 𝛼𝑚−1 < 𝛽𝑋𝑖+ 𝜇𝑖  < 𝛼𝑚)  
                           = 𝑃𝑟(𝛼𝑚−1 −  𝛽𝑋𝑖 < 𝜇𝑖  < 𝛼𝑚 −  𝛽𝑋𝑖) 
                           =  𝐹(𝛼𝑚 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖) − 𝐹(𝛼𝑚−1 − 𝛽𝑋𝑖)                                                    (5)                        
                                                                                                                                             
𝑌𝑖  is an ordered response representing values {0,1,2, … … . 𝑀}. 𝛼𝑚−1 , 𝛼𝑚 are a set of 
unknown threshold coefficients or cutpoints to be estimated. 𝑌𝑖
∗  is a latent and 
unobserved variable which can be treated as utility value. 𝛽 is a vector of estimated 
parameters and 𝜇𝑖 is an error term which is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance one49. In equation (5), the probability that observation i will be treated as 𝑚 is 
determined by the probability that 𝑌𝑖
∗ can be observed between 𝛼𝑚−1 and 𝛼𝑚. 𝐹(∗) is the 
cumulative distribution function.  
 
In this chapter, we observe the following:  
 
                                                 
48
 A latent variable is assumed to represent the ordered response.   
49
 𝛽 represents for the similar effect of 𝑋𝑖 on 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑋𝑖 on 𝑌𝑖
∗.  
102 
 
 𝑌𝑖= 1 (dissatisfied) if  𝑌𝑖
∗  ≤ 𝛼1                                                                                               (6) 
                   
 𝑌𝑖 = 2 (indifferent) if 𝛼1< 𝑌𝑖
∗  ≤ 𝛼2                                                                                         (7)                     
 
    
 𝑌𝑖 = 3 (satisfied) if  𝑌𝑖
∗   > 𝛼2                                                                                                                                                     (8)                                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
𝑌𝑖 refers to the overall job satisfaction and other eight aspects of job satisfaction. 𝛼1, 𝛼2 
are unknown threshold coefficients or cutpoints to be estimated. 𝑋𝑖 is a sector of control 
variable that may affect job satisfaction. Cutpoints can be obtained through the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for ordered probit model.  
 
3.4.2 Alternative models 
First, we use the following specification to explore the determinants of overall job 
satisfaction of all workers in China.    
   
     𝑌𝑖=𝛼0+𝛽0𝑋𝑖 +𝜇𝑖                                                                                                                              (9)             
 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the overall job satisfaction. 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of control variables that may affect 
job satisfaction, which contains personal characteristics (age, age2, years of schooling, 
gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, marriage, household registration, health status and 
social status), employment characteristics (hourly income, firm size, job type and work 
unit type) and regions (east, central and west). 𝜇𝑖  is error term with a normal 
distribution.  
 
In empirical analysis, we have two specifications. Specification 1 is the model 
controlling for hourly wage and specification 2 is the model without controlling for the 
wage effects.  
 
The central topic of this chapter is to explore the relationship between overeducation 
and overall job satisfaction and dimensions of job satisfaction. Models often used in the 
overeducation literature include detailed educational level and two dummy variables 
indicating overeducation and undereducation (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989). In this 
chapter, we also adopt two dummy variables to indicate overeducation and 
undereducation. However, we make two explicit comparisons among individuals. The 
103 
 
first one is that, by controlling for actual educational attainment, overeducated people 
are compared with individuals who have the same educational level but are correctly 
educated. The second one is to make a comparison between overeducated individuals 
and persons who are correctly educated in similar jobs (i.e. with the same required 
educational level) with overeducated people. The two models are described as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖= 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜆1𝑌𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 + 𝜌1𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖+ 𝛾1𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 +𝜀𝑖                                                          (10)              
                                                                
𝑌𝑖= 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖+ 𝜆2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖+ 𝜌2𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 +𝛾2𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝜀𝑖                                                            (11)             
 
Where the dependent variable (𝑌𝑖) is overall job satisfaction and alternatively the other 
eight facets of job satisfaction, 𝑌𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 = actual years of schooling, 𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖= the required 
level of education, 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 is the dummy variable of overeducation, 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖  is the dummy 
variable of undereducation, and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables including personal 
characteristics (age, age2, gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, marriage, household 
registration, health status and social status), employment characteristics (hourly income, 
firm size, job type and work unit type) and regions (east, central and west). 𝜀𝑖  is an error 
term with a normal distribution. In equation (10), mismatched people are compared with 
well-matched workers who have the same years of schooling. In equation (11), 
mismatched groups are compared to correctly educated people who do jobs with the 
same required level of education.   
    
Allen and Van der Velden (2001) note that skill mismatch is more suitable to explore job 
satisfaction than educational mismatch. In order to verify any effects of educational 
mismatch and skill mismatch on job satisfaction and facets of job satisfaction, skill 
mismatch is also added into equations (9), (10) and (11), which are specified as follows: 
  
𝑌𝑖= 𝛼0+𝛽0𝑋𝑖 +𝜇0𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖+𝜇𝑖                                                                                               (12)          
 
𝑌𝑖= 𝛼1+𝛽1𝑋𝑖+𝜆1𝑌𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖+𝜌1𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝛾1𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝜇1𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖+𝜀𝑖                                                 (13)             
                                              
𝑌𝑖= 𝛼2+ 𝛽2𝑋𝑖+𝜆2𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖+ 𝜌2𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 +𝛾2𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖+𝜇2𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖+𝜀𝑖                                          (14)        
 
Where 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖 is a dummy variable to indicate skill mismatch and the same 
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independent variables have been used as equation (9), (10) and (11). 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖 are error 
terms with a normal distribution. These three models will provide evidence to show 
which kind of mismatch is a better indicator of subjective well-being at work. Four 
specifications are used in this chapter to demonstrate the empirical analysis. 
Specification 1 is the model without controlling for the skill mismatch variable. 
Specification 2 is the model without controlling for both skill mismatch and the wage 
effects. Specification 3 includes all the variables. Specification 4 is the model without 
controlling for the wage effects.  
 
 
3.5 Empirical results  
3.5.1 Determinants of overall job satisfaction 
In this section, the determinants of overall job satisfaction will be discussed. Table 3-6 
presents results of marginal effects of reporting each answer category of overall job 
satisfaction. In Table 3-6, specification 1 is the model controlling for hourly wage and 
specification 2 is the model without controlling for the wage effects.  
  
Age  
We observe from Table 3-6 that the negative and positive marginal effects of age and 
age-squared indicate that overall job satisfaction drops with age first and rise thereafter. 
That is to say, there is a U-shaped relationship between age and overall job satisfaction. 
Young workers are new to the labour market and they don’t have a definite judgment 
about their work, so they may report high job satisfaction. As they gain more work 
experience in the labour market, they know how to set standard to judge their jobs and 
working conditions. In addition, boredom from job and some unfulfilled career 
expectations may rise with age. Therefore, job satisfaction decreases around middle age. 
There are two explanations to explain higher job satisfaction among older cohorts. One 
is the “aging effect”, which states that higher job satisfaction reported by older people 
occurs because they have better jobs than young people (Mottaz, 1987). This 
explanation is similar to the self-selection effect, which is proposed by Gazioglu and 
Tansel (2006). Older people are experienced workers and they know how to find a 
suitable, good job for themselves and thus may obtain a higher level of job satisfaction. 
The second explanation is from expectation theory (Clark, 1997). Older people have 
lower expectations about their jobs. They face limited choices in the labour market 
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because of their age, which may result in higher job satisfaction among old age cohorts. 
The U-shaped relationship between age and job satisfaction of Chinese workers in this 
chapter is consistent with existing literature of Clark et al. (1996), Clark and Oswald 
(1996) and Brown and McIntosh (1998). However, Nielsen and Smyth (2008) suggest 
that age has a positive effect on job satisfaction among urban workers in China50.       
 
Gender  
According to Table 3-6, males are less likely to report “satisfied” than females, but this 
result is insignificant. This result is inconsistent with the existing literature in the USA 
and UK (Bender et al., 2005). In China, the fact that the labour force participation rate 
of women has increased making the labour force participation rate of women higher 
than many other countries (Bauer et al., 1992)51, women’s earnings have become an 
important part of family income. The increased labour force participation rate may 
change the structure of women’s expectations in judging job satisfaction. According to 
Crosby (1982), women always compare their circumstances with those women who stay 
at home or who hold low-paid jobs in western countries and thus they report higher job 
satisfaction than men. However, according to the insignificant result in this chapter, 
women may compare themselves with men to judge job satisfaction in China.     
 
Education  
The results in Table 3-6 indicate that there is a positive relationship between years of 
schooling and overall job satisfaction. The positive coefficient on education in 
specification 2, column 6 in Table 3-6 indicates that individuals who have higher 
educational levels are more likely to find a job with high contentment than those with 
lower levels of education. In specification 1, column 3 in Table 3-6, we can see that 
even after controlling for hourly wage, education still has a positive impact on overall 
job satisfaction. That is to say, individuals who are better educated are more competitive 
and so are more likely to find a job with better intrinsic and extrinsic rewards than those 
with lower levels of education at a given income level (Glenn and Weaver, 1982). 
Cheng et al. (2014b) also find a positive effect of education on job satisfaction in China 
using CGSS 2008.   
                                                 
50
 Only age variable is included in the regression in the study of Nielsen and Smyth (2008).   
51
 Bauer et al. (1992) point out that the female participation rate in urban China is almost 90% in the 1987 
One Percent Population Survey.   
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Wages 
If the hourly wage increases by 1%, the probability of being “satisfied” with the overall 
job increases by 0.2 percentage points, which can be seen from specification 1 column 3 
in Table 3-6. The marginal effects on pay of reporting “satisfied” shown in Table 3-6 is 
significantly positive, which indicates that higher pay will result in higher job 
satisfaction. However, this marginal effect is small compared with other variables, for 
example marriage or social status variables. This small marginal effect is consistent with 
Cheng et al. (2014b)52.  
 
Marriage  
According to Table 3-6, people who are married are more likely to report “satisfied” 
than single individuals. A possible reason for this finding is that married families have 
two incomes potentially, so they may not have an economic burden as large as single 
individuals. Therefore, they can choose to stay in jobs that provide high job satisfaction 
or to find a job with high job satisfaction. However, single individuals may have to stay 
in or take jobs that provide low job satisfaction due to income constraints (Nielsen and 
Smyth, 2008).  
 
Establishment size  
Column 3 in Table 3-6, specification 1 indicates that employees in medium and large 
sized firms report a lower level of overall job satisfaction than those in small sized 
firms. Idson (1990) and Clark et al. (2009) all find similar results. Different working 
environment flexibility leads to different levels of job satisfaction (Idson, 1990). For 
example, in large firms, the workplace rigidity is strong and work structure is 
regimented, which may reduce employees’ freedom to design the way to carry out their 
work and their working hours. However, in small firms, working schedules and working 
styles are potentially more flexible than medium and large firms and thus may lead to 
higher job satisfaction.  
 
Social status  
Individuals in the low social status decrease the possibility to report “satisfied” of job 
                                                 
52
 Cheng et al. (2004b) find that the marginal effect of hourly income on reporting job satisfaction is only 
0.003.  
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by 25.1 percentage points than those in the upper class, which is shown in specification 
1 column 3. People judge subjective well-being based on the comparison groups or 
expectations. If you are in a low social status, which means you may face limited 
networks, mobility and opportunities, you may be less likely to find a satisfied and high 
level of job. In the Chinese culture, networks are a good reflection of self-worth (Zhao, 
2001). Thus, downward mobility and unsatisfied self-worth will create a feeling of 
deprivation. Hu (2013) and Liu and Li (2011) all find similar results.  
 
Skill mismatch  
Table 3-6 specification 2 column 6 shows that employees who are skill-mismatched are 
9.6 percentage points less likely to report “satisfied” of the overall job. Even after 
controlling for the hourly wage, this effect remains. Skill mismatch indeed can be 
detrimental to overall job satisfaction53 and thus it is not a desirable result for both 
employees and employers. According to Allen and Van der Velden (2001), skill 
underutilization and skill deficit all have negative effects on job satisfaction, which is 
similar to the findings in this chapter. Badillo-Amador and Vila (2013) suggest that all 
kinds of skill mismatch can strongly reduce employees’ overall job satisfaction54.  
 
Results from specifications 1 and 2 shown in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3-6, respectively, 
indicate that full-time workers are more likely to report higher job satisfaction than part-
time workers, which is similar to the result from Shockey and Mueller (1994). In 
addition, workers in the public sector report higher job satisfaction than those in the 
non-public sector after controlling for hourly wages, which is shown in column 3 
specification 1 in Table 3-6. Higher job satisfaction in the public sector may be 
explained by the relatively stable employment, higher social status and attractive 
compensation provided in the public sector. Han Chinese are less likely to report 
“satisfied” than minority Chinese, which is contrary to our expectations. Minority 
groups are mainly located in the western region and along the west border of China 
where economic development lags behind the east and central region. We speculate that 
Han Chinese may have higher expectations of their jobs than minority Chinese and that 
                                                 
53
 Due to the data limitations, we can not classify skill mismatch specifically as overskilled and skill 
deficit in this chapter.  
54
 Skill mismatch in this study is derived from self-assessment question from survey if one has inadequate 
skills to perform current employment (skill deficit) and current personal capacity allows for a more 
demanding job (overskilled).  
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their aspirations are not being fulfilled. Therefore, they may report lower job 
satisfaction. Based on the results reported in Table 3-6, the effects of other factors on 
job satisfaction, such as political affiliation, household registration and healthy status 
are insignificant. In terms of region, the east and central region are more likely to report 
“satisfied” than the west region, which is a similar result to Cheng et al. (2014b). 
Economic development in Western China is not as advanced as that of central and 
eastern China. Therefore, job expectations for employees in the west region are less 
likely to be fulfilled and thus they report lower job satisfaction levels than their 
counterparts in the central and eastern regions of China.  
 
From section 3.5.2 to section 3.5.9, specification 1 is the model without controlling for 
skill mismatch variable. Specification 2 is the model without controlling for both skill 
mismatch and the wage effects. Specification 3 includes all the variables. Specification 
4 is the model without controlling for the wage effects.  
 
3.5.2 Overall job satisfaction, educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
As can be seen from specification 1, column 3 in Table 3-7, when only educational 
mismatch variables are included in the model, overeducated workers are more likely to 
report “satisfied” than correctly educated individuals working in similar jobs, but this 
effect is not significant. Büchel (2002) also reports that the marginal effect of reporting 
job satisfaction of overeducated people compared to adequately educated people who 
are in similar jobs is positive but insignificant. Undereducated workers are 3.5 
percentage points less likely to report “satisfied” than individuals who are correctly 
educated working in similar jobs. However, this negative effect is also insignificant. In 
addition, each level of required education increases the probability of reporting 
“satisfied” for overall job satisfaction by 3.3 percentage points, which may indicate that 
a correct match between education and job is very important to increase job satisfaction. 
Tsang et al. (1991) also find similar result. When both educational mismatch and skill 
mismatch are included in the model (specification 3), we can see that people with 
mismatched skills are less likely to report job satisfaction by 9.2 percentage points and 
the effects of educational mismatch change little after controlling for skill mismatch 
(compare specification 1 with specification 3). We can also see from specification 3, 
column 3, that the impact of skill mismatch on job satisfaction is stronger than the effect 
of educational mismatch.  
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It is interesting to see that in the gross effects (specification 4) in Table 3-7, 
overeducated individuals are 4.4 percentage points more likely to report “satisfied” for 
the overall job than correctly educated workers in similar jobs. Undereducated workers 
are 4.2 percentage points less likely to report “satisfied” than adequately educated 
individuals who work in jobs with the same required educational level. However, after 
controlling for the hourly wage, both effects of overeducation and undereducation on 
overall job satisfaction become insignificant (specification 3). Wage differentials 
between educational mismatched groups and correctly educated groups in similar jobs 
may provide an explanation to the different results between specification 4 and 
specification 3. The above results show that skill mismatch seems to be a threat to 
workers’ job satisfaction levels rather than educational overeducation.  
 
3.5.3 Job satisfaction with pay, educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
Because overeducated (undereducated) people earn higher (lower) wages than 
adequately educated worker in the same job (Hartog, 2000), we hypothesise that 
overeducated (undereducated) people may show higher (lower) job satisfaction with 
their pay than correctly educated people in similar jobs. Specification 1, reported in 
column 3 Table 3-8, shows the marginal effects for reporting “satisfied” with pay 
without taking consideration of skill mismatch. Contrary to our expectations, we find 
that the relationship between educational overeducation and job satisfaction with pay is 
negative and insignificant after taking hourly wage into consideration55. Such a result 
indicates that overeducation may have no effect on satisfaction with pay, which is 
consistent with Badillo-Amador and Vila (2013). In addition, required educational level 
and deficit education have no impact on job satisfaction with pay as shown in Table 3-8. 
However, when a skill mismatch dummy variable is added into the analysis, we can see 
that employees who have mismatched skills are 5.3 percentage points less likely to 
report “satisfied” in terms of job satisfaction with pay, even after controlling for hourly 
wages (specification 3, column 3). Although skill mismatched people have a lower 
wage penalty than overeducated people (McGuinness and Sloane, 2011), it is the skill 
match itself that is decreasing job satisfaction with respect to pay.  
 
                                                 
55
 The coefficient on undereducation in Table 3-8 Specification 1 is also insignificant in this chapter.  
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3.5.4 Job satisfaction with welfare, educational mismatch and skill mismatch
56
 
Table 3-9 reports the marginal effects of reporting answer categories of job satisfaction 
with welfare. As can be seen from column 3 in Table 3-9 Specification 3, the 
insignificant coefficient of overeducation indicates that overeducation may not 
influence job satisfaction with welfare. However, individuals who have correct 
education level with the job requirement are 2.3 percentage points more likely to report 
“satisfied” with welfare. Undereducated workers are 5.5 percentage points less likely to 
report “satisfied” of job satisfaction with welfare. Undereducation appears to reduce job 
satisfaction with welfare. When skill mismatch is brought into consideration as 
indicated in column 3 in Table 3-9 Specification 3, skill mismatch also has negative 
effects on job satisfaction with welfare. However, this effect is insignificant. It seems 
that education-job match is more relevant in explaining job satisfaction with welfare 
than skill-job match.     
 
3.5.5 Job satisfaction with workload, educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
Table 3-10 reports marginal effects for reporting answer categories of job satisfaction 
with workload. As can be seen from column 3 in Table 3-10 specification 3, 
overeducated people are more likely to report satisfaction with workload and 
undereducated people are less likely to report “satisfied” of their workload. Mavromaras 
et al. (2013) argue that overeducated people are more productive and have better 
adaptability. When choosing a lower level of job than their own educational level, they 
will finish quicker and be more efficient than correctly educated colleagues. Thus, they 
may feel less pressured and relaxed when they are at work and thus they have a higher 
level of job satisfaction. Undereducated workers take tasks higher than their educational 
level and need more time to finish than adequately educated workers in the same job, 
which may make them feel stressed and increase their frustration. Skill mismatched 
individuals have to learn the skills needed for their job and try their best to finish tasks 
                                                 
56
 Since the economic reform in 1978, although there is a massive increase in workers’ wages and non-
wage benefits, the structure of workers’ fringe benefits is relatively static (Xiao, 1991). Worker’s fringe 
benefits is consisted of five parts in China: unemployment insurance, subsidised housing, medical care, 
retirement benefits and work injuries insurance (Frijters et al., 2010). According to the above definition, 
in this chapter, job satisfaction with welfare refers to unemployment insurance, medical care, retirement 
benefits and work injuries insurance (Because there is a job satisfaction with housing benefits category in 
this chapter). In terms of retirement benefits, employers would pay employees 70% or more of his wages 
as a pension in China and this ratio varies with different types of firms and contract type (Xiao, 1991). 
Moreover, in state-owned firms, children’s schooling, transportation are provided by employers as 
additional welfare.  
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and thus are less likely to report satisfaction with their workload. However, according to 
the insignificant coefficient of skill mismatch in specification 3 in Table 3-10, there is 
no effect of skill mismatch on job satisfaction with workload.   
 
3.5.6 Job satisfaction with working conditions and facilities, educational mismatch 
and skill mismatch 
Table 3-11 specification 2 shows that overeducated workers are 6.8 percentage points 
more likely to be satisfied with working conditions and facilities and undereducated 
people are 4.0 percentage points less likely to report “satisfied” of their working 
conditions and facilities than employees who are correctly educated in similar jobs. 
However, after controlling for hourly wages, the effect of undereducation on job 
satisfaction with working conditions and facilities disappears (specification 1). As can 
be seen in Table 3-11 specification 3, individuals who are skill mismatched are 6.9 
percentage points less likely to report “satisfied” with working conditions and facilities, 
which suggests that skill mismatch has a negative impact on job satisfaction with 
working conditions and facilities.  
 
3.5.7 Job satisfaction with the relationship with colleagues and the boss, 
educational mismatch and skill mismatch 
Interpersonal relationship (the relationship with colleagues and boss) is described as 
Guanxi in Chinese culture, which stems from Confucianism. Guanxi is a very important 
factor to build personal relationships and business conduct in Chinese society (Xin and 
Pearce, 1996). In addition, it is well recognised that Guanxi (relationship with boss, 
colleagues and friends) is a very important determinant when choosing a job in Chinese 
culture (Huang, 2008). As can be seen from Table 3-12 Specification 3, overeducated 
people are 4.5 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with the relationship with 
colleagues. However, the effect of overeducation on job satisfaction with the 
relationship with the boss is insignificant, which is shown in Table 3-13 Specification 3. 
In addition, the relationship between undereducation and job satisfaction with the 
relationship with colleagues and boss are both insignificant. In terms of skill mismatch, 
it seems that individuals who are skill mismatched are less likely to report “satisfied” 
with the relationship with both colleagues and the boss.  
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3.5.8 Job satisfaction with commuting distance to job location, educational 
mismatch and skill mismatch 
Results for satisfaction with commuting distance to job location reported in Table 3-14 
indicate that overeducated workers are more likely to report satisfaction with the 
commuting distance to their job location than matched workers. Undereducated workers 
are less likely to report satisfied of commuting distance to job location. However, those 
effects are all insignificant. As a rational decision, individuals may make a trade-off 
between job and commuting distance from home to job location. Overeducated people 
may choose a job with a lower educational requirement because of the short commuting 
distance whereas undereducated people may accept a higher level of job if offered that 
is coupled with a long commuting distance. Long commuting distance can incur 
negative effects on people’s well-being (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999). Thus, 
undereducated people are less likely to report “satisfied” of commuting distance. Until 
now, there is no literature to explore this issue. This chapter suggests that there may be 
no relationship between educational mismatch and satisfaction with commuting distance 
to job location. As can be seen in Table 3-14, the effect of skill mismatch on job 
satisfaction with commuting distance to job location is also insignificant.  
 
3.5.9 Job satisfaction with housing benefits
57
, educational mismatch and skill 
mismatch 
As can be seen from Table 3-15 specification 3, overeducated workers are 5.7 
percentage points more likely to report satisfaction with the housing benefits than 
individuals who are in similar jobs but are correctly educated. The relationship between 
undereducation and job satisfaction with housing benefits is insignificant. However, 
skill-mismatched individuals decrease their probability of reporting satisfaction with 
housing benefits by 6.4 percentage points. The above results indicate that educational 
mismatch and skill mismatch both have significant impacts on job satisfaction with 
housing benefits.  
 
In addition, we also make a comparison between overeducated people and individuals 
with similar level of education but are adequately educated58. However, the relationship 
                                                 
57
 Housing benefits include monetarisation of housing subsidies and rent subsidies. The subsidy level is 
varied among provinces and cities in China (Lee, 2000).  
58
 Results are all attached in the Appendix B.  
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between overeducation and overall job satisfaction and facets of job satisfaction are 
insignificant except for job satisfaction with the relationship with boss and job 
satisfaction with housing benefits. Undereducation only has positive effect on job 
satisfaction on working conditions and facilities and the relationship with the boss. In 
terms of skill mismatch, skill mismatch has significantly negative effects on overall job 
satisfaction and facets of job satisfaction except for the job satisfaction with welfare, 
workload and commuting distance to job location, which yields the same results in the 
comparison with adequately educated people who have the same required educational 
level.  
 
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion   
Throughout the literature on overeducation in China, most studies focus on the 
relationship between overeducation and wages. In this chapter the issue of job 
satisfaction in China is examined and the two research questions outlined in chapter 1 
(page 8) are addressed. The overall analysis of job satisfaction in China is very limited 
due to the previous absence of data on job satisfaction. However, the Chinese General 
Social Survey (2008) provides a range of job satisfaction measures, which enables us to 
explore the determinants of overall and specific aspects of job satisfaction and 
especially to investigate detailed links between overeducation and undereducation and 
job satisfaction in China. For example, not only do we focus upon overall job 
satisfaction, we also investigate satisfaction with: salary, welfare, workload, working 
conditions and facilities, the relationship with colleagues, the relationship with the boss, 
commuting distance to job location and housing benefits. This addresses the first 
research question for this chapter and is a contribution to the overeducation literature in 
China.  
 
The answering of the second research question and another advantage of this chapter is 
the introduction of skill mismatch variable into the analysis. Recent literature indicates 
that educational mismatch and skill mismatch are heterogeneous. Separate exploration 
of these two concepts is needed in the analysis of job satisfaction. In this chapter, 
analysis of the impacts of educational mismatch and skill mismatch on aspects of job 
satisfaction and overall job satisfaction are presented.  
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First, investigating the determinants of overall job satisfaction indicates the following 
results. There is a U-shaped relationship between age and overall job satisfaction, which 
is consistent with previous empirical results. Males have lower job satisfaction than 
women, but this result is not significant. In addition, there is a strong positive 
relationship between years of schooling and overall job satisfaction even after 
controlling for hourly wages. Higher pay will result in higher job satisfaction. That is to 
say, wage is an important determinant of overall job satisfaction in China. Married 
workers and employees in small firm size are more likely to report high level of overall 
job satisfaction. In addition, job type, work unit, social status and regions all play an 
important part in determining job satisfaction.  
 
In terms of educational mismatch, as shown in Table 3-5, overeducated people report 
the highest job satisfaction level among the three groups. Overeducation may not result 
in negative effects on job satisfaction as a priori expectations. Although overeducated 
people’s pay is higher than correctly educated people who work in the same job, 
overeducated people are found to be less likely to report “satisfied” of pay satisfaction. 
However, this effect is insignificant and the relationship between overeducation and 
welfare is also insignificant. In addition, results indicate that overeducated people are 
more satisfied with workload, working conditions and facilities, the relationship with 
colleagues and housing benefits than correctly educated individuals who do jobs with 
the same required educational level. We can infer that pay may not be the main concern 
for overeducated people. Instead, there may be some compensating aspects of job 
offered to overeducated people to achieve maximum utility of employment 
(McGuinness and Sloane, 2011). That is to say, in this chapter, workload, working 
conditions and facilities, the relationship with colleagues and housing benefits may be 
compensating aspects of the job that make overeducated people choose the job lower 
than their educational attainment to achieve a balanced tradeoff between work and life 
and thus they report high levels of job satisfaction. 
 
Another inference from this chapter is that overeducated people choose to stay in a job 
beneath their level of education because of their own preference for some characteristics 
of their job, which has been referred to in the literature as voluntary overeducation 
(Sicherman, 1991); (Mavromaras et al., 2013). For example, overeducated people may 
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prefer to have a low workload and low mental pressure so they choose to stay in a job 
that requires education lower than their educational level. In this chapter, results show 
that overeducated people may prefer to stay in a job with good working conditions and 
facilities and good relationship with colleagues, although the job is lower than their 
educational level. It is well recognised that Guanxi (relationship with boss, colleagues 
and friends) is a very important determinant when choosing a job in Chinese culture. 
Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) note that the relationship with colleagues has a 
positive relationship with job satisfaction. Therefore, overeducated people may report 
higher job satisfaction. 
 
In addition, when educational mismatch and skill mismatch are included simultaneously 
into the analysis of job satisfaction, we can see that skill mismatch has a consistently 
stronger negative effect on job satisfaction and all facets of job satisfaction except job 
satisfaction with the relationship with welfare, workload and commuting distance to job 
location than educational mismatch. It seems that skill mismatch may undermine job 
satisfaction within institutions. This result is also consistent with the recent trend of 
shifting from education mismatch to skill mismatch in the academic and policy concern. 
In addition, from the insignificant results of the comparison between overeducated 
people and adequately educated people who have same years of schooling regarding job 
satisfaction, we can infer that overeducated and undereducated people in the Chinese 
labour market may compare themselves with their counterparts working in jobs with the 
same required education.  
 
Considering the significantly negative effects of skill mismatch on overall job 
satisfaction and many facets of job satisfaction, the main policy concern should focus 
on tackling negative effects of skill mismatch rather than overeducation. The 
government should ensure that the job-worker match mechanism is conducted in a way 
that can effectively use of employees’ skills to increase productivity. A good job-worker 
match can bring economic benefits and improve workers’ well-being.   
 
The following policy suggestions can be considered by the government: 
(1) Improve the quality of education and make it more adaptive to the labour market 
needs. 
The government has the responsibility to establish scientific mechanisms to examine 
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whether the content of current curriculum provided by the education system is 
appropriate to meet the needs of the labour market in order to ensure that the existing 
education system can provide sufficient skills required by the labour market and to 
support economic growth.        
        
(2) Further strengthen the development of vocational education and training.   
After the economic reform in 1978 in China, significant changes have been made to the 
Chinese education system. However, the development of vocational education and 
training (VET) lags far behind the economic development (Zhong, 2005). On one hand, 
the government should increase the ratio of investment on vocational education to total 
expenditure on education. For example, the ratio of investment on vocational college to 
total expenditure on education was only 5%, while the ratio of universities was 23% in 
2013 in China (Molnar and Koen, 2015). The average ratio of education expenditure on 
vocational education to total education expenditure is 12 percent in OECD countries 
(Molnar and Koen, 2015). On the other hand, offering a range of apprenticeships can 
improve the efficiency of matching between skills needed by employers and skills 
offered by employees, especially for young workers. Recent reports from the G20 
commitments and the European Council all address the importance of promoting 
apprenticeships to tackle young workers’ unemployment and underemployment59. In 
addition, providing diversified adult training and work-related training programmes can 
help employees to adapt to the ever changing job content in the labour market to 
maintain the link between employees and labour market synchronously.  
 
(3) Information dissemination mechanism and career guidance.   
The government needs to build official channels or agencies to provide good-quality 
information report about job hiring practices and qualifications needed for the labour 
market so that people can be well-informed in order to make rational education and 
career choices. For example, the Mexican Labour Observatory in Mexico is a free-
accessed online system publishing updated and dynamic employment information on 
the labour market. Job seekers, especially young people, can find the required education 
                                                 
59
 Matching Skills and Labour Market Needs: Building Social Partnerships for Better Skills and Better 
Jobs.  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_Employment_MatchingSkillsLabourMarket_Rep
ort_2014.pdf.  
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level in one occupation or can be informed which skill qualification is highly demand in 
the labour market. In addition, institutions providing career guidance and counselling 
services to the public should be established. Although career service centres have been 
established in some Chinese universities, their function is very weak. The main reason 
behind it is the lack of specialists and support staff. Good examples are from Jobcentre 
Plus in the UK and the Career Services (CS) in New Zealand.  
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Table 3-6 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of overall job satisfaction 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Age 0.007** 0.009** -0.016** 0.007** 0.008** -0.015** 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) 
Age2/100 -0.010*** -0.012*** 0.022*** -0.009** -0.011** 0.020** 
 (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0083) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0083) 
Actual years of schooling -0.007*** -0.008*** 0.015*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 0.017*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0037) 
Hourly wage -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002***    
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)    
Male 0.013 0.015 -0.028 0.010 0.012 -0.022 
 (0.0088) (0.0102) (0.0189) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0189) 
Ethnicity 0.028* 0.033* -0.061* 0.029* 0.033* -0.062* 
 (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) 
Political -0.011 -0.013 0.024 -0.013 -0.015 0.027 
 (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0287) (0.0133) (0.0154) (0.0287) 
Married -0.026** -0.030** 0.057** -0.025** -0.029** 0.055** 
 (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0276) (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0276) 
Urban registration -0.007 -0.008 0.016 -0.010 -0.011 0.021 
 (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) 
Full time job -0.026** -0.030** 0.056** -0.026** -0.030** 0.055** 
 (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) 
Public sector -0.036*** -0.041*** 0.077*** -0.033*** -0.038*** 0.072*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0231) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0231) 
Healthy status -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.0172) (0.0198) (0.0370) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0371) 
Lower social status 0.117*** 0.135*** -0.251*** 0.131*** 0.152*** -0.283*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0328) (0.0609) (0.0288) (0.0324) (0.0602) 
Middle social status 0.065** 0.074** -0.139** 0.076*** 0.088*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0326) (0.0608) (0.0284) (0.0324) (0.0605) 
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Medium-size firm 0.022* 0.026* -0.048* 0.021* 0.025* -0.046* 
 (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0246) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0246) 
Large-size firm 0.021* 0.024* -0.044* 0.018 0.021 -0.039 
 (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0262) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0262) 
Skill mismatch 0.045*** 0.052*** -0.097*** 0.045*** 0.052*** -0.096*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0165) (0.0307) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0307) 
East -0.043*** -0.049*** 0.092*** -0.047*** -0.054*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0233) 
Central -0.069*** -0.080*** 0.149*** -0.069*** -0.080*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0252) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) 
Number of observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 212.16 202.91 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0490 0.0469 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
    Notes:  1. The non-public sector is the benchmark work unit type. 2. West is the bench mark region. 3. Small is the benchmark firm size. 4. Part-time job is the comparison job type. 5. Upper class is the   
benchmark social class. 
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Table 3-7 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of overall job satisfaction (controlling for required educational level) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.043*** 0.049*** -0.092*** 0.042*** 0.049*** -0.091*** 
       (0.0144) (0.0165) (0.0307) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0307) 
Required educational 
level 
-0.015*** -0.018*** 0.033*** -0.019*** -0.022*** 0.041*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 0.035*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 0.042*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0120) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0117) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0119) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0117) 
Overeducated -0.014 -0.016 0.030 -0.018 -0.021 0.040 -0.016 -0.018 0.034 -0.020* -0.023* 0.044* 
 (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0262) (0.0121) (0.0140) (0.0261) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0262) (0.0121) (0.0140) (0.0260) 
Undereducated 0.016 0.019 -0.035 0.019* 0.022* -0.040* 0.017 0.020 -0.037 0.020* 0.023* -0.042* 
 (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0226) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0226) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0226) (0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0225) 
Age 0.007** 0.009** -0.016** 0.007** 0.008** -0.015** 0.008** 0.009** -0.016** 0.007** 0.008** -0.015** 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) 
Age2/100 -0.010** -0.011** 0.021** -0.009** -0.010** 0.019** -0.010** -0.011** 0.021** -0.009** -0.011** 0.020** 
 (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) 
Hourly wage -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002***    -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.003***    
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)    (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)    
Male 0.011 0.013 -0.024 0.008 0.009 -0.017 0.011 0.013 -0.023 0.008 0.009 -0.016 
 (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0192) (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0191) (0.0089) (0.0103) (0.0192) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0191) 
Ethnicity 0.031* 0.035* -0.066* 0.031* 0.035* -0.066* 0.027 0.031 -0.059 0.027 0.031 -0.059 
 (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0372) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0372) 
Political -0.014 -0.016 0.029 -0.015 -0.018 0.033 -0.014 -0.016 0.030 -0.016 -0.018 0.034 
 (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0288) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0288) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0287) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0288) 
Married -0.025* -0.029* 0.054* -0.024* -0.028* 0.051* -0.025* -0.028* 0.053* -0.024* -0.027* 0.051* 
 (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0278) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0278) (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0277) (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0277) 
Urban registration -0.011 -0.012 0.023 -0.013 -0.015 0.029 -0.011 -0.012 0.023 -0.014 -0.016 0.029 
 (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0242) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0241) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0241) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0241) 
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Full time job -0.027** -0.032** 0.059** -0.027** -0.031** 0.058** -0.028** -0.032** 0.060** -0.027** -0.032** 0.059** 
 (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) 
Public sector -0.037*** -0.043*** 0.080*** -0.035*** -0.040*** 0.074*** -0.036*** -0.042*** 0.078*** -0.034*** -0.039*** 0.073*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) 
Healthy status -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0372) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0372) 
Low social status 0.117*** 0.135*** -0.253*** 0.132*** 0.152*** -0.285*** 0.115*** 0.133*** -0.248*** 0.130*** 0.150*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0612) (0.0290) (0.0326) (0.0605) (0.0290) (0.0328) (0.0610) (0.0289) (0.0325) (0.0604) 
Middle social status 0.064** 0.074** -0.138** 0.076*** 0.087*** -0.163*** 0.062** 0.072** -0.134** 0.074*** 0.086*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0327) (0.0611) (0.0286) (0.0326) (0.0608) (0.0285) (0.0326) (0.0609) (0.0285) (0.0325) (0.0606) 
Medium-size firm 0.023** 0.026** -0.049** 0.022* 0.025* -0.047* 0.021* 0.025* -0.046* 0.020* 0.024* -0.044* 
 (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0247) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0247) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0246) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0247) 
Large-size firm 0.021* 0.024* -0.045* 0.018 0.021 -0.039 0.020 0.023 -0.042 0.017 0.019 -0.036 
 (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0263) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0263) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0263) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0263) 
East -0.046*** -0.053*** 0.099*** -0.051*** -0.058*** 0.109*** -0.044*** -0.051*** 0.095*** -0.049*** -0.057*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0233) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0233) 
Central -0.071*** -0.081*** 0.152*** -0.071*** -0.082*** 0.153*** -0.068*** -0.079*** 0.147*** -0.069*** -0.079*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0254) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 198.52 188.57 207.42 197.20 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0458 0.0435 0.0479 0.0455 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-8 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with pay (controlling for required educational level) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.039* 0.014* -0.053* 0.038* 0.013* -0.051* 
       (0.0230) (0.0081) (0.0310) (0.0230) (0.0081) (0.0311) 
Required 
educational level 
-0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 0.010 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 
 (0.0089) (0.0031) (0.0119) (0.0087) (0.0031) (0.0118) (0.0089) (0.0031) (0.0119) (0.0087) (0.0031) (0.0118) 
Overeducated 0.015 0.005 -0.021 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.014 0.005 -0.019 0.005 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.0192) (0.0067) (0.0259) (0.0191) (0.0067) (0.0258) (0.0192) (0.0067) (0.0259) (0.0191) (0.0067) (0.0258) 
Undereducated -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.0168) (0.0059) (0.0227) (0.0168) (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0168) (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0168) (0.0059) (0.0226) 
Age 0.006 0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) 
Age2/100 -0.009 -0.003 0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 -0.009 -0.003 0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 
 (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008)    (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008)    
Male 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.0142) (0.0049) (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0049) (0.0190) (0.0142) (0.0049) (0.0191) (0.0141) (0.0049) (0.0190) 
Ethnicity 0.009 0.003 -0.012 0.009 0.003 -0.012 0.007 0.002 -0.009 0.006 0.002 -0.008 
 (0.0273) (0.0095) (0.0368) (0.0273) (0.0096) (0.0369) (0.0273) (0.0095) (0.0368) (0.0273) (0.0096) (0.0369) 
Political 0.008 0.003 -0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.005 0.007 0.003 -0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.0210) (0.0073) (0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0074) (0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0073) (0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0074) (0.0283) 
Married -0.014 -0.005 0.019 -0.012 -0.004 0.016 -0.014 -0.005 0.019 -0.012 -0.004 0.016 
 (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) (0.0206) (0.0072) (0.0278) (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) 
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Urban registration -0.029 -0.010 0.039 -0.035* -0.012* 0.047* -0.030* -0.010 0.040* -0.035** -0.012* 0.048** 
 (0.0180) (0.0063) (0.0242) (0.0180) (0.0063) (0.0242) (0.0180) (0.0063) (0.0242) (0.0179) (0.0063) (0.0242) 
Full time job -0.041** -0.014* 0.055** -0.040* -0.014* 0.054* -0.041** -0.014** 0.056** -0.041* -0.014* 0.055* 
 (0.0208) (0.0073) (0.0281) (0.0209) (0.0074) (0.0281) (0.0208) (0.0073) (0.0281) (0.0208) (0.0074) (0.0281) 
Public sector -0.011 -0.004 0.015 -0.006 -0.002 0.008 -0.011 -0.004 0.014 -0.005 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.0173) (0.0060) (0.0233) (0.0173) (0.0061) (0.0233) (0.0173) (0.0060) (0.0233) (0.0173) (0.0061) (0.0233) 
Healthy status -0.061** -0.021** 0.082** -0.063** -0.022** 0.085** -0.060** -0.021** 0.081** -0.062** -0.022** 0.084** 
 (0.0276) (0.0098) (0.0372) (0.0277) (0.0098) (0.0374) (0.0276) (0.0097) (0.0372) (0.0277) (0.0098) (0.0374) 
Low social status 0.211*** 0.074*** -0.285*** 0.241*** 0.084*** -0.326*** 0.209*** 0.073*** -0.282*** 0.239*** 0.084*** -0.323*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0162) (0.0606) (0.0453) (0.0163) (0.0600) (0.0455) (0.0162) (0.0606) (0.0453) (0.0162) (0.0600) 
Middle social 
status 
0.129*** 0.045*** -0.174*** 0.152*** 0.053*** -0.206*** 0.128*** 0.044*** -0.172*** 0.151*** 0.053*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0158) (0.0605) (0.0450) (0.0158) (0.0602) (0.0451) (0.0158) (0.0604) (0.0450) (0.0158) (0.0602) 
Medium-size firm 0.013 0.005 -0.018 0.011 0.004 -0.015 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.010 0.003 -0.013 
 (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) 
Large-size firm 0.025 0.009 -0.034 0.019 0.007 -0.026 0.024 0.008 -0.032 0.018 0.006 -0.024 
 (0.0195) (0.0068) (0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0068) (0.0263) (0.0195) (0.0068) (0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0068) (0.0262) 
East -0.063*** -0.022*** 0.084*** -0.072*** -0.025*** 0.097*** -0.061*** -0.021*** 0.082*** -0.070*** -0.025*** 0.095*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0063) (0.0235) (0.0174) (0.0063) (0.0234) (0.0175) (0.0063) (0.0235) (0.0174) (0.0063) (0.0234) 
Central -0.095*** -0.033*** 0.128*** -0.096*** -0.034*** 0.129*** -0.093*** -0.033*** 0.126*** -0.094*** -0.033*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0254) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0255) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0254) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0255) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 138.33 122.01 141.21 124.73 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0289 0.0255 0.0295 0.0261 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-9 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with welfare (controlling for required educational level) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.036 0.008 -0.044 0.035 0.007 -0.043 
       (0.0240) (0.0050) (0.0289) (0.0240) (0.0051) (0.0290) 
Required 
educational level 
-0.018** -0.004* 0.022** -0.025*** -0.005*** 0.030*** -0.019** -0.004** 0.023** -0.026*** -0.005*** 0.031*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0019) (0.0111) (0.0090) (0.0020) (0.0109) (0.0092) (0.0019) (0.0111) (0.0091) (0.0020) (0.0109) 
Overeducated -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.010 -0.002 0.012 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.011 -0.002 0.013 
 (0.0202) (0.0042) (0.0243) (0.0200) (0.0042) (0.0242) (0.0202) (0.0042) (0.0243) (0.0200) (0.0042) (0.0242) 
Undereducated 0.045** 0.009** -0.054** 0.050*** 0.011*** -0.061*** 0.046*** 0.009** -0.055*** 0.051*** 0.011*** -0.062*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0038) (0.0212) (0.0175) (0.0039) (0.0212) (0.0176) (0.0038) (0.0212) (0.0175) (0.0039) (0.0212) 
Age 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) 
Age2/100 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0078) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0078) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0079) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.003***    
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0008)    (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0008)    
Male 0.019 0.004 -0.023 0.012 0.003 -0.015 0.018 0.004 -0.022 0.012 0.002 -0.014 
 (0.0149) (0.0031) (0.0179) (0.0148) (0.0031) (0.0179) (0.0149) (0.0031) (0.0179) (0.0148) (0.0031) (0.0179) 
Ethnicity -0.026 -0.005 0.032 -0.026 -0.006 0.032 -0.029 -0.006 0.035 -0.029 -0.006 0.035 
 (0.0288) (0.0060) (0.0347) (0.0288) (0.0061) (0.0349) (0.0288) (0.0060) (0.0348) (0.0289) (0.0061) (0.0349) 
Political 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.0220) (0.0045) (0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0046) (0.0266) (0.0220) (0.0045) (0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0046) (0.0266) 
Married -0.011 -0.002 0.014 -0.009 -0.002 0.011 -0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.008 -0.002 0.010 
 (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) 
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Urban registration -0.068*** -0.014*** 0.082*** -0.074*** -0.015*** 0.089*** -0.068*** -0.014*** 0.082*** -0.074*** -0.016*** 0.089*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0042) (0.0226) (0.0187) (0.0043) (0.0226) (0.0187) (0.0042) (0.0226) (0.0187) (0.0043) (0.0226) 
Full time job -0.069*** -0.014*** 0.083*** -0.068*** -0.014*** 0.082*** -0.070*** -0.014*** 0.084*** -0.068*** -0.014*** 0.083*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0264) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) 
Public sector -0.036** -0.007* 0.044** -0.031* -0.006* 0.037* -0.036** -0.007* 0.043** -0.030* -0.006 0.036* 
 (0.0181) (0.0038) (0.0218) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0218) (0.0181) (0.0038) (0.0218) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0218) 
Healthy status -0.022 -0.005 0.026 -0.024 -0.005 0.029 -0.021 -0.004 0.025 -0.023 -0.005 0.028 
 (0.0292) (0.0061) (0.0353) (0.0293) (0.0062) (0.0354) (0.0292) (0.0061) (0.0352) (0.0293) (0.0062) (0.0354) 
Low social status 0.189*** 0.039*** -0.229*** 0.219*** 0.046*** -0.265*** 0.188*** 0.039*** -0.227*** 0.217*** 0.046*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0102) (0.0550) (0.0455) (0.0104) (0.0544) (0.0460) (0.0102) (0.0550) (0.0455) (0.0104) (0.0544) 
Middle social 
status 
0.117** 0.024** -0.141*** 0.140*** 0.029*** -0.169*** 0.116** 0.024** -0.140** 0.139*** 0.029*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0096) (0.0547) (0.0453) (0.0098) (0.0544) (0.0455) (0.0096) (0.0547) (0.0453) (0.0098) (0.0544) 
Medium-size firm 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.0191) (0.0039) (0.0230) (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0231) (0.0191) (0.0039) (0.0231) (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0231) 
Large-size firm -0.033 -0.007 0.040 -0.039* -0.008* 0.047* -0.034* -0.007* 0.041* -0.040* -0.008* 0.048** 
 (0.0204) (0.0043) (0.0246) (0.0203) (0.0043) (0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0043) (0.0246) (0.0203) (0.0043) (0.0246) 
East -0.089*** -0.018*** 0.108*** -0.099*** -0.021*** 0.120*** -0.088*** -0.018*** 0.106*** -0.098*** -0.020*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0043) (0.0220) (0.0181) (0.0045) (0.0219) (0.0183) (0.0043) (0.0220) (0.0181) (0.0045) (0.0219) 
Central -0.088*** -0.018*** 0.107*** -0.089*** -0.019*** 0.108*** -0.087*** -0.018*** 0.105*** -0.087*** -0.018*** 0.106*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0046) (0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0047) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0046) (0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0047) (0.0240) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 242.51 226.82 244.80 228.97 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0496 0.0464 0.0500 0.0468 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-10 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with workload (controlling for required educational 
level) 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.032 0.010 -0.042 0.032 0.010 -0.042 
       (0.0228) (0.0072) (0.0300) (0.0228) (0.0072) (0.0300) 
Required educational level -0.026*** -0.008*** 0.034*** -0.028*** -0.009*** 0.037*** -0.027*** -0.008*** 0.035*** -0.029*** -0.009*** 0.038*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0028) (0.0112) (0.0085) (0.0028) (0.0111) (0.0086) (0.0028) (0.0112) (0.0085) (0.0028) (0.0111) 
Overeducated -0.033* -0.010* 0.043* -0.035* -0.011* 0.045* -0.034* -0.011* 0.045* -0.036* -0.011* 0.047* 
 (0.0189) (0.0060) (0.0248) (0.0188) (0.0060) (0.0247) (0.0189) (0.0060) (0.0248) (0.0188) (0.0060) (0.0247) 
Undereducated 0.047*** 0.015*** -0.062*** 0.049*** 0.015*** -0.064*** 0.048*** 0.015*** -0.063*** 0.049*** 0.016*** -0.065*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0053) (0.0216) (0.0164) (0.0053) (0.0215) (0.0165) (0.0053) (0.0216) (0.0164) (0.0053) (0.0215) 
Age 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) 
Age2/100 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) 
Hourly wage -0.001 -0.000 0.001    -0.001 -0.000 0.001    
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)    (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)    
Male 0.015 0.005 -0.019 0.013 0.004 -0.017 0.014 0.004 -0.019 0.012 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.0140) (0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0139) (0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0140) (0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0139) (0.0044) (0.0183) 
Ethnicity -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.0271) (0.0085) (0.0357) (0.0271) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0085) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) 
Political 0.026 0.008 -0.035 0.025 0.008 -0.032 0.026 0.008 -0.034 0.024 0.008 -0.032 
 (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0270) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) 
Married 0.018 0.006 -0.024 0.019 0.006 -0.025 0.018 0.006 -0.024 0.019 0.006 -0.025 
 (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) 
Urban registration -0.032* -0.010* 0.042* -0.034* -0.011* 0.044* -0.032* -0.010* 0.042* -0.034* -0.011* 0.045* 
 (0.0176) (0.0056) (0.0232) (0.0176) (0.0056) (0.0231) (0.0176) (0.0056) (0.0232) (0.0176) (0.0056) (0.0231) 
Full time job -0.029 -0.009 0.039 -0.028 -0.009 0.037 -0.030 -0.009 0.039 -0.029 -0.009 0.038 
 (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) 
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Public sector -0.050*** -0.016*** 0.066*** -0.048*** -0.015*** 0.063*** -0.049*** -0.015*** 0.065*** -0.047*** -0.015*** 0.062*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) 
Healthy status -0.041 -0.013 0.054 -0.042 -0.013 0.055 -0.040 -0.013 0.053 -0.041 -0.013 0.054 
 (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0087) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) 
Low social status 0.139*** 0.044*** -0.183*** 0.150*** 0.047*** -0.197*** 0.138*** 0.043*** -0.181*** 0.148*** 0.047*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0137) (0.0553) (0.0417) (0.0135) (0.0544) (0.0423) (0.0136) (0.0553) (0.0417) (0.0135) (0.0544) 
Middle social status 0.081* 0.025* -0.106* 0.090** 0.028** -0.118** 0.080* 0.025* -0.105* 0.089** 0.028** -0.116** 
 (0.0419) (0.0133) (0.0549) (0.0414) (0.0132) (0.0543) (0.0419) (0.0132) (0.0549) (0.0414) (0.0131) (0.0543) 
Medium-size firm 0.018 0.006 -0.023 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.016 0.005 -0.021 
 (0.0179) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0179) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0180) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0179) (0.0057) (0.0236) 
Large-size firm 0.036* 0.011* -0.048* 0.034* 0.011* -0.045* 0.035* 0.011* -0.046* 0.033* 0.010* -0.044* 
 (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) 
East -0.048*** -0.015*** 0.063*** -0.050*** -0.016*** 0.066*** -0.047*** -0.015*** 0.061*** -0.049*** -0.016*** 0.065*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0056) (0.0226) (0.0171) (0.0056) (0.0225) (0.0173) (0.0056) (0.0227) (0.0172) (0.0056) (0.0225) 
Central -0.085*** -0.027*** 0.112*** -0.085*** -0.027*** 0.112*** -0.084*** -0.026*** 0.110*** -0.084*** -0.026*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0188) (0.0063) (0.0245) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 134.99 133.22 136.94 135.15 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0281 0.0277 0.0285 0.0281 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-11 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with working conditions and facilities (controlling for 
required educational level) 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.041** 0.028** -0.069** 0.040** 0.028** -0.069** 
       (0.0181) (0.0126) (0.0306) (0.0182) (0.0127) (0.0307) 
Required educational level -0.030*** -0.021*** 0.051*** -0.035*** -0.024*** 0.059*** -0.031*** -0.022*** 0.052*** -0.036*** -0.025*** 0.061*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0049) (0.0116) (0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0115) (0.0070) (0.0048) (0.0116) (0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0114) 
Overeducated -0.034** -0.024** 0.058** -0.040*** -0.028*** 0.068*** -0.036** -0.025** 0.060** -0.042*** -0.029*** 0.071*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0256) (0.0151) (0.0106) (0.0255) (0.0152) (0.0105) (0.0256) (0.0151) (0.0105) (0.0255) 
Undereducated 0.020 0.014 -0.033 0.024* 0.016* -0.040* 0.021 0.014 -0.035 0.024* 0.017* -0.041* 
 (0.0131) (0.0091) (0.0222) (0.0131) (0.0092) (0.0222) (0.0131) (0.0091) (0.0222) (0.0131) (0.0092) (0.0222) 
Age 0.007* 0.005* -0.012* 0.006 0.004 -0.010 0.007* 0.005* -0.012* 0.006 0.004 -0.011 
 (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) 
Age2/100 -0.008 -0.006 0.014* -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.008* -0.006* 0.014* -0.007 -0.005 0.012 
 (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0049) (0.0034) (0.0082) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)    (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)    
Male 0.021* 0.014* -0.035* 0.016 0.011 -0.027 0.020* 0.014* -0.034* 0.015 0.011 -0.026 
 (0.0112) (0.0078) (0.0189) (0.0111) (0.0078) (0.0188) (0.0112) (0.0078) (0.0189) (0.0111) (0.0077) (0.0188) 
Ethnicity -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.007 -0.005 0.013 -0.010 -0.007 0.017 -0.010 -0.007 0.018 
 (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0363) (0.0214) (0.0150) (0.0364) (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0363) (0.0215) (0.0150) (0.0364) 
Political -0.006 -0.004 0.010 -0.009 -0.006 0.015 -0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.009 -0.006 0.015 
 (0.0165) (0.0114) (0.0279) (0.0165) (0.0115) (0.0280) (0.0165) (0.0114) (0.0279) (0.0165) (0.0115) (0.0279) 
Married -0.013 -0.009 0.021 -0.011 -0.008 0.018 -0.012 -0.009 0.021 -0.010 -0.007 0.018 
 (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0275) 
Urban registration -0.019 -0.013 0.032 -0.024* -0.017* 0.040* -0.019 -0.013 0.033 -0.024* -0.017* 0.041* 
 (0.0140) (0.0098) (0.0238) (0.0140) (0.0098) (0.0237) (0.0140) (0.0098) (0.0238) (0.0140) (0.0098) (0.0237) 
Full time job -0.036** -0.025** 0.061** -0.036** -0.025** 0.061** -0.037** -0.026** 0.062** -0.036** -0.025** 0.062** 
 (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0275) 
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Public sector -0.018 -0.012 0.030 -0.013 -0.009 0.023 -0.017 -0.012 0.028 -0.013 -0.009 0.021 
 (0.0136) (0.0095) (0.0230) (0.0136) (0.0095) (0.0230) (0.0136) (0.0094) (0.0230) (0.0136) (0.0095) (0.0230) 
Healthy status -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.0216) (0.0150) (0.0366) (0.0216) (0.0151) (0.0367) (0.0216) (0.0150) (0.0365) (0.0216) (0.0151) (0.0367) 
Low social status 0.090*** 0.062*** -0.152*** 0.111*** 0.077*** -0.188*** 0.087** 0.061** -0.148** 0.109*** 0.076*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0237) (0.0576) (0.0339) (0.0236) (0.0569) (0.0341) (0.0237) (0.0575) (0.0338) (0.0235) (0.0569) 
Middle social status 0.042 0.029 -0.072 0.059* 0.041* -0.100* 0.041 0.028 -0.069 0.057* 0.040* -0.097* 
 (0.0338) (0.0235) (0.0572) (0.0336) (0.0234) (0.0568) (0.0337) (0.0234) (0.0571) (0.0335) (0.0234) (0.0568) 
Medium-size firm -0.010 -0.007 0.017 -0.012 -0.008 0.020 -0.012 -0.008 0.020 -0.013 -0.009 0.022 
 (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0241) (0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0242) (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0241) (0.0143) (0.0100) (0.0242) 
Large-size firm -0.036** -0.025** 0.061** -0.040*** -0.028*** 0.068*** -0.037** -0.026** 0.063** -0.041*** -0.029*** 0.070*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0106) (0.0258) (0.0153) (0.0107) (0.0258) (0.0153) (0.0106) (0.0258) (0.0153) (0.0107) (0.0258) 
East -0.027** -0.019** 0.047** -0.035** -0.024** 0.059** -0.026* -0.018* 0.044* -0.033** -0.023** 0.056** 
 (0.0138) (0.0096) (0.0234) (0.0137) (0.0096) (0.0232) (0.0138) (0.0096) (0.0233) (0.0137) (0.0096) (0.0232) 
Central -0.030** -0.021** 0.051** -0.030** -0.021** 0.051** -0.028* -0.020* 0.048* -0.028* -0.020* 0.048* 
 (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0252) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0253) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0252) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0253) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 180.58 166.93 185.62 171.90 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0395 0.0366 0.0406 0.0376 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-12 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with colleagues (controlling for required educational 
level) 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.010* 0.040* -0.050* 0.010* 0.040* -0.050* 
       (0.0056) (0.0226) (0.0280) (0.0056) (0.0225) (0.0280) 
Required educational level -0.008*** -0.032*** 0.039*** -0.008*** -0.034*** 0.043*** -0.008*** -0.032*** 0.040*** -0.009*** -0.035*** 0.044*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0023) (0.0088) (0.0109) (0.0024) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0024) (0.0088) (0.0109) 
Overeducated -0.008* -0.034* 0.043* -0.009* -0.037* 0.046* -0.009* -0.036* 0.045* -0.009* -0.039** 0.048** 
 (0.0048) (0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0048) (0.0192) (0.0240) (0.0048) (0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0048) (0.0193) (0.0240) 
Undereducated 0.003 0.014 -0.018 0.004 0.016 -0.020 0.004 0.015 -0.019 0.004 0.017 -0.021 
 (0.0040) (0.0165) (0.0205) (0.0040) (0.0164) (0.0204) (0.0040) (0.0165) (0.0205) (0.0040) (0.0164) (0.0204) 
Age 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) 
Age2/100 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
Hourly wage -0.000 -0.001 0.001    -0.000 -0.001 0.001    
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008)    (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008)    
Male 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.0034) (0.0141) (0.0175) (0.0034) (0.0140) (0.0174) (0.0034) (0.0141) (0.0175) (0.0034) (0.0140) (0.0174) 
Ethnicity 0.010 0.042 -0.053 0.010 0.042 -0.053 0.010 0.039 -0.049 0.010 0.039 -0.049 
 (0.0069) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0069) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0069) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0069) (0.0281) (0.0349) 
Political -0.016*** -0.064*** 0.080*** -0.016*** -0.066*** 0.082*** -0.016*** -0.065*** 0.081*** -0.016*** -0.066*** 0.083*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0058) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0058) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0058) (0.0226) (0.0281) 
Married 0.003 0.014 -0.018 0.004 0.015 -0.019 0.004 0.015 -0.018 0.004 0.015 -0.019 
 (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0255) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0255) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0255) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0255) 
Urban registration 0.007* 0.030* -0.038* 0.007 0.028 -0.035 0.007* 0.030* -0.037* 0.007 0.028 -0.034 
 (0.0044) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0043) (0.0175) (0.0218) (0.0044) (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0043) (0.0175) (0.0218) 
Full time job -0.011** -0.046** 0.057** -0.011** -0.046** 0.057** -0.011** -0.047** 0.058** -0.011** -0.046** 0.058** 
 (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0244) 
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Public  sector 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.007 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.007 -0.008 
 (0.0042) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0042) (0.0173) (0.0216) (0.0042) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0042) (0.0173) (0.0216) 
Healthy status -0.002 -0.007 0.009 -0.002 -0.008 0.010 -0.002 -0.007 0.008 -0.002 -0.007 0.009 
 (0.0065) (0.0268) (0.0334) (0.0066) (0.0269) (0.0334) (0.0065) (0.0268) (0.0333) (0.0065) (0.0268) (0.0334) 
Low social status 0.003 0.011 -0.013 0.006 0.024 -0.029 0.002 0.008 -0.010 0.005 0.021 -0.026 
 (0.0101) (0.0416) (0.0517) (0.0100) (0.0409) (0.0508) (0.0101) (0.0415) (0.0516) (0.0100) (0.0409) (0.0508) 
Middle social status -0.006 -0.025 0.031 -0.003 -0.014 0.018 -0.006 -0.026 0.032 -0.004 -0.016 0.019 
 (0.0101) (0.0411) (0.0511) (0.0099) (0.0407) (0.0507) (0.0100) (0.0411) (0.0511) (0.0099) (0.0407) (0.0506) 
Medium-size firm -0.014*** -0.057*** 0.070*** -0.014*** -0.058*** 0.072*** -0.014*** -0.058*** 0.072*** -0.014*** -0.059*** 0.074*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0046) (0.0177) (0.0221) (0.0046) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0046) (0.0178) (0.0221) 
Large-size firm -0.017*** -0.069*** 0.086*** -0.017*** -0.071*** 0.089*** -0.017*** -0.070*** 0.087*** -0.018*** -0.073*** 0.090*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0051) (0.0192) (0.0238) (0.0051) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0051) (0.0192) (0.0238) 
East 0.005 0.020 -0.025 0.004 0.017 -0.021 0.005 0.022 -0.027 0.005 0.019 -0.023 
 (0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0217) (0.0042) (0.0173) (0.0215) (0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0217) (0.0043) (0.0173) (0.0215) 
Central -0.005 -0.021 0.027 -0.005 -0.021 0.026 -0.005 -0.019 0.024 -0.005 -0.019 0.023 
 (0.0047) (0.0191) (0.0238) (0.0047) (0.0191) (0.0238) (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0238) (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0239) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 89.52 87.08 92.61 90.18 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0322 0.0313 0.0333 0.0324 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-13 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with the relationship with the boss (controlling for 
required educational level) 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.031*** 0.078*** -0.108*** 0.031*** 0.077*** -0.108*** 
       (0.0091) (0.0224) (0.0312) (0.0091) (0.0225) (0.0313) 
Required educational level -0.023*** -0.057*** 0.080*** -0.025*** -0.062*** 0.087*** -0.023*** -0.059*** 0.082*** -0.025*** -0.064*** 0.089*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0089) (0.0123) (0.0039) (0.0087) (0.0121) (0.0039) (0.0089) (0.0123) (0.0039) (0.0087) (0.0121) 
Overeducated -0.010 -0.025 0.035 -0.013* -0.032* 0.045* -0.011 -0.028 0.039 -0.014* -0.035* 0.049* 
 (0.0077) (0.0192) (0.0268) (0.0076) (0.0191) (0.0267) (0.0076) (0.0192) (0.0268) (0.0076) (0.0191) (0.0266) 
Undereducated 0.009 0.022 -0.031 0.010 0.026 -0.037 0.010 0.025 -0.034 0.011* 0.029* -0.040* 
 (0.0066) (0.0167) (0.0233) (0.0066) (0.0166) (0.0232) (0.0066) (0.0166) (0.0232) (0.0066) (0.0166) (0.0232) 
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) 
Age2/100 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0086) 
Hourly wage -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003***    -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003***    
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009)    (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009)    
Male -0.006 -0.016 0.023 -0.008 -0.021 0.029 -0.007 -0.017 0.024 -0.009 -0.022 0.031 
 (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0197) (0.0056) (0.0140) (0.0196) (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0196) (0.0056) (0.0140) (0.0196) 
Ethnicity 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 
 (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0376) (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0377) (0.0107) (0.0269) (0.0376) (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0377) 
Political -0.019** -0.047** 0.066** -0.020** -0.051** 0.071** -0.019** -0.048** 0.067** -0.020** -0.052** 0.072** 
 (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0304) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0304) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0304) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0304) 
Married -0.009 -0.023 0.032 -0.008 -0.021 0.029 -0.009 -0.022 0.031 -0.008 -0.021 0.029 
 (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0284) (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0284) (0.0080) (0.0203) (0.0283) (0.0080) (0.0203) (0.0283) 
Urban registration -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.009 
 (0.0070) (0.0178) (0.0248) (0.0070) (0.0177) (0.0248) (0.0070) (0.0177) (0.0248) (0.0070) (0.0177) (0.0247) 
Full time job -0.017** -0.043** 0.060** -0.017** -0.043** 0.059** -0.017** -0.043** 0.060** -0.017** -0.043** 0.060** 
 (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0283) (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0283) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0282) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0282) 
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Public sector -0.019*** -0.048*** 0.067*** -0.018** -0.044** 0.062** -0.018*** -0.047*** 0.065*** -0.017** -0.043** 0.059** 
 (0.0070) (0.0172) (0.0240) (0.0070) (0.0172) (0.0240) (0.0069) (0.0172) (0.0240) (0.0069) (0.0172) (0.0240) 
Healthy status 0.007 0.018 -0.025 0.006 0.015 -0.021 0.008 0.020 -0.027 0.007 0.017 -0.023 
 (0.0110) (0.0277) (0.0387) (0.0110) (0.0277) (0.0387) (0.0110) (0.0276) (0.0386) (0.0110) (0.0277) (0.0386) 
Low social status 0.034* 0.086* -0.120* 0.044** 0.110** -0.154** 0.032* 0.082* -0.114* 0.042** 0.106** -0.148** 
 (0.0179) (0.0447) (0.0624) (0.0178) (0.0441) (0.0616) (0.0178) (0.0446) (0.0622) (0.0177) (0.0440) (0.0615) 
Middle social status 0.023 0.059 -0.082 0.031* 0.078* -0.108* 0.022 0.056 -0.078 0.030* 0.075* -0.104* 
 (0.0177) (0.0443) (0.0619) (0.0176) (0.0440) (0.0615) (0.0176) (0.0442) (0.0617) (0.0175) (0.0439) (0.0613) 
Medium-size firm 0.009 0.024 -0.033 0.009 0.022 -0.030 0.008 0.021 -0.029 0.008 0.019 -0.027 
 (0.0073) (0.0182) (0.0254) (0.0073) (0.0182) (0.0255) (0.0072) (0.0182) (0.0254) (0.0072) (0.0182) (0.0254) 
Large-size firm 0.015** 0.039** -0.054** 0.014* 0.034* -0.048* 0.014* 0.036* -0.051* 0.013 0.032* -0.045* 
 (0.0078) (0.0194) (0.0270) (0.0077) (0.0193) (0.0270) (0.0077) (0.0193) (0.0270) (0.0077) (0.0193) (0.0270) 
East -0.004 -0.011 0.015 -0.007 -0.018 0.025 -0.003 -0.007 0.010 -0.006 -0.015 0.021 
 (0.0069) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0069) (0.0173) (0.0242) (0.0069) (0.0174) (0.0243) (0.0069) (0.0173) (0.0242) 
Central -0.026*** -0.065*** 0.091*** -0.026*** -0.065*** 0.091*** -0.024*** -0.061*** 0.085*** -0.024*** -0.061*** 0.085*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0190) (0.0264) (0.0078) (0.0190) (0.0265) (0.0077) (0.0190) (0.0264) (0.0077) (0.0190) (0.0265) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 165.60 156.17 177.34 167.74 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0435 0.0410 0.0466 0.0441 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-14 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with commuting distance to job location (controlling 
for required educational level) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.012 0.011 -0.022 0.012 0.011 -0.022 
       (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0320) (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0321) 
Required educational level -0.007 -0.007 0.014 -0.011* -0.010* 0.020* -0.008 -0.007 0.015 -0.011* -0.010* 0.021* 
 (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0124) (0.0064) (0.0058) (0.0122) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0124) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0122) 
Overeducated -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 
 (0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0270) (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0268) (0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0270) (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0269) 
Undereducated 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.008 0.007 -0.015 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.008 0.007 -0.015 
 (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0234) (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0234) (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0234) (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0234) 
Age 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) 
Age2/100 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) 
Hourly wage -0.001** -0.001** 0.002**    -0.001** -0.001** 0.002**    
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)    (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)    
Male 0.019* 0.017* -0.036* 0.016 0.014 -0.029 0.019* 0.017* -0.036* 0.015 0.014 -0.029 
 (0.0105) (0.0094) (0.0198) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0197) (0.0105) (0.0094) (0.0198) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0197) 
Ethnicity 0.025 0.023 -0.048 0.025 0.023 -0.048 0.025 0.022 -0.047 0.024 0.022 -0.046 
 (0.0204) (0.0183) (0.0387) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0388) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0388) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0389) 
Political -0.044*** -0.040*** 0.084*** -0.046*** -0.041*** 0.087*** -0.044*** -0.040*** 0.084*** -0.046*** -0.041*** 0.087*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) 
Married 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0287) (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0287) (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0288) 
Urban registration -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0250) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0249) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0250) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0249) 
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Full time job -0.027* -0.024* 0.051* -0.026* -0.024* 0.050* -0.027* -0.024* 0.051* -0.026* -0.024* 0.050* 
 (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) 
Public  sector -0.009 -0.008 0.018 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.0127) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0127) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0240) 
Healthy status 0.009 0.008 -0.016 0.007 0.007 -0.014 0.009 0.008 -0.017 0.008 0.007 -0.014 
 (0.0205) (0.0185) (0.0390) (0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0391) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0390) (0.0206) (0.0185) (0.0390) 
Low social status 0.085*** 0.077*** -0.162*** 0.101*** 0.091*** -0.192*** 0.085** 0.076*** -0.161*** 0.101*** 0.091*** -0.191*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0295) (0.0623) (0.0327) (0.0291) (0.0614) (0.0331) (0.0295) (0.0623) (0.0327) (0.0291) (0.0614) 
Middle social status 0.043 0.039 -0.082 0.056* 0.050* -0.106* 0.043 0.039 -0.082 0.056* 0.050* -0.106* 
 (0.0327) (0.0293) (0.0618) (0.0324) (0.0291) (0.0614) (0.0327) (0.0293) (0.0619) (0.0324) (0.0291) (0.0614) 
Medium-size firm 0.018 0.016 -0.033 0.016 0.015 -0.031 0.017 0.015 -0.033 0.016 0.014 -0.030 
 (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0253) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0253) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0253) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0254) 
Large-size firm -0.005 -0.005 0.010 -0.008 -0.007 0.016 -0.006 -0.005 0.011 -0.009 -0.008 0.016 
 (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0144) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) 
East -0.012 -0.011 0.023 -0.017 -0.015 0.032 -0.012 -0.010 0.022 -0.016 -0.015 0.031 
 (0.0129) (0.0115) (0.0244) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0242) (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0244) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0242) 
Central -0.054*** -0.049*** 0.103*** -0.054*** -0.049*** 0.103*** -0.054*** -0.048*** 0.102*** -0.053*** -0.048*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0266) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0267) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0266) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0267) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 87.36 80.26 87.84 80.74 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0210 0.0193 0.0211 0.0194 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table 3-15 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with housing benefits (controlling for required 
educational level) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.073** -0.009** -0.064** 0.072** -0.009** -0.063** 
       (0.0302) (0.0041) (0.0264) (0.0303) (0.0040) (0.0265) 
Required educational level 0.023** -0.003* -0.020** 0.015 -0.002 -0.013 0.022* -0.003* -0.019* 0.014 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.0113) (0.0015) (0.0099) (0.0111) (0.0014) (0.0097) (0.0113) (0.0015) (0.0099) (0.0111) (0.0014) (0.0097) 
Overeducated -0.063** 0.008** 0.055** -0.072*** 0.009*** 0.063*** -0.066*** 0.008** 0.057*** -0.075*** 0.009*** 0.066*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0033) (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0034) (0.0214) (0.0246) (0.0034) (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0034) (0.0214) 
Undereducated -0.032 0.004 0.028 -0.025 0.003 0.022 -0.030 0.004 0.026 -0.024 0.003 0.021 
 (0.0217) (0.0028) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0027) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0028) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0027) (0.0190) 
Age 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 -0.009 0.009 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0008) (0.0058) 
Age2/100 -0.013 0.002 0.011 -0.011 0.001 0.010 -0.013 0.002 0.011 -0.011 0.001 0.010 
 (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) 
Hourly wage -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.002***    -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.002***    
 (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007)    (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007)    
Male 0.019 -0.002 -0.017 0.012 -0.001 -0.010 0.019 -0.002 -0.016 0.011 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.0183) (0.0023) (0.0160) (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0160) (0.0183) (0.0023) (0.0160) (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0159) 
Ethnicity -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.011 0.001 0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.009 
 (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0312) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0314) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0312) (0.0359) (0.0045) (0.0314) 
Political -0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.010 0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.001 0.005 -0.010 0.001 0.009 
 (0.0267) (0.0034) (0.0233) (0.0267) (0.0033) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.0034) (0.0233) (0.0267) (0.0033) (0.0233) 
Married -0.094*** 0.012*** 0.082*** -0.091*** 0.011*** 0.079*** -0.093*** 0.012*** 0.081*** -0.090*** 0.011*** 0.079*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0038) (0.0234) (0.0268) (0.0037) (0.0235) (0.0267) (0.0038) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.0037) (0.0235) 
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Urban registration -0.057** 0.007** 0.049** -0.063*** 0.008** 0.055*** -0.057** 0.007** 0.050** -0.063*** 0.008** 0.055*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0031) (0.0204) (0.0233) (0.0031) (0.0204) (0.0233) (0.0031) (0.0204) (0.0232) (0.0031) (0.0204) 
Full time job -0.084*** 0.011*** 0.074*** -0.082*** 0.010*** 0.072*** -0.085*** 0.011*** 0.075*** -0.083*** 0.010*** 0.072*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0038) (0.0239) (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0239) (0.0272) (0.0038) (0.0239) (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0239) 
Public sector -0.044* 0.006* 0.038* -0.037 0.005 0.032 -0.042* 0.005* 0.037* -0.035 0.004 0.031 
 (0.0224) (0.0029) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0029) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0029) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0029) (0.0195) 
Healthy status -0.020 0.003 0.018 -0.023 0.003 0.020 -0.018 0.002 0.016 -0.021 0.003 0.018 
 (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0312) (0.0359) (0.0045) (0.0314) (0.0357) (0.0045) (0.0312) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0313) 
Low social status 0.183*** -0.023*** -0.160*** 0.218*** -0.027*** -0.191*** 0.179*** -0.023*** -0.157*** 0.214*** -0.027*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0077) (0.0471) (0.0531) (0.0079) (0.0465) (0.0539) (0.0077) (0.0471) (0.0531) (0.0079) (0.0464) 
Middle social status 0.094* -0.012* -0.082* 0.122** -0.015** -0.107** 0.092* -0.012* -0.080* 0.120** -0.015** -0.105** 
 (0.0534) (0.0070) (0.0466) (0.0529) (0.0071) (0.0463) (0.0533) (0.0070) (0.0466) (0.0529) (0.0071) (0.0462) 
Medium-size firm 0.046* -0.006* -0.040* 0.043* -0.005* -0.038* 0.043* -0.005* -0.038* 0.041* -0.005* -0.036* 
 (0.0236) (0.0031) (0.0206) (0.0236) (0.0031) (0.0207) (0.0236) (0.0031) (0.0206) (0.0236) (0.0031) (0.0207) 
Large-size firm 0.014 -0.002 -0.013 0.007 -0.001 -0.006 0.012 -0.001 -0.010 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.0251) (0.0032) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0031) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0032) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0031) (0.0220) 
East -0.081*** 0.010*** 0.071*** -0.092*** 0.011*** 0.080*** -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.068*** -0.089*** 0.011*** 0.078*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0032) (0.0200) (0.0226) (0.0033) (0.0198) (0.0228) (0.0032) (0.0200) (0.0226) (0.0033) (0.0198) 
Central  -0.110*** 0.014*** 0.096*** -0.110*** 0.014*** 0.097*** -0.106*** 0.013*** 0.093*** -0.107*** 0.013*** 0.093*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0037) (0.0215) (0.0246) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0036) (0.0216) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 151.48 138.25 157.32 143.91 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0308 0.0281 0.0320 0.0292 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Chapter 4 Education and educational mismatch: Evidence 
for the rural-to-urban migrant workers in China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the economic reform in 1978, China has experienced a rocket-like rise of 
economic growth. According to the statistics from the World Bank, the average growth 
rate of real GDP in China was about 10% a year from 1978 to 2014. Recently, China 
has become the second largest economy in the World60. People usually use “The World 
Factory” or “Made in China” to describe the significant economic development China 
has made. An important reason behind this “miracle”, is the rural-to-urban migration 
of workers. This group of people, have provided the cheap labour that has helped 
China to achieve a high rate of economic growth for over three decades (Zhang and 
Song, 2003); (Meng, 2012); (Akgüç et al., 2014); (Cheng et al., 2014b).  
 
“Every three months I could send about 660 yuan back to my hometown to my father as well as keep a 
few hundred for myself. I thought I could work there for at least another few years.” 
“I was satisfied with my job in the toy plant. It was terribly hard work, but we had fun too. We had a 
plan. Before we went back home for marriage, we were going to save money to go to Beijing. It was 
such a big dream.” 
“I left the factory in May 1999 and was introduced by my cousin to the toy company. It was a big 
plant...We worked very hard, from sunrise to midnight, twelve hours a day. Every day I would be worn 
out, all my energy gone....But I felt happy there. I had dozens of relatives and friends; we chatted a lot 
and helped each other”61 
 
The quotations above are from three Chinese factory workers describing their life and 
expectations in their urban area. The latest official figures from the National Bureau of 
Statistics of the People’s Republic of China released in April 2015 estimate the total 
number of rural migrant workers to be 273.95 million in 2014, which accounts for 
nearly one fifth of the total population in the country. We have never seen such a large-
scale internal migration in history. Figure 3 depicts the significant increasing trend of 
the number of rural migrants since 1988. According to Meng and Zhang (2001), in 
                                                 
60
 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview    
61
 Ngai (2005) .  
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1988, about 25 million migrants worked in the urban area. This figure rose to 67 
million and 132 million in 1999 and 2006 respectively. It then expanded greatly to 225 
million in 2008. Although from 2009 to 2014, the growth rate of migrant workers has 
decreased, the volume of rural migrant workers is ten times larger than the scale of 
migrant workers in 1988. It is estimated that more than 300 million rural migrant 
workers may move to cities in the next few decades (Meng, 2012). According to the 
National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020), the government will help 100 
million migrant workers to become permanent urban citizens62.  
 
Figure 3: Total number of rural migrants in China 
 
* Source: Year 1988 (Meng and Zhang, 2001); Year 1990 (Magnani and Zhu, 2012); Year 1989 and 
2006 (Zhu, 2016); Year 1997, 1998 and 1999 (Ping and Pieke, 2003); Year 2002 and 2003 (Zhan, 2005) 
and Year 2008 to 2014 (National Bureau of Statistics, China).  
 
A significant characteristic of rural to urban migration in China has emerged in recent 
years. According to the China Rural Migrant Workers Monitoring Report 2009 from 
the National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, about 62% of migrant 
workers were born after 1980. The term “new generation of migrant workers”, was 
first introduced by the Chinese government No.1 Document of 2010, an official 
document to address government priorities each year, to describe this special and 
important group of migrant workers (Cao and Lin, 2010). Due to the fact that the one-
child policy was strictly enforced in urban China, the main part of the labour force in 
the future will come from rural China. As the old generation migrant workers return 
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home to the rural area for retirement, this post-1980 group is replacing the “old” 
migrant group to be the main part of the rural migrant labour force to facilitate the 
urbanisation and the development of the economy in China.  
 
Compared with the old generation migrant workers, “New generation” migrants are 
relatively young, better educated, have a lack of agricultural experience and have 
higher expectations about career and social mobility (Liu et al., 2012). Their 
occupational choices, employment patterns and attitudes towards working and living 
conditions are different from their predecessors (Wang et al., 2013); (Cheng et al., 
2014b). In the old generation, earning money in the urban area was the main aim and 
then they usually chose to return to the countryside, whereas, it is argued that new 
generation migrants intend to settle down in cities permanently (Liu et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the new generation is more aware of their own rights and freedom, and 
place more emphasis on their identity and status in the city. The heterogeneity of 
migrant groups has been addressed by a strand of literature (Cheng, 2014); (Zhu and 
Lin, 2014); (Liang, 2015); (Liu et al., 2012); (Cheng et al., 2014b). However, little 
evidence focuses on exploring the differences in wage returns to education, and 
educational mismatch between these two generations of migrant workers.   
 
Education is an important engine to accelerate the development of economic growth. 
According to Human Capital Theory (HCT), individuals’ real productivity is closely 
connected with the level of education and thus education can lead to income inequality 
among individuals (Schultz, 1961). It is well acknowledged that there is a huge 
disparity of income between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban residents 
(Démurger et al., 2009); (Meng and Zhang, 2001). Moreover, both the educational 
level and quality of schooling is quite low in rural China compared to urban China 
(Heckman, 2005); (Fu and Ren, 2010). Therefore, a comparative study of the wage 
effects of schooling between rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban residents can 
help rural-to-urban migrant workers better integrate into the urban society and 
accelerate urbanization in China. Examining wage returns to schooling of migrant 
workers by generations can be used to see whether new generation migrant workers 
overcome the education and earnings disadvantages of the old generation in order to 
provide a high quality labour force to support the economic development and 
urbanisation in China. In addition, exploring the education-job match of migrant 
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workers plays an important role to guide new generation of migrant workers to form a 
rational career plan to achieve their potential and improve their productivity.  
 
Therefore, four issues are explored in this chapter to answer the research questions 
presented in chapter 1 (page 8). These issues are as follows:   
(1) To investigate whether there is any difference in the wage return to education 
between the new and old generation migrant workers.  
(2) To examine the level of educational mismatch among rural-to-urban migrant 
workers.   
(3) To examine the wage effects of educational mismatch between the two generations.   
(4) To undertake a comparative study of the issue of educational mismatch between 
rural-to-urban migrant workers and urban residents.  
 
To address the above objectives, a large scale dataset, the Rural-Urban Migrant Survey 
in China (RUMiC) 2009 is employed in this chapter. Empirical results in this chapter 
are based on OLS regression, i.e. at the mean, and Quantile Regression (QR). 
Specifically, we explore the heterogeneous wage return to schooling and wage effects 
of educational mismatch across the wage distribution, which enables us to provide a 
wide picture of education and educational mismatch among migrant workers.  
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on the education of migrant workers 
by taking the generation of migrant workers into consideration, i.e. we distinguish 
between the old and new generation of migrant workers. Moreover, this chapter is the 
first to extend the overeducation literature in China by analysis of the educational 
mismatch between old and new generation migrant workers, and between rural-to-
urban migrant workers and urban residents in China.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: the relevant background is 
presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides a comprehensive literature review 
regarding wage returns to schooling and the wage effects of educational mismatch. In 
section 4.4 and 4.5, an introduction to the data and econometric models are presented. 
Section 4.6 presents the empirical results. Finally, a discussion is presented in section 
4.7 and the conclusion is presented in section 4.8.  
 
142 
 
 
4.2 Background  
4.2.1 Rural-to-urban migration 
From 1949 to 1978 
Before the foundation of People’s Republic in 1949, China suffered a series of 
imperialist invasions from Japan from 1937 to 1945 and the Civil War between the 
Communist and the Nationalist Parties between 1946 and 1949. Continuous war made 
China a nation full of poverty and devastation (Wu and Yao, 2003). Thus after 1949, 
reconstructing China and helping its population to overcome hunger and poverty was 
the most urgent task of the Communist Party (Wu and Yao, 2003). In 1952, developing 
capital-intensive heavy industries in order to catch up with the advanced countries, 
like the USA and the UK, was set as the main development strategy of the Chinese 
government. For the purpose of satisfying the needs of operating heavy industries, the 
government encouraged peasants to work in the urban area to support the development 
of urban construction. Moreover, the implementation of a radical programme of 
collectivisation forced an increasing number of people to leave the land after 1953. 
About 40 million rural labourers worked in the urban industrial sectors during 1950 to 
1958 (Ping and Pieke, 2003). However, the development of heavy industries couldn’t 
absorb the large volume of the rural-to-urban labour force. In order to restrict the flow 
of rural-to-urban migrants, the status of free mobility of labour in China was changed 
in the late 1950s with the introduction of the nationwide household registration 
system, the Hukou. The Chinese government issued Regulations of Hukou 
Registration in January 1958, which strictly divided the whole Chinese population into 
two parts, agricultural and non-agricultural. The Household Registration System 
requires each individual to register with their local authority to gain a residency permit 
according to the place they live. Consumer foods, education, jobs and social benefits 
are allocated based on the Household Registration System. Another policy closely 
associated with the Household Registration System is the food rationing system, which 
restricts people to buy food by giving coupons only in the residence area. Therefore, it 
is very hard for an individual with rural registration to live in the city. Working in the 
urban area is a dream for ordinary rural people. Meanwhile, converting Hukou status is 
strictly controlled by the state. Only three channels for rural people to transfer Hukou 
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status are allowed: (1) family reasons63; (2) higher education or joining the army; (3) 
official channels, like state-initiated programmes. However, these paths are extremely 
difficult to obtain and to be guaranteed. Therefore, before the reform started in 1978, 
the Hukou system was employed by the government to control the mobility of labour. 
Based on figures from Zhao (2000) , the net migration rate in China from 1949 to 
1985 was 0.24 percent64, which provides evidence that the Hukou system was effective 
in controlling labour mobility in China65.  
 
From 1978 to 2001 
By the late 1970s, the Chinese government realised that the centrally-planned 
economic system, which had led to low productivity, insufficient resource allocation 
and a lack of innovation, was not a suitable system for the economic development of 
China (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). The agricultural sector first witnessed the market-
oriented economic reform. The Household Contract Responsibility System (HRS) was 
introduced to the rural area in 1979. Under the Household Contract Responsibility 
System, farmland was returned to rural peasants under long-term leases and 
agricultural procurement prices were increased by 25%, which could increase 
peasants’ incentives to engage in agriculture (Seeborg et al., 2000). Every household 
was now rewarded on household productivity rather than production team (village 
level) and thus the rural income and farm productivity witnessed a large increase66. 
According to Lin (1992), from 1978 to 1984, approximately 48.64% of the total 
agricultural output growth was contributed by the Household Contract Responsibility 
System (HRS). The increase in rural productivity ensured the adequate supply of food 
in the urban market and it was also an important consideration in the government 
decision to abolish food rationing (Zhao, 2004). In addition, this reform created 
surplus labour in rural households and the opportunity cost of migration also 
decreased, which increased the incentive for rural people to migrate to the city.  
 
From 1979 to 1983, the movement from rural to urban areas was still prohibited by the 
                                                 
63
 Family reasons include migration with family, marriage (mainly for rural women) and being adopted 
by relatives without children (Zhao, 2000).  
64
 The world average migration rate is 1.84 per cent from 1950 to 1990 (Zhao, 2000).  
65
 There are two large urban-to-rural labour movements during the Great Leap Forward (1959-1961) 
and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which are beyond the scope of this chapter.   
66
 Before the economic reform in 1978, earnings of rural households was determined and allocated by 
production teams and brigades (Brandt and Rawski, 2008).   
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government (Ping and Pieke, 2003). However, with the deepening of the economic 
reform, more rural labour surged into the urban labour market, challenging the Hukou 
regulation. In order to make adjustment of the increasing rural to urban movement, the 
government began to relax the restrictions on rural-to-urban labour mobility. A series 
of policies targeted towards migrants were issued.  
 In 1984, the government allowed migrants to work in urban enterprises and 
operate their business as “food-self-sufficient households” without the supply of 
subsidized food and other benefits available for urban residents from the 
government.  
 In 1985, temporary resident permits to migrants for economic reasons were 
allowed by the government. 
 In 1986, rural labourers could apply for jobs in state-owned enterprises.  
 In 1988, national identity cards were issued as a proof of identity of migrant 
workers making the temporary registration in urban areas easier than before 
(Brandt and Rawski, 2008). The term “Temporary” means that migrants only got 
temporary access to the urban area without changing the Hukou status. This group 
of migrants is also called the “floating population”.    
  
During the Chinese New Year period in 1989, a large number of rural migrants surged 
into cities, which has been described as the “rural migrant wave” (Zhao, 2004). In 
order to cope with this new social-economic phenomenon in cities, the government 
introduced a number of policies to halt the speed of migration from 1989 to 199167.  
 
Following Mr. Deng Xiaoping’s tour of southern coastal China in 1992, the 
development of special economic zones in coastal areas and the shift of development 
strategy from capital-intensive industries to labour-intensive industries created demand 
for cheap and temporary rural migrant labour in the urban area. Although some major 
cities made efforts to restrict migration in order to relieve the unemployment problem 
caused by the reconstruction of state-owned enterprises in urban areas since 1994, in 
all, the government mainly focused on the encouragement of rural-urban migration 
from 1992 to 2000 to some extent (Zhao, 2004).  
 
                                                 
67
 Detailed policies can be seen from the summary of Ping and Pieke (2003) .  
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After 2001 
After joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in November 2001, the labour-
intensive and export-oriented economy in China created enormous demand for low-
skilled and low-cost labour. Therefore, the rural to urban flow of migrant workers kept 
rising. The central government issued many policies to promote the mobility of rural-
urban migration and made adjustments to the Hukou system accordingly. This large 
scale rural to urban migration has become a significant phenomenon in China and 
provides a very important driving force of China’s extraordinary economic growth 
(Meng, 2012). Most of the existing studies focusing on the rural-to-urban migration in 
China only cover the relevant background until the joining of WTO. However, since 
2001, a series of policies have been issued that may influence the trend and 
characteristics of rural migrant workers.  
 In 2003, agricultural taxes had been eliminated by the Chinese government, 
which increased the profit of farming (Liang et al., 2014).  
 In January 2008, protecting migrant workers’ rights regarding labour contract, 
social insurance and fair wages was covered in the new Labour Law issued by 
the National People’s Congress (NPC). Findings from Li and Freeman (2015)  
indicate that the labour cost of migrant workers increased after the application 
of the new labour law. Factories also increased the requirement of labour skills 
of migrant workers (Frijters et al., 2010).   
 Influenced by weak demand of the international economy due to the financial 
crisis since 2008, the Chinese government shifted the development strategy to 
focus on the development of middle and western China. The Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) set “The Spring Wind Action 
Program” in 2008 to encourage rural workers to work in inland provinces 
rather than coastal provinces and provide financial support to help them take 
retraining programmes to improve their skill levels (Wang et al., 2013).  
 In order to relieve the high population pressure presented in large cities like 
Beijing, Shanghai and many coastal cities, the Chinese government changed its 
urbanisation policy to guide rural migrants to work in small and medium cities 
and townships. This trend was a very important policy-concern in the next 
decade (Cao and Lin, 2010).   
 The Chinese government issued the National New-type Urbanization Plan 
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(2014-2020), which aims to increase its urbanization level to reach 60% by 
2020. The central government released a series of policies to help migrant 
workers become permanent residents in the urban area and enjoy more public 
services in the urban area68.  
 
4.2.2 Spatial patterns of rural-to-urban migration 
The different level of economic development and regional disparity in China can be 
classified into three broad regions: the eastern region, the central region and the 
western regions, which can also be called “three economic belts” (Fan, 1995). From 
1949 to 1978, the direction of migration was from the eastern region to the middle and 
western regions so as to support the economic development of inland provinces 
emphasised by the government. However, the failure of a balanced development 
strategy since 1949 urged the government to change to a coastal-dominated 
development strategy after 1978. The implementation of economic reform and open 
door policy has a clear spatial pattern. These policies had been carried out first in the 
coastal regions (special economic zones (1979), open coastal cities (1984), open 
economic areas (1985) and Pudong New District (1990)). Then, they were expanded to 
all the other parts of China. Therefore, the economic growth has a time-region pattern 
accordingly. The Pearl River Delta (Guangdong) witnessed a rapid economic growth 
in the 1980s and followed by the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai, Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang) in the 1990s. It then spread to north China in the 21st century (Beijing, 
Tianjin and Tangshan). All of the above areas are classified into the eastern region. 
Earning money is a key objective of migrant workers. Following this spatial disparity 
of economic growth, most migration was from the western region to the middle region 
and the eastern region. According to the 2000 and 2010 Population Census of the 
People’s Republic, although about two thirds of total migrant workers accumulated in 
the eastern region and this ratio is similar between 2000 and 2010, the central and 
western China have witnessed the largest increase of intra-provincial migration (Liang 
et al., 2014).   
 
4.2.3 Motivations and Reasons for migration  
The most famous theory in the rural-urban migration literature is put forwarded by 
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 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/16/c_133190495.htm .  
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Todaro (1969), which was further developed by Harris and Todaro (1970). In this 
theory, the decision to move is determined by the rural-urban wage gap regarding the 
expected wage rather than absolute wage. If rural people’s expected wage in the 
destination area is higher than their real wages in the rural area, they will move. 
Otherwise, they will stay in the rural area. In China, the most significant and key 
motivation of the rural to urban migration is money, that is the rural-urban income 
inequality, which is also a common feature in many other developing countries 
(Shorrocks and Wan, 2005). The income disparity between rural and urban areas in 
China is caused and intensified by the household registration system (Hukou). 
Obvious urban-rural income disparity in China has been investigated by many 
scholars. According to Sicular et al. (2007), the urban-rural income ratio in China was 
3.11 in 1995 and 3.18 in 2002, which is much higher than that in other Asian countries 
(between 1.3 and 1.8) in 1990s (Eastwood and Lipton, 2004). Wang et al. (2014) 
explore the urban-rural income ratio in China from 1979 to 2009. Although the urban-
rural ratio decreased from 1978 to 1985, an increasing trend can be observed from 
1985 (1.9:1) to 2009 (3.3:1). In addition, regional income disparity is another 
important factor driving people to migrate to urban areas caused by the economic 
development since 1978. Rural migrant workers choose to migrate from poor rural 
regions to high income regions. Apart from the above reasons, the relaxation of 
government policies towards the household registration system, the poverty reduction 
policies of local government and the slowdown in the development of TVEs 
(Township and Village Enterprises) to absorb surplus rural labour all contribute to 
migration from rural to urban areas (Ping and Pieke, 2003). Summing up, loosened 
government policy, increasing labour demand from urban enterprises and huge wage 
differentials between urban and rural area attract more rural people to migrate to cities.  
 
4.2.4 Socio-demographic characteristics of migrants  
Most rural migrant workers are young and single adults seeking jobs in the urban area. 
Even if some married rural migrant workers come to the cities, they tend to leave their 
spouse and children behind in the villages. The distribution of gender varies with 
regions, industries and occupations. For instance, males are more likely to be 
employed as construction workers and female migrant workers usually work in the 
household services sectors (Seeborg et al., 2000). Based on the China Rural Migrant 
Workers Monitoring Report 2009 from the National Bureau of Statistics of People’s 
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Republic of China, 65.1% of migrant workers are males and the proportion of female 
migrant workers is 34.9%. About 62% of migrant workers are 30 years old and below. 
Junior middle school is the main highest education level (64.8%). Half of the rural 
migrant workers have never received any skill training. Moreover, migrant workers 
with lower educational levels are less likely to receive skill training.    
 
4.2.5 Education of rural-to-urban migrant workers 
Although the educational level of rural-to-urban migrant workers is higher than their 
counterparts staying in the rural area, the average education level of rural-to-urban 
migrant workers is only junior middle school or primary school. Most of them don’t 
acquire skill training. According to Lu and Song (2006), about 73.6% of migrant 
workers have junior middle school or primary school. Only 12.5% of them graduated 
from vocational school. In the analysis from Deng and Li (2010), only 3.9% of 
migrant workers have a tertiary degree while around 44% of urban residents have a 
tertiary degree. In addition, the quality of rural compulsory education is low 
(Heckman, 2005). Most rural-to-urban migrant workers receive education in the rural 
area. Because of the strong preference of allocating government funds and educational 
resources to the urban area by the government, three-year junior school and college or 
universities are mainly located in the urban area, while only junior middle schools or 
primary school are located in the rural area (Fu and Ren, 2010). In addition, the central 
government regulates that the county and township government have the responsibility 
to finance rural compulsory education. Due to the limited ability of the local 
government to finance rural compulsory education, the basic operational expense of 
schooling, such as, funding for teaching equipment, salary of teachers, is hard to 
guarantee in some rural areas. According to Fu and Ren (2010), only 20.3% of rural 
primary teachers have a specialised secondary education degree, while in the urban 
area, nearly half of the primary school teachers have at least this degree level.  
 
Realising the significant educational disparity between urban and rural areas, the 
Chinese government has implemented a series of policies to enhance the rural 
education. In 1986, the Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China 
was issued by the National People’s Congress to set the nine-year compulsory 
education system (six-year primary school and three-year junior middle school), which 
can increase the average educational attainment level in rural area. In 1999, the State 
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Council issued Decisions on Deepening the Educational Reform and Improving 
Quality-oriented Education to promote the quality of rural China and in the same year, 
the Ministry of Education approved The Action Plan to Revitalise education towards 
the 21
st
 Century to address the importance of enhancing the educational quality in 
rural area. Increased educational attainment and improved educational quality in rural 
China has been confirmed by researchers (Hannum and Park, 2002); (De Brauw and 
Giles, 2008); (Wang and Zhao, 2011).  
 
4.2.6 Labour market of rural-to-urban migrant workers  
Although migrant workers and urban residents in China speak the same language, own 
the same skin colour and share identical cultural background, the household 
registration system acts as an “internal passport” that splits the urban labour market 
into two segments, which is comparable to the labour market encountered by 
immigrants and natives workers. Rural-to-urban migrant workers are not only looked 
down on by their urban counterparts, but also encounter official discrimination. Thus, 
workers with rural registration mainly undertake low status and low-paying jobs or 3D 
jobs (dirty, dangerous and demanding) in the urban area, while those higher-ranked 
jobs that are typically impossible for rural people to take are always undertaken by 
urban residents with non-agricultural hukou. Many cities have also imposed 
restrictions on the occupation categories that migrant workers can take. For instance, 
Beijing restricts 200 particular job categories that migrant workers can take. Most of 
them are the lowest and dirtiest blue-collar jobs (Kwong, 2006). Moreover, rural 
hukou holders are often denied many of the basic benefits enjoyed by urban hukou 
holders, such as, unemployment insurance, minimum living wages, subsidized 
housing, medical care and schooling for their children. When they came to the cities, 
most of them worked in the manufacturing, construction and service industries. They 
typically work longer hours, are rewarded with lower wages and have very low job 
security compared to urban residents. Moreover, they live in poor housing conditions 
and have poor health (Wong et al., 2007). Many scholars treat rural-to-urban migrant 
workers as the marginalised groups in cities or second-class workers in the urban 
labour market (Wong et al., 2007); (Démurger et al., 2009).   
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4.3 Literature Review   
4.3.1 Theoretical foundation of Mincer equation  
It is well recognised in the economics of education literature that education can have 
an important effect on individuals’ wages. In real life, if comparing two groups of 
individuals of the same age and gender, the group with the higher educational level has 
higher average wages. Schultz (1961) argues that earning differentials are reflected by 
the difference in education. The positive relationship between education and earnings 
is due to the fact that productivity can be enhanced by education (Becker, 1962). 
Based on this fact, those who have higher education can contribute more to 
productivity and thus they would be rewarded by higher earnings (Schultz, 1961).   
 
Mincer (1974) is the first scholar to develop an empirical model to explore the 
relationship between earnings and human capital, which is specified as follows: 
 
      ln 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑖
2 + 𝜇𝑖                                                            (1)    
      
where 𝑋𝑖 is years of working experience. 𝛾1  and 𝛾2  should be positive and negative 
respectively. α is the estimation of the return rate to schooling and is assumed to be 
constant in different educational levels. 𝜇𝑖 is a residual with zero mean and a normal 
distribution. The above equation, which is also called Mincer earning equation, is a 
cornerstone of the empirical research to estimate the wage return to schooling. It has 
been commonly used by data from a number of countries over different time periods 
and individuals to discover the intrinsic quality of wage differentials.    
   
Considering the life-cycle theory and the relationship between earnings and human 
capital investment including schooling and post school investment, Mincer (1974) 
assumes that potential earnings at time t is decided by the investment made in previous 
period t-1. Suppose 𝑊𝑡 is the potential earnings in time t. Post school training cost is 
assumed to account for a fraction of earnings in previous period, i.e.  𝐼𝑡−1 =
𝑘𝑡−1𝑊𝑡−1. Then 
 
          𝑊𝑡=𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡−1𝐼𝑡−1= (1+𝛽𝑡−1𝑘𝑡−1)𝑊𝑡−1                                                      (2)  
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where 𝛽𝑡−1 is the return to post-school investment made by time 𝑡 − 1 . After repeated 
substitution,  
 
           𝑊𝑡 = ∏ (
𝑡−1
𝑖=0 1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖)𝑊0                                                                                 (3)      
  
Investment in one year of schooling can be treated as one year’s forgone earning and 
thus 𝑘𝑡−1=1. Assume that the return to years of schooling is constant in different 
educational levels and the investment in schooling commences at the beginning of life. 
At the same time, post school investment is also assumed to be constant over time and 
is equal to 𝛽0. Then we can get: 
        ln 𝑊𝑡 = ln 𝑊0 + 𝑆 ln(1 + 𝛼𝑆) + ∑ ln(1 + 𝛽0𝑘𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑠 )                                        (4) 
                                   
 It also can be written approximately as follows: 
 
        ln 𝑊𝑡 ≈ ln 𝑊0 + 𝑆𝛼𝑆 + 𝛽0 ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑠                                                                       (5)                                                   
 
In addition, Mincer (1974) also made the assumption that the post-school investment 
is decreasing with time, i.e.  
 
        𝑘𝑠+𝜃 = 𝑘(1 −
𝜃
𝑇
)                                                                                                  (6) 
 
Where θ is equal to t-s, which is the working experience at the time t and T represents 
the total working life. Based on above assumptions, we can write: 
 
     ln 𝑊𝑆+𝜃 ≈ (ln 𝑊0 − 𝑘𝛽0) +  𝑆𝛼𝑆 + (𝛽0𝑘 +
𝛽0𝑘
2𝑇
)𝜃 −
𝛽0𝑘
2𝑇
𝜃2                                        
            = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖
2 + 𝜇𝑖                                                                     (7) 
 
Based on the above frameworks, we obtain the standard Mincer equation (Heckman et 
al., 2003).  
   
4.3.2 Empirical application of Mincer equation in a global aspect   
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) provide a comprehensive summary of studies of 
wage returns to schooling on a global scale, covering more than fifty years since the 
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1950s69. In this study, the average wage return to one year of schooling is 10 percent at 
the world level. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, wage returns to schooling 
are the highest, achieving more than 12 per cent. In Asia and the Middle East, the 
average wage return to education is between 7 to 10 per cent, which is lower than the 
world level. However, although the percentage of individuals receiving higher 
education in the OECD countries is the highest, the average return to education is only 
7.5 percent. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) also suggest that the average wage 
return to schooling has decreased by 0.6 percent from the 1990s due to the worldwide 
education expansion.        
 
4.3.3 Wage returns to schooling in urban China      
Investigation of wage returns to education in China has many important implications. 
The wage return to schooling is always employed by scholars to analyse the structure 
of the labour market and to measure the process of economic transformation in China 
(Guifu and Hamori, 2009). Qian and Smyth (2008) argue that examining the wage 
effects of education enables us to improve the efficiency of resource allocation, which 
can provide incentives to private investment in education and offer guidance regarding 
the government expenditure on education. Moreover, distributional consequences 
caused by investment differentials on education can also be examined (Hannum and 
Park, 2007). Due to China’s particular track of economic development, the wage 
return to schooling in China has unique patterns. Throughout the literature, the 
exploration of returns to education in China can be divided into five aspects: (1) over 
time; (2) data aspects; (3) by groups; (4) migrant workers; (5) methodology issues.  
 
4.3.3.1 Wage returns to education over time  
The first aspect, focuses on studies that capture the wage effects of education over 
time (these studies are presented in Table C 9 in the appendix). Zhou (2000) examines 
the change in the wage return to education between the pre-reform era and the reform 
era in China employing panel data from 20 cities in China in 1955, 1960, 1965, 1975, 
1978, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. The return to junior high school 
increases from insignificant before 1980 to 11 per cent in 1993. Fleisher and Wang 
(2005) use retrospective data collected in 1994 to explore the return to schooling in 
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 This study is a further update of previous versions of Psacharopoulos (1994) .   
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China from 1975 to 1990. The wage effects of education begin to increase gradually 
from 1975 at 1.37 per cent to 5.97 per cent in 1990. Appleton et al. (2005) suggest that 
there is an increasing trend in the wage return to schooling in China from 1988 
adopting four cross sections (1988, 1995, 1999 and 2002) from the Urban Household 
Income Survey (UHIS)70. Zhang et al. (2005) find that the wage return to education 
increases from 4.0 per cent in 1988 to 10.2 per cent in 2001 based on data from the 
annual Urban Household Survey in China. Although the above studies can’t be 
compared directly because they use different datasets and control variables, they all 
indicate an increasing trend of wage returns to education from the 1980s to 1990s and 
beyond71. The most significant explanation behind it is the economic reform and 
institutional changes in the labour market that occurred in China72.  
 
4.3.3.2 Wage returns to education: data aspects  
Table C 10 in the appendix presents the literature about wage returns to education in 
China employing different datasets. The most adopted dataset in the analysis of wage 
returns to education is the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), which contains 
household survey data in 1988, 1995 and 2002. This project can be used to provide 
evidence of returns to education in different phases of economic reform after 1978 in 
China73. Knight and Song (1993) and Xie and Hannum (1996) use the first wave 1988 
of the CHIP to explore the wage return to education in the first decade after the 
commencement of economic reform, and conclude that returns to education are in the 
range 3 to 4 per cent in the 1980s74. Using CHIP 1988 and 1995, Bishop and Chiou 
(2004)  find that the wage return to one year of schooling increases from 2.8 per cent 
in 1988 to 5.6 per cent in 1995. Employing three waves of CHIP data (1988, 1995 and 
2002), Fleisher et al. (2004) report that wage returns to education increased from 5.0 
to 7.9 per cent. 
 
The newly published datasets, Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) and the 
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 The returns to education for four years are 3.6 percent in 1988, 5.6 per cent in 1995, 6.7 per cent in 
1999 and 7.5 per cent in 2002 respectively.  
71
 Heckman and Li (2004) also confirm this after using a proxy for ability.   
72
 Detailed background about the labour market reform in China is described in Chapter 2.     
73
 The first wave of CHIP in 1988 represents for the early ten years in post-reform era. The 1995 wave 
can be used to estimate wage return to education as an indicator of the process of economic reform in 
the 1990s. The latest wave in 2002 provides an update of the previous existing literature on wage 
returns to education.  
74
 Byron and Manaloto (1990) and Maurer-Fazio (1999)  all find similar results.   
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China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) are widely used by scholars to replace 
CHIP to measure the wage return to education in the 2000s. Guifu and Hamori (2009) 
estimate the wage return to education in China to be in the range of 7 to 8 per cent 
using the data from CHNS 2004 and 2006. Liu and Zhang (2008) use seven waves’ 
data of CHNS (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009) to estimate wage 
returns to education in urban China, which covers the latest period, the late 2000s. 
This study reports that wage returns increased over time from 2.46 per cent in 1991 to 
7.10 per cent in 2009. However, the Rural-Urban Migration in China (RIMiC) is 
mainly focused on the exploration of rural migrants. Cui et al. (2013) estimate the 
wage return to education for migrant workers to be in the range of 3 to 5 per cent using 
the RUMiC 2008.  
 
Although with the continuing development of economic reforms, a significant 
increasing trend of wage returns to schooling is presented in the existing literature, 
these estimated wage returns to education are less than 8 per cent, which are still lower 
than the average level of the world (10.1%) and Asian countries (9.6%) 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994).   
 
4.3.3.3 Wage returns to education by groups   
Some studies focus on the analysis of wage returns to education between different 
groups, which are shown in Table C 11 in the appendix. Gender differentials in wage 
return to education in China is confirmed by empirical evidence. Although the 
earnings of males are higher than females, the wage return to education is higher for 
females than males (Jamison and Van der Gaag, 1987); (Li, 2003). However contrary 
to these earlier findings, Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh (2004) and Qian and Smyth (2008) 
report that the rate of return to education is higher for males than females.     
 
Some scholars explore the wage return to different age cohorts. In the Maurer-Fazio 
(1999) study, for people who are younger than 30 years old, the return to schooling is 
6.4 per cent for males and 6.8 per cent for females, which is similar to existing studies 
focusing on Hong Kong and Taiwan 75 . Maurer-Fazio (1999) argues that younger 
workers benefit more from the labour market reform than their elders. Similarly, Qian 
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 According to Psacharopoulos (1994), the return to schooling is 6.1 per cent and 6 per cent in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan respectively.     
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and Smyth (2008) report that the wage return to education for people who are aged 35 
or below is 17.16 per cent, which yields a higher figure than the existing studies in 
China76. However, Li (2003) separates people into three groups due to the time they 
enter the labour market. For those who began to work before the economic transition 
(before 1979), the wage return to education is 4.7 per cent. The estimated wage return 
to schooling for those who enter the labour market in the early stage of urban reform 
(1980 to 1987) is 7.3 per cent; and the last cohort (1988-1995) has 6.5 per cent wage 
return to education. The new wage regime is easier to apply to the new entrants in the 
labour market than old workers, therefore we can see higher returns to schooling for 
individuals who enter the labour market after 1979.  
 
4.3.3.4 Wage returns to schooling of migrant workers 
Due to the previous lack of data collection, only a few datasets are now available for 
the investigation of the wage return to schooling among rural-to-urban migrant 
workers (Démurger et al., 2009). Similar to the wage return to schooling in rural 
China, the return rate to education is also quite low among migrant groups, which can 
be seen from Table C 12 in the appendix. Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh (2004) indicate that 
the return rate to education is only 1.5 percent for the whole migrant sample in the 
Urban Labour Market Integration Project (ULMIP) in China 1999-2000. Cui et al. 
(2013) employ three datasets, the 1995 and 2002 waves of the China Household 
Income Project (CHIP) and the 2008 Rural-Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) to 
investigate the wage return to education among migrant groups over time. Their results 
show that the return to education in the migrant groups did not change much between 
1995 and 2008, 3 percent and 5 percent respectively. However, if focusing on 
subsamples of migrant workers, female migrants have a higher return rate (4.9 
percent) than the whole migrant sample (Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh, 2004). Moreover, 
migrants with a mean educational level higher than 9 years of schooling have a 6.4 
percent return rate to education. 
  
Most of the existing studies focus on the comparison between urban residents and 
migrant workers to explore the wage return to education for migrant workers. Zhao 
and Qu (2013) estimate that the wage return to education of migrant workers increased 
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 Qian and Smyth (2008) suggest using the group of people who are age 35 and below to capture the 
effects of education reform and labour market reform on the return to education in China.    
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from being statistically insignificant in 2002 to 1.3 percent in 2007, while the wage 
return to urban residents decreased from 3.2 per cent to 1.6 percent from 2002 to 2007, 
which indicates a convergence in the wage return to education between urban residents 
and migrant workers. Démurger et al. (2009) find that the disparity of wage returns to 
education between urban residents and migrant workers is larger in the private sector 
than in the public sector. After adopting the standard Heckman selection procedure and 
using individual’s parents schooling as proxy of individual ability, De Brauw and 
Rozelle (2007) argue that the return to education of migrant workers is higher than 
local wage earners, which are 8.3 percent and 5.2 percent respectively. Especially, 
when restricting the sample to migrants who are 35 years old and under, the return rate 
to schooling rises to 11.7 percent. Employing a set of instruments77, wage returns to 
education for male migrant workers increase to about 8-8.5 percent compared to the 
OLS estimation (4.5 per cent) (Sakellariou and Fang, 2016).             
 
4.3.3.5 Wage returns to schooling: methodology issues  
Apart from the institutional changes that can explain the low wage return to education 
in China, employing the ordinary least squares method to estimate the Mincer equation 
is another very important reason (Li and Luo, 2004)78. OLS methodology is criticised 
by the problems of omitted ability and measurement errors. Individuals’ earning 
differentials could also be explained by ability differentials associated with their 
educational level. In this case, the OLS approach may overestimate the wage return to 
schooling. Additionally, the measurement error of years of schooling may cause 
attenuation bias, which may underestimate the wage return to education (Li and Luo, 
2004).  
 
According to Card (1999), three approaches can be used to cope with the issue of 
omission of ability in the analysis: the instrumental variable (IV), the fixed effect 
method and finding a variable to measure ability directly. Heckman and Li (2004) 
provide a detailed discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of the three 
methods. Recent studies in China show that IV estimation indeed yields a higher 
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 Instruments contain individual’s birth order information, age of school entry and spouse’s education.   
78
 However, adopting the OLS approach to examine the wage effects of education is a common feature 
in the study of China (Jamison and Van der Gaag, 1987); (Zhao, 1997); (Gustafsson and Li, 2000); 
(Yang, 2005); (Qian and Smyth, 2008).   
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estimated return to education than OLS approach (Li and Luo, 2004); (Heckman and 
Li, 2004); (Guifu and Hamori, 2009). Most datasets don’t contain variables to measure 
ability directly. Finding a proxy variable for ability as a regressor in the regression is 
seldom used by scholars. Only Frijters et al. (2010) use university entry scores to 
capture ability to estimate the wage return to education for urban workers and migrant 
workers in China using the 2008 Rural-Urban Migrant Survey79.      
 
4.3.3.6 Wage returns to schooling: quantile regression 
The investigation of wage returns to education using OLS methodology only reflects 
the effects from the mean of the conditional distribution of earnings. However, the 
effects might vary across the wage distribution. Quantile Regression (QR) provides a 
way to solve this problem. It describes the education effects on earnings at different 
quantiles of the earnings distribution.  
 
Buchinsky (1994) argues that the OLS method fails to describe some important 
features of the wage structure. He finds that the wage return to education increases 
across quantiles in the U.S. labour market in the 1960s. Employing the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 in the UK, Harmon et al. (2003) 
provide strong evidence that the wage return to schooling is higher at the top decile of 
wage distribution than the bottom decile of the wage distribution. Through the 
investigation of 16 developed countries
80
, Martins and Pereira (2004) suggest that the 
return to education is greater for higher skilled workers after controlling for other 
factors
81
. Increasing wage returns to schooling along the wage distribution is also 
confirmed in many transition countries, such as Bulgaria and Kazakhstan (Staneva et 
al., 2010). However, the wage return to education is higher in the lower half of the 
deciles (below the median) and lower in the upper half of deciles in South Africa 
(Mwabu and Schultz, 1996).  
 
In China, findings of the wage return to education using quantile regression are mixed. 
Table C 13 in the appendix depicts the relevant literature using quantile regression to 
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 However, the authors don’t provide detailed figure of wage returns to education in this study.  
80
 These countries include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.    
81
 Martins and Pereira (2004) argue that overeducation, an interaction between schooling and ability, 
school quality or fields of study can be the possible explanations.     
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explore returns to schooling in China. Knight and Song (2003) suggest that returns to 
each educational level decrease along the wage distribution using two national 
household surveys in 1988 and 1995 in urban China
82
. In Messinis (2013)’s study, 
return to high education varies little as we move along the conditional distribution of 
wages for all full time workers
83
. However, when analysing urban workers and 
migrant workers separately, the return to high education increases with percentiles in 
the migrant sample while the return to high school decreases when moving up the 
distribution for urban workers. Employing the RUMiC 2008, Cui et al. (2013) find that 
returns to schooling were 3 per cent at the 10
th
 quantile and 6 per cent at the 90
th
 
percentile for migrant workers in 2008. Although there is small wage differentials 
along the wage distribution, the average 4 per cent wage return to schooling of 
migrants is only part of the picture when analysing the wage return to schooling of 
migrant workers. In addition, the increasing wage returns to schooling along the wage 
distribution for migrant workers is also found in Zhu (2016).  
 
4.3.4 Wage returns to education in rural China    
Due to the existence of the Household Registration System and the Household 
Production Responsibility System, rural and urban labour markets have been isolated 
for about 40 years (Meng and Zhang, 2001). Under this separated labour market, 
overall inequality has increased over time, especially income inequality (Sicular et al., 
2007). Due to different levels of development in the urban and rural labour markets, 
many scholars suggest analyzing these two areas separately (Johnson and Chow, 
1997); (Zhao, 1997). However, due to the data limitations, most studies only focus on 
the urban labour market. Only a few studies analyse the wage return to education in 
rural areas (Liu and Zhang, 2008). The summary of literature is presented in Table C 
14 in the appendix.  
 
It is not surprising that the wage return to schooling in rural China is lower than in 
urban China and the rest of the world (De Brauw and Rozelle, 2008). Parish et al. 
(1995) and Johnson and Chow (1997) examine the wage return to education in rural 
areas and find returns to education are 1.8 per cent and 4.02 percent respectively using 
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 Substitution between education and ability and the ability to pay of employers are two possible 
reasons.  
83
 High education refers to senior school or higher in this study.  
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two large-scale national datasets. Zhao (1999) estimates that wage returns to schooling 
in rural China are 1.2 per cent based on the data from Sichuan province. Liu and 
Zhang (2008) find that the wage returns to education for urban workers are 2.8 
percentage points on average higher than rural workers from 1975 to 2009. In 
addition, using data from the rural industry sector84, Meng (1996) and Gregory and 
Meng (1995) all find the wage return to schooling is around 1 per cent85. However, 
after controlling for sample selection, De Brauw and Rozelle (2008) find the mean 
wage return to one year of schooling is between 6.3 and 6.5 per cent, which is still 
lower than the world average. The low wage return to education should not be a 
primary reason to reduce the investment in rural education. Instead, we should place 
emphasis on the positive role of education in helping rural people obtain off-farm 
work (Parish et al., 1995).     
 
4.3.5 Heterogeneity of the rural-to-urban migrant workers  
Recently, a strand of literature has begun to focus on the heterogeneity of migrants 
groups. The term “new generation of migrant workers”, first appeared in the Chinese 
government No.1 Document of 2010 (Cao and Lin, 2010). New generation of migrant 
workers refers to those who were born after the 1980s with agricultural registration, 
and then went to urban labour market in 1990s and afterwards. Comparably, the old 
generation migrant workers are those who were born before 1980 with agricultural 
registration. “Born in and after 1980”, this generational division of rural to urban 
migrants in China is widely used in the literature to explore the heterogeneity of these 
two generations (Liu et al., 2012); (Cheng, 2014); (Liang, 2015);(Cheng et al., 2014b); 
(Zhu and Lin, 2014)86.  
 
There are mainly three arguments for this generational division. The first one is 
derived from adult development, which states that the younger and older generations 
have different behaviours and attitudes (Levinson, 1986). The second is the theory of 
market transition (Nee, 1989). Transforming from a centrally-planned economy to a 
market-oriented economy produced a massive influence on people’s life in China. 
With tremendous economic and social development in China, migrants who were born 
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 It includes township, village and privately owned enterprises (TVP).  
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 See Table C14 in the appendix.  
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 National Population and Family Planning Commission of China (NPFPC) Report on China’s migrant 
Population development 2010 is another official report exploring the new generation of migrant workers.  
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in the centrally-planned economy and those who were born in the reform period are 
different in terms of their objectives, preferences and behaviours. The third argument 
is the application of the ‘one child’ policy adopted in China since 1980 (Wang, 2008) 
87. Based on this policy, those born after 1980 have no or fewer siblings than those 
who were born before 1980. The differences in the number of children in one family 
can affect the allocation of investment in education within one family and at the same 
time children’s personality, psychopathology, and cognition also will be influenced 
(Plomin and Daniels, 1987); (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009). The above three 
viewpoints all support the argument that the old and new generations are not 
homogeneous and they should be treated differently if exploring groups of migrants. 
However, there are some different arguments that the 1970s is a transitional period and 
thus there should be a different generational division line of migrant workers. Yue et 
al. (2010) employ the transitional period (from 1970 to 1980) between the two 
generations as eleven possible dividing lines instead of only one (1980) to divide 
migrants. Those who were born after the dividing line are defined as the new 
generation, and respondents who were born before the dividing line are referred to as 
the first generation88.  
 
The generational division of migrant workers is a relatively new concept in the 
literature, thus the attention from scholars is not apparent. Wang (2008) provides a 
comprehensive study of the differences between two generations. He argues that the 
new generation of migrant workers is more educated than the old generation. The 
intention of migrating to urban cities in the old generation is more concerned about 
earning high wage returns to labour to support family. Conversely, the new generation 
of migrant workers treats migration as a pathway to pursue their career plan in order to 
have long term development and learn skills. In addition, the new generation has lower 
wages than the old generation and also works longer hours (Wang, 2008).   
 
Wang et al. (2013) report that the new generation have higher job satisfaction than the 
old generation. Moreover, the new generation has more insurance at work, receives 
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 One child policy was introduced by the government in 1979 to reduce family size that each family is 
allowed to have only one child. Detailed introduction of one child policy can be seen from Hesketh et al. 
(2005).     
88
 In this study, we refer to Year 1980 to divide two generations as Liu et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2013) 
and Cheng et al. (2014b).  
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significantly more on the job training, conducts less dangerous or toxic work, and 
receives more regular health checks than the old generation.  
 
In terms of social networks, Liu et al. (2012) show that the new generation migrant 
workers are more likely to integrate into the host cities and they are more flexible and 
have greater ability in obtaining mobility resources than the old generation migrant 
workers. According to Liang (2015), the interpersonal trust of the new generation is 
expanded to a more social extent, like the acceptance of surroundings and different 
level of trust in others, while the old generation rely more on family, relatives and 
neighbors.    
 
4.3.6 Educational mismatch in the labour market of migrants 
It is well acknowledged that the issue of overeducation and undereducation has been 
of concern for a number of years since Freeman firstly put forward the notion of 
overeducation in 1976. The relevant concept and empirical evidence have been 
explicitly discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. However, the research of educational 
mismatch regarding immigrants is still limited.   
 
4.3.6.1 Incidence of overeducation and undereducation among immigrants  
There is a stylised fact in the literature of educational mismatch of immigrants that 
immigrants are more likely to be overeducated than their native counterparts and 
undereducation is more prevalent among immigrants. Nielsen (2007) finds that the 
incidence of overeducation of foreign-educated immigrants is 39 per cent and the 
incidence of overeducation of native Danes is only 20 per cent. Compared to the 
native males, the incidence of overeducation of recent male migrants is 14.6 per cent 
higher and the incidence of overeducation of earlier male migrants is 4 per cent higher 
in New Zealand (Poot and Stillman, 2010). Tijdens and van Klaveren (2011) explore 
the educational mismatch regarding natives and migrant workers in 13 European 
countries. The higher incidence of overeducation of immigrants relative to their native 
workers is found in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherland, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden. However, in the United States, native males have a higher 
incidence of overeducation than male immigrants (33 per cent vs 29 per cent). Around 
45 per cent of male immigrants are undereducated, which is 26 per cent higher than 
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the incidence of undereducation of native males (Chiswick and Miller, 2009a).  
 
4.3.6.2 What causes the educational mismatch among immigrants?  
Chiswick (1978) finds that wage returns to schooling of foreign-born workers are 
smaller than the native-born when initially entering the labour market in the U.S. 
Chiswick and Miller (2009b) further attributed this to “less-than-perfect international 
transferable of human capital across borders”, which is the main concern in the study 
of immigrant adjustment literature. When immigrants first came to the receiving 
countries, they may encounter a series of handicaps. The most obvious one is the 
language weakness. Despite this, they may find that their skills, on-the-job training 
obtained from home countries couldn’t be fully applied. In addition, the formal 
schooling gained from the country of origin is not equally treated as the schooling in 
the destination countries by employers. They would be required to have more years of 
schooling than natives to conduct a given occupation. Therefore, they are more likely 
to be assigned to a job for which they are overeducated.  
 
Another important reason is the favourable selection among immigrants, especially 
prevalent in those less-well educated (Chiswick and Miller, 2009b). Chiswick (1978) 
argues that only those who are talented and have high motivation are more likely to 
migrate. Due to high level of ability and skills that can be used to substitute the 
shortage of formal schooling, they are favoured by the employers and easily observed 
in jobs where the required level of education is higher than their own educational 
attainment.  
 
Labour market discrimination effects also can be used to explain the educational 
mismatch and subsequent wage differentials between immigrants and natives (Nielsen, 
2007). Discrimination in the labour market can be defined as workers who have the 
same productivities but are treated differently, i.e. differential wages or treatment, due 
to the difference in race, ethnicity and gender (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Nielsen 
(2007) argues that discrimination can be called termed statistical discrimination in 
terms of overeducation. Employers may make judgements about assigning workers 
depending on characteristics that can be treated as indicators of performance, such as 
gender, race and ethnicity rather than education or qualifications if they don’t have 
enough information about their employees. In other words, employers would judge a 
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worker’s employability depending on the average skill level of the groups this worker 
belongs to. Battu and Sloane (2004) argue non-whites in the UK are more likely to 
find a job that is lower than their educational level than white natives simply due to 
this kind of discrimination. Regarding immigrants, if employers have doubts about 
immigrants’ abilities, no matter what skill level an individual employee actually has, 
one might expect that overeducation is more likely to happen among immigrants89.   
 
4.3.6.3 Applications of basic theories of educational mismatch among immigrants 
Throughout the overeducation literature, seven theories can be used to explain reasons 
of educational mismatch, which are (1) search and match theory, (2) human capital 
theory, (3) assignment theory, (4) technological change theory, (5) signaling, (6) career 
mobility theory and (7) job competition theory90. However, in the comparative study 
of overeducation between immigrants and native workers, five theories display 
specific features. To the best of my knowledge, Chiswick and Miller (2009b) is the 
first to extend basic theories in the overeducation literature to the systematic analysis 
of overeducation among immigrants. 
 
Search and match theory 
In terms of immigrants, imperfect information is a common issue when they first enter 
the labour market of destination countries, especially when the home labour market of 
immigrants is different from the labour market of receiving countries. They are not 
familiar with the characteristics and regulations in the labour market of destination 
countries. Both employers and employees don’t have enough information about each 
other, which may cause potential frictions. However, the extent of overeducation of 
immigrants may reduce with the duration in the destination country as more human 
capital and labour market information is accumulated in the destination country. 
Imperfect information is also reflected in that employers in destination countries may 
have doubts about the credentials owned by immigrants. There is no specific 
implication of undereducation among immigrants under this theory. However, Hartog 
(2000) argues that in the search process, both natives and immigrants would search for 
occupations with a higher level of required education. According to the goal of wealth 
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 If employers choose to hire a native rather than an immigrant just because of imperfect information, 
this would not be classified as discrimination (Nielsen, 2007).   
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 Detailed descriptions of seven theories are presented in section 2.3.5.  
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maximization, workers only move job if a future job has a higher required educational 
level than the current one. Therefore, the incidence of undereducation may increase 
with age or experience for all workers.  
 
Human capital theory  
Although there are some real difficulties in transferring both formal schooling and 
labour market experience gained from home countries to destination countries, the 
transferability of formal schooling is higher than work experience. That is to say, 
immigrants can use formal schooling to substitute the lack of work experience in the 
receiving country to some extent but not that easily. Therefore, overeducation is more 
likely to happen among immigrants, especially for the new entrants. Overeducation 
should be a transitory situation when immigrants switch to a higher level of job after 
accumulating more working experience in the host countries (Chiswick and Miller, 
2009b).  
 
Using ability or motivation to compensate for the lack of schooling needs to be taken 
into consideration if there is a favourable selection from employers or self-selection in 
the migration based on ability or motivation. Among immigrants with lower level of 
schooling, more able immigrants and immigrants with high motivation are more likely 
to migrate. Therefore, they are more likely to find a job that requires higher level 
education than their own compared with native workers. There should be no change 
with the length of residence. 
 
Assignment theory   
Assignment theory states that the assignment of jobs considers both the demand side 
and supply side in the labour market. That is to say, job placement is allocated 
depending on the match between different characteristics of employees and the 
heterogeneous requirement of jobs (Sattinger, 1993). However, according to Chiswick 
and Miller (2009b), there are no specific implications in terms of the labour market of 
immigrants.  
 
Technological change theory   
In terms of immigrants, this theory concerns different levels of development of home 
countries and receiving countries of immigrants. For instance, if an individual from a 
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less developed country migrates to a developed country, he is more likely to report 
overeducation than immigrants from developed countries with a given level of 
schooling because of the lack of relevant destination-based skills. However, this theory 
has no implications for undereducation.  
 
Signaling   
For immigrants, a risk-averse employer may have doubts about the credentials 
immigrants obtained from the home countries, especially when there is a disparity 
between the labour market of home countries and receiving countries, and thus 
immigrants are more likely to be treated as overeducated when they first arrive.   
 
Career mobility theory 
According to the career mobility theory, overeducated people are willing to choose a 
job for which their educational levels are higher than the actual educational level 
needed in this job in order to acquire skills or better opportunities to make a career 
upgrade in the future. For immigrants, overeducation is a voluntary choice in their 
early career stages to gain skills or labour market experience and then move to a 
higher level (better-paying or higher ranked) of job that matches their educational 
level. Similar to the human capital theory, the incidence of overeducation will decrease 
as individuals accumulate more labour market experience in the receiving country. 
However, some scholars argue that this theory is unrealistic (Sicherman,1991); 
(Büchel and Mertens, 2004); (Nielsen, 2007). Therefore, its implications for 
immigrants need to be confirmed in further empirical research.    
 
Job competition theory  
Based on the job competition theory, people will increase investment on education in 
order to get a higher rank in the job queue and increase the possibility to acquire the 
job compared with other workers competing for the role. However, for immigrants, 
there is no evidence indicating that they increase their investment on education in 
order to keep their position in the job queue in the receiving country.  
 
4.3.6.4 Wage effects of overeducation and undereducation among immigrants  
In terms of earning consequences of overeducation in the literature, two models are 
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widely used, the ORU equation and VV equation (Hartog, 2000)91. Empirical evidence 
implies that overeducated people earn more than people who work in the same job but 
are correctly educated, but earn less than people who have the same level of education. 
Undereducated people have higher wages than people who have the same educational 
level but are correctly educated, but earn less than people who work in the same job 
but are correctly educated (Tsang and Levin, 1985); (Alba-Ramirez, 1993) and (Groot 
and Maassen Van Den Brink, 2000). In terms of immigrants, many scholars suggest 
that the patterns of return to schooling of immigrants based on the ORU equation are 
similar with those of natives (Chiswick and Miller, 2008); (Nielsen, 2007); (Sanroma 
et al., 2008). To the best of my knowledge, there is no study employing the VV 
equation to explore wage effects of overeducation and undereducation among 
immigrants.   
 
4.3.6.4.1 Wage returns to overeducation: Quantile Regression     
There are few studies adopting quantile regression methodology to examine the 
phenomenon of overeducation in the literature. Focusing on a cohort of Northern 
Ireland graduates, McGuinness and Bennett (2007) find that the wage penalty of 
overeducation is larger in the lower distribution of wage distribution, but this is only 
true for male graduates. In addition, female graduates who are overeducated earn less 
than individuals who have the same level of schooling but are correctly educated 
across the whole wage distribution. McGuinness and Bennett (2007) argue that low 
ability can be part of the explanation for the wage penalty of overeducation and the 
existence of wage effects for overeducation in the middle and higher part of the 
distribution may due to the oversupply of graduates. Budría and Moro-Egido (2007) 
explore the phenomenon of overeducation in 12 European countries using quantile 
regression techniques. They find that the wage penalty of overeducation exists along 
the whole wage distribution. Overeducation can determine productivity regardless of 
ability level. Budria (2011) argues that educational mismatch should be not be simply 
explained by a lack of innate ability, by reporting that the negative wage effects of 
overqualification increase as we move up the distribution, which is contrary to 
findings in McGuinness and Bennett (2007) 92. All of the above literature is based on 
                                                 
91
 Detailed descriptions can be found in Chapter 2.  
92
 Three kinds of educational mismatch are illustrated in the analysis, overqualifications, strong 
educational mismatch and skill mismatch.  
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the point of view that the quantile regression can be used to explore the relationship 
between educational mismatch and unobserved ability93. Undereducated people are 
always individuals with high ability, more experience and are involved in the 
supervisory roles in firms (Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989), thus relevant analysis of 
wage premiums of undereducation is omitted in the literature.  
 
4.3.7 What causes the educational mismatch of rural-to-urban migrant workers 
in China?  
The above literature presents the extent of educational mismatch of immigrants, 
providing possible reasons and relevant theories to explain the difference in the 
educational mismatch between immigrants and natives. However, in the context of the 
Chinese labour market, although rural-to-urban migrants migrate within the same 
country, it is not similar with the popular patterns of internal migration in many 
countries94. The household registration system (Hukou) acts as an “internal passport” 
that splits the Chinese urban labour market into two segments, which is comparable to 
the labour market encountered by the immigrants and natives. Rural-to-urban migrant 
workers have national identity cards as their temporary working and living permits in 
the urban area in China, while international immigrants have visas as their permit to 
work and live in the receiving countries.  
 
Immigrants can be classified into two groups: better-educated (high-skilled) and less-
educated (low-skilled). Better-educated immigrants are more likely to be overeducated 
and most international immigrants (such as “green card” high-skilled immigration in 
the US and Germany) and minority ethnic groups are better educated and more 
employable compared to white natives on average in the international migration 
literature. Chiswick and Miller (2009a) argue that the incidence of undereducation 
should be higher among immigrants than natives due to the favourable selection into 
immigration especially for the less-well educated (for example, a taxi driver working 
in a developed country but from a developing country with six years of formal 
schooling). In terms of rural-to-urban migrant workers in China, many have lower 
educational levels than urban residents and mainly focus on low-paid and unskilled 
                                                 
93
 Detailed discussion of the framework of using quantile regression to indicate unobserved ability can 
be seen from McGuinness and Bennett (2007) and Budria (2011).   
94
  For example in UK and EU countries (Cheng et al., 2014a).  
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jobs. The following paragraphs consider factors that might cause educational 
mismatch to occur among rural-to-urban migrant workers.    
 
According to the search and match theory, immigrants may choose a job that does not 
match with their educational attainment when they first enter the destination country 
due to imperfect information. Then they may move to a higher level of job that 
matches with their educational level to improve the education-job match with 
accumulated labour market experiences and better information set. For rural-to-urban 
migrant workers in China, seeking jobs through family members and relatives is a very 
important channel to obtain jobs in the urban labour market (Liu et al., 2012); (Wang, 
2008); (De Brauw and Giles, 2008). Personal contacts play a primary role in finding a 
job in the urban labour market for rural migrant workers. Meng (2000) argues that this 
ad hoc manner of finding a job may interrupt the efficient allocation of the migrant 
labour force in the urban labour market. Based on this fact, one can expect that the 
educational mismatch may happen among rural-to-urban migrant workers.   
 
For immigrants, there are some difficulties in transferring formal years of schooling 
gained from the home country to the receiving country based on the human capital 
theory. One year of schooling in the host country is not equal to one year of schooling 
in the destination country (Chiswick and Miller, 2009b). Due to the different quality of 
schooling between rural and urban areas in China, one year of rural schooling is not 
equivalent with one year of urban schooling (Fu and Ren, 2010). Moreover, Heckman 
and Li (2004) argue that migrant workers not only have fewer years of education, but 
also acquire disadvantaged compulsory education. That is to say, human capital 
accumulated in the rural area can not transfer perfectly to the urban labour market, 
which may give rise to the educational mismatch among rural-to-urban migrant 
workers
95
.    
 
International immigrants (or ethnic groups) are more likely to be overeducated than 
white natives because of the possibility of discrimination. Due to the existing 
discrimination effects in the urban area caused by the Household registration system in 
                                                 
95
 In China, it is very difficult for migrants’ children to go to schools in the urban area (Démurger and 
Xu, 2013). So we can assume that migrant workers all receive rural education before they work in the 
urban area.  
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China, rural-to-urban migrant of labour is strictly restricted to those low skilled jobs, 
low status and low-paying jobs or 3D jobs (dirty, dangerous and demanding), which 
normally do not require high school education to perform (Meng and Zhang, 2001). 
The discrimination effects might be one important reason to explain the overeducation 
among rural-to-urban migrant workers.  
 
Within rural migrant workers, new generation of migrant workers are considered to be 
more educated than the old generation. However, due to the Hukou system, occupation 
types that can be chosen by migrant workers don’t change too much, which may lead 
to the higher incidence of overeducation in the new generation migrant workers than 
the old generation. In addition, new generation migrant workers treat migration as a 
pathway to pursue their career plan in order to have long term development and learn 
skills (Wang, 2008). They are more likely to choose a job lower than their educational 
level to gain skills and wait to be promoted in the future, which is consistent with the 
career mobility theory. In terms of the old generation, they can use work experience 
gained in the urban labour market to substitute the lack of schooling, so the 
phenomenon of undereducation is more common in the old generation migrant 
workers under the framework of the human capital theory. It is also possible that as 
more new generation migrant workers enter the labour market, the mean level of 
educational level within occupations will increase. As a result, those who were 
previously well-matched old generation migrant workers become undereducated due 
to the “bump down effects” (Battu et al., 2000); (McGuinness, 2006). 
 
 
4.4 Data    
Only a few datasets are available to facilitate the research of migration in China
96
. In 
this chapter, a unique dataset is employed, The Rural-Urban Migration in China 
(RUMiC), conducted by a group of researchers at the Australian National University, 
the University of Queensland and the Beijing Normal University and supported by 
                                                 
96
 In the first three population censuses of the People’s Republic of China in 1952, 1964 and 1982, 
questions regarding migration are not included (Liang, 2001). However, detailed questions about 
migration are included in the China One Percent Population Sample Surveys since 1987. Zhu (2002) 
summarises the problems that exist in surveys of migration.    
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IZA. This is the latest and most comprehensive dataset focusing on migrant workers in 
China
97
.  
 
The Rural-Urban Migration in China consists of three separate surveys: the Urban 
Household Survey (UHS), the Rural Household Survey (RHS) and the Migrant 
Household Survey (MHS)
98
. This project was firstly conducted in 2008. Up to now, 
four waves of the Urban Household Survey (UHS) and the Rural Household Survey 
(RHS) have been collected and the Migrant Household Survey (MHS) contains five 
waves of data. The longitudinal characteristic of this project enables scholars to make 
longitudinal analysis of migrant workers in China. However, only the first two waves 
of the China data (2008, 2009) have been published to date.   
 
Each survey contains detailed information on household members, health conditions, 
education and training, employment situation, children’s education, social network and 
household income and expenditure. In addition, the Migrant Household Survey also 
records the relevant history of migration (Akgüç et al., 2014). 
 
The RUMiC survey is conducted in a representative and large-scale geographical 
scope in China to obtain a representative picture of migrant workers. Ten provinces or 
metropolitan areas are involved in the survey, which are Shanghai, Guangdong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hebei, Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqing and Henan. Survey 
regions are displayed explicitly in the map below.   
                                                 
97
 This dataset is designed specifically to explore the role of migrant workers in the Chinese labour 
market. Detailed discussion of the advantages of RUMiC over other datasets (The Chinese Household 
Income Project (CHIP) and the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) are 
presented in Akgüç et al. (2014).      
98
 The Rural Household Survey contains about 8000 households and around 5000 households are 
involved in the Migrant Household Survey and there are 5000 households covered in the Urban 
Household Survey (Akgüç et al., 2014).     
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  *Source: https://www.rse.anu.edu.au/research/centres-projects/rural-urban-migration-in-china-and-indonesia/  
Shanghai (Province No. 6), Guangdong (Province No. 8), Jiangsu (Province No. 2), 
Zhejiang (Province No. 7), shown in red area in the map, are the four largest migration 
destinations. They are all located in the eastern region, which is the most developed 
area in China.  Anhui (Province No. 5), Hubei (Province No. 4), Henan (Province No. 
1), Sichuan (Province No. 3) and Chongqing (Province No. 10) are five largest 
migration sending areas. Among them, Anhui (Province No. 5), Hubei (Province No. 4) 
and Henan (Province No. 1) belong to the central region in China. Sichuan (Province 
No. 3) and Chongqing (Province No. 10) are two representative provinces in the 
western region. Most rural-to-urban migration in China is from the western region to 
the middle region and the eastern region (Liang et al., 2014).           
 
In this chapter, the Migrant Household Survey (MHS) and the Urban Household 
Survey (UHS) in 2009 are employed
99
. Migrant workers are defined as those 
individuals who have a rural Hukou registration and work in a city with a positive 
wage when they responded to the survey. Comparably, urban workers refer to those 
who hold urban household registration status (hukou) working in the urban areas with 
positive wages when they were surveyed. Moreover, all the individuals are restricted 
                                                 
99
 Using 2009 wave is to explore relevant issues after the crisis in 2008.  
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to those between the age 16 and 60 in both urban and migrant workers samples
100
. 
Those who are students, retired, family business helper without pay and have zero or 
unknown income are omitted from the analysis. In addition, we only consider wage-
earners. Those who are self-employed are excluded in this chapter due to the difficulty 
in obtaining reliable income figures from their business. After deleting all the missing 
values in the two datasets, 3301 observations remain in the migrant workers sample 
and 5921 observations are kept in the urban household sample. Table 4-1 and Table 4-
2 present the summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables used in 
the migrant sample and urban sample respectively. 
 
With respect to the heterogeneity of rural-to-urban migrant workers, I adopt the 
division line: the Year 1980 to define the new and old generation migrant workers in 
this chapter
101
. Those individuals who were born before year 1980 are called the old 
generation migrant workers. The remaining individuals who were born in and after 
1980 are defined as the new generation migrant workers. Based on this classification, 
1393 observations (42%) are treated as the old generation and 1908 (58%) 
observations are the new generation migrant workers
102
.  
 
The dependent variable in this chapter is the logarithm of average hourly wages
103
. 
Note that the average hourly wage includes all bonuses, allowances and earnings in 
kind
104
. According to the literature, using the hourly wage rather than monthly or 
annual wages may provide more precise estimation of the wage return to schooling (Li, 
2003)
105
. As can be seen in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, the logarithm average hourly 
wage of urban workers is much higher than that of migrant workers. Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 show the distribution of logarithm of hourly wage of migrant workers and 
                                                 
100
 The minimum working age is 16 and the mandatory retirement age is 60 in China (Zhang et al., 
2005). Age range of the sample in this chapter is also consistent with Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
101
 See discussion in section 4.3.5.  
102
 According to data in 2009 in the National Bureau of Statistics of China, 62 per cent of migrant 
workers are new generation migrant workers. However, this ratio contains migrant workers working in 
the Town and village enterprises.      
103
 Information about working hours per week is available in the RUMiC. Using working hours a week 
and the monthly wage, we can get hourly wages.    
104
 Wage questions asked in the Urban Household Survey and the Migrant Household Survey are 
similar, which is an advantage of the RUMiC survey. However, in the Chinese Household Income 
Project (CHIP), questions concerning earnings are different for the urban residents and rural migrant 
workers, which may result in biased estimation when making a comparative study of urban workers and 
rural workers.    
105
 Li (2003) argues that less educated individuals tend to work longer hours on average. Therefore, 
using monthly wage or annual wage may underestimate the wage return to education.  
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urban workers respectively. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we can see that both migrant and 
urban samples are right-skewed
106
. In this case, applying quantile regression 
methodology is more suitable than the OLS method
107
. In order to better describe the 
disparity of wages between the old generation of migrant workers and the new 
generation of migrant workers, the kernel density of the logarithm of hourly wage is 
presented in Figure 6. According to Figure 6 we can see that the new generation 
migrant workers have higher densities towards the right side of the wage distribution 
than the old generation of migrant workers.  
 
 
Figure 4: The distribution of logarithm of hourly wage for migrant workers 
 
                         Figure 5: The distribution of logarithm of hourly wage for urban workers 
                                                 
106
 Skewness is an indicator to judge the symmetry of the wage distribution. If the skewness is negative, 
the distribution is left-skewed and if there is a positive skewness, the distribution is right-skewed. The 
skewness of migrant sample and urban sample are 0.1258 and 0.4963 respectively.  
107
 In a skewed distribution, the median is a better measurement than the mean to represent central 
tendency. Assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity in the OLS are not suitable for a skewed 
distribution. However, quantile regression doesn’t have such assumptions.    
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Figure 6: Kernel density of logarithm of hourly wage distribution between the old and new 
generation of migrant workers 
Table 4-3 shows that the average hourly wage of urban residents is 2.3 times more 
than that of migrant workers (17.256 versus 7.485). There are large wage differentials 
between migrant workers and urban residents, which is confirmed by a strand of 
studies (Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh, 2004); (Démurger et al., 2009); (Frijters et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the hourly wage of migrant workers at 50
th
 percentile is lower than the 
hourly wage of urban residents at the 25
th
 quantile, which may explain why the 
competition between rural-to-urban migrant workers and low-skilled or unskilled 
urban residents increased fiercely over recent years (Démurger et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 4-3, wage inequality is more serious among urban 
workers than in the migrant sample according to the wage ratio of 90
th
 percentile to 
10
th 
percentile. One possible explanation for this is that higher average educational 
level of urban residents is associated with higher wage inequality
108
.   
 
4.4.1 Personal characteristics         
In the RUMiC 2009, individuals are asked to report both their highest educational 
level and completed years of schooling. According to Table 4-1 and Table 4-4 we can 
see that on average, the new generation migrant workers have two more years of 
schooling than the old generation, while the urban residents have three more years of 
                                                 
108
 For lower educational levels, the dispersion of skill may be low, while in higher educational levels, 
the differences in ability may lead to the wage gap between high-ability and low-ability individuals 
(Martins and Pereira, 2004).     
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schooling than migrant workers
109
. In terms of the highest educational level as 
indicated in Figure 7, about 23.55 per cent of the old generation migrant workers have 
primary school or less education, while only 3.62 percent of the new generation 
migrant workers have this educational level. The reason for this may be the gradual 
prevalence of nine-year compulsory education settled in 1986 by the government for 
those in the rural area. In addition, the percentage of vocational school is much higher 
in the new generation than the old generation among migrants (18.24 percent versus 
3.88 percent). After finishing compulsory education, students are allowed to make a 
choice between academic school and vocational school through an admission test (De 
Brauw and Giles, 2008). This large disparity between the proportions of vocational 
school attendance may reflect the different preference of the Post-compulsory 
education between generations of migrant workers. For new generation migrant 
workers, in order to find a better job in the urban labour market, acquiring vocational 
education is an efficient way to improve productivity to in order to obtain higher 
income. Meanwhile, this also indicates that the demand of skills-based migrant 
workers is gradually replacing the demand for labour-based migrant workers in the 
urban labour market. Regarding higher education, the percentage of individuals 
holding a higher education degree is 6 percentage points higher in the new generation 
than in the old. Based on the above results, although the average years of schooling is 
higher in the new generation migrant workers than the old generation, only 61 per cent 
of migrant workers acquired the junior middle school or less, which is indicated in 
Table 4-4. About 57 per cent of urban residents have vocational education or above. 
The disparity of educational level between urban residents and migrant workers is 
quite sharp.  
 
Training is another important dimension of human capital (Becker, 1962). In this 
chapter, training is measured as a dummy variable if individuals have taken any 
training or apprenticeship except for the formal education at school
110
. We can see 
from Table 4-1 that although the new generation migrant workers are more highly 
trained than the old generation migrant workers, the training ratio in the whole migrant 
                                                 
109
 Démurger et al. (2009) show that urban residents have 4 more years of schooling than migrant 
workers.   
110
 In the RUMiC migrant sample, training is further classified into four groups: agricultural training, 
corporate internal non-agricultural training, non-agricultural training in the community and other 
trainings. Individuals can choose maximum three kinds of training according to time sequence. 
However, training information is not available in the RUMiC urban sample.     
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sample is still very low. Only about 27.3 per cent of migrant workers received training 
in addition to the formal education. Enhancing the training of migrant workers 
arguably still has a long way to go.  
 
Figure 7: Highest education levels between the old generation and new generation of migrant 
workers 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, the average age of the new generation 
migrant workers is around 23 years old, while the mean age of the old generation 
migrant workers is close to 40 years old
111
. In Table 4-1 in the migrant sample, there 
are more male migrant workers than female migrant workers. In the old generation 
migrant workers, about 61 per cent of migrant workers are male, while among the new 
generation migrant workers, the proportion of males is slightly lower at around 58 per 
cent. In the urban sample, shown in Table 4-2, the percentage of male workers is 
higher than female workers (55.9 per cent versus 44.1 per cent). In addition, there are 
more married old generation migrant workers than that in new generation, which is 
influenced by the life cycle theory. The percentage of urban workers who are married 
is much higher than migrant workers. In terms of ethnicity, there is no significant 
difference between the migrant workers and the urban samples.    
 
                                                 
111
 The average age of the new migrant workers is 25 years old and the average age of old generation is 
41 years old in Wang et al. (2013). It also adopts the same division line as this chapter.  
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4.4.2 Work-related characteristics  
Experience is measured by tenure in the current job rather than the potential working 
experience for both migrant workers and urban residents112. Compared with the old 
generation migrant workers, new generation migrant workers are less experienced. 
Because of their relative young age, new generation migrant workers by definition 
have relatively short job tenure. Urban residents have ten more years of working 
experience than migrant workers (13 years versus 3 years)113. This may be explained 
by the temporary nature of migration of rural-to-urban migrant workers and rural-to-
urban migrant workers are easily to switch jobs (Zhao, 2004).  
 
According to the China National Industrial Classification, there are six industries 
classified in both migrant and urban sample, which are Agriculture, forestry and 
animal husbandry, Manufacture, production and construction, transportation and 
information transmission, finance and business, public and service sectors
114
. In terms 
of the migrant sample, we can see that about 43.6 per cent of migrant workers find 
jobs in the service sector and approximately 37.3 per cent of migrant workers work in 
the manufacturing and construction sectors. The employment rate in the information 
transmission and transportation, public and business and finance sectors is below 10 
per cent. The disparity of industry distribution between the old generation migrant 
workers and the new generation migrant workers mainly exists in the service sectors 
and manufacturing and construction sectors. Nearly half of the old generation migrant 
workers are in the manufacturing and construction sectors, while more than 50 per 
cent of the new generation migrant workers are in the service sector. In addition, as 
can be seen from Table 4-2, about 35.4 per cent of urban residents worked in public 
and finance and business industry and the following are second industry including 
manufacture, production and construction industries (26.1 per cent) and service 
industry (24.0 per cent). Only 0.7 per cent of urban residents involve in the agriculture, 
forestry and animal husbandry.  
                                                 
112
 For migrants, other working experience may be agricultural experience or other experiences that is 
not relevant to the current job in the urban area.  
113
 Frijters et al. (2010) report similar results using RUMiC 2008. 
114
 Based on the China National Industrial Classification (GB/T 4754—2011) issued by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, broad industries can be divided into three: first 
industry, second industry and tertiary industry. First industry includes agriculture, forestry and animal 
husbandry. Second industry contains mining, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, gas 
and water. Information transmission, finance and business, public and service sectors are all in the 
tertiary industry. Detailed industry classification in the migrant sample can be seen from Table C 2.  
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The RUMiC provides two different occupation classifications for migrant workers and 
urban workers, so we cannot make a direct comparison between these two samples in 
terms of occupation. Table 4-5 shows the occupation categories in the rural-to-urban 
migrant sample and the urban sample. The key point we can see from Table 4-5 is that 
migrant workers are more likely to work in blue-collar jobs (service and manufacture 
workers) than are urban residents
115
. There is a huge disparity of ownership types 
between migrant workers and urban residents. As can be seen from Table 4-1 and 
Table 4-2, only 15.6 per cent of migrant workers have jobs in public enterprises, but 
about 65 per cent of urban residents worked in the public sector
116
. Within the migrant 
groups shown in Table 4-1, there are fewer new generation migrant workers working 
in public enterprises than the old generation migrant workers (12 per cent versus 20 
per cent). In terms of job type, only 13.6 per cent of migrant workers have permanent 
jobs. However, for urban residents, this percentage is 34 per cent. There are no 
significant differences in employment characteristics regarding firm size and job type 
between the old generation and new generation migrant workers.   
 
Table 4-6 shows the information on working hours per week of migrant workers and 
urban residents. Working hours a week for old generation migrant workers are a little 
higher than the new generation migrant workers (57.47 hours vs 57 hours). However, 
average working hours a week of both generations are all above the legal 44 hours a 
week
117
. Average working hours for urban residents is 42.40 hours a week.  
 
In terms of the distribution of regions that are shown in Table 4-7, about 61 per cent of 
migrant workers worked in the east region (see the red area in the map Page 171). 23 
per cent and 16 per cent migrant workers accumulated in the middle and western 
regions respectively (see the pink area in the map Page 171). The proportion of the 
new generation migrant workers in the eastern region and western regions are lower 
than the old generation migrant workers, while the percentage of new generation 
                                                 
115
 Due to few observations in “Professionals” (13 observations), “Boss of private enterprises” (12 
observations) and “Other category” (4 observations), I excluded them in the sample.  
116
 Ownership types in this chapter are classified into two categories: public enterprises (state-owned 
enterprises and collective-owned enterprises) and non-public enterprises (private-owned enterprises, foreign-
owned enterprises, joint-venture and other enterprises).   
117
 According to the Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China Article 36, the legal working hour is no more 
than 8 hours a day and maximum 44 hours a week on the average in China. 
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migrant workers employed in the middle region is higher than the old generation 
migrant workers (24.74 per cent versus 20.60 per cent). There are different patterns of 
regional distribution between the old and new generation migrant workers. In this 
chapter, in order to control for regional differences, nine provincial dummy variables 
are included in the analysis
118
. Guangdong is the benchmark province because it is the 
most developed province since the economic reform and the immigration rate is in the 
top in the 2000s (Cui et al., 2013).       
 
4.4.3 Educational mismatch  
There are three widely mentioned ways to measure educational mismatch: (1) Job 
analysts; (2) Workers’ self-assessment and (3) Realised matches119 . The first two 
measures are not possible using the RUMiC survey. Thus in this chapter, realised 
matches is adopted to measure educational mismatch. There are two ways of 
measuring overeducation in realised matches method: the mean index and the mode 
index. The mean index is defined as people who are overeducated if their years of 
schooling is higher than one standard deviation above the mean level of years of 
schooling within a specific occupation. In the mode index, overeducation can be 
defined as if workers’ educational level is higher than the mode level of educational 
attainment in a given occupation. I adopt the mean index to define overeducation and 
undereudcation
120
. In addition, I aggregate some occupation categories to define 
overeducation and undereducation rather than disaggregate occupation categories in 
the migrant sample because there are few observations in some occupations
121
. The 
mean educational level in each occupation is generated by migrant sample and urban 
sample separately.  
 
According to Table 4-8, we can see that the incidence of overeducation of rural-to-
urban migrant workers is higher than urban residents (16.69 per cent compared to 
10.72 per cent). Within migrant groups, the incidence of overeducation is higher in the 
new generation than the old generation (21.91 per cent versus 9.55 per cent) and the 
                                                 
118
 In this chapter, the eastern region contains Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai. Henan, 
Anhui and Hubei represent for the middle region. Chongqing and Sichuan belong to the west region.  
119
 Detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages in each method is cited in Chapter 2.               
120
 In the RUMiC, people are asked to report both years of schooling and the highest level of education 
completed. However, reported years of schooling exclude years of skipping or failing a grade, which is 
more explicit and scientific than highest level of education to measure accumulated human capital.      
121
 Detailed application of occupation category can be seen in Table C 1 in the appendix.  
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incidence of undereducation is higher in the old generation migrant workers than the 
new generation (23.12 per cent versus 4.09 per cent). The incidence of undereducation 
of migrant workers is quite similar with incidence of undereducation among urban 
residents (12.12 per cent versus 12.55 per cent).  
 
Table 4-9 describes the incidence of educational mismatch across the wage distribution 
for migrant workers and urban workers. It is interesting to see that as we move up the 
wage distribution, the incidence of overeducation increases and the incidence of 
undereducation decreases regardless of migrant workers or urban workers, which is  in 
contrast to the notion that overeducation is more prevalent in the lower part of the 
wage distribution and the incidence of undereducation increases along the wage 
distribution (McGuinness and Bennett, 2007)122. 
 
4.5. Estimation methodology  
4.5.1 Estimation models    
This section will discuss the models employed in this chapter. First, we adopt the basic 
Mincer equation (section 4.3.1) as the baseline model to estimate wage returns to 
schooling among rural-to-urban migrant workers, which is described as follows:  
 ln𝑌𝑚=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+𝜀𝑚                                                                                                (8)                                                                            
where 𝑌𝑚 is the average hourly wage including wages, bonus, allowance and earnings 
in kind. 𝑆𝑚  is completed years of schooling, 𝐸𝑚  is tenure in the current job, 𝐸𝑚
2  is 
tenure squared. 𝑋𝑚 is a vector of control variables that probably affect earnings, which 
contains personal characteristics (age, age squared, male, marriage, ethnicity, training), 
employment characteristics (industry, ownership, firm size and job type) and 
provinces123. The subscript m represents for rural-to-urban migrant workers.   
 
                                                 
122
 The only exception is from 10
th
 to 25
th
 for undereducation in the migrant sample.  
123
 In this chapter, occupation controls are omitted from the regressions for two reasons: (1) use 
aggregate occupation to define overeducation; (2) Schultz (1988) argues that wages and occupations 
may be jointly determined.  
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4.5.1.1 Heterogeneous wage returns to education in the old generation and new 
generation of rural-to-urban migrant workers 
Following the specification of equation (8), one dummy variable to control for 
differences in generations is added in the regression:  
   
ln𝑌𝑚=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+ 𝜌1𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚  +𝜀𝑚                                                                    (9)                                       
 
The dummy variable “old” is equal to 1 if individuals are classified as the old 
generation of migrant workers and 0 for the new generation of migrant workers.  
 
In order to explore the possible difference in rates of return to schooling between the 
old and new generation of migrant workers, we add an interaction term “old*S” to the 
model: 
 
 ln𝑌𝑚=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+ 𝜌1𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚 + 𝜌2𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚 ∗ 𝑆𝑚 +  𝜀𝑚                        (10)                      
 
The coefficient of the interaction term 𝜌2 shows the difference in the wage returns to 
education between two generations of migrant workers. The wage return to education 
for the new generation of migrant workers is 𝛼1  and 𝛼1  + 𝜌2 represents the wage 
returns to schooling for the old generation of migrant workers.  
  
4.5.1.2 Wage effects of overeducation in the old generation and new generation of 
rural-to-urban migrant workers 
Wage effects of educational mismatch of migrant workers are addressed in this 
subsection. According to the literature, overeducated people should have a wage 
penalty for surplus education and undereducated people may have wage premium 
compared to individuals with similar educational level but are correctly educated. Two 
dummy variables, “𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅 ” and “𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 ” are added in to model following the 
specification of equation (8) and (9) to control for the wage effects of overeducation 
and undereducation:  
 
 ln𝑌𝑚=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+𝜑1𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑚 +𝜑2𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑚+ 𝜀𝑚                    (11)           
              
ln𝑌𝑚= 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+ 𝜌1𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚+𝜑1𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑚 +𝜑2𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑚+  𝜀𝑚    (12)                      
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Considering the possibility of different wage effects of overeducation and 
undereducation between the two generations of migrant workers, two interaction 
terms, “𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅” and old*UNDER”, are added into the analysis, which can be 
defined as: 
 
 ln𝑌𝑚= 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑚+𝛾1𝐸𝑚+𝛾2𝐸𝑚
2 +𝜃1𝑋𝑚+ 𝜌1𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚+𝜑1𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑚 +𝜑2𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑚+ 𝜑3𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚 ∗
𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑚 + 𝜑4𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑚 ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑚   +  𝜀𝑚                                                                      (13)                            
 
In equation (13), 𝜑1 and 𝜑2  represent the wage effects of overeducation and 
undereducation for the new generation of migrant workers. The wage effects of 
overeducation and undereducation for the old generation migrant workers are 
presented by 𝜑1 + 𝜑3  and 𝜑2 + 𝜑4  respectively. Overeducated workers in the old 
generation have 𝜑3*100% higher (or less) wages than overeducated workers in the 
new generation and undereducated workers in the old generation have 𝜑4 *100% 
higher (or less) wages than overeducated workers in the new generation.  Different 
wage effects of overeducation and undereducation between the two generations can be 
expressed by 𝜑3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑4.   
 
4.5.1.3 Wage returns to schooling and educational mismatch for urban residents 
Because of the data availability of urban sample, two basic models are conducted as 
follows:   
     
     ln𝑌𝑢=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑢+𝛾1𝐸𝑢+𝛾2𝐸𝑢
2+𝜃1𝑋𝑢 +𝜀𝑢                                                                      (14) 
      
     ln𝑌𝑢=𝛼0+𝛼1𝑆𝑢+𝛾1𝐸𝑢+𝛾2𝐸𝑢
2+𝜃1𝑋𝑢+𝜑1𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑢 +𝜑2𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑢+ 𝜀𝑢                        (15)     
                  
where 𝑌𝑢 is the average hourly wage including wages, bonus, allowance and earnings 
in kind for urban residents. 𝑆𝑢 is the actual completed years of schooling, 𝐸𝑢 is tenure 
of current job, 𝐸𝑢
2 is tenure squared. 𝑋𝑢 is a vector of control variables that probably 
affect earnings, which contains personal characteristics (age, age squared, male, 
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marriage, ethnicity)124, employment characteristics (industry, ownership, firm size and 
job type) and provinces125. Two dummy (OVER and UNDER) to indicate whether an 
individual is overeducated or undereducated. The subscript u represents for urban 
residents.  
 
Heckman (1979) argues that individuals choose to participate in work only if their 
reservation wages (𝑊𝑟) are lower than wages offered for them (𝑊). Otherwise, they 
may refuse to work. However, OLS can only observes those individuals who have 
information on wages, i.e. 𝑊𝑟 <𝑊 . Those individuals who have higher reservation 
wages than offered wages are omitted in the analysis, which may lead to sample 
selection problem. If we fail to take sample selection bias into consideration, OLS may 
give biased estimates. Considering the possible sample selection bias, I also conduct a 
Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) for all individuals in both the migrant 
survey and the urban survey
126
.   
 
In the migrant sample, the dependent variable in the selection function is 1 if an 
individual’s current work status is employed and 0 for not employed. However, in the 
urban sample, the selection function is used for workers who have wage information 
(the dependent variable in the selection function is defined as 1) and those with 
missing value of wages (the dependent variable in the selection function is 0)
127
. In 
both the migrant sample and the urban sample, the instruments included in the 
selection function are a dummy variable to indicate whether there are any young 
children in the household (young children are defined as those whose age are under 16 
years old) and a dummy variable to indicate in a healthy health status
128
. Individuals 
who have young children are more likely to have higher reservation wages than those 
without young children due to the cost of child care and thus should be very important 
in the determination of participating in the labour market. Health status should also 
influence individuals’ decision to work.  
                                                 
124
 There is no information in the urban survey about training for urban residents, so it is not included in 
the analysis of urban residents.  
125
 Common variables in both migrant sample and urban residents are age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, male, marriage, minority, industry, ownership, firm size and job type and provinces.  
126
 Detailed information about Heckman selection model can be seen in Heckman (1979).  
127
 No question was asked in the urban survey about current employment status.  
128
 Health variable is measured as a dummy variable and it is equal to one when answers to the current 
health status question are excellent, good or average. Health variable is equal to zero when respondents 
report their health status as poor or very poor.   
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Detailed sample selection results can be seen in Table C 7 for the migrant sample and 
Table C 8 for the urban sample. We conduct three kinds of sample selection results. 
Model 1 only includes health status in the selection function. Model 2 only contains 
the young children dummy in the selection function. Both young children and health 
status dummies are in the selection function in Model 3. The inverse mills ratio, an 
indicator of the probability of being in a work, is an additional regressor added in the 
wage equation to measure whether there is a sample selection effects.  
 
4.5.2 Quantile Regression (QR)  
After the economic reform in 1978, apparent wage inequality and the uneven wage 
distribution in China have been addressed by many scholars (Knight and Song, 2003);  
(Luo, 2008). In this case, the estimation technique OLS, which is based on the mean 
wage, may yield biased results. In order to avoid this problem, quantile regression is 
adopted in this chapter to explore the wage return to schooling.   
  
According to the conditional mean function  𝐸(𝑦|𝑥), the standard linear regression 
reflects the average change in the dependent variable if there is a change in a set of 
independent variables. However, this is only part of the picture of the relationship 
between the outcome variable and regressors. The effects may vary across the 
distribution. A complete and comprehensive summary of the relationship should 
provide information at different points across the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. Quantile Regression (QR) is a useful tool to meet such needs. 
 
We can say that the ordinary least squares (OLS) minimises the sum of the model 
prediction error squared. The median regression requires the least absolute deviations 
of error term. Quantile regression requires a minimum of asymmetrically weighted 
sum of absolute deviations of error term.   
  
The quantile regression model can be written as follows (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 
1978):  
 
        ln 𝑤𝑖 =𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃+𝜇𝑖𝜃      with   𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃 (ln 𝑤𝑖|𝑥𝑖=𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃)                                     (16)               
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where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of control variables. 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃 (ln𝑤𝑖|𝑥𝑖) denotes the 𝜃𝑡ℎ conditional 
quantile of 𝑤𝑖 given 𝑥𝑖. The 𝜃𝑡ℎ  regression quantile, 0<𝜃<1, is defined as the solution 
to the problem: 
 
     min [∑ 𝜃| ln 𝑤𝑖𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝑥𝑖 𝛽𝜃 − 𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃|+ ∑ (1 − 𝜃)| ln 𝑤𝑖𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃  
− 𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜃|]              (17)         
 
Quantile θ minimizes a sum that gives the asymmetric penalties (1- 𝜃)| ln 𝑤𝑖 −
𝑥𝑖 𝛽𝜃|for overprediction and 𝜃| ln 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 𝛽𝜃| for underprediction. 
 
Median regression is a special case of quantile regression where 𝜃 = 0.5.  There are 
some advantages of quantile regression over the OLS regression. First, it is robust to 
outliers. If the distribution of the outcome variable is extraordinary abnormal, quantile 
regression is more robust than OLS regression. Second, it enables us to investigate the 
relationship between regressors and the dependent variable at some specific points, 
like the top decile or the bottom decile, to fully use the characteristics of data. Last but 
not least, with QR analysis, the assumption of normality and homoscedasticity is not 
required, as it is with OLS. 
 
In this chapter, estimation from five quantiles, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, are 
analysed in each estimation model with bootstrap standard errors. When there is a 
existence of heteroscedasticity, standard errors based on Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) 
is not satisfactory (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). Standard errors can be easily obtained 
in bootstrapping in any data distribution (Gould, 1993). Hao and Naiman (2007) argue 
that the bootstrap method is less sensitive to heteroscedasticity and is a better option to 
use when standard errors are independent but not identically distributed.  
 
4.6 Empirical analysis    
4.6.1 Rural-to–Urban migrant workers    
This section presents the estimation of wage returns to education and wage effects of 
educational mismatch for migrant workers. Table 4-10 presents multivariate regression 
results of migrant workers in six models (See section 4.5.1 equation 8-13). Model 1 
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describes the estimates of the basic Mincer equation controlling for personal 
characteristics, employment characteristics and province information. A dummy 
variable is added into model 2 to differentiate the old and new generations. Model 3 
describes the effects of schooling on earnings between the two generations. Model 4 
presents the wage effects of educational mismatch for migrant workers. Model 5 is 
used to explore the differences between the two generations after taking educational 
mismatch into consideration. Heterogeneous wage effects of overeducation and 
undereducation between the two generations are discussed in Model 6. All regressions 
in Table 4-10 are estimated using OLS. Results of quantile regression are presented in 
Table 4-11 to Table 4-16.       
 
4.6.1.1 Basic Mincer equation for migrant workers 
As shown in Table 4-10 Model 1, the rate of return to education is 3.02 per cent for 
migrant workers in 2009, which echoes the literature in returns to schooling for 
migrant workers in China are between 3 and 5 per cent (Cui et al., 2013); (Sakellariou 
and Fang, 2016). This 3 per cent wage return to education is close to the wage return 
to education for urban residents in China in 1995 (Cui et al., 2013). Low skill, low-
paid jobs taken by migrant workers is one of the main reasons for the low wage return 
to schooling. Another possible reason is the inferior quality of schooling in rural areas 
(Fu and Ren, 2010). Cui et al. (2013) argue that some tasks undertaken by migrant 
workers can be easily substituted by machines, which may provide another reason for 
low wage rewards to education.     
 
In terms of gender differentials, males have around a 12 per cent higher wage premium 
than females. There is no wage premium for married workers. Han Chinese have 
around 10 per cent higher wages than minority groups129. The relationship between the 
logarithmic hourly wage and age is non-linear and the tenure of migrant workers has a 
U-shaped relationship with logarithmic hourly wage, which all have the expected sign. 
The returns to tenure increase in the early career stage of migrant workers and achieve 
the maximum at 23 years of tenure, but there is a decreasing trend with the increase of 
job tenure thereafter. Migrant workers who worked in the manufacturing and 
construction industry have around 6 per cent higher wage than migrant workers 
                                                 
129
 Han is the largest ethnic group in China.  
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working in the service industry.  
 
In addition, there are no wage differentials between public-owned enterprises and non-
public-owned enterprises for migrant workers. Due to the government policy, it is very 
difficult for migrant workers to be employed in state-owned enterprises or urban 
collective enterprises (Meng, 2001). Thus, there may be not enough observations in 
public enterprises in the sample. Even when they are hired in SOEs or urban collective 
enterprises, most of the jobs they occupy are low-end, dirty jobs which urban workers 
are unwilling to do. Therefore, it is less likely for them to acquire high wages in the 
public enterprises as urban people who are employed in the public-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, with the economic reform, there has been a rapid increase of productivity-
related wages in the non-public owned enterprises (Cui et al., 2013), which may 
narrow the wage gap between the public and non-public owned enterprises.  
 
In terms of firm size, as can be seen from Table 4-10, the smallest firm size (less than 
5 employees) has about 15 per cent lower wage return than the largest firm size (more 
than 100 employees). Firms with 6 to 20 employees have around a 6 percent lower 
wage compared with the largest firm size. The wage setting systems in large firms are 
more regulated and scientific than small firms, which may make delayed and 
compressed wage payments less likely to happen. In addition, migrant workers who 
have job contracts (permanent, long-term and short-term) have higher wages than 
migrant workers with non-contract temporary and part-time jobs.  
 
One notable result from Table 4-10 model 1 is the high wage returns to training. The 
wage return to training is around 10 per cent, which is 7 percentage points higher than 
wage returns to schooling. For migrant workers, obtaining relevant training and skills 
is more important than education when working in urban areas.   
 
In terms of wage differentials across regions, Guangdong province is selected as the 
benchmark province in the analysis. Shanghai, the largest financial centre of China, 
has a similar wage level with the Guangdong province, which is not surprising. The 
eastern provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) have higher wages than the west (Sichuan) 
and the middle provinces (Henan, Anhui and Hubei). The western province (Sichuan) 
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has higher wages than the middle provinces130. Since the implementation of the “Go 
West” development policy supported by the government in 1999, the capital of 
Sichuan province, Chengdu has been the high-tech production center in the southwest 
region. However, migrant workers in the municipality Chongqing, located in the west, 
have the lowest wages.   
 
4.6.1.2 Heterogeneous wage returns to education between the old and new 
generation of migrant workers  
A dummy variable to differentiate the old and new generation of migrant workers is 
added into model 2. As can be seen from Table 4-10 model 2, keeping all else equal, 
the old generation has around 12 per cent lower wages than the new generation. In 
order to control for possible differences in the schooling effects on wages between the 
old generation and new generation of migrant workers, an old*Schooling interaction 
term is added into model 3. According to the results presented in Table 4-10 model 3, 
it is interesting to see that the return to schooling for the new generation migrant 
workers is significantly higher than that for the old generation of migrant workers 
when keeping no generational differences among other variables. The wage return to 
education in the new generation is 3.46 per cent and the wage return to education in 
the old generation is 2.48 per cent. The coefficient of dummy variable “Old” becomes 
insignificant. That is to say, there is no wage differential between the old generation 
migrant workers and the new generation migrant workers after controlling for the 
different schooling effects on wage between the old and new generation migrant 
workers. In addition, coefficients of other independent variables in model 3 have the 
similar sign, magnitude and statistical significance when compared with the results 
from model 1.  
 
4.6.1.3 Wage effects of overeducation  
After taking educational mismatch into consideration, we can see from the results in 
Table 4-10 model 4 that the wage return to schooling is 3.71 per cent, which increases 
by around 23 percent compared to the basic Mincer equation (model 1). 
Undereducated migrant workers have wage premiums compared to well-matched 
people who have the same educational level, which is consistent with the literature. 
                                                 
130
 Chengdu is the representative city of Sichuan province in the survey.  
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However, there is no significant wage effect of overeducation for migrant workers in 
contrast to earlier findings that there is a negative wage effect of being overeducated 
(Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989); (Kiker et al., 1997).  
 
Compared to model 2, the new generation of migrant workers still have a higher wage 
than the old generation of migrant workers even taking educational mismatch into 
consideration in model 5. Two interaction terms old*OVER and old*UNDER are 
added into Model 6 to control for the possible different wage effects of overeducation 
and undereducation between the old generation and new generation of migrant 
workers. As can be seen from Model 6 in Table 4-10, the coefficient of “old” dummy 
is negative but larger in absolute terms than that of Model 5. In terms of educational 
mismatch, undereducated migrant workers in the old generation have 11.23 per cent 
higher wages than undereducated workers in the new generation. There is no apparent 
difference in the wage effect of overeducation between two generations.  
 
4.6.1.4 Quantile regression results   
In this part, quantile regression results are presented at the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 
of the wage distribution of migrant workers. Table 4-11 reports the wage effects of 
education across the wage distribution at five quantiles as well as wage returns to 
schooling from the OLS regression based on the Model 1. As can be seen from the 
results presented in Table 4-11, along the wage distribution, the return to education 
increases from 2.10 per cent at the 10
th
 percentile to 3.67 per cent at the 75
th
 percentile 
(except at the 90
th
 percentile)
131
. Migrant workers enjoy the highest return to education 
at the 75
th
 percentile. OLS regression indeed provides only part of the picture of wage 
effects of education for migrant workers. Increasing wage returns to schooling across 
the wage distribution suggests that education can explain some of the wage inequality 
among migrant workers to some extent, which is also consistent with the study from 
Magnani and Zhu (2012).  
 
Table 4-12 describes the quantile regression results taking generational differences 
into consideration. The wage differentials between the two generations exist in the 
middle (25th, 50th and 75th) and high end (90th) of the wage distribution. There is no 
                                                 
131
 Not constant coefficients of schooling across quantiles reject the null hypothesis. F (4, 3276) =2.95 
(p=0.0192).  
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difference in terms of wage between the two generations at the 10th percentile.   
  
According to the OLS regression results reported in Table 4-10 model 3, the schooling 
effects on wages between the old and new generation migrant workers are different. 
However, it is interesting to see that in Table 4-13, schooling effects are higher in the 
new generation than the old generation at the 10
th
, 25
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles, i.e. the 
lower half of the wage distribution
132
. The new generation has a higher return to 
schooling than the old generation in the lower half of the wage distribution of migrant 
workers, which indicates that human capital of the new generation migrant workers 
plays a more important role in the wage determination than that of the old generation 
migrant workers in the lower half of the wage distribution.    
 
Table 4-14 presents the wage effects of educational mismatch on the conditional wage 
distribution of migrant workers. In terms of overeducation, quantile regression concurs 
with the OLS regression analysis at the mean in that there are no wage effects of 
overeducation among migrant workers across the wage distribution. However, wage 
premiums of undereducation are mainly concentrated on the low and middle range of 
the distribution (i.e. 10th, 25th, 50th and 75th). There is no significant impact of 
undereducation in the high end of the distribution (90th percentile). It seems that 
undereducation is an important contributor to explore the wage structure of migrant 
workers at the lower and middle part of the wage distribution. Compared with 
individuals who have the same educational level but are correctly educated, wage 
premiums of undereducation are only enjoyed by migrant workers who located at the 
low and middle end of the distribution of wages.  
 
Comparing Table 4-14 with Table 4-15, we can see that there are still no significant 
wage effects of overeducation in the wage distribution in Table 4-15. Wage premiums 
of undereducation are also presented at the 10th, 25th, 50th percentile and 75th 
percentile, i.e. the low and middle of the wage distribution. This generational 
difference can not affect the wage effects of over/under-education across the wage 
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 When making analysis of two generations of migrant workers separately (See Table C5 and C6), we can 
see that wage return to schooling is 1.21 per cent at the 10
th
 percentile, 1.69 per cent at 25
th
 percentile and 
2.23 per cent at the 50
th
 percentile in the old generation migrant workers and wage return to schooling is 2.26 
per cent, 3.33 per cent at 25
th
 percentile and 3.81 per cent at the 50
th
 percentile in the new generation migrant 
workers.   
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distribution. 
  
Table 4-16 describes the differential wage effects of educational mismatch between 
two generations across the wage distribution. At the middle quantiles (25th and 75th), 
undereducated migrant workers in the old generation have higher wages than 
undereducated migrant workers in the new generation. However, at the 90th percentile 
of the wage distribution, overeducated workers in the old generation have higher wage 
than overeducated workers in the new generation.   
 
In addition, we consider the wage effects of educational mismatch for the old 
generation migrant workers and the new generation migrant workers across the wage 
distribution separately from Table 4-16. The coefficients of overeducation (OVER) 
and undereducation (UNDER) in the model indicate the wage effects of educational 
mismatch of the new generation migrant workers. As indicated in Table 4-16, the wage 
effects of overeducation of the new generation migrant workers are negative across the 
wage distribution (except at the 25th and 50th percentile). However, they are all 
insignificant. The coefficients of undereducation of the new generation migrant 
workers have mixed signs across the distribution but are also insignificant. There are 
no significant wage effects of educational mismatch for the new generation migrant 
workers. In terms of the old generation, the wage effects of overeducation in the old 
generation can be expressed by the coefficients, i.e. 𝜑1+𝜑3 in equation (13). There are 
no significant wage effects of overeducation of the old generation across the wage 
distribution. In terms of undereducation, wage premiums of undereducation (𝜑2+𝜑4 in 
equation (13)) existed from the 10th percentile to 75th percentile. There is no impact of 
undereducation on wages of the old generation migrant workers at the top percentile of 
the wage 133 . Above evidence is not consistent with findings in McGuinness and 
Bennett (2007) and Budria (2011).  
 
 
4.6.2 Urban workers 
In this section, we explore the wage return to education and wage effects of 
                                                 
133
 The coefficients of (OVER+ OVER*OLD) at the 10
th
, 25
th
,
 
50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 are -0.013, 0.037, 
0.082, 0.068 and 0.088. The coefficients of (UNDER+UNDR*OLD) at the 10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
 
are 0.132***, 0.092***, 0.125***, 0.149*** and 0.078. 
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educational mismatch for urban workers. Relevant OLS regression results are reported 
in Table 4-17. Model 1 in Table 4-17 reports results from the basic Mincer equation. 
Two dummy variables are included for overeducation and undereducation in Model 2. 
Quantile regression results are analysed thereafter in Table 4-18 to Table 4-21.    
 
From model 1 in Table 4-17, we can see that the return to education for urban workers 
is 5.65 per cent, which is slightly lower than that found by Liu and Zhang (2008) 134. 
Urban male workers have higher wage premiums than their female counterparts. 
Married workers have wage premiums than non-married workers. There is a U-shaped 
relationship between age and wages for urban workers, but only the coefficient of age 
squared is significant at 10 per cent confidence level. However, the U-shaped 
relationship between job tenure and wages is significant statistically. The above results 
may be explained by the positive correlation between age and current job tenure in the 
urban China (Lu and Song, 2006). In terms of industry, the Agriculture industry has 
the highest return and finance and business sector has the second highest return 
compared with the service industry 135 . Individuals working in public-owned 
enterprises have lower wages than in the non-public owned enterprises, but this result 
is insignificant. Individuals working in larger firms have higher wages than those in 
smaller firms. People who have permanent and long term contracts have a wage 
premiums than non-contract and temporary workers.  
 
After taking educational mismatch into consideration, we can see from Table 4-17 
model 2 that overeducation has a significantly negative impact on wages and 
individuals who are undereducated have wage premiums than individuals who have 
the same educational level but are correctly educated. These results are consistent with 
the literature of overeducation and undereducation. Moreover, the returns to education 
increase to 6.67 per cent, which increases 18 percent from model 1 in Table 4-17. 
Based on above results, educational mismatch indeed has an important impact on 
urban workers’ wage. In addition, other control variables in Model 2 seem to be 
similar with Model 1 except the “State” (public-owned enterprises) variable.  
                                                 
134
  Liu and Zhang (2008) find that wage return to education in urban China in 2009 using the Chinese 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is 7.12 per cent. However, they don’t control for industry, firm 
size in the regression, which may yield higher wage return to schooling than this chapter.   
135
 In this chapter, about 22 percent of individuals working in the first industry are principals in state 
agencies, party organisations and enterprises and nearly half of them located in the Guangdong province. 
Thus, their wages are relatively high.    
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Next, we move to the results from the quantile regression analysis. Table 4-18 
describes quantile regression results based on the basic Mincer equation. The results 
show that the return to schooling is 6.52 per cent at 90th percentile, which is higher 
than returns to schooling at the bottom of the wage distribution (5.12 per cent at 10th 
percentile). There is a monotonic effect of education across the wage distribution. That 
is to say, education expansion or increasing the educational attainment may accelerate 
the wage inequality in urban area. Results reported from quantile regression regarding 
wage returns to education for urban workers echo with the stylized fact in the literature 
(Buchinsky, 1994); (Machado and Mata, 2001); (Martins and Pereira, 2004).   
 
In terms of educational mismatch in Table 4-19, negative effects of overeducation 
appear across the wage distribution except the 90th percentile. The positive impact of 
undereducation on wages can be seen from 25th percentile to 90th percentile. 
Undereducation doesn’t influence individuals’ wage at the 10th percentile. 
Interestingly, wage premiums of undereducation increase monotonically from 25th 
percentile to 90th percentile. 
  
Table 4-20 and Table 4-21 report the quantile regression results of wage effects of 
overeducation for urban male workers and urban female workers. For urban male 
workers, impacts of overeducation on wage present at all five percentiles. There is no 
wage effect of undereducation only at the very bottom quantile of the wage 
distribution. For the urban female workers, the negative wage effects of overeducation 
concentrated at the lower half of the wage distribution (10th, 25th and 50th). However, 
there is no impact of undereducation on wages for female across the distribution. 
Different patterns of wage effects of overeducation across the wage distribution by 
gender indicate that the occupational choices made by female and male workers may 
be different136.   
 
4.6.2.1 If the generational division of migrant workers applies to the urban 
residences, will it be the same picture?  
In order to see if this generational division is unique to the migrant workers, we also 
                                                 
136
 Exploring wage effects of educational mismatch by gender is also conducted for rural-to-urban migrant 
workers. However, there is no significantly different pattern by gender among migrant workers.  
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split urban workers into two groups: born before Year 1980 and born in and after Year 
1980 137 . These two groups of urban residences also experience the economic 
transition, which is similar with rural-to-urban migrant workers. Table 4-22 reports the 
differences in the wage effects of schooling between Pre-1980 groups and Post-1980 
group. According to Table 4-22 Model 3, the Pre-1980 group has around 18 per cent 
higher wages than the Post-1980 group but this effect is insignificant. Moreover, there 
is no significant difference in the return to schooling between these two groups.  
 
Next, in terms of quantile regression as shown in Table 4-23, the wage return to 
schooling of the pre-1980 group is lower than the Post-1980 group only at the 50th 
percentile. That is to say, in the middle range of corresponding wage distribution, post-
1980 group have higher wage return to schooling than pre-1980 group. Hence, the 
above results are not similar with those found for migrant workers.  
 
4.7 Discussion 
According to the results from section 4.6.1.2, the new generation of migrant workers 
have a higher wage return to schooling than the old generation of migrant workers. 
When analysing the new generation and old generation of migrant workers separately, 
the wage return to education is 3 per cent in the new generation of migrant workers 
and the return to schooling for the old generation migrant workers is 2.4 per cent (see 
Table C5 and C6 in the appendix). We speculate that the improved rural educational 
attainment and school quality along with the relaxed restrictions on migrant workers 
entering the urban labour market may have led to the higher wage return to schooling 
for the new generation of migrant workers.  
 
Based on a distributional analysis (section 4.6.1.4), the new generation of migrant 
workers have higher wage effects of schooling over the old generation migrant 
workers in the low and middle part of the wage distribution (10th, 25th and 50th 
percentile). Although the in-depth analysis of the wage structure between the old and 
                                                 
137
 4929 observations are in the Pre-1980 groups, 992 observations in the Post-1980 groups. Fewer 
individuals in the post-1980 group are a result of the One Child policy in China. Due to the small number of 
observations for undereducated urban workers in the Post-1980 groups, this chapter only explores the wage 
return to schooling between these two groups.     
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new generation of migrant workers is beyond the scope of this thesis138, we infer that 
different industry composition structure across these two generations may have led to 
such disparity of wage returns to schooling in the wage distribution. If we further 
analyse the detailed composition of industries in the wage distribution, we can see that 
there is a manifest difference in the percentage of individuals working in the 
manufacturing and construction and service sectors between the old and new 
generation migrant workers in the wage distribution (see Table C3 in the appendix). 
More specifically, a shift from manufacturing and construction industry to service 
sectors (wholesale and retail trade, hotel and catering and other service) between two 
generations may lead to different wage effects of schooling. In the China’s 11th Five-
Year Plan (2006-2011), the government would give priority to the development of 
service industry in order to upgrade the industrial structure 139 . Enhancing the 
development of service sectors and increasing the employment in the service sectors is 
also an important goal set in the China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015)140. Thus, the 
shift from manufacturing and construction to service sectors is a result of government-
oriented policy.   
  
In addition, different occupational choices made by these two generations may play an 
important part to explain the different industry structure between two generations. 
According to the RUMIC migrant survey 2009, about 70.10 per cent of new 
generation migrant workers studied in school before they came to the urban labour 
market. While in the old generation migrant workers, approximately 62.65 per cent 
farmed before they entered the urban labour market
141
. This generational difference 
may affect their occupational choices and career aspirations. Schooling may help the 
new generation migrant workers form higher standards and expectations about their 
jobs before coming to the urban labour market than old generation. They may prefer to 
find better working conditions and be more concerned about their career plans than the 
old generation migrant workers (Wang et al., 2013)
142
. The old generation migrant 
workers came to cities only for making a living or getting a new way for income 
                                                 
138
 Many scholars employ the decomposition technique to analysis the wage differentials between 
groups (Knight and Song, 2003); (Zhu, 2016).    
139
 http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/200603/t20060323_63813.html  
140
http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/publicationseries/5-years-
plan/pages/default.aspx .   
141
 In RUMIC Migrant survey, there is a question: “what did you do before you migrated out for the first 
time?”  
142
 Therefore, new generation migrant workers are more willing to settle down in cities permanently.     
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(Wang, 2008). Jobs in construction sector are dangerous and dirty but are highly 
rewarded. Therefore, the old generation migrant workers prefer to work in the 
construction sector to earn high earnings. The above arguments may provide an 
explanation why there is a shift from manufacturing and construction industries 
towards the service sector between two generations.  
 
In this chapter, the wage return to schooling of migrant workers (around 3 per cent) is 
lower than that of urban residents (6 per cent), which has also been confirmed by 
many scholars (Démurger et al., 2009); (Zhu, 2016). Segmented labour marker caused 
by the Household Registration System (Hukou) is the main cause to explain the 
disparity of wage return to schooling between urban residents and migrant workers. In 
terms of educational mismatch, different wage effects of educational mismatch 
between urban residents and rural migrant workers are presented, which support the 
notion of the two-tier labour market in urban China (Meng and Zhang, 2001). The 
wage effects of educational mismatch for urban workers are consistent with the 
existing literature. However for migrant workers, overeducation doesn’t exhibit 
negative wage effects. Even if exploring across the wage distribution, the result still 
holds. The wage premiums enjoyed by undereducated migrant workers are only 
present in the lower and middle part of the wage distribution. One reason behind the 
different wage effects of educational mismatch between urban residents and migrant 
workers may be that the educational level, an indicator of productivity, fails to take its 
function in the process of job-occupation match of rural-to-urban migrant workers in 
the urban labour market. According to the 2009 RUMiC Migrant Survey employed in 
this chapter, nearly 70 per cent of migrants get secure jobs through the family 
members, relatives and friends
143
. That is to say, most of the job-occupation match of 
migrant workers is not through the market mechanism. Although this informal job 
search channel can help to overcome the imperfect information and reduce the 
unemployment rate to some extent, the efficient education-job match process has been 
hindered and thus the wage effects of educational mismatch exhibit different patterns 
compared to urban residents.  
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 In RUMiC survey 2009, there is a question regarding job-seeking channels, “how did you get you 
first job?”.   
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On the other hand, most jobs undertaken by migrant workers require proficiency, are 
paid by piecework and do not need high education
144
. Instead, skills and relevant work 
experience are more related to wages than educational level for migrant workers. 
Higher returns to training than the return to schooling of migrant workers and positive 
wage premiums of undereducation in this chapter also confirm this point of view (See 
Table 4-10 model 1 and model 4). Both old and new generations of migrant workers 
have finished their education before entering the urban labour market. The most direct 
way to improve individual’s employability related to the urban labour market is to 
receive training. Therefore, it is easy to understand the insignificant wage effects of 
overeducation for migrant workers. 
  
In terms of sample selection results, the coefficients on the inverse mills ratios are 
significantly negative in Model 1 and Model 3, as shown in both Tables C7 and C8 in 
the appendix. Therefore, sample selection is apparent in Model 1 and Model 3 in both 
the migrant sample and the urban sample. Negative coefficients on the inverse mills 
ratios indicate that OLS yields downward estimation of wage returns to education. 
However, in terms of the migrant sample, compared wage returns to education in 
Table 4-10 Model 1 (3.02 per cent) (without controlling for sample selection) with 
wage returns to education in Table C 7 Model 1 (3.08 per cent) (controlling for sample 
bias), results are similar. The urban sample has the same case. Base on above evidence, 
taking sample selection into consideration does not greatly influence the results found 
in this chapter.   
 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
Based on above results, the following conclusions are obtained in this chapter: 
(1) According to the OLS regression, the wage return to schooling for migrant workers 
is around 3 per cent. Taking the heterogeneity of migrant workers into consideration, 
the new generation migrant workers have slightly higher (1 percentage point) wage 
return to schooling than the old generation of migrant workers. When using a 
distributional analysis, the new generation of migrant workers have higher wage 
                                                 
144
 See Table C1.  
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effects of schooling than that of old generation of migrant workers in the low and 
middle part of the wage distribution (i.e. 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles).  
 
(2) In terms of educational mismatch, there is no significant wage effect of 
overeducation for migrant workers, while positive wage premiums of undereductaion 
can be enjoyed by migrant workers. According to the results from quantile regression, 
at the middle quantiles (25th and 75th), undereducated migrant workers in the old 
generation enjoy higher wage returns than undereducated migrant workers in the new 
generation. However, at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution, overeducated 
workers in the old generation have higher wage than overeducated workers in the new 
generation.  
 
(3) For urban residents, the wage return to education is around 6 per cent based on the 
OLS regression, which is 3 percentage points higher than for migrant workers. 
Additionally, wage penalties of overeducation are significant in the low and middle 
quantiles of the wage distribution (from 10th to 75th). Wage premiums of 
undereducation increase from 25th percentile to 90th percentile of the wage 
distribution.  
 
Although the wage return to education is quite low for migrant workers compared to 
the urban workers in this chapter, it doesn’t mean education is not important for 
migrant workers. On the contrary, it is good to see in this chapter that the new 
generation of migrant workers have a higher wage return to schooling than the old 
generation of migrant workers, which indicates that the quality of rural human capital 
is improving.  Additionally, the relaxation of urban labour market policies have helped 
migrant workers better integrate into the urban labour market, again increasing the 
purpose of education. On one hand, due to the one-child policy, the shrinking trend in 
the growth rate of working aged urban population has emerged. On the other hand, the 
rural population accounts for 70 percent of the whole population in China (Meng, 
2012). Thus, we can infer that the future labour force will mainly come from the rural 
area. If this is the case, the overall level of human capital in China will be determined 
by the human capital of rural labour force.  
 
Given the above evidence, on one hand, the government should put more investment 
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on rural education to increase the overall level of human capital in order to facilitate 
the economic growth and the urbanisation process in the future. On the other hand, 
although the government has made some efforts to change migrant workers’ situation 
recent years to help them better integrate into the urban area, such as the relaxation of 
the hukou system in small and medium cities and urban housing programmes (Wang 
et al., 2013), more policies have to be implemented to make rural migrant workers 
enjoy equal rights with urban residents. For example, the government should provide a 
comprehensive welfare system including basic medical insurance and pension 
program to migrant workers and also allow the children of migrant workers to go to 
the public school in the urban area to enjoy same quality of schooling with children 
from urban area.   
   
In this chapter, the wage effect of educational mismatch for migrant workers is not 
consistent with urban residents. One reason may be the informal job search channel. In 
order to improve the job-education match of migrant workers, the government should 
provide more official employment service, such as build official job agency 
exclusively for migrant workers, to guide migrant workers to find jobs that match their 
educational levels or skill levels to realise the value of education and their career 
aspirations, especially for new generation migrant workers. In addition, commercial 
job agency should enhance the cooperation with enterprises to reflect comprehensive 
and timely job vacancies from the labour market and at the same time convey 
scientific recruitment criteria to migrant workers to help them establish rational career 
path. A second reason may be that skills and relevant working experiences are more 
related to migrants’ wages than educational level regarding jobs taken by migrant 
workers. The Chinese government has already implemented the “The National Plan of 
Training Rural migrants in 2003-2010” in 2003, the “Sunshine Project” in 2004 and 
“The Spring Wind Action” in 2008 programmes providing migrant workers 
introductory training to help them look for jobs in urban area. However, as more 
migrant workers surge into the cities, the coverage rate of training needs to be 
improved (Zhan, 2005). Therefore, the government needs to adopt multiple channels 
to provide training schemes for migrant workers. Not only relying on basic training 
programmes in the urban area, the local government in the rural area should also 
participate to provide related training to migrant workers before they come to the cities 
in order to enhance migrant workers’ competitiveness and job search efficiency. In 
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terms of return migrants, the local government also needs to establish relevant 
institutions, such as retraining centre or training centre in community, to provide 
vocational education and training to return migrants who have at least junior middle 
school education to improve their employability. In addition, the government should 
provide various types of financial support, such as government subsidy, to enterprises 
to encourage them providing job-specific training to migrant workers to improve their 
productivities.   
 
With migrant workers’ better integration into the urban labour market in the future, the 
pattern of wage effects of overeducation for urban residents may appear in the migrant 
groups. However, based on the results in this chapter, negative wage effects of 
overeducation seem to be overlooked for migrant workers.      
    
In addition, we are still unclear whether there are other effects of educational 
mismatch among rural-to-urban migrant workers in China. For example, will 
educational mismatch influence the return decision of migrant workers? Or will 
educational mismatch detriment well-being of rural-to-urban migrant workers? All 
these questions need to be further investigated in the future. 
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Table 4-1 Summary statistics (Rural-to-Urban migrant workers) 
 
 
 
 Rural-to-urban migrants sample The old generation  The new generation 
Dependent 
variable 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Log hourly wage 1.891 0.487 0.069 4.317 1.894 0.481 0.397 3.807 1.888 0.491 0.069 4.317 
Independent variables 
Years of 
schooling 
9.387 2.886 0 17 8.246 3.171 0 16 10.220 2.329 0 17 
Training 0.273 0.446 0 1 0.228 0.420 0 1 0.306 0.461 0 1 
Overeducated 0.167 0.373 0 1 0.095 0.294 0 1 0.219 0.414 0 1 
Undereducated 0.121 0.326 0 1 0.231 0.422 0 1 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Age 29.972 10.031 16 60 39.882 7.346 30 60 22.736 3.255 16 29 
Age2 998.896 694.732 256 3600 1644.524 625.6638 900 3600 527.53 150.631 256 841 
Male 0.594 0.491 0 1 0.609 0.488 0 1 0.584 0.493 0 1 
Married 0.500 0.500 0 1 0.887 0.317 0 1 0.218 0.413 0 1 
Ethnicity 0.986 0.116 0 1 0.985 0.122 0 1 0.987 0.111 0 1 
Tenure of current 
job 
3.039 3.910 0 38 4.777 5.096 0 38 1.771 1.918 0 13 
Tenure squared 24.520 73.640 0 1444 48.772 107.355 0 1444 6.813 15.104 0 169 
Industry (reference group: Service)  
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
animal husbandry 
0.001 0.025 0 1 0.001 0.027 0 1 0.001 0.023 0 1 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0. 373 0.484 0 1 0.439 0.496 0 1 0.325 0.469 0 1 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.035 0.185 0 1 0.045 0.206 0 1 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Finance and 
Business 
0.077 0.266 0 1 0.080 0.271 0 1 0.074 0.263 0 1 
Public 0.078 0.269 0 1 0.111 0.315 0 1 0.055 0.227 0 1 
Service 0.436 0.496 0 1 0.325 0.469 0 1 0.516 0.500 0 1 
Occupation             
Administrative 
staff and manager 
0.248 0.432 0 1 0.254 0.436 0 1 0.243 0.429 0 1 
Businessman/com
mercial staff 
0.136 0.343 0 1 0.093 0.291 0 1 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Service personnel 0.310 0.463 0 1 0.299 0.458 0 1 0.319 0.466 0 1 
Manufacture and 
transportation 
worker 
0.306 0.461 0 1 0.354 0.478 0 1 0.271 0.445 0 1 
Ownership (reference group: non-public enterprises) 
Public enterprises 0.156 0.363 0 1 0.205 0.404 0 1 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Firm size (reference group: Firm size 4) 
Firm size 1(1 to 5 
employees) 
0.096 0.295 0 1 0.080 0.272 0 1 0.107 0.310 0 1 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) 
0.208 0.406 0 1 0.197 0.398 0 1 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.321 0.467 0 1 0.322 0.467 0 1 0.320 0.466 0 1 
Firm size 4 (100 
and over 
employees) 
0.376 0.484 0 1 0.401 0.490 0 1 0.358 0.480 0 1 
Job type (reference group: Others) 
Permanent 0.136 0.343 0 1 0.126 0.332 0 1 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Long term (one 
year and above) 
0.421 0.494 0 1 0.425 0.495 0 1 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Short term (less 
than one year) 
0.125 0.331 0 1 0.112 0.315 0 1 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Others 0.318 0.466 0 1 0.337 0.473 0 1 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Province (reference group: Guangdong) 
Guangdong 0.232 0.422 0 1 0.227 0.419 0 1 0.235 0.424 0 1 
Henan 0.069 0.253 0 1 0.053 0.224 0 1 0.080 0.272 0 1 
Anhui 0.081 0.273 0 1 0.062 0.242 0 1 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Chongqing 0.083 0.276 0 1 0.098 0.298 0 1 0.072 0.258 0 1 
Shanghai 0.079 0.270 0 1 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.071 0.257 0 1 
Jiangsu 0.145 0.352 0 1 0.154 0.361 0 1 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Zhejiang 0.151 0.359 0 1 0.148 0.356 0 1 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Hubei 0.080 0.272 0 1 0.090 0.287 0 1 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Sichuan 0.080 0.271 0 1 0.076 0.265 0 1 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Total  3301 1393 1908 
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Table 4-2 Summary statistics (Urban workers) 
 
 
 
 
Variables Urban 
Dependent variable Mean SD Min Max 
Log hourly wage 2.517 0.739 0.041 6.442 
Independent variables     
Years of schooling 12.505 3.253 1 35 
Overeducated 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Undereducated 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Age 40.487 9.754 18 60 
Age squared 1734.296 792.810 324 3600 
Male 0.559 0.497 0 1 
Married 0.836 0.370 0 1 
Ethnicity 0.990 0.098 0 1 
Tenure of current job 13.002 10.891 0 45 
Tenure squared 287.643 389.373 0 2025 
Industry (reference group: Service)     
Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Manufacture, production and construction 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Transportation and Information  0.137 0.344 0 1 
Finance and Business 0.095 0.293 0 1 
Public 0.259 0.438 0 1 
Service 0.240 0.427 0 1 
Occupation     
Principals in State Agencies, Party organisations 0.059 0.235 0 1 
Professional technicians 0.242 0.428 0 1 
Clerk and relating personnel 0.268 0.443 0 1 
Commercial and service personnel 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Manufacturing and transporting equipment 0.157 0.363 0 1 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Soldier 
and other practitioner (difficult to classify) 
0.070 0.255 0 1 
Ownership (reference group): non-public enterprises) 
Public enterprises  0.649 0.477 0 1 
Firm size (reference group: Firm size 4)     
Firm size 1(1 to 5 employees) 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) 0.287 0.452 0 1 
Firm size 4 (100 and over employees) 0.495 0.500 0 1 
Job type (reference group: Others)     
Permanent 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Long term contract (one year and above) 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Short term contract (less than one year) 0.042 0.201 0 1 
Others 0.118 0.322 0 1 
Province (reference group: Guangdong)     
Guangdong 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Henan 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Anhui 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Chongqing 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Shanghai 0.124 0.329 0 1 
Jiangsu 0.112 0.315 0 1 
Zhejiang 0.109 0.311 0 1 
Hubei 0.084 0.277 0 1 
Sichuan 0.118 0.322 0 1 
Total 5921 
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Table 4-3 Wage distribution and wage inequality between migrant workers and 
urban residents 
Hourly wage (Yuan) 
Rural to urban migrant 
workers 
The urban sample 
Mean  7.485 17.256 
5
th
 percentile 3.036 4.063 
10
th
 percentile 3.571 5 
25
th
 percentile 4.762 7.5 
50
th
 percentile 6.667 12.5 
75
th
 percentile 9.115 18.75 
90
th
 percentile 12.5 31.25 
95
th
 percentile 15 41.25 
Ratio of 90
th
 to 10
th
 percentile 3.500 6.250 
Ratio of 90
th
 to 50
th
 percentile 1.875 2.500 
Ratio of 50
th
 to 10
th
 percentile  1.867 2.500 
Total number of observations 3301 5921 
 
 
Table 4-4 Average years of schooling and highest educational level 
Variables Full migrant sample Urban residents 
Average years of schooling 9.387 12.505 
Highest educational level   
Primary or less 397 (12.03%) 112 (1.89%) 
Junior middle school 1614 (48.89%) 947 (15.99%) 
Senior middle school 653 (19.78%) 1491 (25.18%) 
Vocational school 402 (12.18%) 626 (10.57%) 
College/Undergraduate or higher 235 (7.12%) 2745 (46.36%) 
Total 3301 5921 
        
 
Table 4-5 Occupations (migrant workers versus urban workers) 
Occupations 
The old 
generation of 
migrant workers 
The new 
generation of 
migrant workers 
Occupations Urban residents  
   
Principals in State 
Agencies, Party 
organisations 
347 (5.86%) 
   
Professional 
technicians 
1433 (24.20%) 
Administrative staff and 
manager 
354 (25.41%) 464 (24.32%) 
Clerk and relating 
personnel 
1585 (26.77%) 
Businessman/commercial 
staff 
130 (9.33%) 318 (16.67%) 
Commercial and 
service personnel 
1214 (20.50%) 
Service personnel 416 (29.86%) 608 (31.87%) 
Manufacturing and 
transporting 
equipment 
927 (15.66%) 
Manufacture and 
transportation worker 
493 (35.39%) 518 (27.15%) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal Husbandry 
and other 
practitioner(difficult to 
classify)145 
415 (7.01%) 
Total 1393 (42.20%) 1908 (57.80%)  5921 
                                                 
145 Due to few observations in Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry (42 observations in urban full 
sample) and Soldier (39 observations in urban full sample), I combine “Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry and “Soldier” into “Other practitioner” category according to the Chinese Dictionary of 
Occupation Classification.  
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Table 4-6 Working hours a week 
Working hours a week 
The old 
generation 
The new 
generation 
Migrant sample 
Urban 
sample 
44 and below146 194 (13.93%) 275 (14.41%) 469 (14.21%) 4207 (71.05%) 
45 to 60 739 (53.05%) 1069 (56.03%) 1808 (54.77%) 1569 (26.50%) 
61 to 80 334 (23.98%) 399 (20.91%) 733 (22.21%) 117 (1.98%) 
Above 80 126 (9.05%) 165 (8.65%) 291 (8.82%) 28 (0.47%) 
Average working hours a week 57.47 56.99 57.19 42.40 
Total 1393 (100%) 1908 (100%) 3301 (100.00%) 5921 (100.00%) 
 
 
 
Table 4-7 Regional distribution (Migrant workers) 
Region 
The old generation 
of migrant workers 
The new 
generation of 
migrant workers 
Migrant sample 
East 863 (61.95%) 1142 (59.85%) 2005 (60.74%) 
Middle 287 (20.60%) 472 (24.74%) 759 (22.99%) 
West 243 (17.44%) 294 (15.41%) 537 (16.27%) 
Total 1393 1908 3301 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-8 Educational mismatch (Migrant workers versus urban workers) 
Variables 
The old generation 
of migrant workers 
The new generation 
of migrant workers 
Migrant sample Urban sample 
Overeducated 133 (9.55%) 418 (21.91%) 551(16.69%) 635 (10.72%) 
Correctly 
educated 
938 (67.34%) 1412 (74.00%) 2350 (71.19%) 4543 (76.73%) 
Undereducated 322 (23.12%) 78 (4.09%) 400 (12.12%) 743 (12.55%) 
Total 1393 1908 3301 5921 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 According to the Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China, the legal working hour is 8 hours a 
day and maximum 44 hours a week in China.  
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Table 4-9 Educational mismatch by wage quantiles 
 (Migrant workers versus urban workers) 
Percentile Urban residents Migrant workers 
 Undereducation Correct education Overeducation Undereducation Correct education Overeducation 
0~10th 124 (20.06%) 465 (75.24%) 29 (4.69%) 69 (18.25%) 262 (69.31%) 47 (12.43%) 
10th~25th 157 (16.83%) 693 (74.28%) 83 (8.90%) 87 (19.16%) 317 (69.82%) 50 (11.01%) 
25th~50th 216 (13.09%) 1266 (76.73%) 168 (10.18%) 102 (12.33%) 618 (74.73%) 107 (12.94%) 
50th ~75th 132 (10.64%) 956 (77.03%) 153 (12.33%) 88 (10.77%) 600 (73.44%) 129 (15.79%) 
75th ~90th 67 (7.12%) 750 (79.70%) 124 (13.18%) 44 (8.12%) 365 (67.34%) 133 (24.54%) 
90th ~100th 47 (8.74%) 413 (76.77%) 78 (14.50%) 10 (3.53%) 188 (66.43%) 85 (30.04%) 
Total 743 (12.55%) 4543 (76.73%) 635 (10.72%) 400 (12.12%) 2350 (71.19%) 551 (16.69%) 
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Table 4-10 Multivariate regression for rural-to-urban migrant workers 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Years of schooling 0.0302*** 0.0291*** 0.0346*** 0.0371*** 0.0359*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Old  -0.1208*** -0.0226  -0.1172*** -0.1378*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0624)  (0.0307) (0.0322) 
Old*Schooling   -0.0098*    
   (0.0054)    
OVER    0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0205 
    (0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0285) 
UNDER    0.0927*** 0.0891*** 0.0083 
    (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0517) 
Old*OVER      0.0587 
      (0.0440) 
Old*UNDER      0.1123** 
      (0.0545) 
Training 0.0966*** 0.0955*** 0.0960*** 0.0957*** 0.0946*** 0.0949*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Male 0.1271*** 0.1260*** 0.1283*** 0.1301*** 0.1289*** 0.1287*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
Married -0.0015 0.0026 0.0076 0.0021 0.0059 0.0063 
 (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
Ethnicity 0.1040* 0.1034* 0.1031* 0.1073* 0.1064* 0.1002 
 (0.0611) (0.0609) (0.0609) (0.0610) (0.0609) (0.0609) 
age 0.0478*** 0.0617*** 0.0608*** 0.0472*** 0.0608*** 0.0620*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
age2 -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure of current 
job 0.0328*** 0.0334*** 0.0339*** 0.0331*** 0.0336*** 0.0338*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Tenure squared -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
State 0.0113 0.0145 0.0149 0.0119 0.0150 0.0149 
 (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
animal husbandry 
-0.0141 -0.0237 -0.0442 -0.0578 -0.0647 -0.0679 
 (0.2868) (0.2862) (0.2863) (0.2869) (0.2863) (0.2862) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0567*** 0.0556*** 0.0562*** 0.0551*** 0.0543*** 0.0552*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0430 0.0427 0.0420 0.0443 0.0441 0.0455 
 (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0398) 
Finance and 
Business 0.0025 0.0051 0.0058 -0.0011 0.0014 0.0014 
 (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0287) 
Public -0.0388 -0.0410 -0.0409 -0.0386 -0.0407 -0.0380 
 (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) -0.1483*** -0.1480*** -0.1460*** -0.1486*** -0.1485*** -0.1492*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0281) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) -0.0594*** -0.0604*** -0.0588*** -0.0604*** -0.0614*** -0.0626*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 0.0105 0.0096 0.0103 0.0117 0.0107 0.0095 
 (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
Permanent 0.0585** 0.0561** 0.0557** 0.0585** 0.0562** 0.0560** 
 (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Long term 0.1056*** 0.1047*** 0.1039*** 0.1062*** 0.1053*** 0.1047*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
Short term 0.0543** 0.0545** 0.0543** 0.0562** 0.0562** 0.0571** 
 (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) 
Henan -0.3462*** -0.3464*** -0.3460*** -0.3419*** -0.3423*** -0.3424*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317) 
Anhui -0.3379*** -0.3407*** -0.3429*** -0.3373*** -0.3399*** -0.3390*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) 
Chongqing -0.3925*** -0.3908*** -0.3911*** -0.3899*** -0.3883*** -0.3871*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Shanghai -0.0239 -0.0248 -0.0262 -0.0231 -0.0239 -0.0233 
 (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0297) 
Jiangsu -0.0913*** -0.0921*** -0.0948*** -0.0922*** -0.0927*** -0.0916*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0246) 
Zhejiang -0.0982*** -0.0989*** -0.0993*** -0.0955*** -0.0962*** -0.0958*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
Hubei -0.3447*** -0.3421*** -0.3411*** -0.3442*** -0.3418*** -0.3396*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0292) 
Sichuan -0.1638*** -0.1616*** -0.1636*** -0.1699*** -0.1670*** -0.1659*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0305) 
Constant 0.7040*** 0.4819*** 0.4416*** 0.6358*** 0.4213*** 0.4120*** 
 (0.1119) (0.1251) (0.1270) (0.1172) (0.1297) (0.1297) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.3167 0.3199 0.3206 0.3186 0.3216 0.3228 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
Note: 1. (1) Service industry is the benchmark industry; (2) Firm size above 100 employees is the bench mark group; (3) 
Others (non-contract temporary job, part-time job and others) is the benchmark job type; (4) Guangdong is the 
benchmark province; (5) Non-public is the benchmark work unit type.  
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Table 4-11 OLS VS QR Model 1for migrant workers 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0302*** 0.0210*** 0.0258*** 0.0318*** 0.0367*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0042) 
Training 0.0966*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.0854*** 0.113*** 0.0784*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0264) (0.0213) (0.0207) (0.0216) (0.0246) 
male 0.127*** 0.0976*** 0.0956*** 0.127*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0221) (0.0207) (0.0173) (0.0204) (0.0248) 
Married -0.00146 -0.00593 0.0290 0.0191 0.0000982 0.0244 
 (0.0212) (0.0361) (0.0293) (0.0290) (0.0284) (0.0364) 
Ethnicity 0.104* 0.0766 0.170* 0.0841 0.0962 0.0713 
 (0.0611) (0.1010) (0.0953) (0.0711) (0.1081) (0.1473) 
Age 0.0478*** 0.0538*** 0.0447*** 0.0388*** 0.0433*** 0.0410*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0067) (0.0071) (0.0092) 
age2 -0.000719*** -0.000812*** -0.000696*** -0.000603*** -0.000663*** -0.000608*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
0.0328*** 0.0192*** 0.0221*** 0.0317*** 0.0461*** 0.0483*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0080) 
Tenure squared -0.000718*** -0.000250 -0.000259 -0.000659*** -0.00119*** -0.00124*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, forestry 
and animal 
husbandry 
-0.0141 0.414** 0.266*** 0.0478 -0.187* -0.470*** 
 (0.2868) (0.1613) (0.1022) (0.0630) (0.1103) (0.1769) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0567*** 0.0688** 0.0421 0.0721*** 0.0513** 0.0353 
 (0.0188) (0.0288) (0.0267) (0.0221) (0.0249) (0.0314) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0430 0.0804 0.108** 0.0294 0.0246 0.00628 
 (0.0399) (0.0512) (0.0541) (0.0522) (0.0528) (0.0754) 
Finance and 
Business 
0.00249 -0.00880 0.0388 0.0173 -0.0346 -0.0179 
 (0.0287) (0.0569) (0.0387) (0.0323) (0.0380) (0.0455) 
Public -0.0388 -0.0977* -0.0200 -0.0193 -0.0591 -0.0615 
 (0.0290) (0.0575) (0.0405) (0.0331) (0.0371) (0.0518) 
State 0.0113 0.00621 -0.00978 0.0201 0.0176 0.0346 
 (0.0207) (0.0370) (0.0287) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0341) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) 
-0.148*** -0.166*** -0.201*** -0.149*** -0.147*** -0.130** 
 (0.0282) (0.0467) (0.0387) (0.0365) (0.0348) (0.0556) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
-0.0594*** -0.0199 -0.0563** -0.0748** -0.0652** -0.0664* 
 (0.0219) (0.0340) (0.0271) (0.0303) (0.0312) (0.0372) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.0105 0.0367 0.0158 0.00455 0.000573 -0.000490 
 (0.0183) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0207) (0.0228) (0.0279) 
Permanent 0.0585** 0.0718** 0.0344 0.0626** 0.0442 0.0565 
 (0.0238) (0.0358) (0.0324) (0.0305) (0.0288) (0.0449) 
Long term 0.106*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 0.0685** 0.0862*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0296) (0.0243) (0.0226) (0.0279) (0.0310) 
Short term 0.0543** 0.0919*** 0.0465 0.0521* -0.0139 0.0564 
 (0.0247) (0.0351) (0.0306) (0.0271) (0.0335) (0.0418) 
Henan -0.346*** -0.397*** -0.380*** -0.328*** -0.295*** -0.324*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0661) (0.0422) (0.0448) (0.0459) (0.0443) 
Anhui -0.338*** -0.404*** -0.332*** -0.340*** -0.321*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0480) (0.0428) (0.0393) (0.0382) (0.0497) 
Chongqing -0.393*** -0.386*** -0.373*** -0.421*** -0.409*** -0.406*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0427) (0.0333) (0.0316) (0.0422) (0.0555) 
Shanghai -0.0239 -0.0456 -0.0385 0.0115 0.0246 -0.0705 
 (0.0297) (0.0531) (0.0349) (0.0384) (0.0331) (0.0548) 
Jiangsu -0.0913*** -0.114*** -0.0412 -0.0801*** -0.0995*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0369) (0.0319) (0.0275) (0.0326) (0.0401) 
Zhejiang -0.0982*** -0.0872** -0.0810*** -0.0921*** -0.0863*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0357) (0.0295) (0.0335) (0.0321) (0.0348) 
Hubei -0.345*** -0.357*** -0.355*** -0.345*** -0.335*** -0.297*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0407) (0.0585) 
Sichuan -0.164*** -0.265*** -0.171*** -0.109*** -0.155*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0447) (0.0519) (0.0359) (0.0470) (0.0416) 
Constant 0.704*** 0.278 0.493*** 0.833*** 0.962*** 1.235*** 
 (0.1119) (0.1801) (0.1728) (0.1388) (0.1627) (0.2060) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.317      
Note: 1. A bootstrap method is adopted to calculate standard errors in quantile regression.  
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Table 4-12  OLS VS QR Model 2 for migrant workers 
 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.0291*** 0.0202*** 0.0249*** 0.0317*** 0.0364*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0045) 
Old -0.121*** -0.0624 -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.101** -0.191*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0482) (0.0412) (0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0509) 
Training 0.0955*** 0.0986*** 0.0991*** 0.0836*** 0.116*** 0.0631*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0271) (0.0210) (0.0206) (0.0217) (0.0237) 
male 0.126*** 0.0923*** 0.0951*** 0.129*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0233) (0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0209) (0.0254) 
Married 0.00265 -0.00480 0.0236 0.0200 0.00207 0.0416 
 (0.0211) (0.0350) (0.0292) (0.0310) (0.0294) (0.0362) 
Ethnicity 0.103* 0.0797 0.151 0.0982 0.0929 -0.0172 
 (0.0609) (0.0972) (0.0957) (0.0751) (0.1044) (0.1415) 
Age 0.0617*** 0.0578*** 0.0619*** 0.0526*** 0.0555*** 0.0613*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0114) 
age2 -0.000854*** -0.000837*** -0.000876*** -0.000736*** -0.000780*** -0.000810*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
0.0334*** 0.0188*** 0.0219*** 0.0336*** 0.0465*** 0.0481*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0079) 
Tenure squared -0.000721*** -0.000231 -0.000183 -0.000716*** -0.00119*** -0.00120*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
animal husbandry 
-0.0237 0.414*** 0.235** 0.0338 -0.199* -0.477*** 
 (0.2862) (0.1598) (0.1024) (0.0688) (0.1175) (0.1816) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0556*** 0.0604** 0.0399 0.0688*** 0.0527** 0.0410 
 (0.0188) (0.0295) (0.0275) (0.0224) (0.0262) (0.0284) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0427 0.0784 0.0787 0.0163 0.0269 0.0321 
 (0.0398) (0.0499) (0.0520) (0.0498) (0.0541) (0.0758) 
Finance and 
Business 
0.00514 0.00637 0.00737 0.0187 -0.0271 -0.0302 
 (0.0286) (0.0551) (0.0369) (0.0338) (0.0399) (0.0448) 
Public -0.0410 -0.0931 -0.0245 -0.0184 -0.0557 -0.0833* 
 (0.0289) (0.0574) (0.0397) (0.0333) (0.0372) (0.0505) 
State 0.0145 0.00498 0.00267 0.0194 0.0169 0.0146 
 (0.0206) (0.0386) (0.0302) (0.0266) (0.0278) (0.0323) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 
5 employees) 
-0.148*** -0.171*** -0.194*** -0.138*** -0.123*** -0.123** 
 (0.0281) (0.0455) (0.0363) (0.0381) (0.0386) (0.0499) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) 
-0.0604*** -0.0338 -0.0538* -0.0741** -0.0707** -0.0621* 
 (0.0218) (0.0342) (0.0281) (0.0297) (0.0330) (0.0331) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.00956 0.0310 0.0158 0.00858 0.000612 0.00423 
 (0.0183) (0.0286) (0.0271) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0276) 
Permanent 0.0561** 0.0826** 0.0582* 0.0593* 0.0521* 0.0552 
 (0.0238) (0.0349) (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0306) (0.0451) 
Long term 0.105*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.0603** 0.0768** 
 (0.0186) (0.0301) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0287) (0.0304) 
Short term 0.0545** 0.0969*** 0.0585** 0.0526* -0.0180 0.0479 
 (0.0246) (0.0350) (0.0292) (0.0289) (0.0366) (0.0413) 
Henan -0.346*** -0.399*** -0.372*** -0.338*** -0.294*** -0.347*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0695) (0.0403) (0.0440) (0.0471) (0.0436) 
Anhui -0.341*** -0.419*** -0.332*** -0.348*** -0.335*** -0.368*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0491) (0.0414) (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0451) 
Chongqing -0.391*** -0.364*** -0.365*** -0.420*** -0.427*** -0.422*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0421) (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0426) (0.0509) 
Shanghai -0.0248 -0.0514 -0.0408 0.00702 0.0175 -0.0594 
 (0.0297) (0.0512) (0.0376) (0.0382) (0.0321) (0.0502) 
Jiangsu -0.0921*** -0.108*** -0.0362 -0.105*** -0.117*** -0.133*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0358) (0.0323) (0.0296) (0.0325) (0.0390) 
Zhejiang -0.0989*** -0.0862** -0.0683** -0.108*** -0.0966*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0359) (0.0289) (0.0339) (0.0320) (0.0368) 
Hubei -0.342*** -0.358*** -0.350*** -0.365*** -0.348*** -0.310*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0339) (0.0324) (0.0371) (0.0449) (0.0526) 
Sichuan -0.162*** -0.269*** -0.169*** -0.142*** -0.163*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0447) (0.0500) (0.0379) (0.0481) (0.0428) 
Constant 0.482*** 0.218 0.227 0.598*** 0.769*** 1.018*** 
 (0.1251) (0.1945) (0.1937) (0.1628) (0.1806) (0.2174) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.320      
Note: (0.90-0.10): schooling= 0. 0154***; (0.75-0.25); schooling =0.0109** 
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Table 4-13 OLS VS QR Model 3 for migrant workers 
 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.0346*** 0.0297*** 0.0385*** 0.0431*** 0.0394*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0076) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0060) 
Old -0.0226 0.0842 0.0789 0.0611 -0.0462 -0.190* 
 (0.0624) (0.1044) (0.0818) (0.0823) (0.0859) (0.1031) 
Old*Schooling -0.00983* -0.0160* -0.0214** -0.0184** -0.00610 -0.000178 
 (0.0054) (0.0090) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0084) 
Training 0.0960*** 0.0986*** 0.0941*** 0.0922*** 0.118*** 0.0619*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0279) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0221) (0.0236) 
male 0.128*** 0.0922*** 0.0918*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0199) (0.0175) (0.0213) (0.0264) 
Married 0.00764 -0.0215 0.0404 0.0396 0.00357 0.0412 
 (0.0213) (0.0351) (0.0274) (0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0353) 
Ethnicity 0.103* 0.110 0.118 0.0865 0.0938 -0.0187 
 (0.0609) (0.0925) (0.1004) (0.0723) (0.1057) (0.1447) 
Age 0.0608*** 0.0610*** 0.0579*** 0.0496*** 0.0560*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0114) 
age2 -0.000849*** -0.000878*** -0.000827*** -0.000709*** -0.000792*** -0.000810*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
0.0339*** 0.0229*** 0.0266*** 0.0351*** 0.0480*** 0.0482*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0079) 
Tenure squared -0.000734*** -0.000375 -0.000448 -0.000751*** -0.00120*** -0.00120*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
animal husbandry 
-0.0442 0.414*** 0.156 0.0223 -0.195 -0.475*** 
 (0.2863) (0.1481) (0.0954) (0.0854) (0.1263) (0.1766) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0562*** 0.0763** 0.0422 0.0669*** 0.0509** 0.0411 
 (0.0188) (0.0306) (0.0263) (0.0215) (0.0258) (0.0290) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0420 0.0718 0.0637 0.0136 0.0203 0.0317 
 (0.0398) (0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0477) (0.0548) (0.0758) 
Finance and 
Business 
0.00579 -0.00878 0.0283 0.0241 -0.0221 -0.0310 
 (0.0286) (0.0534) (0.0363) (0.0330) (0.0417) (0.0459) 
Public -0.0409 -0.0816 -0.0229 -0.0244 -0.0554 -0.0822 
 (0.0289) (0.0568) (0.0392) (0.0347) (0.0367) (0.0509) 
State 0.0149 -0.00450 0.00312 0.0203 0.0230 0.0147 
 (0.0206) (0.0366) (0.0306) (0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0330) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 
5 employees) 
-0.146*** -0.190*** -0.203*** -0.146*** -0.126*** -0.123** 
 (0.0281) (0.0458) (0.0375) (0.0365) (0.0390) (0.0492) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) 
-0.0588*** -0.0352 -0.0554** -0.0674** -0.0707** -0.0615* 
 (0.0218) (0.0359) (0.0271) (0.0298) (0.0331) (0.0333) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.0103 0.0284 0.00764 0.0105 -0.00114 0.00319 
 (0.0183) (0.0290) (0.0267) (0.0222) (0.0250) (0.0272) 
Permanent 0.0557** 0.0666* 0.0444 0.0561* 0.0503 0.0553 
 (0.0237) (0.0373) (0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0313) (0.0449) 
Long term 0.104*** 0.125*** 0.131*** 0.116*** 0.0661** 0.0778*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0297) (0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0294) (0.0302) 
Short term 0.0543** 0.0953*** 0.0547* 0.0411 -0.0126 0.0493 
 (0.0246) (0.0359) (0.0292) (0.0290) (0.0371) (0.0405) 
Henan -0.346*** -0.376*** -0.373*** -0.349*** -0.291*** -0.344*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0681) (0.0403) (0.0424) (0.0473) (0.0430) 
Anhui -0.343*** -0.388*** -0.331*** -0.350*** -0.335*** -0.367*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0488) (0.0404) (0.0371) (0.0389) (0.0435) 
Chongqing -0.391*** -0.373*** -0.363*** -0.426*** -0.425*** -0.419*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0420) (0.0326) (0.0339) (0.0428) (0.0519) 
Shanghai -0.0262 -0.0409 -0.0451 0.00135 0.0154 -0.0568 
 (0.0297) (0.0488) (0.0367) (0.0375) (0.0318) (0.0505) 
Jiangsu -0.0948*** -0.101*** -0.0610* -0.112*** -0.123*** -0.132*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0364) (0.0323) (0.0296) (0.0321) (0.0391) 
Zhejiang -0.0993*** -0.0795** -0.0782*** -0.109*** -0.0950*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0238) (0.0353) (0.0299) (0.0327) (0.0324) (0.0374) 
Hubei -0.341*** -0.350*** -0.355*** -0.360*** -0.351*** -0.307*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0356) (0.0340) (0.0344) (0.0422) (0.0524) 
Sichuan -0.164*** -0.246*** -0.176*** -0.151*** -0.163*** -0.146*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0439) (0.0496) (0.0383) (0.0495) (0.0431) 
Constant 0.442*** 0.0350 0.195 0.544*** 0.728*** 1.016*** 
 (0.1270) (0.2014) (0.1957) (0.1571) (0.1843) (0.2219) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.321      
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Table 4-14 OLS VS QR Model 4 for migrant workers 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0371*** 0.0288*** 0.0295*** 0.0387*** 0.0478*** 0.0380*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0073) 
OVER 0.000685 -0.0160 0.0287 0.0291 -0.0183 0.0333 
 (0.0262) (0.0466) (0.0338) (0.0321) (0.0364) (0.0380) 
UNDER 0.0927*** 0.0838* 0.0680* 0.107*** 0.124*** 0.0538 
 (0.0332) (0.0439) (0.0411) (0.0403) (0.0462) (0.0527) 
Training 0.0957*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.0823*** 0.101*** 0.0727*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0258) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0207) (0.0253) 
male 0.130*** 0.0864*** 0.102*** 0.122*** 0.155*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0168) (0.0205) (0.0255) 
Married 0.00215 -0.00573 0.0348 0.0142 0.00704 0.0158 
 (0.0212) (0.0355) (0.0282) (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0360) 
Ethnicity 0.107* 0.0600 0.149 0.0825 0.128 0.0462 
 (0.0610) (0.1058) (0.1025) (0.0759) (0.0935) (0.1525) 
Age 0.0472*** 0.0495*** 0.0444*** 0.0389*** 0.0413*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0091) 
age2 -0.000718*** -0.000751*** -0.000693*** -0.000616*** -0.000645*** -0.000598*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current job 0.0331*** 0.0215*** 0.0230*** 0.0336*** 0.0465*** 0.0484*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0080) 
Tenure squared -0.000707*** -0.000292 -0.000332 -0.000663*** -0.00119*** -0.00130*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, forestry and 
animal husbandry 
-0.0578 0.397** 0.208** -0.0109 -0.263** -0.503*** 
 (0.2869) (0.1542) (0.0910) (0.0652) (0.1285) (0.1846) 
Manufacture, production 
and construction 
0.0551*** 0.0567* 0.0299 0.0782*** 0.0474* 0.0341 
 (0.0189) (0.0290) (0.0269) (0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0302) 
Information Transmission 
and Transportation 
0.0443 0.0601 0.105** 0.0341 0.0123 0.0130 
 (0.0399) (0.0540) (0.0528) (0.0477) (0.0597) (0.0796) 
Finance and Business -0.00111 -0.0145 0.0407 0.0268 -0.0439 -0.0413 
 (0.0288) (0.0551) (0.0378) (0.0304) (0.0381) (0.0442) 
Public -0.0386 -0.0874 -0.0336 -0.00977 -0.0661* -0.0694 
 (0.0290) (0.0598) (0.0419) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0516) 
State 0.0119 0.00516 -0.0123 0.0208 0.0173 0.0230 
 (0.0206) (0.0376) (0.0296) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0343) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) 
-0.149*** -0.198*** -0.209*** -0.132*** -0.135*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0453) (0.0399) (0.0357) (0.0364) (0.0543) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
-0.0604*** -0.0440 -0.0547** -0.0563** -0.0772** -0.0712** 
 (0.0218) (0.0338) (0.0271) (0.0284) (0.0334) (0.0360) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
0.0117 0.0254 0.0145 0.0198 0.0102 -0.00488 
 (0.0183) (0.0288) (0.0284) (0.0209) (0.0240) (0.0282) 
Permanent 0.0585** 0.0665* 0.0489 0.0740*** 0.0501 0.0533 
 (0.0238) (0.0355) (0.0344) (0.0285) (0.0309) (0.0425) 
Long term 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.141*** 0.118*** 0.0714*** 0.0781** 
 (0.0186) (0.0300) (0.0239) (0.0219) (0.0275) (0.0306) 
Short term 0.0562** 0.103*** 0.0605* 0.0538** -0.00749 0.0382 
 (0.0246) (0.0362) (0.0309) (0.0264) (0.0327) (0.0433) 
Henan -0.342*** -0.375*** -0.363*** -0.334*** -0.272*** -0.325*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0681) (0.0419) (0.0412) (0.0443) (0.0441) 
Anhui -0.337*** -0.406*** -0.320*** -0.349*** -0.320*** -0.368*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0486) (0.0442) (0.0358) (0.0373) (0.0482) 
Chongqing -0.390*** -0.379*** -0.364*** -0.405*** -0.418*** -0.386*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0413) (0.0352) (0.0312) (0.0443) (0.0546) 
Shanghai -0.0231 -0.0426 -0.0316 0.00747 0.0363 -0.0575 
 (0.0297) (0.0506) (0.0368) (0.0385) (0.0313) (0.0559) 
Jiangsu -0.0922*** -0.104*** -0.0495 -0.0875*** -0.112*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0359) (0.0313) (0.0270) (0.0321) (0.0412) 
Zhejiang -0.0955*** -0.0899*** -0.0777*** -0.0940*** -0.0965*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0347) (0.0300) (0.0316) (0.0291) (0.0336) 
Hubei -0.344*** -0.353*** -0.363*** -0.339*** -0.338*** -0.302*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0320) (0.0382) (0.0329) (0.0418) (0.0590) 
Sichuan -0.170*** -0.264*** -0.192*** -0.142*** -0.162*** -0.166*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0451) (0.0494) (0.0379) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
Constant 0.636*** 0.288 0.463** 0.753*** 0.853*** 1.268*** 
 (0.1172) (0.1849) (0.1864) (0.1466) (0.1553) (0.2173) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.319      
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Table 4-15 OLS VS QR Model 5 for migrant workers 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.0359*** 0.0286*** 0.0281*** 0.0378*** 0.0439*** 0.0376*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0074) 
OVER -0.00195 -0.0290 0.0259 0.0356 0.00611 0.00983 
 (0.0261) (0.0463) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0356) (0.0412) 
UNDER 0.0891*** 0.0829* 0.0658* 0.108*** 0.103** 0.0494 
 (0.0331) (0.0448) (0.0397) (0.0406) (0.0449) (0.0533) 
Old -0.117*** -0.0457 -0.120*** -0.0963** -0.0926** -0.175*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0493) (0.0423) (0.0417) (0.0394) (0.0521) 
Training 0.0946*** 0.106*** 0.0996*** 0.0845*** 0.111*** 0.0628*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0272) (0.0215) (0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0243) 
male 0.129*** 0.0789*** 0.0973*** 0.123*** 0.149*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0230) (0.0205) (0.0171) (0.0212) (0.0263) 
Married 0.00585 -0.0205 0.0372 0.0283 -0.00341 0.0217 
 (0.0212) (0.0367) (0.0275) (0.0301) (0.0289) (0.0356) 
Ethnicity 0.106* 0.0718 0.131 0.0759 0.131 -0.0183 
 (0.0609) (0.1051) (0.1005) (0.0773) (0.0933) (0.1389) 
Age 0.0608*** 0.0563*** 0.0576*** 0.0492*** 0.0539*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0113) 
age2 -0.000849*** -0.000817*** -0.000819*** -0.000715*** -0.000766*** -0.000816*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
0.0336*** 0.0209*** 0.0248*** 0.0352*** 0.0480*** 0.0496*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0081) 
Tenure squared -0.000711*** -0.000301 -0.000379 -0.000706*** -0.00123*** -0.00134*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
animal husbandry 
-0.0647 0.403*** 0.192** -0.0237 -0.251* -0.513*** 
 (0.2863) (0.1537) (0.0917) (0.0722) (0.1333) (0.1889) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0543*** 0.0627** 0.0370 0.0676*** 0.0474* 0.0439 
 (0.0188) (0.0300) (0.0276) (0.0218) (0.0260) (0.0284) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0441 0.0583 0.0727 0.0127 0.0321 0.0419 
 (0.0398) (0.0539) (0.0490) (0.0454) (0.0603) (0.0764) 
Finance and 
Business 
0.00138 -0.0147 0.0212 0.0107 -0.0268 -0.0406 
 (0.0287) (0.0530) (0.0376) (0.0314) (0.0400) (0.0463) 
Public -0.0407 -0.0811 -0.0287 -0.0210 -0.0564 -0.0745 
 (0.0289) (0.0594) (0.0404) (0.0361) (0.0374) (0.0527) 
State 0.0150 0.00739 0.00385 0.0303 0.0151 0.0119 
 (0.0206) (0.0383) (0.0298) (0.0265) (0.0256) (0.0332) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 
5 employees) 
-0.148*** -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.135*** -0.129*** -0.134*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0447) (0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0377) (0.0494) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) 
-0.0614*** -0.0395 -0.0565** -0.0585** -0.0753** -0.0759** 
 (0.0218) (0.0342) (0.0287) (0.0292) (0.0330) (0.0345) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.0107 0.0226 0.0148 0.0181 0.00808 -0.00273 
 (0.0183) (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0213) (0.0243) (0.0283) 
Permanent 0.0562** 0.0755** 0.0503 0.0703** 0.0434 0.0591 
 (0.0237) (0.0354) (0.0334) (0.0294) (0.0329) (0.0449) 
Long term 0.105*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.115*** 0.0673** 0.0704** 
 (0.0186) (0.0303) (0.0231) (0.0224) (0.0285) (0.0294) 
Short term 0.0562** 0.102*** 0.0603** 0.0489* -0.0136 0.0234 
 (0.0246) (0.0370) (0.0292) (0.0277) (0.0353) (0.0418) 
Henan -0.342*** -0.381*** -0.364*** -0.347*** -0.282*** -0.354*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0683) (0.0403) (0.0412) (0.0455) (0.0447) 
Anhui -0.340*** -0.418*** -0.329*** -0.351*** -0.345*** -0.372*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0520) (0.0432) (0.0359) (0.0395) (0.0451) 
Chongqing -0.388*** -0.379*** -0.365*** -0.410*** -0.436*** -0.424*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0419) (0.0350) (0.0331) (0.0430) (0.0543) 
Shanghai -0.0239 -0.0288 -0.0500 0.00600 0.0208 -0.0503 
 (0.0297) (0.0511) (0.0398) (0.0384) (0.0316) (0.0500) 
Jiangsu -0.0927*** -0.103*** -0.0520 -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0365) (0.0329) (0.0281) (0.0313) (0.0393) 
Zhejiang -0.0962*** -0.0906** -0.0735** -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0358) (0.0293) (0.0327) (0.0300) (0.0381) 
Hubei -0.342*** -0.348*** -0.364*** -0.344*** -0.343*** -0.319*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0329) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0436) (0.0540) 
Sichuan -0.167*** -0.257*** -0.177*** -0.151*** -0.168*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0458) (0.0488) (0.0383) (0.0447) (0.0454) 
Constant 0.421*** 0.169 0.270 0.603*** 0.682*** 0.984*** 
 (0.1297) (0.2003) (0.2033) (0.1623) (0.1737) (0.2198) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.322      
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Table 4-16 OLS VS QR Model 6 for migrant workers 
 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0363*** 0.0286*** 0.0267*** 0.0389*** 0.0448*** 0.0389*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0076) 
OVER -0.0205 -0.0251 0.0237 0.00942 -0.0318 -0.0333 
 (0.0285) (0.0529) (0.0368) (0.0354) (0.0386) (0.0416) 
UNDER 0.00834 0.0272 -0.0682 -0.00239 0.0461 0.0208 
 (0.0517) (0.0897) (0.0606) (0.0752) (0.0567) (0.1272) 
Old -0.138*** -0.0713 -0.135*** -0.123*** -0.131*** -0.203*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0542) (0.0435) (0.0419) (0.0433) (0.0520) 
OVER*Old 0.0587 0.0117 0.0132 0.0726 0.100 0.121* 
 (0.0440) (0.0768) (0.0661) (0.0630) (0.0629) (0.0696) 
UNDER*Old 0.112** 0.105 0.160*** 0.127 0.103* 0.0573 
 (0.0545) (0.0911) (0.0615) (0.0808) (0.0603) (0.1326) 
Training 0.0949*** 0.0972*** 0.100*** 0.0870*** 0.118*** 0.0750*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0278) (0.0216) (0.0201) (0.0215) (0.0247) 
male 0.129*** 0.0864*** 0.100*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0201) (0.0175) (0.0209) (0.0256) 
Married 0.00627 -0.0166 0.0307 0.0282 -0.00473 0.0297 
 (0.0212) (0.0353) (0.0261) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0352) 
Ethnicity 0.100 0.0900 0.136 0.0710 0.151* -0.0336 
 (0.0609) (0.0991) (0.0975) (0.0738) (0.0894) (0.1438) 
Age 0.0620*** 0.0561*** 0.0602*** 0.0515*** 0.0565*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0080) (0.0088) (0.0110) 
age2 -0.000867*** -0.000814*** -0.000855*** -0.000738*** -0.000798*** -0.000801*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current job 0.0338*** 0.0258*** 0.0258*** 0.0351*** 0.0486*** 0.0485*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0076) 
Tenure squared -0.000706*** -0.000618* -0.000423 -0.000692*** -0.00123*** -0.00132*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, forestry and animal 
husbandry 
-0.0679 0.365** 0.202** -0.0273 -0.264** -0.510*** 
 (0.2862) (0.1523) (0.0864) (0.0679) (0.1265) (0.1884) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.0552*** 0.0620** 0.0330 0.0618*** 0.0576** 0.0359 
 (0.0188) (0.0300) (0.0266) (0.0218) (0.0264) (0.0284) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0455 0.0468 0.0668 0.0158 0.0462 0.0539 
 (0.0398) (0.0557) (0.0506) (0.0434) (0.0590) (0.0819) 
Finance and Business 0.00136 -0.0177 0.0182 0.0122 -0.0165 -0.0384 
 (0.0287) (0.0538) (0.0376) (0.0322) (0.0384) (0.0467) 
Public -0.0380 -0.0962 -0.0250 -0.0317 -0.0537 -0.0792 
 (0.0289) (0.0588) (0.0396) (0.0368) (0.0377) (0.0522) 
State 0.0149 0.0106 0.000905 0.0266 0.0218 0.00638 
 (0.0206) (0.0382) (0.0297) (0.0257) (0.0263) (0.0339) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.149*** -0.184*** -0.202*** -0.138*** -0.126*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0445) (0.0380) (0.0357) (0.0386) (0.0500) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.0626*** -0.0430 -0.0571** -0.0616** -0.0720** -0.0698** 
 (0.0218) (0.0347) (0.0264) (0.0281) (0.0332) (0.0355) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) 0.00953 0.0272 0.00761 0.0115 0.0115 0.00399 
 (0.0183) (0.0297) (0.0265) (0.0219) (0.0248) (0.0291) 
Permanent 0.0560** 0.0636* 0.0532* 0.0725** 0.0589* 0.0515 
 (0.0237) (0.0363) (0.0323) (0.0297) (0.0331) (0.0461) 
Long term 0.105*** 0.128*** 0.141*** 0.124*** 0.0762*** 0.0663** 
 (0.0186) (0.0303) (0.0240) (0.0220) (0.0292) (0.0293) 
Short term 0.0571** 0.0883** 0.0695** 0.0544* 0.00415 0.0289 
 (0.0246) (0.0378) (0.0300) (0.0280) (0.0366) (0.0391) 
Henan -0.342*** -0.398*** -0.370*** -0.346*** -0.268*** -0.332*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0681) (0.0402) (0.0412) (0.0483) (0.0466) 
Anhui -0.339*** -0.408*** -0.325*** -0.352*** -0.337*** -0.359*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0524) (0.0408) (0.0356) (0.0398) (0.0444) 
Chongqing -0.387*** -0.374*** -0.365*** -0.409*** -0.434*** -0.405*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0436) (0.0352) (0.0331) (0.0436) (0.0508) 
Shanghai -0.0233 -0.0572 -0.0437 0.00454 0.0202 -0.0479 
 (0.0297) (0.0505) (0.0385) (0.0373) (0.0321) (0.0497) 
Jiangsu -0.0916*** -0.109*** -0.0532 -0.0985*** -0.131*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0367) (0.0348) (0.0284) (0.0325) (0.0375) 
Zhejiang -0.0958*** -0.101*** -0.0794*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0367) (0.0295) (0.0326) (0.0299) (0.0375) 
Hubei -0.340*** -0.355*** -0.359*** -0.340*** -0.337*** -0.289*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0340) (0.0346) (0.0353) (0.0457) (0.0519) 
Sichuan -0.166*** -0.272*** -0.175*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.117*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0463) (0.0481) (0.0378) (0.0453) (0.0452) 
Constant 0.412*** 0.163 0.245 0.564*** 0.600*** 0.992*** 
 (0.1297) (0.1946) (0.1999) (0.1617) (0.1714) (0.2225) 
Observations 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 3301 
R2 0.323      
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Table 4-17 Wage returns to education in urban sample (OLS) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Years of schooling 0.0565*** 0.0667*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0035) 
OVER  -0.1237*** 
  (0.0286) 
UNDER  0.0764*** 
  (0.0273) 
male 0.1758*** 0.1769*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Married 0.0625** 0.0606** 
 (0.0252) (0.0251) 
Ethnicity 0.0439 0.0444 
 (0.0766) (0.0764) 
age 0.0113 0.0112 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) 
age2 -0.0002* -0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure of current job 0.0262*** 0.0260*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Tenure squared -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry  0.3798*** 0.3747*** 
 (0.0883) (0.0881) 
Manufacture, production and construction 0.1072*** 0.0996*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0228) 
Information Transmission and Transportation 0.1857*** 0.1760*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) 
Business and Finance 0.2758*** 0.2685*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Public 0.2576*** 0.2432*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0239) 
State -0.0306 -0.0316* 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.1617*** -0.1641*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0392) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.1477*** -0.1465*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.0358* -0.0387** 
 (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Permanent 0.4261*** 0.4215*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0320) 
Long term 0.2507*** 0.2471*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) 
Short term -0.0413 -0.0403 
 (0.0430) (0.0430) 
Henan -0.7765*** -0.7733*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Anhui -0.7624*** -0.7595*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Chongqing -0.6333*** -0.6229*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Shanghai -0.1555*** -0.1592*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0297) 
Jiangsu -0.4504*** -0.4471*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Zhejiang -0.2515*** -0.2551*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0299) 
Hubei -0.5347*** -0.5335*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0323) 
Sichuan -0.5939*** -0.5941*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Constant 1.3212*** 1.2140*** 
 (0.1751) (0.1768) 
Observations 5921 5921 
R2 0.4026 0.4049 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Note: (1) Service is the benchmark industry. (2) Firm size above 100 employees is the benchmark group (3) Others (non-
contract temporary job, temporary job and others) is the benchmark job type; (4) Guangdong is the base province; (5) 
Non-public is the benchmark work unit type.  
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Table 4-18 OLS VS QR wage returns to education in urban sample 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0565*** 0.0512*** 0.0583*** 0.0615*** 0.0625*** 0.0652*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0060) 
male 0.176*** 0.132*** 0.163*** 0.189*** 0.182*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0200) (0.0195) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0311) 
Married 0.0625** 0.0423 0.0405 0.0441 0.0873*** 0.0771 
 (0.0252) (0.0287) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0278) (0.0498) 
Ethnicity 0.0439 0.0751 0.187** 0.100 -0.0803 -0.0275 
 (0.0766) (0.0600) (0.0787) (0.1176) (0.1229) (0.2813) 
age 0.0113 0.0140 0.0134 0.0200* 0.00296 0.0102 
 (0.0080) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0152) 
age2 -0.000163* -0.000219* -0.000215** -0.000271** -0.0000466 -0.000104 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Tenure of current job 0.0262*** 0.0219*** 0.0259*** 0.0275*** 0.0296*** 0.0274*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0057) 
Tenure squared -0.000489*** -0.000429*** -0.000480*** -0.000455*** -0.000516*** -0.000543*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandary  
0.380*** 0.362*** 0.315*** 0.380*** 0.377** 0.475* 
 (0.0883) (0.1339) (0.1103) (0.1051) (0.1671) (0.2523) 
Manufacture, production 
and construction 
0.107*** 0.0281 0.0888*** 0.0918*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0254) (0.0308) (0.0463) 
Information Transmission 
and Transportation 
0.186*** 0.175*** 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.192*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0350) (0.0281) (0.0317) (0.0330) (0.0521) 
Business and Finance 0.276*** 0.196*** 0.203*** 0.234*** 0.280*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0329) (0.0315) (0.0372) (0.0397) (0.0859) 
Public  0.258*** 0.200*** 0.219*** 0.246*** 0.279*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0330) (0.0261) (0.0265) (0.0291) (0.0472) 
State -0.0306 -0.0282 0.00983 -0.0397* -0.0455** -0.0506 
 (0.0186) (0.0222) (0.0202) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0410) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) 
-0.162*** -0.142*** -0.161*** -0.204*** -0.148** -0.116 
 (0.0392) (0.0537) (0.0388) (0.0494) (0.0603) (0.0833) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
-0.148*** -0.163*** -0.102*** -0.158*** -0.150*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0287) (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0286) (0.0438) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
-0.0358* -0.0855*** -0.0388* -0.0496** -0.0149 0.0457 
 (0.0184) (0.0222) (0.0234) (0.0220) (0.0229) (0.0375) 
Permanent 0.426*** 0.487*** 0.452*** 0.410*** 0.386*** 0.299*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0421) (0.0375) (0.0435) (0.0511) (0.0641) 
Long term 0.251*** 0.314*** 0.247*** 0.252*** 0.237*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0306) (0.0298) (0.0338) (0.0450) (0.0573) 
Short term -0.0413 0.0589 0.00190 -0.00370 -0.0856 -0.124 
 (0.0430) (0.0444) (0.0385) (0.0462) (0.0643) (0.0963) 
Henan -0.777*** -0.757*** -0.698*** -0.695*** -0.856*** -0.910*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0432) (0.0353) (0.0360) (0.0402) (0.0710) 
Anhui -0.762*** -0.665*** -0.662*** -0.697*** -0.798*** -0.922*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0385) (0.0304) (0.0377) (0.0419) (0.0648) 
Chongqing -0.633*** -0.458*** -0.484*** -0.569*** -0.731*** -0.858*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0464) (0.0367) (0.0362) (0.0387) (0.0656) 
Shanghai -0.156*** -0.0129 -0.0541* -0.124*** -0.222*** -0.321*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0368) (0.0309) (0.0375) (0.0430) (0.0642) 
Jiangsu -0.450*** -0.335*** -0.327*** -0.401*** -0.522*** -0.572*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0444) (0.0323) (0.0366) (0.0418) (0.0678) 
Zhejiang -0.252*** -0.151*** -0.159*** -0.198*** -0.330*** -0.386*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0373) (0.0364) (0.0375) (0.0416) (0.0722) 
Hubei -0.535*** -0.375*** -0.427*** -0.471*** -0.641*** -0.754*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0405) (0.0408) (0.0374) (0.0418) (0.0748) 
Sichuan -0.594*** -0.568*** -0.524*** -0.504*** -0.610*** -0.718*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0449) (0.0316) (0.0378) (0.0399) (0.0676) 
Constant 1.321*** 0.697*** 0.722*** 0.963*** 1.806*** 2.031*** 
 (0.1751) (0.1950) (0.1771) (0.2325) (0.2727) (0.4358) 
Observations 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 
R2 0.403      
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Table 4-19 OLS VS QR Wage effects of overeducation in urban sample 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0667*** 0.0588*** 0.0698*** 0.0750*** 0.0765*** 0.0832*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0078) 
OVER -0.124*** -0.133*** -0.151*** -0.105*** -0.103*** -0.0737 
 (0.0286) (0.0449) (0.0326) (0.0339) (0.0375) (0.0537) 
UNDER 0.0764*** 0.0166 0.0921*** 0.111*** 0.139*** 0.157*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0382) (0.0329) (0.0360) (0.0375) (0.0490) 
male 0.177*** 0.131*** 0.177*** 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0205) (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0314) 
Married 0.0606** 0.0235 0.0495* 0.0350 0.0639** 0.0734 
 (0.0251) (0.0298) (0.0270) (0.0341) (0.0279) (0.0492) 
Ethnicity 0.0444 0.0636 0.146 0.125 -0.0796 -0.0843 
 (0.0764) (0.0614) (0.0903) (0.1130) (0.1160) (0.2810) 
age 0.0112 0.0129 0.0167** 0.0168* 0.00896 0.00924 
 (0.0080) (0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0096) (0.0117) (0.0149) 
age2 -0.000163* -0.000199* -0.000250** -0.000224* -0.000121 -0.0000983 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Tenure of current job 0.0260*** 0.0225*** 0.0243*** 0.0281*** 0.0289*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0055) 
Tenure squared -0.000486*** -0.000446*** -0.000439*** -0.000475*** -0.000493*** -0.000578*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry  
0.375*** 0.332** 0.291** 0.357*** 0.358** 0.488* 
 (0.0881) (0.1371) (0.1152) (0.1089) (0.1671) (0.2561) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.0996*** 0.0276 0.0861*** 0.0807*** 0.146*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0251) (0.0291) (0.0475) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.176*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.159*** 0.199*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0336) (0.0269) (0.0299) (0.0326) (0.0534) 
Business and Finance 0.268*** 0.182*** 0.194*** 0.217*** 0.265*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0340) (0.0319) (0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0885) 
Public 0.243*** 0.163*** 0.214*** 0.232*** 0.271*** 0.254*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0343) (0.0258) (0.0248) (0.0305) (0.0490) 
State -0.0316* -0.0142 0.00831 -0.0406* -0.0386* -0.0527 
 (0.0186) (0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0230) (0.0220) (0.0380) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.164*** -0.126** -0.172*** -0.224*** -0.172*** -0.139* 
 (0.0392) (0.0537) (0.0380) (0.0497) (0.0591) (0.0820) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.146*** -0.149*** -0.114*** -0.159*** -0.130*** -0.139*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0282) (0.0265) (0.0264) (0.0282) (0.0417) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
-0.0387** -0.0803*** -0.0511** -0.0505** -0.0147 0.0506 
 (0.0184) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0209) (0.0233) (0.0372) 
Permanent 0.422*** 0.490*** 0.431*** 0.398*** 0.379*** 0.287*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0425) (0.0349) (0.0422) (0.0481) (0.0632) 
Long term 0.247*** 0.323*** 0.247*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 0.135** 
 (0.0273) (0.0317) (0.0300) (0.0334) (0.0415) (0.0560) 
Short term -0.0403 0.0833* 0.00543 -0.00938 -0.0727 -0.118 
 (0.0430) (0.0437) (0.0402) (0.0460) (0.0595) (0.0949) 
Henan -0.773*** -0.767*** -0.692*** -0.705*** -0.845*** -0.887*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0422) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0410) (0.0740) 
Anhui -0.759*** -0.680*** -0.671*** -0.705*** -0.799*** -0.897*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0389) (0.0314) (0.0362) (0.0430) (0.0620) 
Chongqing -0.623*** -0.461*** -0.492*** -0.570*** -0.714*** -0.837*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0453) (0.0362) (0.0366) (0.0421) (0.0632) 
Shanghai -0.159*** -0.0259 -0.0660** -0.135*** -0.241*** -0.320*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0387) (0.0302) (0.0392) (0.0441) (0.0635) 
Jiangsu -0.447*** -0.330*** -0.337*** -0.410*** -0.505*** -0.569*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0424) (0.0328) (0.0376) (0.0437) (0.0638) 
Zhejiang -0.255*** -0.159*** -0.173*** -0.206*** -0.349*** -0.412*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0387) (0.0354) (0.0365) (0.0415) (0.0650) 
Hubei -0.533*** -0.380*** -0.414*** -0.476*** -0.637*** -0.760*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0433) (0.0406) (0.0377) (0.0407) (0.0756) 
Sichuan -0.594*** -0.582*** -0.525*** -0.518*** -0.611*** -0.704*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0462) (0.0331) (0.0380) (0.0394) (0.0653) 
Constant 1.214*** 0.650*** 0.566*** 0.864*** 1.536*** 1.882*** 
 (0.1768) (0.2020) (0.1839) (0.2191) (0.2813) (0.4342) 
Observations 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 
R2 0.405      
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Table 4-20 OLS VS QR Wage effects of overeducation in urban male sample 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0727*** 0.0655*** 0.0714*** 0.0823*** 0.0813*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0088) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0102) 
OVER -0.146*** -0.140** -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.125*** -0.149** 
 (0.0385) (0.0605) (0.0442) (0.0460) (0.0477) (0.0689) 
UNDER 0.108*** 0.0260 0.0888* 0.157*** 0.162*** 0.202*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0534) (0.0473) (0.0461) (0.0560) (0.0704) 
Married 0.145*** 0.0712 0.117*** 0.106** 0.147*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0476) (0.0378) (0.0445) (0.0417) (0.0763) 
Ethnicity 0.133 0.0966 0.272*** 0.169 0.114 0.171 
 (0.1048) (0.0684) (0.0949) (0.1790) (0.1528) (0.3402) 
age 0.0176 0.0237 0.0208* 0.0201 0.00776 0.000914 
 (0.0111) (0.0193) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0162) (0.0234) 
age2 -0.000249* -0.000301 -0.000319** -0.000275 -0.000111 -0.0000320 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Tenure of current job 0.0262*** 0.0306*** 0.0312*** 0.0277*** 0.0311*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0089) 
Tenure squared -0.000475*** -0.000634*** -0.000575*** -0.000451*** -0.000550*** -0.000427** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry  
0.505*** 0.385** 0.564*** 0.480*** 0.558*** 0.652** 
 (0.1127) (0.1642) (0.1834) (0.1473) (0.1931) (0.2580) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.131*** 0.102** 0.151*** 0.159*** 0.194*** 0.111* 
 (0.0318) (0.0500) (0.0358) (0.0388) (0.0377) (0.0645) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.178*** 0.237*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.199*** 0.143* 
 (0.0353) (0.0496) (0.0342) (0.0410) (0.0444) (0.0765) 
Business and Finance 0.289*** 0.253*** 0.219*** 0.292*** 0.280*** 0.263** 
 (0.0427) (0.0510) (0.0493) (0.0525) (0.0533) (0.1123) 
Public 0.276*** 0.229*** 0.267*** 0.272*** 0.311*** 0.258*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0580) (0.0405) (0.0419) (0.0429) (0.0739) 
State -0.0603** -0.0221 0.0111 -0.0402 -0.0733** -0.144*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0352) (0.0318) (0.0330) (0.0366) (0.0525) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.177*** -0.170** -0.180*** -0.186** -0.0900 -0.0712 
 (0.0591) (0.0785) (0.0579) (0.0776) (0.1007) (0.1336) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.116*** -0.156*** -0.0655* -0.122*** -0.0918** -0.0882 
 (0.0338) (0.0567) (0.0354) (0.0365) (0.0459) (0.0698) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.0412* -0.0708** -0.0119 -0.0481 -0.0238 0.0709 
 (0.0248) (0.0353) (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0329) (0.0555) 
Permanent 0.436*** 0.444*** 0.406*** 0.448*** 0.370*** 0.392*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0620) (0.0547) (0.0634) (0.0653) (0.0980) 
Long term 0.313*** 0.321*** 0.279*** 0.318*** 0.273*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0500) (0.0437) (0.0512) (0.0543) (0.0872) 
Short term -0.0146 0.127 0.0257 0.0303 -0.0742 -0.0345 
 (0.0648) (0.1036) (0.0651) (0.0631) (0.0847) (0.1492) 
Henan -0.803*** -0.780*** -0.721*** -0.790*** -0.852*** -0.862*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0659) (0.0499) (0.0514) (0.0526) (0.1048) 
Anhui -0.754*** -0.609*** -0.650*** -0.733*** -0.772*** -0.893*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0716) (0.0509) (0.0488) (0.0535) (0.0890) 
Chongqing -0.621*** -0.422*** -0.475*** -0.600*** -0.713*** -0.864*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0686) (0.0552) (0.0519) (0.0515) (0.0898) 
Shanghai -0.188*** -0.00472 -0.0692 -0.218*** -0.225*** -0.319*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0619) (0.0445) (0.0558) (0.0498) (0.0897) 
Jiangsu -0.466*** -0.375*** -0.358*** -0.468*** -0.474*** -0.515*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0658) (0.0473) (0.0570) (0.0517) (0.0946) 
Zhejiang -0.275*** -0.114* -0.172*** -0.278*** -0.323*** -0.375*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0598) (0.0446) (0.0530) (0.0593) (0.0884) 
Hubei -0.534*** -0.367*** -0.405*** -0.507*** -0.621*** -0.760*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0613) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0543) (0.1039) 
Sichuan -0.551*** -0.487*** -0.478*** -0.523*** -0.591*** -0.639*** 
 (0.0399) (0.0706) (0.0445) (0.0535) (0.0592) (0.0885) 
Constant 1.003*** 0.260 0.379 0.733** 1.370*** 1.755*** 
 (0.2440) (0.4044) (0.2356) (0.3439) (0.3749) (0.5875) 
Observations 3307 3307 3307 3307 3307 3307 
R2 0.390      
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Table 4-21 OLS VS QR Wage effects of overeducation in urban female sample 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0569*** 0.0608*** 0.0575*** 0.0625*** 0.0645*** 0.0584*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0079) (0.0091) (0.0116) 
OVER -0.0958** -0.152** -0.112** -0.0721* -0.0831 0.0261 
 (0.0426) (0.0665) (0.0478) (0.0401) (0.0578) (0.1020) 
UNDER 0.0261 0.0279 0.0212 0.0520 0.0806 0.0755 
 (0.0416) (0.0588) (0.0447) (0.0553) (0.0642) (0.0822) 
Married -0.0164 0.00963 -0.0214 -0.0314 0.000955 -0.0461 
 (0.0343) (0.0440) (0.0393) (0.0331) (0.0442) (0.0730) 
Ethnicity -0.0548 -0.0221 0.0708 -0.0270 -0.0347 -0.0828 
 (0.1116) (0.1521) (0.1633) (0.1443) (0.1702) (0.4206) 
age -0.00527 0.00291 0.0109 0.0102 0.00775 0.00295 
 (0.0122) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0166) (0.0297) 
age2 0.0000410 -7.7E-05 -0.000178 -0.000167 -0.000130 -0.0000322 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Tenure of current job 0.0236*** 0.0141** 0.0207*** 0.0244*** 0.0233*** 0.0320*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0063) (0.0088) 
Tenure squared -0.000428*** -0.00022 -0.000394** -0.000366** -0.000301 -0.000683*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry  
0.129 -0.118 0.190 0.0617 0.0643 0.391 
 (0.1427) (0.2562) (0.1416) (0.1665) (0.2606) (0.4971) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.0561* -0.0312 0.0214 0.0105 0.0720 0.167** 
 (0.0332) (0.0401) (0.0367) (0.0352) (0.0491) (0.0834) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.206*** 0.168*** 0.203*** 0.205*** 0.185*** 0.187** 
 (0.0431) (0.0451) (0.0471) (0.0454) (0.0526) (0.0914) 
Business and Finance 0.257*** 0.124** 0.190*** 0.163*** 0.301*** 0.377*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0534) (0.0437) (0.0489) (0.0542) (0.0893) 
Public 0.202*** 0.130*** 0.153*** 0.188*** 0.203*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0403) (0.0380) (0.0360) (0.0510) (0.0672) 
State 0.00864 -0.0292 0.0246 -0.0123 0.00685 0.0540 
 (0.0269) (0.0315) (0.0291) (0.0272) (0.0384) (0.0588) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.157*** -0.199** -0.181*** -0.218*** -0.141* -0.164 
 (0.0523) (0.0785) (0.0509) (0.0549) (0.0764) (0.1414) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.168*** -0.142*** -0.153*** -0.157*** -0.162*** -0.213*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0352) (0.0365) (0.0320) (0.0427) (0.0627) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.0469* -0.0764** -0.0948*** -0.0698** -0.0523 0.0283 
 (0.0272) (0.0347) (0.0337) (0.0293) (0.0386) (0.0567) 
Permanent 0.446*** 0.504*** 0.472*** 0.430*** 0.442*** 0.250*** 
 (0.0458) (0.0606) (0.0521) (0.0562) (0.0744) (0.0952) 
Long term 0.194*** 0.310*** 0.220*** 0.206*** 0.183*** 0.0292 
 (0.0375) (0.0391) (0.0421) (0.0429) (0.0645) (0.0814) 
Short term -0.0484 0.0777 -0.0234 -0.00460 -0.0453 -0.196* 
 (0.0570) (0.0552) (0.0612) (0.0591) (0.0919) (0.1152) 
Henan -0.746*** -0.750*** -0.657*** -0.612*** -0.839*** -0.886*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0597) (0.0505) (0.0504) (0.0704) (0.1072) 
Anhui -0.775*** -0.684*** -0.701*** -0.651*** -0.868*** -0.905*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0524) (0.0446) (0.0621) (0.0786) (0.0947) 
Chongqing -0.632*** -0.512*** -0.479*** -0.504*** -0.702*** -0.846*** 
 (0.0473) (0.0724) (0.0456) (0.0532) (0.0856) (0.1021) 
Shanghai -0.121*** -0.021 -0.00813 -0.0298 -0.219*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0439) (0.0500) (0.0483) (0.0517) (0.0740) (0.1002) 
Jiangsu -0.432*** -0.298*** -0.283*** -0.316*** -0.571*** -0.577*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0504) (0.0430) (0.0511) (0.0777) (0.0941) 
Zhejiang -0.229*** -0.176*** -0.147*** -0.110** -0.340*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0442) (0.0461) (0.0488) (0.0530) (0.0704) (0.1115) 
Hubei -0.534*** -0.398*** -0.394*** -0.386*** -0.676*** -0.755*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0663) (0.0472) (0.0567) (0.0724) (0.1001) 
Sichuan -0.651*** -0.672*** -0.565*** -0.482*** -0.677*** -0.750*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0694) (0.0437) (0.0550) (0.0713) (0.0986) 
Constant 1.852*** 1.014*** 1.036*** 1.354*** 1.822*** 2.448*** 
 (0.2648) (0.3302) (0.3110) (0.3328) (0.3961) (0.7342) 
Observations 2614 2614 2614 2614 2614 2614 
R2 0.397      
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Table 4-22 Wage returns to education by generations in urban sample 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Years of schooling 0.0565*** 0.0564*** 0.0652*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0079) 
Old  0.0334 0.1778 
  (0.0398) (0.1290) 
Old*Schooling   -0.0099 
   (0.0084) 
male 0.1758*** 0.1757*** 0.1763*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
Married 0.0625** 0.0585** 0.0610** 
 (0.0252) (0.0256) (0.0257) 
Ethnicity 0.0439 0.0441 0.0419 
 (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0766) 
age 0.0113 0.0056 0.0039 
 (0.0080) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
age2 -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Tenure of current job 0.0262*** 0.0261*** 0.0263*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Tenure squared -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry 
0.3798*** 0.3807*** 0.3796*** 
 (0.0883) (0.0883) (0.0883) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.1072*** 0.1075*** 0.1069*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0227) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.1857*** 0.1859*** 0.1848*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) 
Business and Finance 0.2758*** 0.2758*** 0.2754*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
Public 0.2576*** 0.2577*** 0.2578*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
State -0.0306 -0.0305 -0.0307* 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.1617*** -0.1618*** -0.1605*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0393) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 employees) -0.1477*** -0.1478*** -0.1471*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 employees) -0.0358* -0.0358* -0.0357* 
 (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
Permanent 0.4261*** 0.4259*** 0.4260*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321) 
Long term 0.2507*** 0.2507*** 0.2503*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273) 
Short term -0.0413 -0.0409 -0.0415 
 (0.0430) (0.0430) (0.0430) 
Henan -0.7765*** -0.7768*** -0.7760*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Anhui -0.7624*** -0.7624*** -0.7617*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Chongqing -0.6333*** -0.6333*** -0.6328*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Shanghai -0.1555*** -0.1555*** -0.1557*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
Jiangsu -0.4504*** -0.4507*** -0.4505*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Zhejiang -0.2515*** -0.2519*** -0.2524*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
Hubei -0.5347*** -0.5347*** -0.5339*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0324) 
Sichuan -0.5939*** -0.5940*** -0.5937*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Constant 1.3212*** 1.4235*** 1.3301*** 
 (0.1751) (0.2134) (0.2277) 
Observations 5921 5921 5921 
R2 0.4026 0.4027 0.4028 
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Table 4-23 OLS VS QR Wage returns to education in urban sample (generations) 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0652*** 0.0514*** 0.0585*** 0.0796*** 0.0792*** 0.0748*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0160) (0.0088) (0.0099) (0.0115) (0.0145) 
Old 0.178 0.0341 0.0356 0.306** 0.315* 0.324 
 (0.1290) (0.2335) (0.1416) (0.1531) (0.1817) (0.2529) 
Old*Schooling -0.00985 -0.0000556 -0.000662 -0.0195* -0.0187 -0.0115 
 (0.0084) (0.0164) (0.0095) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0159) 
male 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.160*** 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0296) 
Married 0.0610** 0.0351 0.0379 0.0336 0.0865*** 0.0675 
 (0.0257) (0.0293) (0.0281) (0.0347) (0.0286) (0.0465) 
Ethnicity 0.0419 0.0823 0.193** 0.0918 -0.0813 -0.0429 
 (0.0766) (0.0606) (0.0798) (0.1091) (0.1208) (0.2883) 
age 0.00389 0.00825 0.00922 0.0121 -0.00445 -0.0207 
 (0.0106) (0.0137) (0.0111) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0210) 
age2 -0.0000848 -0.000155 -0.000170 -0.000181 0.0000264 0.000225 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Tenure of current job 0.0263*** 0.0223*** 0.0254*** 0.0290*** 0.0300*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0056) 
Tenure squared -0.000490*** -0.000446*** -0.000472*** -0.000497*** -0.000525*** -0.000489*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry 
0.380*** 0.363*** 0.281** 0.377*** 0.363** 0.474* 
 (0.0883) (0.1346) (0.1118) (0.1074) (0.1655) (0.2617) 
Manufacture, production and 
construction 
0.107*** 0.0323 0.0884*** 0.0867*** 0.143*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0271) (0.0264) (0.0254) (0.0307) (0.0457) 
Information Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.185*** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.157*** 0.193*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0359) (0.0281) (0.0321) (0.0323) (0.0509) 
Business and Finance 0.275*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 0.229*** 0.267*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0336) (0.0320) (0.0346) (0.0392) (0.0830) 
Public 0.258*** 0.195*** 0.225*** 0.242*** 0.282*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0327) (0.0258) (0.0267) (0.0287) (0.0483) 
State -0.0307* -0.0220 0.00652 -0.0410* -0.0434** -0.0462 
 (0.0186) (0.0228) (0.0202) (0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0394) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 employees) -0.161*** -0.140*** -0.164*** -0.199*** -0.137** -0.156* 
 (0.0393) (0.0523) (0.0386) (0.0503) (0.0578) (0.0825) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
-0.147*** -0.159*** -0.105*** -0.163*** -0.141*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0287) (0.0267) (0.0265) (0.0283) (0.0422) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
-0.0357* -0.0845*** -0.0439* -0.0446** -0.0111 0.0481 
 (0.0184) (0.0224) (0.0233) (0.0214) (0.0228) (0.0379) 
Permanent 0.426*** 0.486*** 0.451*** 0.411*** 0.389*** 0.324*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0430) (0.0368) (0.0426) (0.0502) (0.0642) 
Long term 0.250*** 0.311*** 0.246*** 0.258*** 0.240*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0310) (0.0301) (0.0338) (0.0432) (0.0568) 
Short term -0.0415 0.0599 -0.00707 -0.00353 -0.0701 -0.0526 
 (0.0430) (0.0443) (0.0381) (0.0475) (0.0616) (0.0968) 
Henan -0.776*** -0.766*** -0.705*** -0.698*** -0.846*** -0.920*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0430) (0.0356) (0.0351) (0.0409) (0.0704) 
Anhui -0.762*** -0.660*** -0.669*** -0.696*** -0.804*** -0.934*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0387) (0.0311) (0.0358) (0.0407) (0.0651) 
Chongqing -0.633*** -0.462*** -0.486*** -0.576*** -0.724*** -0.891*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0460) (0.0371) (0.0350) (0.0392) (0.0654) 
Shanghai -0.156*** -0.0157 -0.0576* -0.122*** -0.215*** -0.332*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0366) (0.0314) (0.0368) (0.0430) (0.0640) 
Jiangsu -0.450*** -0.337*** -0.326*** -0.401*** -0.519*** -0.579*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0454) (0.0323) (0.0359) (0.0422) (0.0680) 
Zhejiang -0.252*** -0.151*** -0.159*** -0.208*** -0.328*** -0.423*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0371) (0.0373) (0.0362) (0.0400) (0.0701) 
Hubei -0.534*** -0.371*** -0.429*** -0.474*** -0.636*** -0.751*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0415) (0.0400) (0.0366) (0.0410) (0.0742) 
Sichuan -0.594*** -0.570*** -0.527*** -0.511*** -0.597*** -0.735*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0444) (0.0312) (0.0372) (0.0390) (0.0668) 
Constant 1.330*** 0.789** 0.794*** 0.859*** 1.683*** 2.467*** 
 (0.2277) (0.3326) (0.2245) (0.2841) (0.3726) (0.5234) 
Observations 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 5921 
R2 0.403      
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
5.1 Summary of the Thesis   
This thesis focuses on the exploration of overeducation in the Chinese labour market 
in three aspects. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the phenomenon of overeducation 
in China. Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between overeducation and job 
satisfaction based on the point of view of productivity. Chapter 4 examines the wage 
return to education and wage effects of overeducation in segmented labour markets in 
urban China. The main conclusions from each chapter will be discussed below. At the 
end of this section, policy implications and recommendations for future work are 
highlighted.   
 
Chapter 2 (Research question 1) provides a longitudinal analysis of overeducation 
over the period from 1989 to 2009 to explore whether the stylised patterns of 
overeducation regarding the incidence of overeducation, the determinants of and wage 
effects of overeducation are found in China. First, based on the realised matches (RM) 
method, about 18.19% of workers in our sample are treated as overeducated and 
20.33% employees have deficit education in the mean index. While using the mode 
index, the incidence of overeducation is 26.10% and about 30.16% of workers are 
estimated as undereducated. The incidence of overeducation and undereducation found 
in this chapter are similar with other studies about overeducation in China (21% in 
Yang and Yue (2005), 20.5% in Mayston and Yang (2008) and 27.3% in Ren and 
Miller (2012), even though they have different methods to define overeducation and 
use different datasets. In addition, compared to the extent of overeducation in Chapter 
3 (23.1% using the mode index) and Chapter 4 (16.69% for migrant workers and 
10.72% for urban residents using the mean index), results in this chapter are slightly 
higher. Based on the above evidence, we can infer that the incidence of overeducation 
in China is somewhere between 20% and 30% regardless of the measurement of 
required education used.  
 
Results indicate that in both indexes, males are more likely to be overeducated than 
females and individuals who have an urban registration are more likely to be estimated 
as overeducated than people with rural registration. In addition, individuals who have 
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less experience are more likely to be estimated as overeducated, which confirms the 
human capital theory that there is a potential trade-off between schooling and other 
kinds of human capital. However, this result is only found in the mean index. 
Temporary workers tend to be overeducated in both indexes and workers in the private 
sector are more likely to be overeducated than individuals in the government sector in 
both indexes.  
 
In terms of the wage effects of overeducation in the pooled OLS regression, the results 
in Chapter 2 are from two equations (ORU and VV equations). Both the mean index 
and mode index produce results that are consistent with literature. After taking time 
effects into consideration, although time effects change the magnitude of wage effects, 
the pattern of estimation results are still consistent with previous findings that 
educational mismatch causes wage differentials. When taking unobserved 
heterogeneity into account, empirical results in this chapter indicate that the wage 
penalty of overeducation becomes smaller or even disappears, which can be confirmed 
by the mode index in the VV equation. In all, the results from Chapter 2 suggest that 
the stylised patterns of overeducation in the literature are present in the Chinese labour 
market.  
 
In addition, there are some specific features of the wage effects of overeducation in 
China indicated in this chapter. The exploration of wage effects of overeducation by 
wave suggests that there are increasing wage returns to overeducation over time in 
China. This may be explained by the economic transition and its following changes in 
the labour market and education system. In addition, different wage effects of 
overeducation by age groups may be explained by the changes in Post-Mao and Mao 
education systems to some extent.   
 
Chapter 3 (Research question 2) investigates detailed relationships among educational 
mismatch, skill mismatch and job satisfaction in China. First, according to the 
summary statistics in the sample, overeducated people report the highest job 
satisfaction level among the three groups (overeducated, undereducated and correctly 
educated). When exploring relationships between educational mismatch and overall 
job satisfaction and aspects of job satisfaction without taking skill mismatch into 
consideration, results indicate that overeducated people are more satisfied with their 
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workload, working conditions and facilities, their relationship with colleagues and 
housing benefits compared to workers who work in similar jobs who are correctly 
educated. In terms of overall job satisfaction, there is no evidence from the ordered 
probit model that overeducated individuals are more likely to report low job 
satisfaction. Two reasons can explain the above results. The first is that there may be 
compensating aspects of the job that make overeducated people choose a job lower 
than their educational attainment to achieve a balanced tradeoff between work and 
leisure. The second is that overeducated people may choose to stay in a job beneath 
their level of education due to their own preference for one or more characteristics of 
the job. 
  
When educational mismatch and skill mismatch are included simultaneously into the 
analysis of job satisfaction, empirical results suggest that skill mismatch has a 
consistently stronger negative effect on overall job satisfaction and many facets of job 
satisfaction except for job satisfaction with welfare, workload and commuting distance 
to job location than educational mismatch. It seems that skill mismatch may 
undermine job satisfaction within institutions. This result is also consistent with the 
recent literature that focuses on skill mismatch.  
 
Chapter 4 (Research question 3) depicts the wage effects of schooling and wage 
effects of overeducation and undereducation for rural-to-urban migrant workers and 
urban residents who are segmented in the urban labour market in China. Empirical 
results show that the new generation of migrant workers have a higher wage returns to 
schooling than the old generation of migrant workers. Improved rural educational 
attainment and school quality, and relaxed restrictions on migrant workers entering the 
urban labour market may lead to the higher wage returns to schooling for the new 
generation of migrant workers. Based on results in the quantile regression, the new 
generation migrant workers have higher wage returns to schooling than the old 
generation migrant workers in the low and middle part of the wage distribution (10th, 
25th and 50th percentile). Although we are unable to make a further in-depth analysis of 
the wage structure between the old and new generation of migrant workers, we 
speculate that a shift from manufacturing and construction industry to service sectors 
(wholesale and retail trade, hotel and catering and other service) between two 
generations may lead to such different wage effects of schooling. In addition, the wage 
223 
 
return to schooling of migrant workers (around 3 per cent) is lower than that of urban 
residents (6 per cent). The segmented labour market caused by the Household 
Registration System (Hukou) is the main cause that explains the disparity of wage 
returns to schooling between urban residents and migrant workers.  
 
In terms of educational mismatch, there is no significant wage effect of overeducation 
for migrant workers and positive wage premiums of undereducation can be enjoyed by 
migrant workers. Based on a distributional analysis, undereducated migrant workers in 
the old generation enjoy higher wage premiums of undereducation at the middle 
quantiles (25th and 75th). Overeducated workers in the old generation have higher wage 
effects of overeducation at the 90th quantile of the wage distribution. The wage effects 
of educational mismatch for urban workers are consistent with the existing literature. 
Different wage effects of educational mismatch between urban residents and rural 
migrant workers are presented, which support the notion of the two-tier labour market 
in urban China (Meng and Zhang, 2001). Informal job search in the migrant groups is 
an important reason to explain the educational mismatch of rural-to-urban migrant 
workers. Another reason is the inferior jobs undertaken by some migrant workers that 
require proficiency and are paid by piecework. Skills and relevant working experience 
are more related to wages than educational level in those jobs. Therefore, it is easy to 
understand the insignificant wage effects of overeducation for migrant workers.  
 
5.2 Policy implications 
It should be mentioned that although this thesis cannot be treated as evidence for 
policy making, it can offer some information to policy makers. Given the empirical 
findings in this thesis, enhancing skills to commensurate with the market needs, 
increasing the investment in rural education and further removing barriers from Hukou 
system should be importantly highlighted.  
 
Regarding the current situation in China, the growth rate of GDP has begun to 
decrease gradually since 2010 and the latest figure is 6.8% in the fourth quarter of 
2015 (Wall Street Journal, 19 January, 2016). At the same time, China is experiencing 
significant structural changes in the economy
147
. Service sectors (Tertiary industry) are 
                                                 
147
 Industry classifications in China can be seen in Chapter 4.  
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expanding, while shares of the first industry and second industry are declining. Based 
on statistic from the National Bureau of Statistics, the proportion of service sectors 
account for the total amount of GDP in China increased from 34.3% in 1990 to 48.2% 
in 2014. About 40% of the total employment comes from the service sector (Lam et al., 
2015). According to China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the main task for the 
government is to develop a services-dominated industrial structure
148
. The service 
sector will become the key engine of economic development in China and newly 
created jobs will mainly come from the service sector in the future. Most jobs in the 
service sector are skills-based, especially in those called “new” service sectors, such as 
communications, business and finance, and research (Wu, 2007). Therefore, given the 
above conditions, the match between job and worker is vital for economic 
development and to maintain the stability of the labour market in China. Empirical 
findings that unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role in determining the 
wage effects of overeducation in Chapter 2 and significant negative effects of skill 
mismatch on job satisfaction and facets of job satisfaction in Chapter 3 all indicate that 
the government should make more effort to ensure that skills offered in the labour 
market should be in line with the market needs. That is to say, the government should 
ensure that the job-worker match mechanism conduct in a way that can effectively use 
of employees’ skills to increase productivity. Reforming higher education to adapt to 
the labour market needs, enhancing the development of vocational education and 
training, work-related training and improving information dissemination and career 
guidance all can bring benefits to the society and help to improve the job-worker 
match efficiency in the labour market, in order to keep sustained economic growth in 
China.   
 
As China’s urbanization program expands and there is a decline in the number of 
urban working population due to the one child policy
149
, rural-to-urban migrant 
workers, especially the new generation of migrant workers, will become the main 
labour force in the Chinese labour market. This implies that the level of overall human 
capital in the country will be determined by the human capital of the rural labour force 
in the future. The exploration of rural-to-urban migrant workers is a key to understand 
                                                 
148
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/13thfiveyearplan/2016-02/26/content_23652904.htm  
149
 One-child policy in rural area is more loosened in rural China than in urban China (Peng, 1991). 
More special conditions allowing the second child are applied in rural areas than the urban areas. Meng 
(2012) argues that one-child policy has fewer effects on fertility rate in rural China than in urban China.  
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the Chinese labour market. Empirical findings in Chapter 4 indicate that enhancing 
rural education and providing more job-specific skill training and vocational education 
in the rural area, alongside further relaxation of the restrictions caused by the “Hukou” 
system are vital for the China’s economic growth.  
   
 5.3 Research limitations  
Despite the limitations stated in each chapter, there are still two further limitations that 
need to be addressed in this section. First, this thesis doesn’t provide empirical models 
to explore whether overeducation is a long run or temporary phenomenon in China. If 
overeducation is a short-run phenomenon, it may not be a threat to the economy and 
this temporary mismatch will be relieved in the end when overeducated individuals 
move to higher levels of jobs that are matched with their educational attainment. 
However, if overedcuation is a long run phenomenon, regarding its negative impacts 
on the labour market, it should be considered in depth in the future analysis. 
According to the low within-group standard deviation in the fixed effects model in 
Chapter 2, overeducation may be a long run phenomenon in China.  
 
Second, unfortunately, there is no analysis of overeducation by subjects of graduates 
in this thesis due to data limitations. As stated in the introduction part, about 31% 
university graduates and 38% vocational college graduates fail to find jobs that are 
matched with their majors in China. In addition, unemployment rates of graduates 
differ by majors. According to Molnar et al. (2015), graduates majoring in physics, 
biology and biotechnology find it easier to secure a position than those graduates 
whose majors are in the Arts and design and social science. The evidence above 
indicates that there may be different effects of overeducation across majors in China. 
Frenette (2004) argues that exploring overeducation by majors offers more practical 
implications to students and policy makers. If data about majors becomes available in 
the future, exploring overeducation across majors will provide useful guidance to help 
reform Chinese higher education system to the market needs.   
 
If comprehensive data on majors, skill category and school quality are available in the 
future, the exploration of overeducation will provide more practical implications to 
policy makers and society.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A 1 GDP growth rate and the number of college enrollment 
Source: Chinese statistical database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 2 CPI and average monthly wage in China 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
CPI (1989=100) 100 106.6 130.1 210.5 206.8 217.2 224.4 247.3 
Average monthly 
wage (Yuan) 
161.25 195.0 280.9 539.2 777.8 1326.7 1738.0 2687.0 
  Source: Chinese statistical database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year GDP growth rate 
(%) 
The number of college enrollment (million) 
Growth rate of college 
enrollment (%) 
1998 7.8 1.08 8.00 
1999 7.6 1.55 43.52 
2000 8.4 2.21 42.58 
2001 8.3 2.68 21.27 
2002 9.1 3.21 19.78 
2003 10 3.82 19.00 
2004 10.1 4.47 17.02 
2005 11.3 5.04 12.75 
2006 12.7 5.46 8.33 
2007 14.2 5.66 3.67 
2008 9.6 6.08 7.42 
2009 9.2 6.39 5.10 
2010 10.4 6.62 3.60 
2011 9.3 6.82 3.02 
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Table A 3 Occupations in CHNS 
 Occupations Number 
1 Senior professional/technical 1339 (7.54%) 
2 Junior professional/technical 1562 (8.79%) 
3 Administrator/ executive/ manager 1857 (10.45%) 
4 Office staff 1925 (10.84%) 
5 Farmer, fisherman, hunter 213 (1.20%) 
6 Skilled worker 3170 (17.84%) 
7 Non-skilled worker 4665 (26.26%) 
8 Army officer, police officer 65 (0.37%) 
9 Ordinary soldier, policeman 121 (0.68%) 
10 Driver 425 (2.39%) 
11 Service worker 1946 (10.95%) 
12 Athlete, actor, musician 80 (0.45%) 
13 Other  398 (2.24%) 
                     Total 17766 (100.00%) 
 
 
Table A 4 Aggregate occupation category 
Category Occupations Number 
Clerk Office staff, ordinary soldier and policeman 2046 
Junior Junior professional/technical worker, skilled worker 
and driver 
5157 
Senior Senior professional/ technical worker 1339 
Leader Administrator/executive/manager or an army officer, 
police officer 
1922 
Other Athlete, actor, musician or other 478 
Unskilled 
Service worker, farmer, fisherman, hunter or non-
skilled worker   
6824 
Total   17766 
 
 
Table A 5 The distribution of highest educational level by groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 
Master’s 
degree or 
higher 
University or 
college 
degree 
Technical 
or 
vocational  
Upper 
middle 
school  
Lower 
middle 
school  
Primary 
school or 
less 
Post-Mao 
education 
2 
(0.06%) 
469 
(13.93%) 
564 
(16.75%) 
650 
(19.30%) 
1398 
(41.51%) 
285 
(8.46%) 
Mao 
education 
24 
(0.17%) 
1251 
(8.69%) 
1542 
(10.71%) 
3440 
(23.89%) 
5147 
(35.75%) 
2994 
(20.79%) 
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Table A 6 Definitions of variables 
Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables 
Log of monthly wages Natural logarithm of average monthly wages last year (without any subsides and bonuses)    
Independent variables 
Years of schooling (CEDU) Actual completed years of schooling    
Years of required schooling (REDU) The mean value of years of schooling in a specific occupation and a given wave  
Years of overeducation (OEDU) Years of schooling above the required years of schooling within an occupation and a given wave   
Years of undereducation (UEDU) Years of schooling below the required years of schooling within an occupation and a given wave   
Overeducated (OVER) OVER=1 if overeducated and OVER=0 if otherwise 
Undereducated (UNDER) UNDER=1 if undereducated and UNDER=0 if otherwise 
Female (Female) Female=1 if females, and Female=0 if males    
Urban registration (UR) UR=1 if urban registration; UR=0 if rural registration  
Age  Age of individuals     
Experience (Exper) This variable is the maximum potential years of work experience=age-education-6 
Experience squared (Exper squared) Experience squared 
Ownership: reference group (Government sector) 
Government sector (Gov) Gov=1 if an individual works in a government, state service/institute or state-owned enterprise 
and Gov=0 if otherwise 
Private sector (Pri) Pri=1 if an individual works in a family contract farming, private, individual enterprise or three-
capital enterprise and Pri=0 if otherwise 
Collective sector (Collective) 
 
Collective=1 if an individual works in small and large collective enterprises and Collective=0 if 
otherwise 
Unknown ownership (Unknown1) Unknown1=1 if type of work unit is unknown and Unknown1=0 if otherwise  
Educational attainment: reference group (Primary school or less) 
Primary school or less (Edu1)  Edu1=1 if individual’s highest level of education is primary school degree or less and Edu1=0 if 
otherwise 
Lower middle school (Edu2) Edu2=1 if individual’s highest level of education is lower middle school degree and Edu2=0 if 
otherwise 
Upper middle school (Edu3)                   Edu3=1 if individual’s highest level of education is upper middle school degree and Edu3=0 if 
otherwise 
Technical or vocational degree (Edu4)                        Edu4=1 if individual’s highest level of education is technical or vocational degree and Edu4=0 
if otherwise 
University or college degree (Edu5) Edu5= 1 if individual’s highest level of education is university or college degree and Edu5=0 if 
otherwise 
Master’s degree or higher degree (Edu6) Edu6=1 if individual’s highest level of education is master’s degree or higher and Edu6=0 if 
otherwise 
Economic region: reference group (West)  
Northeast Northeast=1 if Province: Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Northeast=0 if otherwise 
Central Central=1 if Province: Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Central=0 if otherwise 
East East=1 if Province: Shandong, Jiangsu and East=0 if otherwise 
West West =1 if Province: Guangxi and Guizhou and West=0 if otherwise 
Firm size: reference group (Firm size 1)  
Firm size 1 (more than 100 employees) Firmsize1=1 if the number of employees in the work unit is more than 100 and Firmsize1=0 if 
otherwise 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 100 
employees) 
Firmsize2=1 if the number of employees in the work unit is between 20 and 100 and 
Firmsize2=0 if otherwise 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 employees) Firmsize3=1 if the number of employees in the work unit is less than 20 and Firmsize3=0 if 
otherwise 
Unknown firm size (Firmsize4) Firmsize4=1 if the number of employees in the work unit is unknown and Firmsize4=0 if 
otherwise 
Job type: reference group (Permanent)  
Permanent Permanent=1 if works for another person or enterprises as permanent employee, and 
Permanent=0 if otherwise 
Contractor Contractor=1 if contractor with other people or enterprise, and Contractor=0 if otherwise 
Temporary Temporary=1 if temporary workers, and Temporary=0 if otherwise 
Other  Other=1 if job type is paid family workers, unpaid family workers, other and unknown and 
Other=0 if otherwise 
Aggregate occupations: reference group (Unskilled)  
Clerk Clerk=1 if the individual works as an office staff or an ordinary soldier, policeman, and Clerk=0 
if otherwise 
Junior Junior=1 if the individual works as a junior professional/technical worker, skilled worker or 
driver, and Junior=0 if otherwise 
Senior Senior=1 if the individual works as a senior professional/technical worker and Senior=0 if 
otherwise 
Leader Leader=1 if the individual works as an administrator/executive/manager or an army officer, 
police officer and Leader=0 if otherwise 
Other Other=1 if the individual’s work is athlete, actor, musician and other and Other=0 if otherwise 
Unskilled  Unskilled=1 if the individual’s work is service workers, farmer, fisherman, hunter or non-skilled 
workers and Unskilled=0 if  otherwise 
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Table A7 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) ----- mean index VS mode index 
 
 The mean index The mode index 
Variables Pooled OLS (1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required education 0.2324*** 0.0280*** 0.0175* 0.0271*** 0.2620*** 0.0773*** 0.0555*** 0.0787*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0097) (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0183) (0.0071) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0298*** 0.0257*** 0.0183*** 0.0260*** 0.0968*** 0.0394*** 0.0452** 0.0457*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0083) (0.0073) (0.0179) (0.0072) 
Wage return to undereducation -0.0382*** -0.0209*** -0.0076 -0.0223*** -0.1319*** -0.0808*** -0.0268 -0.0741*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0188) (0.0079) 
Female -0.2128*** -0.1700***  -0.1876*** -0.1960*** -0.1727***  -0.1908*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0096)  (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0095)  (0.0105) 
Urban registration 0.0591*** 0.0599***  0.0510*** 0.0491*** 0.0574***  0.0477*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0095)  (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0095)  (0.0105) 
Experience 0.0230*** 0.0168*** 0.0151** 0.0185*** 0.0247*** 0.0169*** 0.0176** 0.0188*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0074) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0082) (0.0015) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Private sector 0.4126*** 0.0422** -0.0977*** -0.0032 0.4780*** 0.0567*** -0.0923*** 0.0114 
 (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0219) (0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0219) (0.0153) 
Collective sector 0.3156*** 0.1563*** -0.0192 0.1016*** 0.3357*** 0.1657*** -0.0193 0.1096*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0149) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0149) 
Unknown ownership 0.3425*** 0.0034 0.0245 -0.0065 0.4027*** 0.0120 0.0250 -0.0003 
 (0.0480) (0.0434) (0.0394) (0.0299) (0.0483) (0.0433) (0.0394) (0.0299) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 100 employees) 0.0204 0.0179 -0.0017 0.0108 0.0366** 0.0134 -0.0037 0.0063 
 (0.0148) (0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0125) (0.0152) (0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0124) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 employees) -0.2131*** -0.1592*** -0.1000*** -0.1430*** -0.1934*** -0.1591*** -0.1038*** -0.1449*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0178) (0.0209) (0.0150) (0.0193) (0.0177) (0.0209) (0.0150) 
Unknown firm size -0.7458*** 0.0068 0.0395 0.0105 -0.8447*** 0.0082 0.0403 0.0111 
 (0.0145) (0.0279) (0.0334) (0.0236) (0.0139) (0.0278) (0.0334) (0.0236) 
Contractor 0.1248*** 0.0267 -0.0163 0.0194 0.1399*** 0.0319* -0.0148 0.0235* 
 (0.0179) (0.0166) (0.0186) (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0141) 
Temporary 0.0244 -0.1259*** -0.0970*** -0.1150*** 0.0469** -0.1198*** -0.0941*** -0.1088*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0160) (0.0203) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0161) 
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Other job type -0.0598 -0.0808** -0.0168 -0.0587** -0.0402 -0.0770** -0.0159 -0.0570** 
 (0.0411) (0.0365) (0.0330) (0.0262) (0.0421) (0.0362) (0.0330) (0.0262) 
Clerk -0.2937*** 0.0721*** 0.0288 0.0537*** -0.0368** 0.0692*** 0.0253 0.0479*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0176) (0.0229) (0.0180) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0190) (0.0149) 
Junior -0.1395*** 0.0945*** 0.0268* 0.0665*** 0.0311** 0.0921*** 0.0271** 0.0641*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0129) (0.0102) 
Senior -0.5066*** 0.1864*** 0.0782** 0.1517*** -0.1228*** 0.1570*** 0.0668** 0.1245*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0278) (0.0356) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0220) (0.0292) (0.0222) 
Leader -0.2849*** 0.1092*** 0.0714*** 0.0782*** -0.0422** 0.1052*** 0.0662*** 0.0713*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0199) (0.0183) (0.0217) (0.0163) 
Other 0.0029 0.0782*** 0.0562* 0.0635*** 0.1133*** 0.0846*** 0.0622** 0.0701*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0242) (0.0331) (0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0241) 
Northeast 0.0496*** 0.0386***  0.0419** 0.0593*** 0.0378***  0.0398** 
 (0.0163) (0.0144)  (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0143)  (0.0166) 
Central 0.0229 0.0341***  0.0323** 0.0204 0.0337***  0.0321** 
 (0.0146) (0.0131)  (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0131)  (0.0146) 
East 0.1341*** 0.1360***  0.1143*** 0.1288*** 0.1394***  0.1174*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0135)  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0135)  (0.0146) 
Year 1991  0.1063*** 0.1524*** 0.1119***  0.1107*** 0.1509*** 0.1154*** 
  (0.0114) (0.0178) (0.0118)  (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0116) 
Year 1993  0.2461*** 0.3140*** 0.2500***  0.2446*** 0.3018*** 0.2472*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0293) (0.0128)  (0.0137) (0.0319) (0.0125) 
Year 1997  0.7291*** 0.8948*** 0.7376***  0.7290*** 0.8772*** 0.7368*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0647) (0.0257)  (0.0303) (0.0693) (0.0255) 
Year 2000  1.0704*** 1.2792*** 1.0798***  1.0725*** 1.2571*** 1.0813*** 
  (0.0311) (0.0828) (0.0265)  (0.0306) (0.0895) (0.0257) 
Year 2004  1.3285*** 1.6654*** 1.3564***  1.3215*** 1.6292*** 1.3477*** 
  (0.0332) (0.1074) (0.0292)  (0.0321) (0.1185) (0.0277) 
Year 2006  1.4958*** 1.8652*** 1.5219***  1.4821*** 1.8135*** 1.5053*** 
  (0.0343) (0.1197) (0.0301)  (0.0330) (0.1322) (0.0285) 
Year 2009  1.8133*** 2.2521*** 1.8443***  1.8024*** 2.1918*** 1.8291*** 
  (0.0347) (0.1389) (0.0303)  (0.0331) (0.1539) (0.0283) 
Constant 3.0029*** 3.8767*** 4.0800*** 3.9146*** 4.5009*** 3.9699*** 4.0788*** 3.9936*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0615) (0.1513) (0.0581) (0.0327) (0.0393) (0.1403) (0.0354) 
Observations 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 
r2 0.5588 0.6510 0.5964  0.5440 0.6525 0.5966  
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Table A8 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) by groups -----The mean index 
 
 Post-Mao education  Mao education  
Variables 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.2550*** 0.0509*** 0.0472 0.0455*** 0.2038*** 0.0211*** 0.0138 0.0214*** 
 
(0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0296) (0.0141) (0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0067) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0683*** 0.0328*** 0.0251 0.0364*** 0.0319*** 0.0287*** 0.0185** 0.0283*** 
 
(0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0182) (0.0071) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0072) (0.0038) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.0802*** -0.0413*** -0.0110 -0.0448*** -0.0396*** -0.0192*** -0.0074 -0.0203*** 
 
(0.0120) (0.0112) (0.0299) (0.0107) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0086) (0.0042) 
Female -0.2258*** -0.1576***  -0.1707*** -0.2094*** -0.1768***  -0.1970*** 
 
(0.0230) (0.0210)  (0.0210) (0.0118) (0.0108)  (0.0122) 
Urban registration 0.0531** 0.0462**  0.0292 0.0580*** 0.0608***  0.0563*** 
 
(0.0235) (0.0214)  (0.0220) (0.0115) (0.0105)  (0.0120) 
Experience 0.0647*** 0.0436*** -0.0068 0.0419*** 0.0390*** 0.0288*** 0.0234*** 0.0316*** 
 
(0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0230) (0.0067) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0080) (0.0021) 
Experience squared -0.0012*** -0.0016*** -0.0006 -0.0015*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Private sector 0.4309*** 0.1462*** 0.1050** 0.1196*** 0.3375*** -0.0066 -0.1402*** -0.0564*** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0307) (0.0489) (0.0275) (0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0246) (0.0185) 
Collective sector 0.3145*** 0.2031*** 0.0700 0.1644*** 0.2894*** 0.1314*** -0.0438* 0.0702*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0324) (0.0459) (0.0283) (0.0234) (0.0241) (0.0228) (0.0177) 
Unknown ownership 0.3591*** 0.1466** 0.1103 0.1248** 0.2729*** -0.0447 0.0061 -0.0485 
 
(0.0795) (0.0718) (0.0951) (0.0592) (0.0561) (0.0523) (0.0435) (0.0345) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
-0.0270 -0.0154 -0.0390 -0.0219 0.0450** 0.0306** 0.0053 0.0232 
 
(0.0266) (0.0243) (0.0393) (0.0240) (0.0175) (0.0150) (0.0178) (0.0145) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
-0.1610*** -0.1473*** -0.1922*** -0.1519*** -0.2061*** -0.1616*** -0.0832*** -0.1380*** 
 
(0.0321) (0.0298) (0.0488) (0.0275) (0.0234) (0.0221) (0.0232) (0.0179) 
Unknown firm size -0.3653*** 0.0399 -0.0268 0.0259 -0.7450*** -0.0480 0.0418 -0.0294 
 
(0.0346) (0.0404) (0.0645) (0.0375) (0.0162) (0.0384) (0.0393) (0.0305) 
Contractor 0.1574*** 0.0614** -0.0438 0.0416* 0.0699*** -0.0090 -0.0035 -0.0057 
 
(0.0266) (0.0244) (0.0361) (0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0177) 
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Temporary 0.0619** -0.0765*** -0.1061** -0.0788*** -0.0142 -0.1538*** -0.0943*** -0.1342*** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0278) (0.0453) (0.0272) (0.0247) (0.0233) (0.0263) (0.0200) 
Other job type 0.0291 -0.0508 0.1305 -0.0269 -0.0945** -0.0807** -0.0379 -0.0611** 
 
(0.0912) (0.0856) (0.0853) (0.0587) (0.0441) (0.0400) (0.0360) (0.0292) 
Clerk -0.2247*** 0.0968** -0.0084 0.0937** -0.2635*** 0.0674*** 0.0324 0.0457** 
 
(0.0492) (0.0480) (0.0751) (0.0451) (0.0199) (0.0187) (0.0241) (0.0196) 
Junior -0.0958*** 0.0958*** 0.0267 0.0898*** -0.1125*** 0.0960*** 0.0276* 0.0628*** 
 
(0.0325) (0.0315) (0.0436) (0.0285) (0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0133) 
Senior -0.1887*** 0.2799*** 0.0440 0.2384*** -0.4432*** 0.1839*** 0.0817** 0.1457*** 
 
(0.0713) (0.0679) (0.1235) (0.0723) (0.0346) (0.0305) (0.0375) (0.0303) 
Leader -0.2114*** 0.1247* 0.0893 0.1322** -0.2460*** 0.1072*** 0.0693*** 0.0698*** 
 
(0.0713) (0.0676) (0.0945) (0.0610) (0.0230) (0.0217) (0.0262) (0.0203) 
Other 0.0576 0.1365** 0.0169 0.1185** 0.0081 0.0758** 0.0624* 0.0607** 
 
(0.0664) (0.0575) (0.0847) (0.0523) (0.0364) (0.0330) (0.0337) (0.0273) 
Northeast 0.0041 -0.0189  -0.0163 0.0721*** 0.0593***  0.0710*** 
 
(0.0358) (0.0312)  (0.0340) (0.0178) (0.0161)  (0.0190) 
Central -0.0324 -0.0376  -0.0273 0.0405** 0.0534***  0.0558*** 
 
(0.0310) (0.0276)  (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0148)  (0.0171) 
East 0.1191*** 0.1135***  0.0994*** 0.1451*** 0.1485***  0.1276*** 
 
(0.0316) (0.0285)  (0.0287) (0.0164) (0.0153)  (0.0169) 
Year 1991  -0.0089 0.1377 0.0284  0.1109*** 0.1475*** 0.1127*** 
 
 (0.1034) (0.0937) (0.0703)  (0.0113) (0.0186) (0.0121) 
Year 1993  0.1791* 0.3374*** 0.2013***  0.2371*** 0.3008*** 0.2371*** 
 
 (0.1006) (0.1166) (0.0690)  (0.0141) (0.0311) (0.0134) 
Year 1997  0.7011*** 0.9536*** 0.7216***  0.6413*** 0.8600*** 0.6572*** 
 
 (0.1055) (0.1916) (0.0771)  (0.0404) (0.0713) (0.0322) 
Year 2000  1.0068*** 1.3603*** 1.0271***  0.9748*** 1.2377*** 0.9910*** 
 
 (0.1064) (0.2413) (0.0789)  (0.0411) (0.0904) (0.0333) 
Year 2004  1.1946*** 1.7088*** 1.2268***  1.2594*** 1.6299*** 1.2903*** 
 
 (0.1102) (0.3070) (0.0849)  (0.0435) (0.1167) (0.0362) 
Year 2006  1.3525*** 1.9401*** 1.3892***  1.4318*** 1.8206*** 1.4544*** 
 
 (0.1116) (0.3407) (0.0877)  (0.0445) (0.1297) (0.0370) 
Year 2009  1.6933*** 2.3243*** 1.7166***  1.7460*** 2.2199*** 1.7796*** 
 
 (0.1132) (0.3923) (0.0888)  (0.0450) (0.1503) (0.0376) 
Constant 2.5186*** 3.6669*** 3.6924*** 3.7442*** 3.0054*** 3.8433*** 4.0452*** 3.8311*** 
 
(0.1233) (0.1603) (0.2570) (0.1363) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.1869) (0.0688) 
Observations 3368 3368 3368 3368 14398 14398 14398 14398 
r2 0.5084 0.6019 0.5496  0.5695 0.6500 0.6032  
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Table A9 Wage effects of overeducation (ORU) by groups -----The mode index 
 
 Post-Mao education  Mao education 
Variables 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.3117*** 0.1030*** 0.0208 0.0977*** 0.2405*** 0.0694*** 0.0632*** 0.0739*** 
 
(0.0154) (0.0158) (0.0443) (0.0159) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0202) (0.0082) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.1709*** 0.0358** 0.0092 0.0431*** 0.0975*** 0.0487*** 0.0550*** 0.0549*** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0153) (0.0404) (0.0145) (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0200) (0.0084) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.2124*** -0.1108*** 0.0203 -0.1052*** -0.1304*** -0.0761*** -0.0371* -0.0704*** 
 
(0.0247) (0.0217) (0.0483) (0.0196) (0.0109) (0.0095) (0.0205) (0.0088) 
Female -0.2182*** -0.1674***  -0.1806*** -0.1943*** -0.1779***  -0.1979*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0206)  (0.0209) (0.0117) (0.0107)  (0.0121) 
Urban registration 0.0445* 0.0500**  0.0333 0.0489*** 0.0582***  0.0526*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0215)  (0.0221) (0.0115) (0.0105)  (0.0120) 
Experience 0.0664*** 0.0403*** -0.0262 0.0384*** 0.0416*** 0.0283*** 0.0296*** 0.0315*** 
 
(0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0215) (0.0066) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0091) (0.0021) 
Experience squared -0.0010*** -0.0015*** -0.0005 -0.0014*** -0.0006*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0005*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Private sector 0.4719*** 0.1547*** 0.1041** 0.1261*** 0.3909*** 0.0064 -0.1343*** -0.0425** 
 
(0.0300) (0.0305) (0.0490) (0.0276) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0247) (0.0187) 
Collective sector 0.3134*** 0.2068*** 0.0710 0.1679*** 0.3102*** 0.1407*** -0.0442* 0.0776*** 
 
(0.0336) (0.0323) (0.0460) (0.0282) (0.0233) (0.0240) (0.0228) (0.0177) 
Unknown ownership 0.3928*** 0.1476** 0.0987 0.1234** 0.3218*** -0.0358 0.0077 -0.0421 
 
(0.0793) (0.0719) (0.0951) (0.0593) (0.0559) (0.0521) (0.0435) (0.0345) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
-0.0114 -0.0195 -0.0380 -0.0249 0.0575*** 0.0268* 0.0024 0.0186 
 
(0.0274) (0.0243) (0.0394) (0.0239) (0.0179) (0.0150) (0.0178) (0.0145) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
-0.1393*** -0.1509*** -0.1906*** -0.1563*** -0.1887*** -0.1597*** -0.0884*** -0.1393*** 
 
(0.0323) (0.0296) (0.0488) (0.0274) (0.0236) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0179) 
Unknown firm size -0.4150*** 0.0351 -0.0225 0.0210 -0.8254*** -0.0432 0.0423 -0.0263 
 
(0.0354) (0.0402) (0.0649) (0.0375) (0.0157) (0.0382) (0.0392) (0.0305) 
Contractor 0.1640*** 0.0615** -0.0416 0.0410* 0.0825*** -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0005 
 
(0.0270) (0.0244) (0.0363) (0.0238) (0.0234) (0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0177) 
Temporary 0.0740** -0.0757*** -0.1079** -0.0789*** 0.0061 -0.1483*** -0.0904*** -0.1280*** 
 
(0.0305) (0.0279) (0.0454) (0.0272) (0.0252) (0.0233) (0.0264) (0.0201) 
Other job type 0.0602 -0.0391 0.1285 -0.0155 -0.0798* -0.0784** -0.0373 -0.0607** 
 
(0.0921) (0.0853) (0.0856) (0.0588) (0.0449) (0.0396) (0.0360) (0.0292) 
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Clerk 0.0514 0.1052*** 0.0300 0.0951** -0.0454*** 0.0585*** 0.0254 0.0354** 
 
(0.0438) (0.0388) (0.0586) (0.0370) (0.0169) (0.0154) (0.0203) (0.0163) 
Junior 0.0889*** 0.1046*** 0.0518 0.0936*** 0.0299** 0.0891*** 0.0252* 0.0568*** 
 
(0.0274) (0.0245) (0.0345) (0.0232) (0.0135) (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0114) 
Senior 0.2293*** 0.2898*** 0.0968 0.2416*** -0.1235*** 0.1457*** 0.0634** 0.1097*** 
 
(0.0656) (0.0570) (0.1063) (0.0611) (0.0293) (0.0242) (0.0306) (0.0240) 
Leader 0.0503 0.1254** 0.1217 0.1216** -0.0403* 0.0964*** 0.0613*** 0.0576*** 
 
(0.0675) (0.0618) (0.0824) (0.0557) (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0227) (0.0172) 
Other 0.1570** 0.1479*** 0.0314 0.1250** 0.1049*** 0.0779** 0.0676** 0.0644** 
 
(0.0685) (0.0567) (0.0838) (0.0517) (0.0364) (0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0271) 
Northeast 0.0076 -0.0176  -0.0140 0.0818*** 0.0584***  0.0679*** 
 
(0.0366) (0.0312)  (0.0340) (0.0178) (0.0160)  (0.0189) 
Central -0.0337 -0.0349  -0.0231 0.0384** 0.0530***  0.0557*** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0274)  (0.0282) (0.0162) (0.0147)  (0.0170) 
East 0.1160*** 0.1172***  0.1056*** 0.1430*** 0.1533***  0.1321*** 
 
(0.0319) (0.0283)  (0.0285) (0.0164) (0.0152)  (0.0169) 
Year 1991  0.0102 0.1842** 0.0441  0.1124*** 0.1374*** 0.1137*** 
 
 (0.1033) (0.0916) (0.0702)  (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0118) 
Year 1993  0.2026** 0.4201*** 0.2220***  0.2344*** 0.2725*** 0.2327*** 
 
 (0.1005) (0.1120) (0.0687)  (0.0139) (0.0347) (0.0131) 
Year 1997  0.7290*** 1.1228*** 0.7480***  0.6425*** 0.8109*** 0.6569*** 
 
 (0.1054) (0.1809) (0.0764)  (0.0400) (0.0775) (0.0320) 
Year 2000  1.0463*** 1.5959*** 1.0637***  0.9757*** 1.1716*** 0.9907*** 
 
 (0.1060) (0.2272) (0.0774)  (0.0406) (0.0995) (0.0325) 
Year 2004  1.2381*** 2.0226*** 1.2645***  1.2473*** 1.5337*** 1.2768*** 
 
 (0.1089) (0.2922) (0.0822)  (0.0426) (0.1312) (0.0348) 
Year 2006  1.3881*** 2.2862*** 1.4220***  1.4154*** 1.7009*** 1.4342*** 
 
 (0.1100) (0.3229) (0.0841)  (0.0433) (0.1464) (0.0355) 
Year 2009  1.7351*** 2.7281*** 1.7555***  1.7306*** 2.0789*** 1.7587*** 
 
 (0.1110) (0.3730) (0.0845)  (0.0437) (0.1702) (0.0358) 
Constant 4.1105*** 3.9061*** 3.9969*** 3.9465*** 4.2742*** 3.8946*** 3.9244*** 3.8718*** 
 
(0.0659) (0.1100) (0.1348) (0.0841) (0.0419) (0.0519) (0.1862) (0.0458) 
Observations 3368 3368 3368 3368 14398 14398 14398 14398 
r2 0.4897 0.6026 0.5489  0.5596 0.6512 0.6035  
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Table A10 Wage returns to overeducation (ORU) by wave----the mean index 
Variables 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Wage return to required 
education 
-0.0211 0.0022 -0.0914*** 0.0034 0.1140*** 0.0723*** 0.0591*** 0.0776*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0116) (0.0189) (0.0230) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0164) (0.0154) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0061 0.0133** 0.0198** 0.0235*** 0.0200** 0.0508*** 0.0741*** 0.0475*** 
 
(0.0079) (0.0055) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0101) (0.0102) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.0188* -0.0113* -0.0171* -0.0057 -0.0223** -0.0433*** -0.0439*** -0.0365*** 
 
(0.0100) (0.0067) (0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0093) (0.0099) (0.0099) 
Female -0.1291*** -0.1525*** -0.1304*** -0.1822*** -0.1799*** -0.1597*** -0.2009*** -0.2584*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0148) (0.0211) (0.0226) (0.0256) (0.0244) (0.0257) (0.0258) 
Urban registration 0.0082 0.0551*** 0.1245*** 0.0701*** 0.0197 0.1086*** 0.0786*** 0.0944*** 
 
(0.0213) (0.0147) (0.0208) (0.0224) (0.0260) (0.0236) (0.0249) (0.0248) 
Experience 0.0237*** 0.0227*** 0.0240*** 0.0199*** 0.0149*** 0.0127*** 0.0139*** 0.0162*** 
 
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0044) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Private sector 0.0201 0.1426*** -0.0855 0.2717*** 0.0649 0.0693** 0.0760** 0.0737** 
 
(0.0721) (0.0545) (0.0921) (0.0602) (0.0567) (0.0329) (0.0351) (0.0332) 
Collective sector 0.2957*** 0.4659*** 0.5869*** 0.3982*** 0.2247*** -0.1673*** -0.1795*** -0.0822* 
 
(0.0710) (0.0435) (0.0485) (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0385) (0.0426) (0.0458) 
Unknown ownership 0.0747 -0.1136 0.2997** 0.2939*** 0.2558*** -0.1037 0.0344 -0.0711 
 
(0.1090) (0.1076) (0.1399) (0.1064) (0.0987) (0.0694) (0.0675) (0.0716) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
   -0.0057 -0.0912*** 0.0435 -0.0057 0.0488* 
 
   (0.0263) (0.0297) (0.0273) (0.0292) (0.0291) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
   -0.1008*** -0.1305*** -0.1448*** -0.1480*** -0.1794*** 
 
   (0.0335) (0.0371) (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0342) 
Unknown firm size    0.0256 -0.0178 -0.0756 0.0096 -0.0498 
 
   (0.0499) (0.0523) (0.0638) (0.0678) (0.0531) 
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Contractor -0.0431 -0.5642** 0.0907 0.1056*** 0.0841** 0.0296 -0.0414 -0.1105*** 
 
(0.0843) (0.2711) (0.1484) (0.0340) (0.0386) (0.0342) (0.0351) (0.0323) 
Temporary -0.5505 -0.0520  -0.0245 0.0192 -0.1612*** -0.1791*** -0.1793*** 
 
(0.5453) (0.0537)  (0.0426) (0.0439) (0.0374) (0.0385) (0.0374) 
Other job type -0.0643 -0.1669* 0.0161 -0.3474*** -0.0608 -0.1693* -0.1684** -0.0384 
 
(0.0643) (0.0972) (0.1047) (0.0873) (0.0691) (0.0870) (0.0822) (0.0763) 
Clerk 0.0617 0.0753** 0.1833*** 0.1415** -0.0942 0.1003 0.0446 0.0612 
 
(0.0426) (0.0313) (0.0471) (0.0610) (0.0662) (0.0656) (0.0633) (0.0592) 
Junior 0.0919*** 0.0567*** 0.1743*** 0.1605*** 0.0170 0.1251*** 0.1403*** 0.0983** 
 
(0.0301) (0.0208) (0.0330) (0.0398) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0440) (0.0394) 
Senior 0.2859*** 0.1154* 0.4346*** 0.2082** -0.0291 0.2269*** 0.2792*** 0.2035*** 
 
(0.0907) (0.0642) (0.0971) (0.0966) (0.0891) (0.0804) (0.0748) (0.0748) 
Leader 0.1463*** 0.1218*** 0.2949*** 0.0819 -0.0547 0.0944 0.1438** 0.0875 
 
(0.0452) (0.0313) (0.0518) (0.0567) (0.0701) (0.0673) (0.0650) (0.0640) 
Other 0.1438** 0.0015 0.0750 0.1701** 0.0805 0.0636 0.0273 0.0304 
 
(0.0731) (0.0582) (0.0774) (0.0679) (0.0804) (0.0653) (0.0718) (0.0644) 
Northeast 0.0629* 0.0955*** -0.0028 -0.0932** -0.0682* 0.1023*** 0.1201*** 0.1237*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0249) (0.0346) (0.0416) (0.0396) (0.0355) (0.0376) (0.0375) 
Central 0.0684** 0.0876*** -0.0248 0.1100*** 0.0046 -0.0221 0.0400 0.1102*** 
 
(0.0303) (0.0208) (0.0283) (0.0305) (0.0362) (0.0347) (0.0366) (0.0358) 
East 0.0939*** 0.0941*** 0.1817*** 0.2164*** 0.2102*** 0.2212*** 0.2238*** 0.1803*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0208) (0.0287) (0.0302) (0.0355) (0.0344) (0.0367) (0.0354) 
Constant 4.2183*** 4.0974*** 5.0313*** 4.6889*** 4.2118*** 4.7564*** 5.0600*** 5.2184*** 
 
(0.1454) (0.1027) (0.1664) (0.2076) (0.1996) (0.2084) (0.1775) (0.1730) 
Observations 2797 2769 2363 2194 2014 1757 1843 2029 
r2 0.0887 0.2214 0.1730 0.1502 0.1110 0.2684 0.2621 0.2666 
Note: 1. There is no information regarding firm size from 1989 to 1993 in the raw data; 2. Only 18 observations in the raw data in 1993 have reported their job as temporary. They are dropped when 
merging data set. 
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Table A11 Wage returns to overeducation (ORU) by wave----the mode index 
Variables 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Wage return to required 
education 
-0.0284 -0.0048 -0.0794*** 0.0278 0.1604*** 0.1381*** 0.1263*** 0.1483*** 
 
(0.0362) (0.0257) (0.0219) (0.0225) (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0286 0.0268** 0.0343* 0.0442** 0.0550*** 0.0871*** 0.1018*** 0.0416** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0121) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0175) (0.0207) (0.0196) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.0354 -0.0386** -0.0319* -0.0543** -0.0710*** -0.1004*** -0.1210*** -0.1448*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0259) (0.0244) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Female -0.1289*** -0.1517*** -0.1348*** -0.1815*** -0.1818*** -0.1657*** -0.2088*** -0.2645*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0148) (0.0211) (0.0225) (0.0254) (0.0241) (0.0256) (0.0254) 
Urban registration 0.0060 0.0535*** 0.1264*** 0.0685*** 0.0158 0.1024*** 0.0811*** 0.0869*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0147) (0.0208) (0.0223) (0.0260) (0.0240) (0.0250) (0.0247) 
Experience 0.0239*** 0.0227*** 0.0237*** 0.0194*** 0.0157*** 0.0138*** 0.0140*** 0.0155*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Private sector 0.0124 0.1466*** -0.0854 0.2743*** 0.0748 0.0797** 0.0844** 0.0912*** 
 
(0.0727) (0.0546) (0.0924) (0.0601) (0.0566) (0.0332) (0.0352) (0.0330) 
Collective sector 0.2927*** 0.4663*** 0.5866*** 0.3991*** 0.2313*** -0.1596*** -0.1651*** -0.0650 
 
(0.0716) (0.0436) (0.0486) (0.0400) (0.0402) (0.0387) (0.0429) (0.0454) 
Unknown ownership 0.0733 -0.1154 0.2993** 0.2836*** 0.2759*** -0.0999 0.0481 -0.0639 
 
(0.1092) (0.1076) (0.1401) (0.1062) (0.0986) (0.0695) (0.0678) (0.0709) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
   -0.0036 -0.0904*** 0.0373 -0.0111 0.0452 
 
   (0.0263) (0.0295) (0.0272) (0.0291) (0.0288) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
   -0.0977*** -0.1213*** -0.1514*** -0.1473*** -0.1742*** 
 
   (0.0335) (0.0369) (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0338) 
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Unknown firm size    0.0311 -0.0125 -0.0730 0.0208 -0.0469 
 
   (0.0499) (0.0521) (0.0638) (0.0680) (0.0526) 
Contractor -0.0565 -0.5682** 0.0914 0.1098*** 0.0885** 0.0346 -0.0312 -0.1033*** 
 
(0.0863) (0.2710) (0.1487) (0.0340) (0.0384) (0.0342) (0.0354) (0.0321) 
Temporary -0.5560 -0.0490  -0.0181 0.0212 -0.1613*** -0.1717*** -0.1803*** 
 
(0.5452) (0.0537)  (0.0425) (0.0437) (0.0375) (0.0387) (0.0371) 
Other job type -0.0688 -0.1667* 0.0167 -0.3397*** -0.0506 -0.1798** -0.1531* -0.0328 
 
(0.0643) (0.0970) (0.1048) (0.0872) (0.0690) (0.0870) (0.0825) (0.0756) 
Clerk 0.0203 0.0597** 0.1211*** 0.1228*** 0.0364 0.1397*** 0.0683 0.0679 
 
(0.0370) (0.0262) (0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0467) (0.0455) (0.0610) (0.0609) 
Junior 0.0781*** 0.0581*** 0.1111*** 0.1516*** 0.0982*** 0.1445*** 0.1347*** 0.1031*** 
 
(0.0276) (0.0183) (0.0272) (0.0306) (0.0351) (0.0345) (0.0366) (0.0352) 
Senior 0.3113*** 0.1694** 0.2880*** 0.1861*** 0.0789 0.2257*** 0.2868*** 0.2084*** 
 
(0.1186) (0.0837) (0.0776) (0.0644) (0.0690) (0.0598) (0.0562) (0.0649) 
Leader 0.1073*** 0.1057*** 0.2030*** 0.0721* 0.0881* 0.1437*** 0.1619** 0.0616 
 
(0.0410) (0.0264) (0.0423) (0.0434) (0.0501) (0.0478) (0.0665) (0.0659) 
Other 0.1127 -0.0196 -0.0118 0.1584** 0.1117 0.0379 0.0452 0.0819 
 
(0.0756) (0.0602) (0.0787) (0.0672) (0.0796) (0.0666) (0.0698) (0.0632) 
Northeast 0.0613* 0.0954*** 0.0007 -0.1005** -0.0724* 0.1060*** 0.1299*** 0.1263*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0249) (0.0346) (0.0416) (0.0395) (0.0355) (0.0376) (0.0371) 
Central 0.0657** 0.0856*** -0.0275 0.1066*** 0.0013 -0.0180 0.0423 0.1220*** 
 
(0.0304) (0.0208) (0.0283) (0.0305) (0.0361) (0.0348) (0.0367) (0.0355) 
East 0.0953*** 0.0936*** 0.1826*** 0.2210*** 0.2115*** 0.2290*** 0.2316*** 0.1882*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0208) (0.0288) (0.0302) (0.0354) (0.0344) (0.0368) (0.0350) 
Constant 4.0984*** 4.1309*** 4.4190*** 4.6714*** 4.8807*** 5.1190*** 5.3313*** 5.6492*** 
 
(0.0852) (0.0597) (0.0611) (0.0709) (0.0822) (0.0864) (0.0889) (0.0880) 
Observations 2797 2769 2363 2194 2014 1757 1843 2029 
r2 0.0889 0.2221 0.1703 0.1521 0.1156 0.2674 0.2587 0.2796 
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Table A12 Wage returns to years of schooling by wave using monthly wage 
Variables 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Wage return to years of 
schooling 
0.0097* 0.0119*** 0.0074 0.0169*** 0.0342*** 0.0455*** 0.0570*** 0.0482*** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Female -0.1318*** -0.1528*** -0.1482*** -0.1833*** -0.1564*** -0.1500*** -0.1965*** -0.2401*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0148) (0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0251) (0.0236) (0.0250) (0.0249) 
Urban registration 0.0087 0.0544*** 0.1321*** 0.0707*** 0.0080 0.0969*** 0.0729*** 0.0794*** 
 
(0.0213) (0.0147) (0.0209) (0.0223) (0.0260) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0248) 
Experience 0.0242*** 0.0230*** 0.0238*** 0.0195*** 0.0146*** 0.0126*** 0.0128*** 0.0152*** 
 
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002* -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Private sector 0.0275 0.1469*** -0.1099 0.2739*** 0.0577 0.0634* 0.0806** 0.0720** 
 
(0.0721) (0.0546) (0.0925) (0.0601) (0.0567) (0.0325) (0.0341) (0.0325) 
Collective sector 0.3089*** 0.4694*** 0.6013*** 0.4024*** 0.2159*** -0.1726*** -0.1744*** -0.0878* 
 
(0.0708) (0.0435) (0.0487) (0.0398) (0.0401) (0.0384) (0.0421) (0.0455) 
Unknown ownership 0.0850 -0.1135 0.3099** 0.2885*** 0.2532** -0.1019 0.0284 -0.0726 
 
(0.1088) (0.1075) (0.1408) (0.1063) (0.0988) (0.0695) (0.0670) (0.0713) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
   -0.0071 -0.0727** 0.0472* -0.0059 0.0542* 
 
   (0.0260) (0.0294) (0.0270) (0.0288) (0.0289) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
   -0.1028*** -0.1119*** -0.1474*** -0.1448*** -0.1673*** 
 
   (0.0333) (0.0370) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0340) 
Unknown firm size    0.0274 -0.0022 -0.0661 0.0127 -0.0443 
 
   (0.0498) (0.0522) (0.0638) (0.0676) (0.0529) 
Contractor -0.0211 -0.5591** 0.0877 0.1082*** 0.0854** 0.0247 -0.0387 -0.1163*** 
 
(0.0837) (0.2710) (0.1494) (0.0339) (0.0386) (0.0341) (0.0350) (0.0322) 
Temporary -0.5650 -0.0505  -0.0187 0.0192 -0.1654*** -0.1702*** -0.1819*** 
 
(0.5452) (0.0537)  (0.0426) (0.0439) (0.0374) (0.0384) (0.0372) 
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Other job type -0.0633 -0.1657* 0.0195 -0.3435*** -0.0637 -0.1720** -0.1636** -0.0411 
 
(0.0642) (0.0969) (0.1052) (0.0872) (0.0691) (0.0868) (0.0818) (0.0760) 
Clerk 0.0222 0.0595** 0.0186 0.1142*** 0.1079** 0.1765*** 0.0908** 0.1746*** 
 
(0.0370) (0.0262) (0.0363) (0.0381) (0.0434) (0.0419) (0.0435) (0.0436) 
Junior 0.0629** 0.0505*** 0.0590** 0.1437*** 0.1544*** 0.1753*** 0.1425*** 0.1451*** 
 
(0.0255) (0.0174) (0.0252) (0.0279) (0.0325) (0.0318) (0.0335) (0.0327) 
Senior 0.1487*** 0.0721* -0.0130 0.1705*** 0.2645*** 0.3218*** 0.3049*** 0.3396*** 
 
(0.0535) (0.0381) (0.0503) (0.0512) (0.0551) (0.0467) (0.0508) (0.0508) 
Leader 0.1075*** 0.1051*** 0.1060*** 0.0579 0.1589*** 0.1704*** 0.1812*** 0.1671*** 
 
(0.0410) (0.0263) (0.0380) (0.0389) (0.0466) (0.0444) (0.0493) (0.0494) 
Other 0.1464** 0.0043 0.0610 0.1601** 0.1152 0.0840 0.0410 0.0625 
 
(0.0728) (0.0579) (0.0775) (0.0673) (0.0798) (0.0623) (0.0683) (0.0635) 
Northeast 0.0596* 0.0940*** 0.0013 -0.0962** -0.0703* 0.1039*** 0.1180*** 0.1256*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0249) (0.0349) (0.0416) (0.0396) (0.0355) (0.0375) (0.0373) 
Central 0.0681** 0.0871*** -0.0230 0.1093*** 0.0000 -0.0192 0.0350 0.1129*** 
 
(0.0303) (0.0208) (0.0284) (0.0305) (0.0362) (0.0346) (0.0365) (0.0357) 
East 0.0969*** 0.0943*** 0.1898*** 0.2179*** 0.1996*** 0.2213*** 0.2203*** 0.1763*** 
 
(0.0306) (0.0207) (0.0288) (0.0302) (0.0354) (0.0344) (0.0365) (0.0352) 
Constant 3.9539*** 4.0112*** 4.1996*** 4.5787*** 4.8914*** 4.9993*** 5.0805*** 5.4907*** 
 
(0.0682) (0.0469) (0.0648) (0.0760) (0.0892) (0.0908) (0.0971) (0.0995) 
Observations 2797 2769 2363 2194 2014 1757 1843 2029 
r2 0.0877 0.2218 0.1615 0.1504 0.1083 0.2666 0.2642 0.2698 
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Table A13 Wage returns to years of schooling by wave using hourly wage 
Variables 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Wage return to years of 
schooling 
0.0147*** 0.0147*** 0.0126** 0.0243*** 0.0410*** 0.0542*** 0.0612*** 0.0583*** 
 
(0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064) 
Female -0.1233*** -0.1365*** -0.1314*** -0.1628*** -0.1136*** -0.1182*** -0.1679*** -0.2263*** 
 
(0.0221) (0.0155) (0.0214) (0.0239) (0.0277) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0273) 
Urban registration 0.0393* 0.0610*** 0.1546*** 0.1180*** 0.0407 0.0789*** 0.1146*** 0.0849*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0154) (0.0213) (0.0239) (0.0287) (0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0273) 
Experience 0.0257*** 0.0234*** 0.0253*** 0.0222*** 0.0179*** 0.0196*** 0.0169*** 0.0187*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Private sector 0.0286 0.1696*** -0.0486 0.2894*** 0.0031 -0.0617* -0.0712* -0.0852** 
 
(0.0742) (0.0576) (0.0934) (0.0651) (0.0628) (0.0370) (0.0366) (0.0357) 
Collective sector 0.3691*** 0.3938*** 0.5173*** 0.2386*** 0.0934** -0.2358*** -0.1909*** -0.2445*** 
 
(0.0740) (0.0457) (0.0508) (0.0430) (0.0444) (0.0436) (0.0451) (0.0500) 
Unknown ownership 0.0594 -0.1341 0.1676 0.2152* 0.1405 -0.1528* -0.0310 -0.1509* 
 
(0.1179) (0.1174) (0.1635) (0.1214) (0.1111) (0.0796) (0.0723) (0.0787) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
   -0.0036 -0.0919*** 0.0373 0.0030 0.0613* 
 
   (0.0279) (0.0324) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0318) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
   -0.0711** -0.1152*** -0.1453*** -0.1378*** -0.1377*** 
 
   (0.0358) (0.0408) (0.0377) (0.0353) (0.0373) 
Unknown firm size    0.0319 -0.0054 -0.0669 -0.0420 -0.0746 
 
   (0.0542) (0.0580) (0.0741) (0.0740) (0.0586) 
Contractor 0.4096*** -0.6485** -0.0293 0.0665* 0.0456 0.0481 -0.0524 -0.0946*** 
 
(0.0866) (0.2834) (0.1509) (0.0365) (0.0427) (0.0387) (0.0375) (0.0355) 
Temporary -0.6059 0.0498  -0.0688 -0.0004 -0.2178*** -0.1968*** -0.2154*** 
 
(0.5607) (0.0562)  (0.0463) (0.0486) (0.0425) (0.0412) (0.0410) 
Other job type -0.1175* -0.1960* -0.0293 -0.2587*** -0.0428 -0.1704* -0.1765** -0.0910 
 
(0.0666) (0.1017) (0.1085) (0.0942) (0.0772) (0.0998) (0.0886) (0.0840) 
Clerk 0.0421 0.0571** 0.0081 0.1532*** 0.1636*** 0.2757*** 0.1666*** 0.2299*** 
 
(0.0382) (0.0274) (0.0369) (0.0408) (0.0478) (0.0476) (0.0465) (0.0480) 
Junior 0.0816*** 0.0610*** 0.0664*** 0.1588*** 0.1929*** 0.2035*** 0.1371*** 0.1926*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0183) (0.0257) (0.0299) (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0359) 
Senior 0.1489*** 0.0709* -0.0214 0.1991*** 0.3083*** 0.3739*** 0.3725*** 0.3978*** 
 
(0.0552) (0.0399) (0.0509) (0.0550) (0.0605) (0.0530) (0.0546) (0.0559) 
Leader 0.1263*** 0.0944*** 0.1153*** 0.0743* 0.2022*** 0.2777*** 0.2669*** 0.2022*** 
 
(0.0425) (0.0275) (0.0385) (0.0418) (0.0514) (0.0506) (0.0528) (0.0544) 
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Other 0.2002*** 0.0174 0.1227 0.1959*** 0.0595 0.2538*** 0.2138*** 0.1529** 
 
(0.0755) (0.0606) (0.0792) (0.0738) (0.0905) (0.0714) (0.0733) (0.0696) 
Northeast 0.0582 0.0860*** -0.0492 -0.1509*** -0.0900** 0.0362 0.0590 0.0197 
 
(0.0368) (0.0260) (0.0355) (0.0445) (0.0440) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0409) 
Central 0.0890*** 0.0939*** -0.0126 0.0849*** 0.0349 -0.0437 0.0134 0.0880** 
 
(0.0314) (0.0218) (0.0291) (0.0328) (0.0402) (0.0395) (0.0393) (0.0392) 
East 0.0822*** 0.0665*** 0.1585*** 0.1118*** 0.1433*** 0.1647*** 0.1510*** 0.1162*** 
 
(0.0317) (0.0217) (0.0295) (0.0325) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0387) 
Constant -1.4063*** -1.2881*** -1.1328*** -0.6469*** -0.3789*** -0.3228*** -0.1459 0.2093* 
 
(0.0705) (0.0491) (0.0667) (0.0818) (0.0986) (0.1035) (0.1040) (0.1097) 
Observations 2770 2750 2304 2146 1955 1737 1827 2012 
r2 0.1251 0.2054 0.1504 0.1309 0.1152 0.2940 0.3175 0.3172 
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Table A14 Wage returns to overeducation (ORU) using hourly wage 
 
 The mean index The mode index 
Variables 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to required 
education 
0.2525*** 0.0539*** 0.0248** 0.0505*** 0.2908*** 0.1099*** 0.0628*** 0.1104*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0106) (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0199) (0.0076) 
Wage return to overeducation 0.0341*** 0.0300*** 0.0222*** 0.0324*** 0.1083*** 0.0510*** 0.0441** 0.0607*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0073) (0.0036) (0.0085) (0.0076) (0.0195) (0.0077) 
Wage return to 
undereducation 
-0.0433*** -0.0265*** -0.0130 -0.0293*** -0.1402*** -0.0901*** -0.0287 -0.0875*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0089) (0.0042) (0.0102) (0.0089) (0.0204) (0.0085) 
Female -0.1941*** -0.1519***  -0.1674*** -0.1775*** -0.1543***  -0.1705*** 
 
(0.0110) (0.0100)  (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0099)  (0.0112) 
Urban registration 0.0775*** 0.0788***  0.0685*** 0.0672*** 0.0759***  0.0650*** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0099)  (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0099)  (0.0113) 
Experience 0.0261*** 0.0199*** 0.0192** 0.0217*** 0.0281*** 0.0201*** 0.0187** 0.0221*** 
 
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0080) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0089) (0.0016) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Private sector 0.2938*** -0.0668*** -0.1618*** -0.0933*** 0.3656*** -0.0489** -0.1550*** -0.0760*** 
 
(0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0239) (0.0164) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0165) 
Collective sector 0.2503*** 0.0886*** -0.0471** 0.0571*** 0.2732*** 0.0982*** -0.0469** 0.0653*** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0162) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0162) 
Unknown ownership 0.2990*** -0.0443 -0.0186 -0.0466 0.3634*** -0.0347 -0.0184 -0.0394 
 
(0.0505) (0.0460) (0.0443) (0.0331) (0.0510) (0.0459) (0.0442) (0.0330) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
0.0124 0.0118 -0.0145 0.0013 0.0282* 0.0071 -0.0170 -0.0034 
 
(0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0177) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0139) (0.0177) (0.0134) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
-0.2195*** -0.1611*** -0.1068*** -0.1492*** -0.2007*** -0.1610*** -0.1114*** -0.1513*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0193) (0.0229) (0.0163) (0.0205) (0.0191) (0.0230) (0.0162) 
Unknown firm size -0.8535*** -0.0242 0.0408 -0.0139 -0.9594*** -0.0227 0.0422 -0.0130 
 
(0.0156) (0.0317) (0.0368) (0.0259) (0.0149) (0.0315) (0.0367) (0.0258) 
Contractor 0.1360*** 0.0370* -0.0458** 0.0207 0.1522*** 0.0429** -0.0436** 0.0257* 
 
(0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0153) (0.0205) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0153) 
Temporary -0.0213 -0.1766*** -0.1464*** -0.1680*** 0.0043 -0.1688*** -0.1428*** -0.1603*** 
 
(0.0213) (0.0197) (0.0250) (0.0174) (0.0219) (0.0197) (0.0251) (0.0174) 
Other job type -0.0487 -0.0804** -0.0425 -0.0719** -0.0287 -0.0749* -0.0421 -0.0686** 
 
(0.0432) (0.0388) (0.0364) (0.0286) (0.0442) (0.0386) (0.0364) (0.0285) 
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Clerk -0.2872*** 0.0669*** 0.0183 0.0485** -0.0160 0.0860*** 0.0165 0.0607*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0188) (0.0249) (0.0194) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0207) (0.0160) 
Junior -0.1440*** 0.0829*** 0.0152 0.0550*** 0.0373*** 0.0961*** 0.0172 0.0652*** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0164) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0115) (0.0141) (0.0110) 
Senior -0.5347*** 0.1380*** 0.0618 0.1154*** -0.1325*** 0.1400*** 0.0509 0.1141*** 
 
(0.0333) (0.0299) (0.0388) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0238) (0.0317) (0.0238) 
Leader -0.2761*** 0.1051*** 0.0585** 0.0769*** -0.0200 0.1222*** 0.0545** 0.0872*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0207) (0.0273) (0.0206) (0.0196) (0.0180) (0.0236) (0.0176) 
Other 0.0800** 0.1477*** 0.0809** 0.1159*** 0.2004*** 0.1666*** 0.0906*** 0.1327*** 
 
(0.0336) (0.0303) (0.0343) (0.0263) (0.0342) (0.0304) (0.0343) (0.0261) 
Northeast 0.0092 0.0005  0.0019 0.0197 0.0002  0.0005 
 
(0.0168) (0.0149)  (0.0178) (0.0169) (0.0148)  (0.0177) 
Central 0.0319** 0.0447***  0.0466*** 0.0288* 0.0442***  0.0466*** 
 
(0.0151) (0.0138)  (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0137)  (0.0157) 
East 0.0885*** 0.0923***  0.0745*** 0.0832*** 0.0954***  0.0777*** 
 
(0.0148) (0.0137)  (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0137)  (0.0156) 
Year 1991  0.0847*** 0.1452*** 0.0946***  0.0978*** 0.1514*** 0.1057*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0194) (0.0128)  (0.0122) (0.0201) (0.0125) 
Year 1993  0.2210*** 0.3125*** 0.2331***  0.2249*** 0.3126*** 0.2350*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0319) (0.0139)  (0.0145) (0.0347) (0.0135) 
Year 1997  0.8023*** 0.9994*** 0.8143***  0.8108*** 1.0082*** 0.8214*** 
  (0.0341) (0.0708) (0.0281)  (0.0337) (0.0758) (0.0278) 
Year 2000  1.1341*** 1.3889*** 1.1509***  1.1538*** 1.4045*** 1.1679*** 
  (0.0357) (0.0905) (0.0289)  (0.0350) (0.0978) (0.0281) 
Year 2004  1.3821*** 1.7528*** 1.4116***  1.3993*** 1.7669*** 1.4233*** 
  (0.0373) (0.1172) (0.0318)  (0.0360) (0.1292) (0.0302) 
Year 2006  1.5339*** 1.9381*** 1.5605***  1.5388*** 1.9405*** 1.5602*** 
  (0.0386) (0.1306) (0.0328)  (0.0370) (0.1441) (0.0310) 
Year 2009  1.8509*** 2.3340*** 1.8852***  1.8617*** 2.3372*** 1.8890*** 
  (0.0389) (0.1515) (0.0329)  (0.0371) (0.1678) (0.0308) 
Constant -2.3638*** -1.6029*** -1.2913*** -1.5596*** -0.7504*** -1.3640*** -1.2041*** -1.3525*** 
 
(0.0662) (0.0660) (0.1648) (0.0626) (0.0345) (0.0433) (0.1530) (0.0383) 
Observations 17501 17501 17501 17501 17501 17501 17501 17501 
r2 0.5732 0.6536 0.5913  0.5590 0.6552 0.5915  
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Table A15 Wage effects of overeducation (VV) 
 The mean index The mode index 
Variables 
Pooled OLS 
(1) 
Pooled OLS with 
time effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
effects 
(3) 
Random effects 
(4) 
Pooled OLS 
(5) 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects 
(6) 
Fixed 
effects 
(7) 
Random effects 
(8) 
Wage return to education 0.1141*** 0.0300*** 0.2767*** 0.0286*** 0.2393*** 0.0831*** 0.0509*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0590) (0.0035) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0176) (0.0066) 
Overeducated -0.2400*** 0.0004 0.0399** 0.0126 -0.2033*** -0.0513*** -0.0064 -0.0445*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0147) (0.0140) (0.0122) (0.0158) (0.0118) 
Undereducated 0.2257*** 0.0483*** 0.0199 0.0388** 0.1486*** 0.0285** 0.0427*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0166) (0.0235) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0124) (0.0158) (0.0114) 
Female -0.1754*** -0.1686***  -0.1859*** -0.1929*** -0.1751***  -0.1925*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0095)  (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0095)  (0.0105) 
Urban registration 0.0379*** 0.0550***  0.0454*** 0.0441*** 0.0568***  0.0473*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0094)  (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0094)  (0.0105) 
Experience 0.0248*** 0.0176*** 0.2823*** 0.0194*** 0.0248*** 0.0174*** 0.0162** 0.0190*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0588) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0082) (0.0015) 
Experience squared -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** -0.0003*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Private sector 0.4435*** 0.0495*** -0.0960*** 0.0035 0.4718*** 0.0607*** -0.0931*** 0.0138 
 
(0.0180) (0.0176) (0.0218) (0.0151) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0219) (0.0152) 
Collective sector 0.3229*** 0.1608*** -0.0165 0.1052*** 0.3368*** 0.1671*** -0.0186 0.1106*** 
 
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0149) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0203) (0.0149) 
Unknown ownership 0.4017*** 0.0074 0.0273 -0.0036 0.4099*** 0.0126 0.0238 0.0000 
 
(0.0476) (0.0433) (0.0394) (0.0299) (0.0476) (0.0433) (0.0394) (0.0299) 
Firm size 2 (between 20 and 
100 employees) 
0.0592*** 0.0186 -0.0015 0.0111 0.0411*** 0.0112 -0.0033 0.0051 
 
(0.0153) (0.0127) (0.0162) (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0124) 
Firm size 3 (less than 20 
employees) 
-0.1740*** -0.1586*** -0.1026*** -0.1424*** -0.1836*** -0.1622*** -0.1037*** -0.1468*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0178) (0.0209) (0.0150) (0.0192) (0.0177) (0.0209) (0.0150) 
Unknown firm size -0.8513*** 0.0082 0.0389 0.0123 -0.8565*** 0.0060 0.0394 0.0097 
 
(0.0139) (0.0279) (0.0333) (0.0236) (0.0140) (0.0277) (0.0334) (0.0236) 
Contractor 0.1241*** 0.0270 -0.0172 0.0201 0.1401*** 0.0323** -0.0149 0.0241* 
 
(0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0185) (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0165) (0.0186) (0.0141) 
Temporary 0.0247 -0.1237*** -0.0975*** -0.1126*** 0.0374* -0.1184*** -0.0947*** -0.1078*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0160) (0.0203) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0160) 
Other job type -0.0368 -0.0783** -0.0194 -0.0577** -0.0340 -0.0770** -0.0165 -0.0567** 
 
(0.0419) (0.0365) (0.0330) (0.0262) (0.0421) (0.0363) (0.0330) (0.0262) 
Clerk 0.0077 0.0781*** 0.0469** 0.0615*** -0.0026 0.0592*** 0.0284 0.0416*** 
 
(0.0173) (0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0146) (0.0164) (0.0143) (0.0188) (0.0145) 
Junior 0.0501*** 0.0996*** 0.0370*** 0.0723*** 0.0494*** 0.0879*** 0.0286** 0.0617*** 
 
(0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0129) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0128) (0.0101) 
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Senior 0.0248 0.1952*** 0.1026*** 0.1619*** -0.0446* 0.1443*** 0.0765*** 0.1186*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.0205) (0.0279) (0.0207) (0.0260) (0.0212) (0.0281) (0.0210) 
Leader -0.0176 0.1107*** 0.0911*** 0.0827*** -0.0140 0.0934*** 0.0702*** 0.0637*** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0189) (0.0217) (0.0161) (0.0202) (0.0185) (0.0215) (0.0159) 
Other 0.0912*** 0.0842*** 0.0610* 0.0712*** 0.1114*** 0.0825*** 0.0634** 0.0694*** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0241) (0.0327) (0.0288) (0.0313) (0.0241) 
Northeast 0.0568*** 0.0379***  0.0406** 0.0616*** 0.0380***  0.0402** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0144)  (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0143)  (0.0166) 
Central 0.0233 0.0346***  0.0325** 0.0242* 0.0344***  0.0330** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0131)  (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0131)  (0.0146) 
East 0.1214*** 0.1355***  0.1132*** 0.1312*** 0.1405***  0.1185*** 
 
(0.0148) (0.0135)  (0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0135)  (0.0146) 
Year 1991  0.1089*** -0.3552*** 0.1138***  0.1112*** 0.1526*** 0.1160*** 
  (0.0113) (0.1131) (0.0116)  (0.0112) (0.0185) (0.0116) 
Year 1993  0.2469*** -0.7273*** 0.2503***  0.2429*** 0.3069*** 0.2466*** 
  (0.0136) (0.2305) (0.0125)  (0.0136) (0.0318) (0.0124) 
Year 1997  0.7328*** -1.2205*** 0.7405***  0.7271*** 0.8844*** 0.7362*** 
  (0.0304) (0.4681) (0.0254)  (0.0302) (0.0692) (0.0254) 
Year 2000  1.0754*** -1.6294** 1.0839***  1.0707*** 1.2668*** 1.0809*** 
  (0.0307) (0.6431) (0.0257)  (0.0306) (0.0894) (0.0257) 
Year 2004  1.3255*** -2.3024*** 1.3532***  1.3177*** 1.6427*** 1.3464*** 
  (0.0324) (0.8765) (0.0279)  (0.0321) (0.1184) (0.0277) 
Year 2006  1.4927*** -2.6264*** 1.5186***  1.4735*** 1.8329*** 1.5009*** 
  (0.0329) (0.9922) (0.0283)  (0.0328) (0.1318) (0.0282) 
Year 2009  1.8121*** -3.0427*** 1.8420***  1.7932*** 2.2136*** 1.8241*** 
  (0.0330) (1.1691) (0.0282)  (0.0330) (0.1535) (0.0281) 
Constant 4.0015*** 3.8345*** -1.8359 3.8762*** 4.5463*** 3.9540*** 4.0989*** 3.9815*** 
 
(0.0482) (0.0486) (1.3141) (0.0449) (0.0328) (0.0394) (0.1396) (0.0353) 
Observations 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 17766 
r2 0.5390 0.6518 0.5972  0.5417 0.6526 0.5966  
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Appendix B 
 
Table B 1 Highest educational level 
Highest educational level Freq. Percent 
Primary school or less 331 14.65 
Junior high school 669 29.60 
Senior high school 710 31.42 
College level 304 13.45 
University 228 10.09 
Master’s or higher 18 0.80 
Total 2260 10.00 
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Table B 2 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of overall job satisfaction (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.045*** 0.052*** -0.097*** 0.045*** 0.051*** -0.096*** 
       (0.0144) (0.0165) (0.0307) (0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0307) 
Actual years of schooling -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.016*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.019*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 0.017*** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.020*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0044) 
Overeducated 0.009 0.010 -0.018 0.009 0.010 -0.018 0.008 0.009 -0.017 0.008 0.009 -0.017 
 (0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0270) (0.0126) (0.0145) (0.0270) (0.0125) (0.0144) (0.0270) (0.0125) (0.0145) (0.0270) 
Undereducated -0.005 -0.006 0.010 -0.006 -0.007 0.013 -0.005 -0.006 0.011 -0.006 -0.007 0.014 
 (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0228) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0229) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0228) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0228) 
Age 0.007** 0.008** -0.015** 0.007** 0.008** -0.014** 0.007** 0.008** -0.016** 0.007** 0.008** -0.014** 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0069) 
Age2/100 -0.010** -0.011** 0.021** -0.009** -0.010** 0.019** -0.010** -0.011** 0.021** -0.009** -0.011** 0.020** 
 (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0084) 
Hourly wage -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002***    -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.002***    
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)    (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008)    
Male 0.012 0.014 -0.027 0.010 0.011 -0.021 0.012 0.014 -0.026 0.009 0.011 -0.020 
 (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0191) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0190) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0191) (0.0088) (0.0102) (0.0190) 
Ethnicity 0.032* 0.037* -0.069* 0.032* 0.037* -0.069* 0.028* 0.033* -0.061* 0.029* 0.033* -0.061* 
 (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0173) (0.0199) (0.0371) 
Political -0.011 -0.013 0.025 -0.013 -0.015 0.028 -0.012 -0.013 0.025 -0.013 -0.015 0.028 
 (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0288) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0288) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0287) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0287) 
Married -0.026** -0.030** 0.056** -0.025* -0.029* 0.054* -0.026** -0.030** 0.056** -0.025* -0.029* 0.054* 
 (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0277) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0278) (0.0129) (0.0148) (0.0277) (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0277) 
Urban registration -0.007 -0.008 0.016 -0.010 -0.011 0.021 -0.007 -0.008 0.016 -0.010 -0.011 0.021 
 (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0243) 
Full time job -0.026** -0.030** 0.056** -0.025* -0.029* 0.055* -0.026** -0.030** 0.056** -0.026** -0.030** 0.055** 
 (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0279) 
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Public sector -0.036*** -0.041*** 0.078*** -0.033*** -0.039*** 0.072*** -0.035*** -0.040*** 0.075*** -0.032*** -0.037*** 0.070*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0232) (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0231) 
Healthy status -0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.0172) (0.0198) (0.0370) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0371) (0.0172) (0.0198) (0.0370) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0371) 
Low social status 0.120*** 0.139*** -0.259*** 0.135*** 0.156*** -0.291*** 0.118*** 0.136*** -0.254*** 0.133*** 0.153*** -0.286*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0329) (0.0611) (0.0290) (0.0325) (0.0604) (0.0290) (0.0328) (0.0610) (0.0289) (0.0325) (0.0602) 
Middle social status 0.068** 0.078** -0.145** 0.079*** 0.091*** -0.170*** 0.066** 0.076** -0.142** 0.078*** 0.090*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0327) (0.0611) (0.0286) (0.0325) (0.0607) (0.0286) (0.0326) (0.0609) (0.0285) (0.0325) (0.0606) 
Medium-size firm 0.024** 0.028** -0.052** 0.024** 0.027** -0.051** 0.023** 0.026** -0.049** 0.022* 0.026* -0.048* 
 (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0247) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0247) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0246) (0.0115) (0.0132) (0.0247) 
Large-size firm 0.022* 0.025* -0.046* 0.019 0.022 -0.041 0.020* 0.023* -0.043* 0.018 0.020 -0.038 
 (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0263) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0262) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0262) (0.0122) (0.0141) (0.0262) 
East -0.044*** -0.051*** 0.096*** -0.049*** -0.056*** 0.105*** -0.043*** -0.049*** 0.092*** -0.047*** -0.054*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0233) (0.0111) (0.0127) (0.0235) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0233) 
Central -0.072*** -0.083*** 0.154*** -0.072*** -0.083*** 0.155*** -0.069*** -0.080*** 0.149*** -0.070*** -0.081*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) (0.0122) (0.0138) (0.0253) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 203.20 194.30 212.96 203.90 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0469 0.0449 0.0492 0.0471 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 3 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with pay (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.041* 0.014* -0.055* 0.040* 0.014* -0.055* 
       (0.0230) (0.0081) (0.0310) (0.0231) (0.0081) (0.0311) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
-0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.006* -0.002* 0.008* -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.006* -0.002* 0.009* 
 (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0044) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0044) 
Overeducated 0.022 0.008 -0.030 0.022 0.008 -0.030 0.022 0.008 -0.030 0.022 0.008 -0.029 
 (0.0197) (0.0069) (0.0266) (0.0198) (0.0069) (0.0267) (0.0197) (0.0069) (0.0266) (0.0198) (0.0069) (0.0267) 
Undereducated -0.006 -0.002 0.008 -0.009 -0.003 0.012 -0.006 -0.002 0.009 -0.009 -0.003 0.012 
 (0.0169) (0.0059) (0.0228) (0.0169) (0.0059) (0.0228) (0.0169) (0.0059) (0.0228) (0.0169) (0.0059) (0.0228) 
Age 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.006 0.002 -0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0069) 
Age2/100 -0.009 -0.003 0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 -0.010 -0.003 0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.011 
 (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0083) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008)    (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0008)    
Male 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.011 0.004 -0.015 0.005 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.0141) (0.0049) (0.0190) (0.0141) (0.0049) (0.0190) (0.0141) (0.0049) (0.0190) (0.0140) (0.0049) (0.0190) 
Ethnicity 0.009 0.003 -0.013 0.009 0.003 -0.013 0.007 0.002 -0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.009 
 (0.0273) (0.0095) (0.0368) (0.0273) (0.0096) (0.0369) (0.0273) (0.0095) (0.0368) (0.0273) (0.0096) (0.0369) 
Political 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.008 0.003 -0.011 0.012 0.004 -0.016 0.008 0.003 -0.011 
 (0.0210) (0.0073) (0.0283) (0.0210) (0.0073) (0.0283) (0.0209) (0.0073) (0.0282) (0.0209) (0.0073) (0.0283) 
Married -0.015 -0.005 0.020 -0.013 -0.005 0.018 -0.015 -0.005 0.020 -0.013 -0.005 0.018 
 (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) (0.0206) (0.0072) (0.0278) (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) (0.0205) (0.0072) (0.0277) 
Urban registration -0.025 -0.009 0.034 -0.030 -0.010 0.040 -0.025 -0.009 0.034 -0.030* -0.010 0.040* 
 (0.0181) (0.0063) (0.0244) (0.0181) (0.0064) (0.0244) (0.0181) (0.0063) (0.0244) (0.0181) (0.0064) (0.0244) 
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Full time job -0.039* -0.014* 0.053* -0.038* -0.013* 0.051* -0.039* -0.014* 0.053* -0.038* -0.013* 0.052* 
 (0.0209) (0.0073) (0.0281) (0.0209) (0.0074) (0.0282) (0.0208) (0.0073) (0.0281) (0.0209) (0.0074) (0.0281) 
Public sector -0.008 -0.003 0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.010 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.0173) (0.0060) (0.0233) (0.0172) (0.0060) (0.0233) (0.0173) (0.0060) (0.0233) (0.0172) (0.0060) (0.0233) 
Healthy status -0.060** -0.021** 0.081** -0.062** -0.022** 0.084** -0.059** -0.021** 0.080** -0.062** -0.022** 0.083** 
 (0.0276) (0.0097) (0.0372) (0.0277) (0.0098) (0.0373) (0.0276) (0.0097) (0.0372) (0.0277) (0.0098) (0.0373) 
Low social status 0.212*** 0.074*** -0.285*** 0.241*** 0.085*** -0.326*** 0.210*** 0.073*** -0.283*** 0.240*** 0.084*** -0.324*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0162) (0.0606) (0.0451) (0.0162) (0.0598) (0.0455) (0.0162) (0.0605) (0.0451) (0.0162) (0.0598) 
Middle social status 0.131*** 0.046*** -0.176*** 0.154*** 0.054*** -0.208*** 0.130*** 0.045*** -0.175*** 0.153*** 0.054*** -0.207*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0158) (0.0604) (0.0449) (0.0158) (0.0601) (0.0451) (0.0158) (0.0604) (0.0449) (0.0158) (0.0601) 
Medium-size firm 0.015 0.005 -0.020 0.013 0.005 -0.018 0.014 0.005 -0.018 0.012 0.004 -0.016 
 (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0248) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0247) (0.0183) (0.0064) (0.0248) 
Large-size firm 0.025 0.009 -0.034 0.020 0.007 -0.027 0.024 0.008 -0.033 0.019 0.007 -0.025 
 (0.0195) (0.0068) (0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0068) (0.0262) (0.0195) (0.0068) (0.0262) (0.0194) (0.0068) (0.0262) 
East -0.061*** -0.021*** 0.083*** -0.070*** -0.024*** 0.094*** -0.060*** -0.021*** 0.081*** -0.068*** -0.024*** 0.092*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0063) (0.0235) (0.0174) (0.0063) (0.0234) (0.0175) (0.0063) (0.0236) (0.0174) (0.0063) (0.0234) 
Central -0.096*** -0.033*** 0.129*** -0.096*** -0.034*** 0.130*** -0.094*** -0.033*** 0.127*** -0.095*** -0.033*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0254) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0255) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0254) (0.0190) (0.0070) (0.0255) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 139.35 124.54 142.48 127.60 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0292 0.0261 0.0298 0.0267 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 4 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with welfare (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.038 0.008 -0.046 0.038 0.008 -0.046 
       (0.0240) (0.0050) (0.0290) (0.0241) (0.0051) (0.0291) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
-0.007** -0.002** 0.009** -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.012*** -0.008** -0.002** 0.009** -0.011*** -0.002*** 0.013*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0007) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0007) (0.0042) (0.0034) (0.0008) (0.0041) 
Overeducated 0.024 0.005 -0.028 0.024 0.005 -0.029 0.023 0.005 -0.028 0.023 0.005 -0.028 
 (0.0208) (0.0043) (0.0250) (0.0208) (0.0044) (0.0251) (0.0207) (0.0043) (0.0250) (0.0207) (0.0044) (0.0251) 
Undereducated 0.022 0.005 -0.027 0.019 0.004 -0.023 0.022 0.005 -0.027 0.019 0.004 -0.023 
 (0.0177) (0.0037) (0.0213) (0.0177) (0.0037) (0.0214) (0.0177) (0.0037) (0.0213) (0.0177) (0.0037) (0.0214) 
Age 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.0065) 
Age2/100 -0.007 -0.002 0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0078) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0079) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0078) (0.0065) (0.0014) (0.0079) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.003***    
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0008)    (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0008)    
Male 0.021 0.004 -0.025 0.014 0.003 -0.017 0.020 0.004 -0.024 0.014 0.003 -0.017 
 (0.0148) (0.0031) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0031) (0.0178) (0.0148) (0.0031) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0031) (0.0178) 
Ethnicity -0.025 -0.005 0.030 -0.025 -0.005 0.030 -0.028 -0.006 0.033 -0.027 -0.006 0.033 
 (0.0288) (0.0060) (0.0347) (0.0288) (0.0061) (0.0349) (0.0288) (0.0060) (0.0348) (0.0288) (0.0061) (0.0349) 
Political 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.0220) (0.0045) (0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0046) (0.0266) (0.0220) (0.0045) (0.0265) (0.0220) (0.0046) (0.0266) 
Married -0.013 -0.003 0.015 -0.010 -0.002 0.013 -0.012 -0.002 0.015 -0.010 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) (0.0216) (0.0045) (0.0261) 
Urban registration -0.066*** -0.014*** 0.079*** -0.071*** -0.015*** 0.086*** -0.066*** -0.014*** 0.079*** -0.071*** -0.015*** 0.086*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0042) (0.0228) (0.0188) (0.0043) (0.0228) (0.0189) (0.0042) (0.0228) (0.0188) (0.0043) (0.0228) 
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Full time job -0.068*** -0.014*** 0.082*** -0.067*** -0.014*** 0.081*** -0.069*** -0.014*** 0.083*** -0.067*** -0.014*** 0.081*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0266) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) (0.0219) (0.0049) (0.0265) 
Public sector -0.036** -0.007* 0.043** -0.030* -0.006* 0.037* -0.035* -0.007* 0.042* -0.029 -0.006 0.036 
 (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0218) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0218) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.0218) 
Healthy status -0.023 -0.005 0.028 -0.026 -0.005 0.031 -0.022 -0.005 0.027 -0.025 -0.005 0.031 
 (0.0292) (0.0061) (0.0352) (0.0292) (0.0062) (0.0354) (0.0292) (0.0061) (0.0352) (0.0292) (0.0062) (0.0354) 
Low social status 0.193*** 0.040*** -0.233*** 0.223*** 0.047*** -0.270*** 0.192*** 0.040*** -0.231*** 0.222*** 0.047*** -0.269*** 
 (0.0460) (0.0102) (0.0550) (0.0455) (0.0105) (0.0543) (0.0460) (0.0102) (0.0551) (0.0455) (0.0105) (0.0544) 
Middle social 
status 
0.121*** 0.025*** -0.146*** 0.145*** 0.030*** -0.175*** 0.120*** 0.025** -0.145*** 0.144*** 0.030*** -0.174*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0097) (0.0548) (0.0453) (0.0098) (0.0545) (0.0456) (0.0097) (0.0548) (0.0453) (0.0098) (0.0545) 
Medium-size firm 0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0231) (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0232) (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0231) (0.0191) (0.0040) (0.0232) 
Large-size firm -0.032 -0.007 0.039 -0.037* -0.008* 0.045* -0.033 -0.007 0.040 -0.039* -0.008* 0.047* 
 (0.0204) (0.0043) (0.0245) (0.0203) (0.0043) (0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0043) (0.0245) (0.0203) (0.0043) (0.0246) 
East -0.088*** -0.018*** 0.106*** -0.097*** -0.020*** 0.117*** -0.086*** -0.018*** 0.104*** -0.095*** -0.020*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0043) (0.0220) (0.0182) (0.0045) (0.0219) (0.0183) (0.0043) (0.0221) (0.0182) (0.0044) (0.0219) 
Central -0.089*** -0.018*** 0.108*** -0.090*** -0.019*** 0.109*** -0.088*** -0.018*** 0.106*** -0.089*** -0.019*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0047) (0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0047) (0.0240) (0.0198) (0.0046) (0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0047) (0.0240) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 243.17 227.95 245.70 230.42 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0497 0.0466 0.0502 0.0471 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 5 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with workload (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.034 0.011 -0.045 0.034 0.011 -0.045 
       (0.0229) (0.0072) (0.0300) (0.0229) (0.0073) (0.0301) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
-0.010*** -0.003*** 0.014*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.015*** -0.011*** -0.003*** 0.014*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.015*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0011) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0011) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0042) 
Overeducated 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.0195) (0.0061) (0.0257) (0.0195) (0.0061) (0.0257) (0.0195) (0.0061) (0.0256) (0.0195) (0.0061) (0.0256) 
Undereducated 0.015 0.005 -0.020 0.015 0.005 -0.019 0.015 0.005 -0.020 0.014 0.005 -0.019 
 (0.0166) (0.0052) (0.0218) (0.0166) (0.0052) (0.0218) (0.0166) (0.0052) (0.0218) (0.0166) (0.0052) (0.0218) 
Age 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0016) (0.0066) 
Age2/100 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0019) (0.0080) 
Hourly wage -0.001 -0.000 0.001    -0.001 -0.000 0.001    
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)    (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)    
Male 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.015 0.005 -0.020 0.016 0.005 -0.022 0.015 0.005 -0.020 
 (0.0139) (0.0044) (0.0183) (0.0138) (0.0044) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0044) (0.0182) (0.0138) (0.0044) (0.0182) 
Ethnicity -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.0271) (0.0085) (0.0357) (0.0271) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) 
Political 0.027 0.008 -0.035 0.025 0.008 -0.033 0.027 0.008 -0.035 0.025 0.008 -0.033 
 (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) 
Married 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.017 0.005 -0.022 0.017 0.005 -0.022 
 (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) (0.0204) (0.0064) (0.0268) 
Urban registration -0.030* -0.009* 0.039* -0.031* -0.010* 0.041* -0.030* -0.009* 0.039* -0.031* -0.010* 0.041* 
 (0.0178) (0.0057) (0.0234) (0.0177) (0.0057) (0.0233) (0.0178) (0.0057) (0.0233) (0.0177) (0.0057) (0.0233) 
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Full time job -0.028 -0.009 0.037 -0.027 -0.009 0.036 -0.029 -0.009 0.038 -0.027 -0.009 0.036 
 (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0270) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0065) (0.0269) 
Public sector -0.050*** -0.016*** 0.065*** -0.048*** -0.015*** 0.063*** -0.049*** -0.015*** 0.064*** -0.047*** -0.015*** 0.062*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0222) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0223) (0.0170) (0.0055) (0.0222) 
Healthy status -0.043 -0.013 0.056 -0.044 -0.014 0.057 -0.042 -0.013 0.055 -0.043 -0.013 0.056 
 (0.0272) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0272) (0.0087) (0.0357) (0.0271) (0.0086) (0.0357) (0.0271) (0.0086) (0.0357) 
Low social status 0.144*** 0.045*** -0.189*** 0.154*** 0.049*** -0.203*** 0.142*** 0.045*** -0.187*** 0.152*** 0.048*** -0.200*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0137) (0.0553) (0.0416) (0.0135) (0.0543) (0.0423) (0.0137) (0.0553) (0.0416) (0.0135) (0.0543) 
Middle social 
status 
0.085** 0.027** -0.112** 0.094** 0.030** -0.123** 0.084** 0.026** -0.110** 0.093** 0.029** -0.122** 
 (0.0419) (0.0133) (0.0550) (0.0414) (0.0132) (0.0543) (0.0419) (0.0133) (0.0549) (0.0414) (0.0132) (0.0543) 
Medium-size firm 0.019 0.006 -0.025 0.018 0.006 -0.024 0.018 0.006 -0.024 0.017 0.005 -0.023 
 (0.0180) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0180) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0180) (0.0057) (0.0236) (0.0180) (0.0057) (0.0236) 
Large-size firm 0.037* 0.012* -0.049* 0.036* 0.011* -0.047* 0.036* 0.011* -0.047* 0.034* 0.011* -0.045* 
 (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) (0.0191) (0.0061) (0.0251) 
East -0.046*** -0.015*** 0.061*** -0.048*** -0.015*** 0.064*** -0.045*** -0.014** 0.059*** -0.047*** -0.015** 0.062*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0056) (0.0227) (0.0172) (0.0056) (0.0226) (0.0173) (0.0056) (0.0227) (0.0172) (0.0056) (0.0226) 
Central -0.086*** -0.027*** 0.114*** -0.087*** -0.027*** 0.114*** -0.085*** -0.027*** 0.111*** -0.085*** -0.027*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) (0.0187) (0.0063) (0.0245) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 136.04 134.40 138.23 136.59 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0283 0.0279 0.0287 0.0284 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 6 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction on working conditions and facilities (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.045** 0.031** -0.076** 0.045** 0.031** -0.076** 
            (0.0182) (0.0126) (0.0306) (0.0182) (0.0127) (0.0307) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
-0.015*** -0.010*** 0.025*** -0.017*** -0.012*** 0.028*** -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.026*** -0.017*** -0.012*** 0.029*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0026) (0.0018) (0.0043) 
Overeducated 0.011 0.008 -0.019 0.011 0.008 -0.019 0.011 0.007 -0.018 0.011 0.008 -0.018 
 (0.0157) (0.0108) (0.0265) (0.0157) (0.0109) (0.0265) (0.0156) (0.0108) (0.0265) (0.0156) (0.0109) (0.0265) 
Undereducated -0.022* -0.015* 0.037* -0.024* -0.016* 0.040* -0.022* -0.015* 0.037* -0.024* -0.017* 0.040* 
 (0.0132) (0.0091) (0.0223) (0.0132) (0.0092) (0.0224) (0.0132) (0.0091) (0.0223) (0.0132) (0.0092) (0.0223) 
Age 0.006 0.004 -0.011 0.006 0.004 -0.010 0.007 0.005 -0.011 0.006 0.004 -0.010 
 (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0068) 
Age2/100 -0.008* -0.006* 0.014* -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.008* -0.006* 0.014* -0.007 -0.005 0.012 
 (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0082) (0.0048) (0.0034) (0.0082) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.003***    
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)    (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)    
Male 0.023** 0.016** -0.038** 0.019* 0.013* -0.032* 0.022** 0.015** -0.038** 0.018* 0.013* -0.031* 
 (0.0111) (0.0077) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0187) (0.0111) (0.0077) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0187) 
Ethnicity -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.008 -0.006 0.014 -0.008 -0.006 0.014 
 (0.0214) (0.0148) (0.0362) (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0363) (0.0214) (0.0148) (0.0362) (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0363) 
Political -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.007 
 (0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0278) (0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0279) (0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0278) (0.0164) (0.0114) (0.0278) 
Married -0.015 -0.010 0.025 -0.014 -0.009 0.023 -0.015 -0.010 0.025 -0.013 -0.009 0.023 
 (0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0275) (0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0273) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) 
Urban registration -0.012 -0.008 0.020 -0.016 -0.011 0.027 -0.012 -0.008 0.021 -0.016 -0.011 0.027 
 (0.0141) (0.0098) (0.0239) (0.0141) (0.0098) (0.0239) (0.0141) (0.0098) (0.0239) (0.0141) (0.0098) (0.0238) 
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Full time job -0.033** -0.023** 0.056** -0.032** -0.023** 0.055** -0.033** -0.023** 0.057** -0.033** -0.023** 0.056** 
 (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) (0.0162) (0.0113) (0.0274) 
Public sector -0.015 -0.010 0.025 -0.011 -0.008 0.019 -0.014 -0.010 0.023 -0.010 -0.007 0.017 
 (0.0135) (0.0094) (0.0229) (0.0135) (0.0094) (0.0229) (0.0135) (0.0094) (0.0229) (0.0135) (0.0094) (0.0229) 
Healthy status -0.003 -0.002 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.0215) (0.0149) (0.0364) (0.0215) (0.0150) (0.0365) (0.0215) (0.0149) (0.0363) (0.0215) (0.0150) (0.0365) 
Low social status 0.096*** 0.067*** -0.163*** 0.116*** 0.081*** -0.197*** 0.094*** 0.065*** -0.159*** 0.114*** 0.079*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0237) (0.0575) (0.0338) (0.0235) (0.0567) (0.0341) (0.0236) (0.0574) (0.0338) (0.0234) (0.0566) 
Middle social status 0.050 0.035 -0.085 0.066** 0.046** -0.112** 0.049 0.034 -0.083 0.065* 0.045* -0.109* 
 (0.0338) (0.0234) (0.0571) (0.0336) (0.0233) (0.0567) (0.0338) (0.0234) (0.0570) (0.0335) (0.0233) (0.0566) 
Medium-size firm -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.008 -0.005 0.013 -0.008 -0.006 0.014 -0.009 -0.006 0.016 
 (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0241) (0.0143) (0.0099) (0.0242) (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0241) (0.0142) (0.0099) (0.0241) 
Large-size firm -0.034** -0.024** 0.058** -0.037** -0.026** 0.063** -0.036** -0.025** 0.060** -0.039** -0.027** 0.066** 
 (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0257) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0257) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0257) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0257) 
East -0.024* -0.017* 0.041* -0.030** -0.021** 0.052** -0.023 -0.016 0.038* -0.029** -0.020** 0.049** 
 (0.0138) (0.0096) (0.0233) (0.0137) (0.0096) (0.0232) (0.0138) (0.0096) (0.0233) (0.0137) (0.0096) (0.0232) 
Central -0.032** -0.022** 0.054** -0.032** -0.022** 0.054** -0.030** -0.021** 0.050** -0.030** -0.021** 0.051** 
 (0.0149) (0.0103) (0.0251) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0252) (0.0149) (0.0103) (0.0251) (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0252) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 193.73 182.33 199.80 188.41 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0424 0.0399 0.0437 0.0413 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 7 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with colleagues (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.010* 0.041* -0.050* 0.010* 0.041* -0.051* 
       (0.0056) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0056) (0.0226) (0.0281) 
Actual years of schooling -0.002** -0.009** 0.011** -0.002*** -0.010*** 0.012*** -0.002** -0.009*** 0.011*** -0.002*** -0.010*** 0.013*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0009) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0041) 
Overeducated -0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.0050) (0.0203) (0.0252) (0.0050) (0.0203) (0.0252) (0.0049) (0.0203) (0.0252) (0.0049) (0.0203) (0.0252) 
Undereducated -0.004 -0.018 0.022 -0.005 -0.019 0.023 -0.004 -0.018 0.022 -0.005 -0.019 0.024 
 (0.0041) (0.0167) (0.0208) (0.0041) (0.0167) (0.0208) (0.0041) (0.0167) (0.0207) (0.0041) (0.0167) (0.0207) 
Age 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0063) 
Age2/100 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) (0.0015) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
Hourly wage -0.000 -0.001 0.001    -0.000 -0.001 0.001    
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008)    (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0008)    
Male 0.001 0.005 -0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.0034) (0.0140) (0.0175) (0.0034) (0.0139) (0.0174) (0.0034) (0.0140) (0.0174) (0.0034) (0.0139) (0.0173) 
Ethnicity 0.011 0.043 -0.054 0.011 0.043 -0.054 0.010 0.040 -0.050 0.010 0.040 -0.050 
 (0.0070) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0070) (0.0281) (0.0349) (0.0070) (0.0281) (0.0350) (0.0070) (0.0281) (0.0350) 
Political -0.017*** -0.069*** 0.086*** -0.017*** -0.071*** 0.088*** -0.017*** -0.070*** 0.087*** -0.017*** -0.071*** 0.089*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0059) (0.0226) (0.0281) 
Married 0.003 0.013 -0.016 0.003 0.014 -0.017 0.003 0.013 -0.016 0.003 0.014 -0.017 
 (0.0050) (0.0206) (0.0256) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0256) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0256) (0.0050) (0.0205) (0.0255) 
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Urban registration 0.007 0.028 -0.035 0.006 0.025 -0.032 0.007 0.028 -0.035 0.006 0.025 -0.031 
 (0.0044) (0.0177) (0.0221) (0.0044) (0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0044) (0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0044) (0.0177) (0.0220) 
Full time job -0.012** -0.047** 0.059** -0.011** -0.047** 0.058** -0.012** -0.047** 0.059** -0.012** -0.047** 0.059** 
 (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0246) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) (0.0050) (0.0197) (0.0245) 
Public sector -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.0042) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0042) (0.0173) (0.0215) (0.0042) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0042) (0.0173) (0.0215) 
Healthy status -0.003 -0.010 0.013 -0.003 -0.011 0.014 -0.002 -0.010 0.012 -0.003 -0.010 0.013 
 (0.0066) (0.0268) (0.0334) (0.0066) (0.0268) (0.0334) (0.0065) (0.0268) (0.0333) (0.0066) (0.0268) (0.0334) 
Low social status 0.003 0.014 -0.017 0.007 0.029 -0.036 0.003 0.012 -0.014 0.007 0.027 -0.033 
 (0.0102) (0.0416) (0.0518) (0.0100) (0.0409) (0.0509) (0.0102) (0.0416) (0.0518) (0.0100) (0.0409) (0.0509) 
Middle social status -0.005 -0.022 0.028 -0.002 -0.010 0.012 -0.006 -0.023 0.029 -0.003 -0.011 0.014 
 (0.0101) (0.0412) (0.0513) (0.0100) (0.0408) (0.0508) (0.0101) (0.0412) (0.0512) (0.0100) (0.0408) (0.0507) 
Medium-size firm -0.014*** -0.057*** 0.071*** -0.014*** -0.058*** 0.073*** -0.014*** -0.058*** 0.073*** -0.015*** -0.060*** 0.074*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0047) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0046) (0.0178) (0.0221) (0.0047) (0.0178) (0.0221) 
Large-size firm -0.017*** -0.068*** 0.084*** -0.017*** -0.070*** 0.088*** -0.017*** -0.069*** 0.086*** -0.017*** -0.072*** 0.089*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0051) (0.0192) (0.0239) (0.0051) (0.0193) (0.0239) (0.0051) (0.0192) (0.0239) 
East 0.005 0.021 -0.026 0.004 0.018 -0.022 0.006 0.023 -0.028 0.005 0.019 -0.024 
 (0.0043) (0.0175) (0.0217) (0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0216) (0.0043) (0.0175) (0.0217) (0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0217) 
Central -0.005 -0.022 0.027 -0.005 -0.022 0.027 -0.005 -0.020 0.024 -0.005 -0.019 0.024 
 (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0238) (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0239) (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0239) (0.0047) (0.0192) (0.0239) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 83.48 80.43 86.63 83.63 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0300 0.0289 0.0311 0.0300 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 8 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with the relationship with the boss (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.032*** 0.080*** -0.112*** 0.032*** 0.080*** -0.112*** 
       (0.0092) (0.0226) (0.0314) (0.0092) (0.0226) (0.0315) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
-0.007*** -0.018*** 0.025*** -0.008*** -0.020*** 0.028*** -0.007*** -0.019*** 0.026*** -0.008*** -0.021*** 0.029*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0046) 
Overeducated 0.016* 0.039* -0.055* 0.016* 0.039* -0.055* 0.015* 0.039* -0.054* 0.015* 0.039* -0.054* 
 (0.0080) (0.0200) (0.0280) (0.0080) (0.0201) (0.0280) (0.0080) (0.0200) (0.0279) (0.0080) (0.0200) (0.0279) 
Undereducated -0.015** -0.039** 0.054** -0.016** -0.041** 0.057** -0.015** -0.039** 0.054** -0.016** -0.041** 0.057** 
 (0.0068) (0.0169) (0.0236) (0.0068) (0.0170) (0.0237) (0.0068) (0.0169) (0.0236) (0.0068) (0.0169) (0.0236) 
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0071) 
Age2/100 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0087) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0086) 
Hourly wage -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003***    -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003***    
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0010)    (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0009)    
Male -0.004 -0.011 0.015 -0.006 -0.015 0.021 -0.005 -0.011 0.016 -0.006 -0.016 0.022 
 (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0197) (0.0056) (0.0140) (0.0196) (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0196) (0.0056) (0.0140) (0.0196) 
Ethnicity 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.005 
 (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0377) (0.0107) (0.0271) (0.0378) (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0376) (0.0107) (0.0270) (0.0377) 
Political -0.021** -0.052** 0.073** -0.022** -0.056** 0.078** -0.021** -0.053** 0.074** -0.022** -0.056*** 0.079*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0305) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0305) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0304) (0.0088) (0.0218) (0.0305) 
Married -0.010 -0.025 0.035 -0.009 -0.023 0.033 -0.010 -0.025 0.034 -0.009 -0.023 0.032 
 (0.0081) (0.0204) (0.0285) (0.0081) (0.0204) (0.0285) (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0284) (0.0081) (0.0204) (0.0284) 
Urban registration -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.010 
 (0.0071) (0.0180) (0.0251) (0.0071) (0.0179) (0.0250) (0.0071) (0.0179) (0.0250) (0.0071) (0.0179) (0.0250) 
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Full time job -0.017** -0.043** 0.059** -0.017** -0.042** 0.059** -0.017** -0.043** 0.060** -0.017** -0.043** 0.060** 
 (0.0082) (0.0204) (0.0284) (0.0082) (0.0204) (0.0284) (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0283) (0.0081) (0.0203) (0.0283) 
Public  sector -0.020*** -0.052*** 0.072*** -0.019*** -0.047*** 0.066*** -0.020*** -0.050*** 0.069*** -0.018*** -0.045*** 0.063*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0173) (0.0241) (0.0070) (0.0173) (0.0241) (0.0070) (0.0172) (0.0240) (0.0069) (0.0172) (0.0240) 
Healthy status 0.005 0.012 -0.017 0.004 0.009 -0.013 0.006 0.014 -0.020 0.004 0.011 -0.015 
 (0.0110) (0.0277) (0.0387) (0.0110) (0.0277) (0.0387) (0.0109) (0.0276) (0.0386) (0.0109) (0.0277) (0.0386) 
Low social status 0.037** 0.093** -0.131** 0.047*** 0.119*** -0.167*** 0.035** 0.089** -0.125** 0.046** 0.115*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0448) (0.0626) (0.0179) (0.0442) (0.0618) (0.0179) (0.0447) (0.0624) (0.0178) (0.0441) (0.0616) 
Middle social status 0.026 0.065 -0.090 0.034* 0.085* -0.119* 0.025 0.062 -0.087 0.033* 0.083* -0.116* 
 (0.0178) (0.0445) (0.0621) (0.0177) (0.0442) (0.0617) (0.0176) (0.0444) (0.0619) (0.0176) (0.0441) (0.0615) 
Medium-size firm 0.009 0.023 -0.032 0.008 0.021 -0.030 0.008 0.020 -0.028 0.007 0.019 -0.026 
 (0.0073) (0.0183) (0.0255) (0.0073) (0.0183) (0.0255) (0.0072) (0.0182) (0.0254) (0.0072) (0.0183) (0.0255) 
Large-size firm 0.016** 0.040** -0.056** 0.014* 0.035* -0.049* 0.015* 0.037* -0.052* 0.013* 0.033* -0.046* 
 (0.0078) (0.0194) (0.0271) (0.0078) (0.0194) (0.0271) (0.0077) (0.0194) (0.0270) (0.0077) (0.0194) (0.0270) 
East -0.004 -0.009 0.012 -0.006 -0.016 0.022 -0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.005 -0.012 0.017 
 (0.0069) (0.0175) (0.0245) (0.0069) (0.0174) (0.0243) (0.0069) (0.0175) (0.0244) (0.0069) (0.0174) (0.0243) 
Central -0.027*** -0.067*** 0.094*** -0.027*** -0.067*** 0.094*** -0.025*** -0.063*** 0.087*** -0.025*** -0.063*** 0.087*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0190) (0.0265) (0.0078) (0.0191) (0.0266) (0.0077) (0.0190) (0.0265) (0.0078) (0.0191) (0.0266) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 153.06 142.93 165.43 155.22 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0402 0.0376 0.0435 0.0408 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 9 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with commuting distance to job satisfaction (controlling for actual years of 
schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.012 0.011 -0.024 0.013 0.011 -0.024 
       (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0321) (0.0169) (0.0152) (0.0321) 
Actual years of schooling -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.004* -0.004* 0.008* -0.003 -0.003 0.006 -0.004* -0.004* 0.008* 
 (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0047) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0046) 
Overeducated 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.005 0.005 -0.010 0.005 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0279) (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0279) (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0279) (0.0147) (0.0132) (0.0279) 
Undereducated -0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 
 (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0236) 
Age 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.008 0.005 0.004 -0.009 0.004 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0072) 
Age2/100 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 -0.007 -0.006 0.013 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0087) 
Hourly wage -0.001** -0.001** 0.002**    -0.001** -0.001** 0.002**    
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)    (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)    
Male 0.020* 0.018* -0.037* 0.017 0.015 -0.031 0.019* 0.017* -0.037* 0.016 0.015 -0.031 
 (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0197) (0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0197) (0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0197) (0.0104) (0.0093) (0.0197) 
Ethnicity 0.026 0.023 -0.049 0.026 0.023 -0.049 0.025 0.022 -0.047 0.025 0.022 -0.047 
 (0.0204) (0.0183) (0.0387) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0388) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0388) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0388) 
Political -0.044*** -0.039*** 0.083*** -0.045*** -0.041*** 0.086*** -0.044*** -0.039*** 0.083*** -0.045*** -0.041*** 0.086*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) (0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0301) 
Married 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) (0.0151) (0.0136) (0.0287) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0288) 
Urban registration 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.0133) (0.0119) (0.0252) (0.0132) (0.0119) (0.0251) (0.0133) (0.0119) (0.0252) (0.0132) (0.0119) (0.0251) 
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Full time job -0.026* -0.024* 0.050* -0.026* -0.023* 0.049* -0.027* -0.024* 0.050* -0.026* -0.023* 0.049* 
 (0.0152) (0.0137) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0137) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0137) (0.0288) (0.0152) (0.0137) (0.0288) 
Public sector -0.009 -0.008 0.017 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 -0.009 -0.008 0.017 -0.006 -0.006 0.012 
 (0.0127) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0127) (0.0114) (0.0240) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0240) 
Healthy status 0.008 0.007 -0.016 0.007 0.006 -0.013 0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.007 0.006 -0.013 
 (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0390) (0.0205) (0.0185) (0.0390) (0.0205) (0.0184) (0.0389) (0.0205) (0.0185) (0.0390) 
Low social status 0.086*** 0.078*** -0.164*** 0.103*** 0.092*** -0.195*** 0.086*** 0.077*** -0.163*** 0.102*** 0.092*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0295) (0.0623) (0.0327) (0.0291) (0.0613) (0.0331) (0.0295) (0.0623) (0.0327) (0.0291) (0.0613) 
Middle social status 0.045 0.040 -0.085 0.057* 0.052* -0.109* 0.044 0.040 -0.084 0.057* 0.051* -0.108* 
 (0.0327) (0.0293) (0.0619) (0.0324) (0.0291) (0.0614) (0.0327) (0.0293) (0.0619) (0.0324) (0.0291) (0.0614) 
Medium-size firm 0.018 0.016 -0.034 0.017 0.015 -0.032 0.018 0.016 -0.033 0.016 0.015 -0.031 
 (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0253) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0254) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0254) (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0254) 
Large-size firm -0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.008 -0.007 0.015 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 -0.008 -0.007 0.015 
 (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0272) 
East -0.012 -0.010 0.022 -0.016 -0.014 0.030 -0.011 -0.010 0.021 -0.015 -0.014 0.029 
 (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0244) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0243) (0.0129) (0.0116) (0.0245) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0243) 
Central -0.054*** -0.049*** 0.103*** -0.054*** -0.049*** 0.103*** -0.054*** -0.048*** 0.102*** -0.054*** -0.048*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0266) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0267) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0266) (0.0143) (0.0127) (0.0267) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 87.61 80.70 88.14 81.25 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0210 0.0194 0.0211 0.0195 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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Table B 10 Marginal effects of reporting each answer category of job satisfaction with housing benefits (controlling for actual years of schooling) 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
 Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied Dissatisfied Indifferent Satisfied 
Skill mismatch       0.075** -0.010** -0.066** 0.075** -0.009** -0.066** 
       (0.0303) (0.0041) (0.0265) (0.0304) (0.0040) (0.0266) 
Actual years of 
schooling 
0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.0043) (0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0005) (0.0037) 
Overeducated -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.069*** -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.068*** -0.079*** 0.010*** 0.069*** -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.069*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0035) (0.0221) (0.0253) (0.0035) (0.0222) (0.0253) (0.0035) (0.0221) (0.0253) (0.0035) (0.0221) 
Undereducated -0.016 0.002 0.014 -0.018 0.002 0.016 -0.016 0.002 0.014 -0.019 0.002 0.016 
 (0.0218) (0.0028) (0.0191) (0.0219) (0.0028) (0.0191) (0.0218) (0.0028) (0.0191) (0.0218) (0.0028) (0.0191) 
Age 0.009 -0.001 -0.008 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0008) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0008) (0.0058) 
Age2/100 -0.013 0.002 0.011 -0.011 0.001 0.010 -0.013 0.002 0.011 -0.012 0.001 0.010 
 (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0070) 
Hourly wage -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002***    -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002***    
 (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007)    (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0007)    
Male 0.016 -0.002 -0.014 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.015 -0.002 -0.013 0.009 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0159) (0.0182) (0.0023) (0.0159) 
Ethnicity -0.006 0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.012 0.001 0.010 -0.011 0.001 0.010 
 (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0313) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0314) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0313) (0.0359) (0.0045) (0.0314) 
Political 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.0267) (0.0034) (0.0233) (0.0267) (0.0033) (0.0234) (0.0267) (0.0034) (0.0233) (0.0267) (0.0033) (0.0233) 
Married -0.094*** 0.012*** 0.082*** -0.092*** 0.011*** 0.080*** -0.094*** 0.012*** 0.082*** -0.091*** 0.011*** 0.080*** 
 (0.0268) (0.0038) (0.0234) (0.0268) (0.0038) (0.0235) (0.0267) (0.0038) (0.0234) (0.0268) (0.0037) (0.0235) 
Urban registration -0.048** 0.006** 0.042** -0.053** 0.007** 0.047** -0.048** 0.006** 0.042** -0.053** 0.007** 0.046** 
 (0.0235) (0.0031) (0.0206) (0.0235) (0.0031) (0.0206) (0.0235) (0.0031) (0.0205) (0.0234) (0.0031) (0.0205) 
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Full time job -0.081*** 0.010*** 0.071*** -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.068*** -0.082*** 0.010*** 0.071*** -0.079*** 0.010*** 0.069*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0239) (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0240) (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0239) (0.0273) (0.0037) (0.0240) 
Public sector -0.037 0.005 0.032 -0.030 0.004 0.027 -0.035 0.004 0.030 -0.028 0.004 0.025 
 (0.0223) (0.0029) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0028) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0029) (0.0195) (0.0223) (0.0028) (0.0195) 
Healthy status -0.017 0.002 0.015 -0.020 0.002 0.017 -0.015 0.002 0.013 -0.018 0.002 0.016 
 (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0313) (0.0359) (0.0045) (0.0314) (0.0357) (0.0045) (0.0312) (0.0358) (0.0045) (0.0313) 
Low social status 0.181*** -0.023*** -0.158*** 0.214*** -0.027*** -0.187*** 0.178*** -0.022*** -0.155*** 0.211*** -0.026*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0077) (0.0471) (0.0531) (0.0079) (0.0464) (0.0539) (0.0077) (0.0471) (0.0530) (0.0078) (0.0464) 
Middle social status 0.095* -0.012* -0.083* 0.122** -0.015** -0.107** 0.093* -0.012* -0.081* 0.120** -0.015** -0.105** 
 (0.0535) (0.0071) (0.0467) (0.0530) (0.0071) (0.0463) (0.0534) (0.0070) (0.0466) (0.0529) (0.0071) (0.0462) 
Medium-size firm 0.048** -0.006* -0.042** 0.046* -0.006* -0.041* 0.046* -0.006* -0.040* 0.044* -0.006* -0.039* 
 (0.0237) (0.0031) (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.0031) (0.0208) (0.0237) (0.0031) (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.0031) (0.0207) 
Large-size firm 0.014 -0.002 -0.012 0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.011 -0.001 -0.010 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.0252) (0.0032) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0031) (0.0220) (0.0252) (0.0032) (0.0220) (0.0251) (0.0031) (0.0220) 
East -0.080*** 0.010*** 0.070*** -0.089*** 0.011*** 0.078*** -0.076*** 0.010*** 0.067*** -0.086*** 0.011*** 0.075*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0032) (0.0200) (0.0227) (0.0033) (0.0199) (0.0228) (0.0032) (0.0200) (0.0227) (0.0032) (0.0199) 
Central -0.110*** 0.014*** 0.096*** -0.111*** 0.014*** 0.097*** -0.106*** 0.013*** 0.093*** -0.107*** 0.013*** 0.093*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0037) (0.0216) (0.0246) (0.0036) (0.0217) 
Observations 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 2260 
LR chi2 147.59 136.45 153.76 142.55 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0300 0.0277 0.0312 0.0290 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
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Appendix C   
 
Table C 1 Occupation category in Migrant sample 
Aggregate occupation category Occupations 
Number of 
observations 
Administrative staff and manager 
Managers 
818 Clerks 
Security, warehouse and property management 
Businessman/commercial staff 
Retail of vegetable/ fruits/ grains/ other 
agricultural by-products, and others 
448 
Sales 
recycling and other buyer 
Service personnel 
restaurant and hotel staff 
1024 
housemaids, household worker 
hairdresser, beautician, Masseur, tourist guide 
auto and home appliance repair 
cleaning and sanitizing 
chefs and butcher 
kitchen assistance 
drivers and conductors 
other service area 
Manufacture and transportation 
worker 
delivery and transport worker 
1011 
construction labourers 
manufacturing 
repair and manufacturing service 
other factory process 
Total  3301 
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Table C 2  Industry classification in the migrant sample 
Broad Industry 
Classification  
Industry Migrant workers 
Agriculture, forestry and 
animal husbandry 
Agriculture, Forestry, Animal husbandry, 
Fishery 
2 (0.06%) 
Manufacture, production 
and construction 
Mining 5 (0.15%) 
Manufacturing 864 (26.17%) 
Production and Supply of Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
4 (0.12%) 
Construction Enterprise 359 (10.88%) 
Transportation and 
Information  
 
Transport, Storage and Post Industry 94 (2.85%) 
Information Transmission, Computer 
Services and Software 
23 (0.70%) 
Service 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 544 (16.48%) 
Hotel and Catering Services 655 (19.84%) 
Services to Households and Other 
Services 
239 (7.24%) 
Business and Finance  
Financial Intermediation 13 (0.39%) 
Real Estate Industry 206 (6.24%) 
Leasing and Business Services 34 (1.03%) 
Public  
Scientific Research, Technical Service 75 (2.27%) 
Management of Water Conservancy, 
Environment and Public Facilities 
13 (0.39%) 
Education 35 (1.06%) 
Health, Social Security and Social 
Welfare 
89 (2.70%) 
Culture, Sport and Entertainment 46 (1.39%) 
Public Management and Social 
Organizations 
1 (0.03%) 
International Organization 0 (0.00%) 
Total  3301 
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Table C 3 Industries for migrant workers by wage distribution 
Industry 0~10
th
 10
th
 ~25
th
 25
th
~50
th
 50
th
 ~75
th
 75
th
 ~90
th
 90
th
 ~100
th
 
Old generation of migrant workers 
Agriculture,  forestry 
and animal husbandry 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(0.30%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Manufacture and 
Construction 
42 
(28.97%) 
84 
(38.36%) 
142 
(40.92%) 
177 
(53.15%) 
100 
(44.25%) 
66 
(53.66%) 
Transportation and 
Information 
4 
(2.76%) 
7 
(3.20%) 
20 
(5.76%) 
9 
(2.70%) 
12 
(5.31%) 
10 
(8.13%) 
Finance and Business 
12 
(8.28%) 
17 
(7.76%) 
30 
(8.65%) 
25 
(7.51%) 
18 
(7.96%) 
9 
(7.32%) 
Public 
19 
(13.10%) 
36 
(16.44%) 
38 
(10.95%) 
31 
(9.31%) 
21 
(9.29%) 
10 
(8.13%) 
Service 
68 
(46.90%) 
75 
(34.25%) 
117 
(33.72%) 
90 
(27.03%) 
75 
(33.19%) 
28 
(22.76%) 
Total 
145 
(38.36%) 
219 
(48.24%) 
347 
(41.96%) 
333 
(40.76%) 
226 
(41.70%) 
123 
(43.46%) 
New generation of migrant workers 
Agriculture and other 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
1 
(0.21%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
0 
(0.00%) 
Manufacture and 
Construction 
48 
(12.70%) 
47 
(20%) 
148 
(30.83%) 
189 
(39.05%) 
121 
(38.29%) 
68 
(42.5%) 
Transportation and 
Information 
1 
(0.43%) 
6 
(2.55%) 
12 
(2.50%) 
23 
(4.75%) 
11 
(3.48%) 
2 
(1.25%) 
Finance and Business 
10 
(4.29%) 
9 
(3.83%) 
40 
(8.33%) 
36 
(7.44%) 
34 
(10.76%) 
13 
(8.13%) 
Public 
13 
(5.58%) 
11 
(4.68%) 
25 
(5.21%) 
28 
(5.79%) 
21 
(6.65%) 
6 
(3.75%) 
Service 
161 
(69.10%) 
162 
(68.94%) 
254 
(52.92%) 
208 
(42.98%) 
129 
(40.82%) 
71 
(44.38%) 
Total 
233 
(61.64%) 
235 
(51.76%) 
480 
(58.04%) 
484 
(59.24%) 
316 
(58.30%) 
160 
(56.54%) 
Total 
378 
(100%) 
454 
(100%) 
827 
(100%) 
817 
(100%) 
542 
(100%) 
283 
(100%) 
 
 
Table C 4  Incidence of educational mismatch by industries among migrant 
workers 
Industry Undereducation Correct Education Overeducation 
Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry  1 (50%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (50%) 
Manufacture and Construction  181(14.69%) 841 (68.26%) 210 (17.05%) 
Transportation and Information  10 (8.55%) 77 (65.81%) 30 (25.64%) 
Finance and Business 24 (9.49%) 201 (79.45%) 28 (11.07%) 
Public 49 (18.92%) 175 (67.57%) 35 (13.51%) 
Service  135 (9.39%) 1056 (73.44%) 247 (17.18%) 
Total  400 (12.12%) 2350 (71.19%) 551 (16.69%) 
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Table C 5 OLS VS QR Model 1 for the old generation migrant workers 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of 
schooling 
0.0242*** 0.0121** 0.0169*** 0.0223*** 0.0264*** 0.0348*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0070) 
Training 0.0657** 0.119*** 0.103*** 0.0524 0.0646* -0.0153 
 (0.0256) (0.0438) (0.0291) (0.0396) (0.0343) (0.0411) 
male 0.189*** 0.120*** 0.172*** 0.174*** 0.202*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0348) (0.0281) (0.0290) (0.0373) (0.0466) 
Married 0.0306 0.0578 0.0613 0.0499 -0.0126 -0.0134 
 (0.0349) (0.0625) (0.0429) (0.0527) (0.0426) (0.0648) 
Ethnicity 0.0664 0.0444 0.185 0.0192 -0.0142 0.0865 
 (0.0782) (0.1263) (0.1802) (0.0955) (0.1211) (0.1125) 
Age -0.00234 -0.0197 -0.0169 -0.0237 -0.00846 0.0229 
 (0.0150) (0.0261) (0.0184) (0.0180) (0.0205) (0.0252) 
age2 -0.000124 0.0000646 0.0000334 0.0000979 -0.0000544 -0.000364 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
0.0301*** 0.0191** 0.0219*** 0.0316*** 0.0436*** 0.0448*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0085) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0081) (0.0093) 
Tenure squared -0.000568*** -0.000256 -0.000281 -0.000620** -0.000859** -0.00115*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, Animal 
husbandry  
0.0357 0.499** 0.314** 0.0673 -0.178 -0.488* 
 (0.0513) (0.2330) (0.1518) (0.0599) (0.1111) (0.2562) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
0.0628** 0.105** 0.00661 0.0865** 0.0580 0.0446 
 (0.0282) (0.0463) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0441) (0.0542) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
0.0337 0.105 -0.00887 0.0492 0.0184 0.0862 
 (0.0563) (0.0789) (0.0666) (0.0767) (0.0898) (0.1180) 
Business and 
Finance 
-0.0650 -0.0488 -0.0445 -0.0762 -0.0762 -0.128* 
 (0.0432) (0.0620) (0.0554) (0.0536) (0.0625) (0.0686) 
Public -0.0399 -0.0515 -0.0267 0.0132 -0.0941* -0.163 
 (0.0389) (0.0636) (0.0552) (0.0494) (0.0528) (0.1088) 
State -0.0357 -0.0112 -0.0786** -0.0621* -0.0188 -0.0531 
 (0.0286) (0.0415) (0.0369) (0.0360) (0.0384) (0.0579) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 
5 employees) 
-0.0689 -0.0848 -0.113 -0.0722 -0.0529 -0.0551 
 (0.0463) (0.0736) (0.0703) (0.0600) (0.0631) (0.1093) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 
20 employees) 
-0.0427 0.0825 -0.00233 -0.0474 -0.0446 -0.119* 
 (0.0310) (0.0510) (0.0380) (0.0391) (0.0372) (0.0657) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 
99 employees) 
0.0253 0.0763* 0.00678 0.0116 0.0512 0.00157 
 (0.0274) (0.0453) (0.0402) (0.0330) (0.0354) (0.0522) 
Permanent 0.0271 0.0301 -0.00452 0.0597 0.00438 -0.00196 
 (0.0369) (0.0532) (0.0496) (0.0476) (0.0446) (0.0762) 
Long term 0.0724** 0.127*** 0.104*** 0.0676* 0.0503 0.0301 
 (0.0283) (0.0406) (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0391) (0.0544) 
Short term 0.0216 0.0721 0.0374 0.0210 -0.0440 -0.00699 
 (0.0393) (0.0637) (0.0484) (0.0440) (0.0561) (0.0897) 
Henan -0.356*** -0.449*** -0.356*** -0.347*** -0.282*** -0.354*** 
 (0.0564) (0.1234) (0.0750) (0.0746) (0.0798) (0.0774) 
Anhui -0.308*** -0.342*** -0.305*** -0.265*** -0.289*** -0.337*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0850) (0.0545) (0.0723) (0.0604) (0.0860) 
Chongqing -0.335*** -0.344*** -0.356*** -0.327*** -0.404*** -0.340*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0689) (0.0540) (0.0514) (0.0572) (0.0951) 
Shanghai 0.0619 0.00227 0.0208 0.0974 0.0845 0.0484 
 (0.0456) (0.0595) (0.0569) (0.0673) (0.0582) (0.0773) 
Jiangsu -0.0880** -0.109* -0.0391 -0.0679 -0.128*** -0.147** 
 (0.0370) (0.0565) (0.0489) (0.0489) (0.0472) (0.0741) 
Zhejiang -0.0347 -0.00263 -0.0103 -0.0500 -0.0582 -0.0545 
 (0.0356) (0.0519) (0.0462) (0.0481) (0.0543) (0.0642) 
Hubei -0.268*** -0.260*** -0.225*** -0.230*** -0.285*** -0.370*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0851) (0.0621) (0.0487) (0.0603) (0.0757) 
Sichuan -0.0580 -0.252*** -0.110 -0.0403 -0.0150 0.0128 
 (0.0493) (0.0748) (0.0804) (0.0634) (0.0882) (0.0872) 
Constant 1.724*** 1.726*** 1.734*** 2.230*** 2.167*** 1.568*** 
 (0.3244) (0.5425) (0.4080) (0.3997) (0.4461) (0.5356) 
Observations 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 
R2 0.347      
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Table C 6 OLS VS QR Model 1 for the new generation migrant workers 
Variables OLS Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Years of schooling 0.0307*** 0.0226*** 0.0333*** 0.0381*** 0.0394*** 0.0288*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0080) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0055) (0.0072) 
Training 0.0954*** 0.0979*** 0.0990*** 0.0757** 0.0878*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0355) (0.0255) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0327) 
male 0.0811*** 0.0452 0.0530** 0.102*** 0.0927*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0319) (0.0245) (0.0284) (0.0237) (0.0338) 
Married -0.000992 -0.0256 0.0311 0.0105 0.00115 0.0247 
 (0.0285) (0.0469) (0.0376) (0.0374) (0.0411) (0.0535) 
Ethnicity 0.133 0.258 0.0774 0.139 0.181 -0.0804 
 (0.1005) (0.1975) (0.1240) (0.0956) (0.1513) (0.3138) 
Age 0.213*** 0.286*** 0.252*** 0.189*** 0.185*** 0.134* 
 (0.0404) (0.0739) (0.0539) (0.0550) (0.0597) (0.0694) 
age2 -0.00405*** -0.00570*** -0.00498*** -0.00357*** -0.00340*** -0.00232 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
Tenure  of current job 0.0532*** 0.0546** 0.0597*** 0.0595*** 0.0393** 0.0344* 
 (0.0133) (0.0219) (0.0187) (0.0176) (0.0162) (0.0207) 
Tenure squared -0.00285 -0.00515** -0.00485* -0.00421* -0.0000926 0.000588 
 (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0030) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry  
-0.147** 0.384* 0.123 -0.200* -0.456** -0.511* 
 (0.0569) (0.1968) (0.0843) (0.1105) (0.2287) (0.2894) 
Manufacture, production 
and construction 
0.0329 0.0212 0.0374 0.0529 0.0304 0.0388 
 (0.0248) (0.0438) (0.0310) (0.0322) (0.0347) (0.0469) 
Information Transmission 
and Transportation 
0.0441 -0.0193 0.121* 0.0106 0.0155 0.0118 
 (0.0490) (0.1149) (0.0638) (0.0590) (0.0730) (0.0907) 
Business and Finance 0.0377 0.00816 0.0764 0.0245 0.00176 0.0651 
 (0.0364) (0.0833) (0.0473) (0.0456) (0.0598) (0.0676) 
Public -0.00570 -0.156 -0.000169 0.0611 0.0428 -0.0593 
 (0.0461) (0.0970) (0.0825) (0.0516) (0.0548) (0.0733) 
State 0.0757*** 0.0985 0.0913*** 0.0667* 0.0651* 0.0814* 
 (0.0276) (0.0646) (0.0351) (0.0384) (0.0332) (0.0445) 
Firm size 1(1 to 5 
employees) 
-0.199*** -0.259*** -0.226*** -0.197*** -0.178*** -0.109** 
 (0.0369) (0.0606) (0.0467) (0.0471) (0.0558) (0.0552) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
-0.0775** -0.0783 -0.113*** -0.0628 -0.0832* -0.00571 
 (0.0308) (0.0540) (0.0410) (0.0396) (0.0505) (0.0483) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
0.000116 0.0278 -0.00268 0.0242 -0.0161 -0.00373 
 (0.0241) (0.0401) (0.0327) (0.0326) (0.0337) (0.0376) 
Permanent 0.0682** 0.101** 0.0650 0.0562 0.0851* 0.0747 
 (0.0328) (0.0513) (0.0438) (0.0451) (0.0464) (0.0565) 
Long term 0.117*** 0.114** 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.0918*** 0.0969** 
 (0.0257) (0.0455) (0.0363) (0.0346) (0.0335) (0.0438) 
Short term 0.0707** 0.115** 0.105** 0.0512 -0.000156 0.0543 
 (0.0325) (0.0456) (0.0424) (0.0398) (0.0465) (0.0584) 
Henan -0.365*** -0.432*** -0.395*** -0.359*** -0.339*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0695) (0.0545) (0.0606) (0.0659) (0.0658) 
Anhui -0.373*** -0.408*** -0.350*** -0.369*** -0.369*** -0.390*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0561) (0.0547) (0.0522) (0.0518) (0.0612) 
Chongqing -0.421*** -0.367*** -0.394*** -0.443*** -0.475*** -0.392*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0594) (0.0513) (0.0506) (0.0613) (0.0687) 
Shanghai -0.0880** -0.168* -0.0744 -0.0209 -0.0702 -0.1000 
 (0.0419) (0.0971) (0.0581) (0.0576) (0.0508) (0.0655) 
Jiangsu -0.0844*** -0.0627 -0.0275 -0.0818** -0.135*** -0.137*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0494) (0.0407) (0.0416) (0.0442) (0.0482) 
Zhejiang -0.142*** -0.115** -0.114*** -0.101** -0.148*** -0.199*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0532) (0.0418) (0.0424) (0.0381) (0.0469) 
Hubei -0.383*** -0.378*** -0.402*** -0.430*** -0.404*** -0.285*** 
 (0.0402) (0.0465) (0.0421) (0.0579) (0.0661) (0.0883) 
Sichuan -0.248*** -0.332*** -0.246*** -0.212*** -0.295*** -0.213*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0729) (0.0619) (0.0453) (0.0580) (0.0609) 
Constant -1.277*** -2.550*** -1.912*** -1.130* -0.835 0.261 
 (0.4636) (0.8314) (0.6066) (0.6148) (0.7213) (0.8731) 
Observations 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 1908 
R2 0.336      
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Table C 7 Heckman sample selection results in the migrant sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables 
Selection 
equation 
Wage equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Years of schooling  0.0308***  0.0311***  0.0311*** 
  (0.0028)  (0.0028)  (0.0028) 
Healthy status 0.9504***    1.0226***  
 (0.1731)    (0.1765)  
Young children   -1.0141***  -1.0282***  
   (0.0730)  (0.0735)  
Training  0.0991***  0.0972***  0.0969*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0167)  (0.0167) 
male  0.1277***  0.1276***  0.1274*** 
  (0.0153)  (0.0153)  (0.0153) 
Married  -0.0003  0.0052  0.0096 
  (0.0211)  (0.0217)  (0.0217) 
Ethnicity  0.0987  0.0961  0.0967 
  (0.0606)  (0.0606)  (0.0606) 
Age  0.0484***  0.0482***  0.0487*** 
  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0056) 
age2  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0007*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Tenure  of current 
job 
 0.0332***  0.0336***  0.0338*** 
  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042) 
Tenure squared  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0007*** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, Animal 
husbandry  
 -0.0179  -0.0199  -0.0239 
  (0.2877)  (0.2880)  (0.2878) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
 0.0576***  0.0569***  0.0555*** 
  (0.0188)  (0.0189)  (0.0189) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
 0.0412  0.0434  0.0442 
  (0.0400)  (0.0400)  (0.0400) 
Business and 
Finance 
 0.0050  0.0012  0.0017 
  (0.0288)  (0.0288)  (0.0287) 
Public  -0.0355  -0.0362  -0.0364 
  (0.0287)  (0.0287)  (0.0287) 
State  0.0101  0.0112  0.0116 
  (0.0207)  (0.0207)  (0.0207) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) 
 -0.1489***  -0.1473***  -0.1464*** 
  (0.0279)  (0.0280)  (0.0279) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
 -0.0597***  -0.0591***  -0.0584*** 
  (0.0219)  (0.0219)  (0.0219) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
 0.0124  0.0129  0.0135 
  (0.0183)  (0.0183)  (0.0183) 
Permanent  0.0581**  0.0598**  0.0594** 
  (0.0237)  (0.0237)  (0.0237) 
Long term  0.1040***  0.1061***  0.1062*** 
  (0.0186)  (0.0187)  (0.0186) 
Short term  0.0522**  0.0533**  0.0538** 
  (0.0247)  (0.0247)  (0.0247) 
Henan  -0.3481***  -0.3468***  -0.3445*** 
  (0.0316)  (0.0317)  (0.0317) 
Anhui  -0.3410***  -0.3386***  -0.3387*** 
  (0.0299)  (0.0299)  (0.0299) 
Chongqing  -0.3942***  -0.3943***  -0.3943*** 
  (0.0293)  (0.0293)  (0.0293) 
Shanghai  -0.0292  -0.0300  -0.0311 
  (0.0297)  (0.0297)  (0.0297) 
Jiangsu  -0.0899***  -0.0887***  -0.0891*** 
  (0.0246)  (0.0246)  (0.0246) 
Zhejiang  -0.0975***  -0.0974***  -0.0964*** 
  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0239) 
Hubei  -0.3475***  -0.3460***  -0.3458*** 
  (0.0293)  (0.0293)  (0.0293) 
Sichuan  -0.1663***  -0.1666***  -0.1658*** 
  (0.0302)  (0.0302)  (0.0302) 
F value  52.13  51.90  52.06 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.4293**  -0.0799  -0.1446** 
  (0.1800)  (0.0750)  (0.0691) 
Number of 
observations 
3596 3330 3596 3330 3596 3330 
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Table C 8 Heckman sample selection results in the urban sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables  Selection 
equation 
Wage equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage equation 
Selection 
equation 
Wage 
equation 
Years of schooling   0.0570***  0.0571***  0.0570*** 
  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0027) 
Healthy status 0.9107***    0.8738***  
 (0.0736)    (0.0741)  
Young children    0.5020***  0.4914***  
   (0.0304)  (0.0306)  
male  0.1691***  0.1681***  0.1668*** 
  (0.0162)  (0.0162)  (0.0162) 
Married  0.0740***  0.0613**  0.0516* 
  (0.0257)  (0.0276)  (0.0269) 
Ethnicity  0.0690  0.0716  0.0736 
  (0.0778)  (0.0779)  (0.0779) 
age  0.0125  0.0098  0.0089 
  (0.0082)  (0.0083)  (0.0082) 
age2  -0.0002*  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Tenure of current job  0.0263***  0.0264***  0.0261*** 
  (0.0031)  (0.0031)  (0.0031) 
Tenure squared  -0.0005***  -0.0005***  -0.0005*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal husbandry  
 0.3879***  0.3948***  0.3956*** 
  (0.0905)  (0.0906)  (0.0905) 
Manufacture, 
production and 
construction 
 0.1177***  0.1182***  0.1184*** 
  (0.0233)  (0.0233)  (0.0233) 
Information 
Transmission and 
Transportation 
 0.1960***  0.1973***  0.1980*** 
  (0.0273)  (0.0273)  (0.0273) 
Business and Finance  0.2841***  0.2864***  0.2860*** 
  (0.0297)  (0.0297)  (0.0297) 
Public  0.2679***  0.2686***  0.2689*** 
  (0.0243)  (0.0243)  (0.0243) 
State  -0.0356*  -0.0366*  -0.0364* 
  (0.0190)  (0.0191)  (0.0191) 
Firm size 1 (1 to 5 
employees) 
 -0.1667***  -0.1668***  -0.1669*** 
  (0.0401)  (0.0402)  (0.0401) 
Firm size 2 (6 to 20 
employees) 
 -0.1438***  -0.1444***  -0.1441*** 
  (0.0239)  (0.0239)  (0.0239) 
Firm size 3 (21 to 99 
employees) 
 -0.0329*  -0.0326*  -0.0323* 
  (0.0188)  (0.0188)  (0.0188) 
Permanent  0.4100***  0.4115***  0.4102*** 
  (0.0329)  (0.0329)  (0.0329) 
Long term  0.2429***  0.2450***  0.2431*** 
  (0.0280)  (0.0280)  (0.0280) 
Short term  -0.0434  -0.0407  -0.0430 
  (0.0441)  (0.0441)  (0.0441) 
Henan  -0.7872***  -0.7838***  -0.7817*** 
  (0.0306)  (0.0307)  (0.0306) 
Anhui  -0.7673***  -0.7639***  -0.7612*** 
  (0.0305)  (0.0307)  (0.0306) 
Chongqing  -0.6417***  -0.6404***  -0.6373*** 
  (0.0337)  (0.0338)  (0.0337) 
Shanghai  -0.1478***  -0.1485***  -0.1436*** 
  (0.0304)  (0.0305)  (0.0305) 
Jiangsu  -0.4581***  -0.4572***  -0.4535*** 
  (0.0305)  (0.0306)  (0.0306) 
Zhejiang  -0.2520***  -0.2530***  -0.2493*** 
  (0.0307)  (0.0308)  (0.0308) 
Hubei  -0.5316***  -0.5289***  -0.5253*** 
  (0.0332)  (0.0333)  (0.0333) 
Sichuan  -0.5899***  -0.5895***  -0.5849*** 
  (0.0300)  (0.0301)  (0.0301) 
F value  132.56  132.10  132.47 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.3173***  -0.0988  -0.1789*** 
  (0.1007)  (0.0755)  (0.0623) 
Number of 
observations  
8913 5932 8913 5932 8913 5932 
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Table C 9  Studies exploring wage returns to education in urban China: Over time 
Study Year Wage returns to education 
(Zhou, 2000) 
1955, 1960, 1965, 1975, 1978, 1984, 1987, 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994. 
Junior high school: 
(1) Insignificant in 1960, 1965  and 
1978; 
(2) 5.0 in 1984, 7.0 in 1987, 9.0 in 
1991 and 11.0 in 1993. 
 
 
(Appleton et al., 2005) 1988, 1995, 1999, 2002 3.6-7.5 
(Fleisher and Wang, 2005) 1975, 1978, 1984, 1987, 1990 1.37-5.97 
(Zhang et al., 2005) 
1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 
4.0-10.2 
 
Table C 10 Studies exploring wage returns to education in urban China: Data 
aspects 
Study Dataset Wage returns to education 
(Knight and Song, 1993) CHIP 1988 4.5 
(Xie and Hannum, 1996) CHIP 1988 3.1 
(Bishop and Chiou, 2004) CHIP 1988, 1995 2.8-5.6 
(Fleisher et al., 2004) CHIP 1988, 1995, 2002 5.0-7.9 
(Guifu and Hamori, 2009) CHNS 2004, 2006 7.7-8.1 
(Liu and Zhang, 2008) 
CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006 , 2009 
2.46-7.10 
(Cui et al., 2013) RUMiC 2008  3.0-5.0 
 
 
Table C 11 Studies exploring wage returns to education in urban China: by groups 
Study Individuals  Wage returns to education 
(Jamison and Van der Gaag, 1987) Gender Male: 4.5; Female: 5.6 
(Li, 2003) Gender  Male: 4.3; Female: 6.9 
(Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh, 2004) Gender Male: 4.5; Female: 2.6 
(Qian and Smyth, 2008) Gender Male:13.55; Female: 9.27 
(Maurer-Fazio, 1999) Under age 30 Male: 6.4; Female: 6.8 
(Qian and Smyth, 2008) Age 35 and below 17.16 
(Li, 2003) 
Different time entering the 
labour market 
Before 1979: 4.7 
1980-1987: 7.3 
1988-1995: 6.5 
 
 
Table C 12 Studies exploring wage returns to education in urban China: migrant 
workers 
Study Dataset Wage returns to education 
(Démurger et al., 2009) CHIP 2002 3.6-7.3 
(Maurer‐Fazio and Dinh, 2004) 1999-2000 Urban Labour Market 
Integration Project 
1.5-6.4 
(Cui et al., 2013) CHIP 1995 and 2002; RUMiC 2008 3.0-5.0 
(Zhao and Qu, 2013) CHIP 2002; RUMiC 2008 Insignificant to 1.3 
(De Brauw and Rozelle, 2007) Author’s own data 8.3 
(Sakellariou and Fang, 2016) RUMiC 2009 4.5-8.5 
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Table C 13 Studies exploring wage returns to education in urban China: 
Methodology 
Study Methodology Wage returns to education 
(Li and Luo, 2004) OLS; IV OLS: 9.8 
  IV: 17.7 
(Heckman and Li, 2004) OLS; IV OLS: 7.3 
  IV: 14.0 
(Guifu and Hamori, 2009) OLS; IV OLS: 7.7-8.1 
  IV: 12.61-14.47 
(Knight and Song, 2003) Quantile Regression (QR) 
Wage returns to college or above in 1988:  
Q (0.125): 17.14 
Q (0.375): 14. 20 
Q (0.625): 14.71 
Q (0.875): 7. 54  
(Messinis, 2013) Quantile Regression (QR) 
Wage returns to high education of full time 
workers: 
Q(0.10): 21.4 
Q(0.25): 19.9 
Q(0.50): 23.2 
Q(0.75): 19.6 
Q(0.90): 21.8 
(Cui et al., 2013) OLS; Quantile Regression (QR) 
Wage returns to education of migrant workers in 
2008: 
OLS: 4.0 
Q(0.10): 3.0 
Q(0.50): 6.0 
Q(0.90): 6.0 
(Zhu, 2016) Quantile Regression (QR) 
Wage returns to education in 2007: 
Urban workers:    Q (0.10): 3.8 
                             Q (0.50): 5.7 
                             Q (0.90): 5.0 
Migrant workers: Q (0.10): 3.1 
                             Q (0.50): 4.4 
                             Q (0.90): 4.9 
 
 
Table C 14 Studies exploring wage returns to education in rural China 
Study Dataset Wage returns to education 
(Parish et al., 1995) 
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 
1993 
1.8 
(Johnson and Chow, 1997) CHIP 1988 4.02 
(Meng, 1996) Workers Survey Questionnaire 1985 1.1 
(Gregory and Meng, 1995) 
Data collected by the World Bank and the 
Institute of Economics of the Chinese 
Economy of Social Sciences 1986-1987 
1.0 
(Zhao, 1999) 
Household Survey from Sichuan 
Province 1995 
1.2 
(De Brauw and Rozelle, 2008) Author’s own data 6.3-6.5 
(Liu and Zhang, 2008) 
CHNS 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2009 
0.97-3.37 
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